Abolfazl Zohrehvand, a member of the Iranian parliament's national security and foreign policy committee, said the 2003 agreement, which led to the Tehran Declaration, was a "strategic mistake" that should not be repeated.
In October 2003, Iran agreed to suspend uranium enrichment and permit enhanced inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to demonstrate the peaceful nature of its nuclear program and avoid referral to the United Nations Security Council.
The agreement was signed by Iran's then-Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Hassan Rouhani, along with the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany at Tehran's Saadabad Palace. It temporarily averted escalation of the nuclear dispute.
However, following the election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005, Iran resumed uranium conversion activities at the Isfahan facility in August 2005 and enrichment at the Natanz facility in early 2006. By April 2006, Iran announced it had successfully enriched uranium to a purity level of approximately 3.5%, marking a significant advancement in its nuclear capabilities.
Zohrehvand said in an interview with Didban Iran that Tehran agreed in 2003 to suspend enrichment, signed the Saadabad agreement, and fulfilled its commitments by sealing the Natanz enrichment facility and the yellowcake production facility in Isfahan.
However, despite several rounds of negotiations, Iran’s request for reciprocal measures from the West went unmet, he added.
He said during that period, President Mohammad Khatami had tried to formally transfer a centrifuge to Tehran University to demonstrate Iran’s mastery of centrifuge technology. However, he said, then-Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi contacted British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw to coordinate the move, only to be told it was not permitted and that all centrifuges had to be dismantled.
Zohrehvand also noted that following a visit to Tehran, the German foreign minister went directly to Israel and announced, “We told the Iranians to dismantle their enrichment program entirely.”
According to Zohrehvand, today’s Western demands echo the same expectations as those of two decades ago.
“This same model is being repeated again,” he warned.
Zohrehvand said while a temporary suspension of enrichment in return for sanctions relief might now be acceptable, it would be naïve to believe that the United States would be satisfied with such a deal.
“If resolving the issue merely means suspending or halting enrichment, it could happen—there’s no problem with suspending enrichment for a few years in exchange for the suspension or lifting of sanctions,” Zohrehvand said.
“But believing that the Americans would be content with that is simplistic.”
