Iran is not a war-torn country, yet four decades of Islamic Republic rule have driven mass emigration. UN data show over five million registered refugees or asylum seekers since 1980, with millions more leaving legally – about one in every 15 Iranians now living abroad.
So why have millions of Iranians chosen to endure the hardship of life far from home rather than remain under the Islamic Republic?
This report draws on official United Nations figures for Iranian refugees and asylum seekers, which begin in 1980 – about a year into the Islamic Revolution.
The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) published no figures for Iranian refugees or asylum seekers before 1980, although UNHCR has been collecting refugee statistics since 1951.
Before the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979, there were no recorded asylum cases, aside from scholarship students and legal Iranian migrants.
There are, however, personal accounts involving a small number of members of the Tudeh Party – a pro-Soviet Iranian communist party – who fled to the former Soviet Union. One such account concerns Ataollah Safavi, a former Tudeh Party member who, after fleeing to the Soviet Union, was sent to Siberian forced labor camps.
Ali Khamenei kisses the hand of Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, in an undated image.
First decade: War years under Khomeini’s leadership
The first wave of Iranian asylum began in 1980. Shortly after the Islamic Republic was established, Iranians could still migrate relatively easily using passports issued under the previous government.
In this period, a large number of Iranians traveled legally to the United States.
From 1980, the registration of Iranian asylum seekers began with 44 cases, marking the start of a trend that would accelerate through the decade.
The first ten years, from 1980 to 1989, coincided with the eight-year Iran–Iraq war, the presidency of Ali Khamenei, and the premiership of Mirhossein Mousavi, while Ruhollah Khomeini served as Supreme Leader.
Over that decade, more than 312,000 Iranians were registered as refugees, according to United Nations data.
The peak came in 1985, when more than 88,000 refugees were recorded in a single year – the highest annual total of the decade.
(From left) Ali Khamenei, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, and Mousavi Ardebili
Second decade: Khamenei takes charge
In 1989, Ali Khamenei began his tenure as Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, and Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani took office as president – ushering in what Iran’s official political language calls the “reconstruction” era, a term used for the post–Iran-Iraq war drive to rebuild state capacity and the economy.
By the end of Rafsanjani’s presidency, inflation compared to his first year was up 478%, and the record for Iran’s annual inflation is still attributed to his government at more than 49%.
Against that economic backdrop, the trend in Iranian asylum intensified.
Over the 1990–1999 period, nearly 1.06 million Iranians were registered as refugees, with the peak in 1991, when 130,000 refugees were recorded.
After 1997 – often described in Iran as the start of the “reform era” – the pace of refugee registrations eased for a time, falling to below 100,000 a year.
Former presidents Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (left) and Mohammad Khatami
Third decade: Reform and Ahmadinejad
In 1997, the election of Mohammad Khatami ushered in a period often described as Iran’s “reform” era, bringing a measure of optimism to parts of Iranian society.
During the first three years of Khatami’s presidency, the number of Iranians registered as refugees and asylum seekers declined modestly, before reversing course and rising again.
From 2000 to 2009, nearly 1.1 million Iranians were registered as refugees or asylum seekers, although some cases initially recorded as asylum claims may have been reclassified as refugee status in subsequent years.
A similar pattern emerged under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose early presidency also saw a year-on-year decline in asylum registrations. That trend, however, reversed after his first two years in office.
In 2009, as protests known as the Green Movement erupted following Iran’s disputed presidential election, refugee and asylum registrations reached their highest level of the decade.
The ministers of foreign affairs of France, Germany, the European Union, Iran, the United Kingdom and the United States as well as Chinese and Russian diplomats announcing the framework for a comprehensive agreement on the Iranian nuclear program (Lausanne, April 2, 2015)
Fourth decade: Nuclear tensions and the JCPOA
In the decade spanning 2010 to 2019, Iran’s migration pressures unfolded alongside an increasingly fraught nuclear dispute and repeated economic shocks.
Unlike earlier periods, the trend in Iranian asylum did not ease after Hassan Rouhani took office in 2013, remaining on an upward path even after the JCPOA – the 2015 nuclear accord formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – was signed between Tehran and world powers.
After Donald Trump became US president in 2017, asylum registrations by Iranians rose sharply, reflecting the renewed strain that followed his administration’s tougher posture toward Tehran.
The same period also coincided with the rise of ISIS in Syria and Iraq, adding another layer of regional instability.
Over the decade as a whole, around 1.5 million Iranians were registered as refugees or asylum seekers.
A scene of 2019 protests in Tehran
From Bloody November 2019 to today
“Bloody Aban” is the term commonly used by Iranians to refer to the November 2019 crackdown on nationwide protests, an episode that marked a turning point in the country’s recent political and economic trajectory.
From 2020, Iran’s economic conditions deteriorated further, adding to pressures already created by sanctions and domestic mismanagement.
In the years following 2019, the overall trend in Iranian asylum and refugee registrations moved upward, with the exception of 2022, when the numbers temporarily eased.
This period was also shaped by the COVID-19 pandemic, which compounded existing strains.
In Iran, pandemic-related restrictions were imposed in 2019 and were fully lifted in 2022.
Across the six years that followed, 1,266,000 people were registered as asylum seekers or refugees.
One in every 15 Iranians lives outside Iran
United Nations data show that trends in Iranian asylum do not closely track changes of administrations in Tehran, suggesting that leaving the country has been driven more by long-term structural pressures than by shifts between governments.
There is no single, definitive figure for the total number of Iranians living abroad.
Domestic sources such as Iran’s Migration Observatory estimate the number of Iranian migrants at around two million.
Iran’s Foreign Ministry places the figure at about four million, a total that includes people born in Iran as well as a second generation born abroad.
Even so, UN data show that from 1980, when registrations of Iranian asylum seekers began, until today, 5,183,000 Iranians have been registered as asylum seekers or refugees, reflecting the scale of forced or protection-based departures over more than four decades. Of that total, nearly 4,142,000 are recorded as refugees.
Taken together with estimates that nearly two million Iranians have also left the country through legal migration, the combined figures point to a stark conclusion: roughly one in every 15 Iranians now lives outside the country.
From the outside, Iran’s migration story can appear singular. In reality, it spans legal migration and forced displacement, driven by a combination of economic pressure and political anxiety.
Many Iranians describe the same trade-off: accepting language barriers, unfamiliar cultures, and separation from family in exchange for the belief that staying offers little stability or future.
Iranians across generations increasingly see migration not as a dream but as an escape from a future that feels out of reach, a survival strategy driven by economic collapse, shrinking opportunities, and a sense of confinement they say follows them both at home and abroad.
Ahead of International Migrants Day, Iran International asked its audience to submit messages responding to questions about migration: the challenges, opportunities, and lessons it has brought, and whether – if they could go back – they would choose migration again.
Many respondents described leaving Iran not as a free decision but as a reaction to conditions they say have stripped away the possibility of a normal life.
One respondent rejected the term “migration” outright, writing that leaving Iran was “an escape from the prison of the mullahs’ regime” and “the prison of the Islamic Republic government.”
Another, a 51-year-old specialist doctor, said that if he had known how bad conditions would deteriorate and how far the status of doctors would fall, he would “definitely” have considered emigrating.
Some contrasted today’s crises with memories of a more prosperous past, citing Canada as one of the top destinations for Iranians and arguing that “the conditions Canada has today, we had in our country 50 years ago, with every comfort and excellent facilities.”
Others described migration through direct comparisons between life inside and outside Iran, focusing on differences in standards of living, prices, and the quality of goods.
Younger voices described a generation stuck between an unlivable economy at home and closed doors abroad, as the rial’s collapse and soaring prices erase prospects for housing, cars, further study, and family life.
One 35-year-old who once studied in Spain but was forced back as the euro jumped from 4,000 to about 130,000 rials said life in Iran has become “hell,” that he suffers severe depression, and that “we young people in Iran no longer have any motivation to continue.”
He said the exchange-rate shock effectively closed the path to migration and spoke of an economic dead end and an inability to buy a home, continue studying, or build a future – an outcome he said led to “severe depression.”
Several respondents said they would migrate “without a second’s hesitation” if they had the money, while others said they were planning to move to the UK or Nordic countries.
Some emphasized that money is central to the decision, saying they cannot afford to migrate even though they want to.
Others, unable to leave, spoke of holding university degrees while working as street vendors and pleaded for their voices to reach the world, saying the youth have been the main victims of the current system – in line with reports of rising anxiety and hopelessness among Iran’s educated middle class.
Among the messages, regret and longing featured prominently.
Several respondents said that if they could return to the past, they would have migrated decades earlier to secure their children’s futures.
One said waiting for “promises” had ended in what he called “valleys of misery.”
Internal migration also appeared in the accounts, with moves from smaller towns to major cities described by some as improving children’s education and quality of life – though others said such moves would only be truly desirable if resources and opportunities were distributed more evenly across the country.
“In 2001, I migrated within the country to a bigger city and, despite the initial difficulties, I am very satisfied. It had a profound impact on my children’s education and other aspects,” one respondent said.
No easy way back
Those who did leave described the shock of adapting to new countries but also the relief of everyday freedoms, like going out with friends without fearing that police or security forces will stop them or harass women over hijab.
Others said migration, while an opportunity for some, was experienced by many as coercion, a forced choice, and an escape from daily crises under the shadow of the Islamic Republic, while for another group it remained an unattainable dream that grows more distant under economic and political pressure.
“I’ve wanted to leave for many years, but from what I’ve heard, many people have died on the way. Going illegally has many troubles, and there’s always the risk of being deported,” another respondent said.
One said that seeing officers mistreat women fuels fantasies of violent revenge, yet concern for family holds them back, another sign of the psychological toll of living under constant pressure.
Some who had migrated described it as a difficult path with no return.
“Migration is not a good thing; it’s a hard experience. As for me, I’m never going back,” one respondent said.
Iran’s president is facing growing heat as moderate allies turn against him, arguing that his promised government of national consensus has instead lost its authority and internal cohesion.
Over the past month, three senior aides have resigned, while persistent rumors point to the possible departure of Vice President Mohammad-Reza Aref and several cabinet ministers, either voluntarily or under pressure from the hardline-dominated parliament.
The wave began last month when Fayyaz Zahed, a member of the Government Information Council (GIC), resigned, citing restrictions on expressing his views and the appointment of well-known conservatives under the banner of “national consensus.”
“Whatever this is, it is not consensus; it is distortion,” Zahed wrote on X.
A university professor and head of the Tehran Journalists’ Trade Association, Zahed had repeatedly criticized limits on free expression, judicial independence and media freedom.
More departures
Within days, Mohammad Mohajeri, another GIC member and a prominent journalist, resigned, citing similar concerns.
The third departure came last weekend, when the sociologist Mohammad-Reza Javadi-Yeganeh announced on X that he was leaving the Center for Public Communications in the president’s office and returning to academia.
“The reality is that people suffer not only from countless economic problems but also from unnecessary restrictions and interventions,” Javadi-Yeganeh wrote on X, criticizing the administration for shelving a key promise to lift internet restrictions in the face of hardline pressure.
Javadi-Yeganeh had recently shared part of a confidential survey conducted by the Iranian Students Polling Agency (ISPA) on behalf of the presidency, which some political groups said suggested public dissatisfaction approaching 92 percent.
‘Political erosion’
Many moderates in Tehran have framed the resignations as an ominous sign for the administration’s political future.
“Reformists and media outlets supporting the government will no longer pass over this issue so easily,” the news website Rouydad24 wrote in an editorial.
Another editorial, published by the moderate outlet Rooz-e No, warned of a phase of “political erosion” that it said was now visible both outside the government and within the circles close to President Masoud Pezeshkian.
Rooz-e No argued that the resignations, combined with rumors of further departures, mounting pressure from a hardline parliament and the prospect of impeaching key ministers, point to a deeper crisis.
‘Limping’ government
The political strain is unfolding against a backdrop of worsening economic conditions.
Recent government measures aimed at stabilizing the exchange rate and raising gasoline prices have driven up the cost of goods and services, including food and transportation, while shortages of some medicines have worsened.
Critics say the deteriorating economy has not translated into changes in economic leadership, particularly where such moves could carry political costs for Pezeshkian.
They point in particular to Central Bank Governor Mohammad Reza Farzin, who Pezeshkian retained from the conservative administration of Ebrahim Raisi and appears unwilling—or unable—to touch.
"Not even a word about resignation or at least an apology,” journalist Hamid Shojaei exclaimed in an article in moderate daily Arman-e Melli, arguing that it was only the reform-minded like former economy minister Nasser Hemmati and former adviser Ali Tayebnia who pay for the crisis.
“The cycle of resignations will continue,” Shojaei warned Pezeshkian on X. “Is your national consensus not limping? Where are you headed to?”
A chronic shortage of nurses and auxiliary staff in Iran’s hospitals has quietly given rise to a new and largely unregulated job: the “patient companion.”
Across Tehran and other major cities, advertising websites, job boards and even the walls outside hospitals are plastered with notices offering such services.
The role is not filled by relatives. Instead, patient companions are hired—often informally—to care for hospitalized patients, helping with eating, hygiene and mobility.
According to the head of Iran’s Nursing Organization, the country faces a shortfall of at least 100,000 nurses. The deficit appears to have created a parallel, low-wage labor market with little oversight and frequent abuse.
A nurse working at a hospital in Tehran told Iran International that the tasks assigned to patient companions often go far beyond what their wages suggest.
“They do work that no one would normally accept for this pay,” she said, requesting anonymity. “They care for patients who cannot go to the toilet or bathe on their own.”
Exploited
A search for “patient companion” (hamrah-e bimār) on Iran’s largest classifieds website, Divar, produces dozens of listings from across the country. The companies share a familiar pitch: assurances of experience, professionalism and official registration.
One company advertises an eight-hour shift for a mobile patient who does not require personal hygiene care at 800,000 tomans (about $6 at December 16 exchange rates). Many others list prices as “negotiable.”
Alongside these firms, individuals also advertise their services directly. Many claim to have first-aid training or nursing experience and say they are willing to travel nationwide.
Yet trust remains a major barrier.
“People don’t feel comfortable hiring individuals directly,” said another nurse in Tehran, who also asked not to be named. “So they turn to companies, even though the companies take most of the money.”
According to this nurse, nursing service firms often keep close to two-thirds of what families pay, leaving companions with little compensation despite the physical and emotional demands of the work.
No better option
To avoid company fees, some companions eventually try to secure work through hospital staff. After being introduced repeatedly by agencies, they ask nurses or aides to connect them directly with families in need.
The practice is most common in public hospitals, where staff shortages are most acute.
A doctor at a Tehran hospital told Iran International that families struggling to pay medical bills sometimes plead with doctors or nurses to help a relative find work as a patient companion. “It becomes a way to cover treatment costs,” he said.
A male nurse in Tehran described hiring a companion through an agency several years ago to care for his grandmother, who had cancer.
“She was a nursing student, working to support herself while studying,” he said. “She told us the companies demand large promissory notes from workers and then take two-thirds of the family’s payment.”
For many companions, the job is a temporary lifeline rather than a chosen profession.
Home-care assignments can carry additional risks, especially for women. Reports of assault or sexual harassment are not rare, the nurse added, but few are willing to come forward, fearing that agencies may move to cash promissory notes at the first sign of dispute—effectively blacklisting workers from future employment.
That lack of regulation cuts both ways. Families often prefer companies, believing them to be safer. But, as nurses acknowledge, the skills of agency-provided companions are far from guaranteed.
“Most companions are women, many of them heads of household,” one nurse in Tehran said. “Few have formal training. Most learn on the job from hospital staff. They do this because they have no other option.”
Tehran state-affiliated media are hinting that Judiciary Chief Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei could soon be appointed by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to head the Guardian Council, the powerful body that vets election candidates and approves parliament’s legislation.
The strongest signal came last week from the Revolutionary Guards-linked Fars News Agency, which described the potential move as a “necessary transition in governance.”
The council’s current chairman, ultra-conservative cleric Ahmad Jannati, will turn 99 next February. He was appointed to the post more than three decades ago and has become increasingly absent from public view.
The timing has also drawn attention because Ejei—himself appointed judiciary chief by Khamenei—is approaching the end of his term.
‘Instill hope’
Beyond the passage of time, Fars floated two additional explanations: resolving tensions between Ejei and President Massoud Pezeshkian over the enforcement of compulsory hijab laws and countering what it described as efforts by “domestic and foreign actors” to depict the Islamic Republic as being in crisis.
According to the agency, these actors are amplifying signs of internal discord—pointing to the resignation of Vice President Javad Zarif last year and rumors Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref may follow suit—as evidence of an intensifying succession struggle.
The commentary ultimately stressed that the Guardian Council ranks above the Judiciary in the political hierarchy and framed Ejei’s transfer as a promotion rather than a demotion, calling for swift action to “calm the political and social atmosphere and instill hope among the nation.”
‘Hope it’s not true’
The issue has since been widely debated across Tehran’s media.
Mohammad Mohajeri, a former Kayhan editor who later became a conservative commentator, said Jannati’s departure would be “good news” after years of what he described as “questionable” candidate vetting. But he added: “I hope it is not true.”
Speaking to Fararu, Mohajeri said Ejei would “most probably improve the Guardian Council,” warning that his exit from the Judiciary could slow or reverse what he saw as modest positive changes there.
Others were more critical. Some dissidents and outspoken lawyers rejected the idea of Ejei’s “promotion,” arguing that he should instead be held accountable for his record as judiciary chief.
During his tenure, at least two senior judicial officials were tried and convicted on financial corruption charges.
Another hardliner in line?
Moderate outlets, including the Tehran daily Shargh, suggested the move was effectively settled, citing “behind-the-scenes jockeying” by hardline factions to position themselves for Ejei’s departure.
The judiciary chief’s post is traditionally reserved for figures within the Supreme Leader’s trusted inner circle, reflecting the institution’s control over the prison system and its central role in suppressing dissent.
Several media outlets have pointed to Mohammad Jafar Montazeri, the hardline head of Iran’s Supreme Court, as Ejei’s likely successor. Montazeri is known for his strict stance on hijab enforcement but has not previously been regarded as part of Khamenei’s closest circle.
Avaye Latif, a website close to the Judiciary, wrote that Montazeri’s appointment would amount to “the continuation of judicial management by someone with a long history in this institution.”
A bus crash on the Esfahan-Natanz highway killed 13 people after an intercity coach allegedly veered into the opposite lane and slammed into a taxi on Tuesday, with Iran’s road police blaming suspected driver fatigue for the accident.
Emergency services said two passengers in the taxi and nine bus passengers died shortly after the accident. The crash also injured at least 11 others with multiple traumas, all of whom are currently in urgent care.
The Scania intercity bus, operated by the Royal Safar Isfahan company and travelling from Esfahan toward Tehran, overturned around 22:10 local time near kilometer 80 of the Esfahan–Natanz route, then collided with a passenger car, official media cited local police and provincial officials as saying.
The Iranian Red Crescent said the remaining occupants suffered injuries of varying severity and were taken to hospitals in Natanz, Shahinshahr and Isfahan.
Police account
A senior traffic police official told state media that the preliminary hypothesis is that the driver’s drowsiness and loss of control caused the bus to veer into the opposite lane, overturn and strike the car, but added that the final conclusion will depend on full technical and safety assessments.
Authorities said the scene has been cleared and traffic restored, while forensic and road-safety teams continue to inspect the vehicle, road conditions and possible mechanical factors.
Officials have said that if any negligence by the bus company, driver or other parties is confirmed, the case will be pursued through legal channels.
Iran’s Vice President on Tuesday in Tehran recalled a similar deadly accident in October in northern Iran, rejecting the driver fatigue theory.
“Is the driver to blame, when it’s apparently noted that this accident occurred about 20 minutes after he passed the police station? That would mean drowsiness, which is being raised as the issue, was not involved,” Mohammad Reza Aref said in a speech.
“A few months ago in Semnan we had a similar case, when they were going from the dormitory to class and the same thing happened and students were killed,” he added.
At least 26 students have died in 13 accidents involving university buses across Iran over the past decade, the daily Ham-Mihan reported earlier this year, reviving concerns about road safety and vehicle standards.