Firsthand reports from contributors inside Iran
Iranian perspectives on the conflicts in the Middle East are mostly dominated by the prevailing resentment toward their own rulers.
“The enemy of my enemy is my friend” is a prevailing logic vis-a-vis the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, overshadowing political, even humanitarian, sentiments.
Across Tehran, banners urging support for Palestinian and Lebanese war victims have become a common sight. One banner calls on citizens to sponsor displaced Lebanese families. On state TV, women are featured donating their gold and jewelry for Gaza and Lebanon. But this is not the whole story—far from it, in fact.
“These campaigns to support Gaza and Lebanon are sickening. They target people who can’t even afford bread. Money that could help Iranians escape poverty is funneled into Gaza and Lebanon.” This is my friend Safoora, a 38-year-old graphic designer. She jumps in when I ask our rideshare driver what he thinks about the pro-Palestinian billboards. The driver nods in agreement, half-glancing at Safoora in the rear-mirror.
“I agree with every word,” he joins in. “The government pours oil revenues into Gaza and Lebanon while our own people suffer. They wanted a Shiite crescent in the region, but look at what happened to the IRGC commanders and the leaders of Hamas and Hezbollah. They spent our money for nothing.”
No reliable data exists on Iranians’ view of regional politics. But anecdotal evidence suggests the views shared by Safoora and Kamran the driver are typical.
Iran’s strategy of backing armed groups against Israel and the United States has not sat well with much of the Iranian population. The discontent is evident in everyday conversations. And it’s cried out in almost every collective act of protest in recent years: “No to Gaza, no to Lebanon, (I give) my life for Iran”.
The laws of the Islamic Republic criminalize travel to Israel or expressing support for it. Iranian athletes are barred from competing against Israelis in international events.
Until recently, even using the word “Israel” in publications (instead of the “Zionist regime”) could mean serious trouble. Then there's the annual, state-sponsored Quds Day rally in solidarity with the Palestinian cause.
This one-sided approach has alienated many Iranians, who increasingly link the country’s economic woes to its regional policies.
Apathy and resentment are prevalent. Those feeling differently—those sympathetic to Palestinians and critical of Israel— often keep quiet to avoid “pro-regime” and “apologist” labels.
“The regime has monopolized and corrupted the Palestinian issue,” says Roya, a 34-year old activist from Iran’s Kurdish region. “It’s almost impossible to express support for Palestinians when the public is so hostile or indifferent at best."
"People who oppose Israel’s killing of civilians feel trapped. We want to protest these atrocities, but we don’t want to be associated with the regime and its propaganda,” she added.
Last month, more than 400 Iranian academics, writers, and activists inside and outside Iran signed a letter condemning Israel’s actions in Gaza.
The letter sparked backlash on social media. The signatories were called hypocrites for not criticizing the Islamic Republic equally. They responded that Iran’s stance was irrelevant to their concern about what they called genocide.
“Why do they condemn Israel but not Hamas? Why are they not so vocal when the regime executes protesters?” said Alireza, 29, works in a tech-support company. He believes it’s “stupid at best” to be concerned about Palestinians. “We have enough injustice to deal with at home,” he added.
His coworker, Babak, snaps at him. “So I’m stupid if I’m mad about kids being killed by Israel?” He turns to me, “I often think we’re blinded by our hatred for the Islamic Republic. We happily ignore or condone any crime if we think it’s somehow against our government.”
The debate surrounding Israel and Palestine is a microcosm of Iran’s internal struggles. For many Iranians, animus toward the Islamic Republic overshadows everything, including humanitarian sentiments. Life is tough here—too tough, often, for empathy to get the better of cynicism.
Justifying his statement, Pezeshkian said, "With the leadership of Khamenei and the economic potential of our country, Iran does not deserve to lag behind its neighboring countries."
However, Iran has a bitter history of inviting foreign experts and economists to solve Iran's problems since the early 1910s.
Five years after Iran's 1905 Constitutional Revolution, the country's first parliament, determined to establish a Western-oriented democratic civil society in what was then known internationally as Persia, persuaded Mohammad Ali Shah—a ruler heavily influenced by Russia—to invite an economic adviser from the United States. Unlike Russia and Great Britain, the US had no political ambitions in Iran and showed no interest in exploiting its resources.
The 1905 revolutionaries had forced the Qajar Dynasty monarch Mozaffar ad-Din Shah to agree to the election of a parliament (Majles) and the opening up of a relatively free press as well as bringing about other reforms. But the king died within a few months and was replaced by Mohammad Ali Shah.
At the time, the United States was so uninvolved in regional ambitions that it initially declined Iran's request. However, under persistent pressure from the Iranians, the US government recommended William Morgan Shuster—a lawyer, civil servant, and publisher—who was ultimately appointed by the Iranian parliament as the Treasurer-General of Persia. Shuster served in this role from May to December 1911.
Shuster made every effort to stabilize Iran's chaotic and fragile economy, which had been severely impacted by the Qajar Shahs' debts to Imperial Russia and Great Britain. These two powers had effectively divided Iran into spheres of influence under the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention. However, Shuster’s reforms, which sought to restore financial independence, challenged the authority of both Russia and Britain. In response, their agents in Iran created obstacles for him, and Russian forces subsequently occupied parts of northern Iran. They later accused Shuster of deploying Iranian gendarmes to collect taxes from people within the Russian-occupied territories.
Under mounting pressure from Russia and Britain, Shuster was ultimately forced to resign. He returned to the United States, where he wrote The Strangling of Persia, a book detailing the extensive influence and interference of Britain and Russia in Iran.
The Iranian government also appointed US-educated British lawyer and economist Arthur Millspaugh as its financial adviser, first from 1922 to 1927 and again from 1942 to 1945, to reform the country’s financial system. While his first tenure was relatively successful, his second was deemed a complete failure. The Iranian government attributed this failure to Millspaugh's "arrogance," though many observers pointed to factional infighting, political instability, and obstruction by opposition groups as key factors.
The factors mentioned—factional disputes, economic and political instability, obstructions by political rivals, and a deep-rooted xenophobia exacerbated under the Islamic Republic’s anti-West ideology—persist in modern Iran. Although 80 percent of the economy is controlled by the state or entities affiliated with the Islamic Republic’s establishment, factions thrive among these privileged groups ranging from clerics to the IRGC and influential families. Reforming the economy is hard to imagine in this non-competitive, non-transparent system.
Starting in the 1950s and continuing until the 1979 revolution, American and other international experts, advisors, and engineering specialists flocked to Iran to support the ambitious economic and industrial development spearheaded by Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. By the 1970s, Iran was emerging as a regional industrial power and a major oil exporter.
In the unlikely event that Pezeshkian secures approval to hire international advisers, the challenges inherent in the Islamic Republic's economic and political system are likely to hinder their work.
Addressing Western nations, Behrouz Kamalvandi wrote in a Tehran newspaper, “There is still time for engagement and for setting aside pressure and threats. While Iran has prepared itself to counter threats, it prefers dialogue over confrontation.”
Iranian officials have condemned a censure resolution adopted during the November 21 quarterly meeting of the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors. While they claim Iran is ready to negotiate over its nuclear commitments, their calls for dialogue come against the backdrop of years of failed diplomatic efforts by the IAEA and Western powers to address concerns over Tehran’s reduced cooperation with the UN watchdog.
The IAEA Board of Governors approved a resolution proposed by four Western powers condemning the expansion of Iran’s nuclear activities and Tehran’s lack of necessary cooperation with the agency. The resolution passed with a majority vote.
This marked the second resolution adopted against the Islamic Republic by the Board of Governors in the past six months.
On Friday, Kamalvandi responded to the IAEA resolution by announcing a “significant increase” in uranium enrichment levels.
Speaking to state media, he said this step was part of Iran’s “compensatory measures in response to the new Board of Governors resolution” and noted that the process had “already begun immediately.”
The spokesperson for Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization stated that the Islamic Republic had informed the IAEA it would respond "immediately": "Before the agency officials left the Secretariat, we informed them, and today we also sent a DIQ (Design Information Questionnaire). This process is ongoing."
Kamalvandi provided details of Iran’s retaliatory measures, saying: "The enrichment sector is the most impacted area, and we are significantly increasing our enrichment capacity."
He added: "We are utilizing advanced centrifuges, accelerating research and development on each of them, expanding infrastructure, and implementing additional measures to enhance security."
Earlier, Ali Larijani, a top advisor to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei tweeted that if the Trump administration wants Iran to refrain from making a bomb, "They must accept Iran's conditions and grant necessary concessions, including #compensating_Iran for damages and similar measures, to reach a new agreement, rather than issuing unilateral demands."
The escalation of Iran’s nuclear activities comes as the IAEA Board of Governors stated in its resolution that the Islamic Republic has still not cooperated with the agency “clearly and comprehensively” and has failed to take “the urgent and necessary actions outlined in the June 2024 resolution of the Board.”
The Board expressed “deep concern” over the situation, adding: “This lack of cooperation impacts the agency’s ability to ensure and verify the non-diversion of Iran’s nuclear materials toward nuclear weapons or other explosive devices.”
The resolution was adopted shortly after the Islamic Republic formally invited Rafael Grossi, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, to visit Iran on November 11.
Regarding topics raised during Grossi’s visit, Kamalvandi said, "Mr. Grossi proposed during his trip to Iran that we temporarily refrain from increasing our 60% uranium stockpile, although not in a way that stops enrichment at various levels, including 60%."
He added: "We agreed to this with certain conditions, but we made it clear this would only apply if the resolution was not adopted."
Iran has amassed enough uranium enriched at 60% that it can quickly purify to 90% and produce four nuclear warheads, the IAEA and Western countries have said.
The IAEA resolution, combined with likely revival of the so-called maximum pressure campaign of sanctions on Iran from Trump's first term may set US-led Western countries on a collision course with Tehran over the nuclear dossier.