As Voting Takes Place in Iran, Debate Over Boycott Continues

To understand why, we must look back to the fall of 2022, when widespread protests shook the Islamic Republic like never before. No one expected teenagers, some as young as 15, to become the heart and soul of that uprising. Generation Z was thought to be apolitical—and perhaps they were. But their rebellious spirit and desire to live freely proved far more powerful and inspiring than any ideology or political inclination.

The Zs took to the streets across Iran and became the change they wanted to see –as Gandhi would say –unlike their previous generation who asked for change from those in power. They had little time for their parents’ good old haggling with the regime. They were ready to fight for the ‘basics’ they believed were their right. And fight they did –leading chants, removing and burning headscarves, tearing down state banners and symbols, and of course, popping turbans off the mullahs’ head. They crushed political taboos and paid dearly for it. Young souls like Nika Shakarami and Sarina Esmailzadeh were killed protesting before their 17th birthday. The idea that they would have voted for this or that ‘approved’ candidate tomorrow is laughable.

“I don't even know the names of the candidates,” says Hasti, an 18-year-old preparing for Iran’s centralized university entrance exam. “Why would I follow them when I’m not voting? I don't vote because I have learned that to achieve my rights, I have to fight, not wait for change to come from the ballot box.”

Hasti believes there’s a generational gap –and the little data that exists publicly seems to confirm this: middle-aged Iranians are more likely to vote in this election. “My parents grew up during the [Iran-Iraq] war,” she says. “They were taught to want less, be content, and feel guilty for their desires. They had minimal contact with the world, and their parents were often supportive of the government. It’s different now. I know more than a bit about what's happening in the world. I set my own values, and my parents no longer support the government."

The advocates of voting tell young people like Hasti that the president matters, even though much is decided and implemented by non-elected officials. But it’s not easy convincing someone who sees the severe repression at school or faces suspension or expulsion from university with the slightest sign of dissent.

"Any protest or political activity that’s not in line with the state’s desires is suppressed, whoever the president,” Amin, a first-year university student, says sneering. “Everybody knows that the president and his education minister have no authority. It’s the security agencies who decide how to deal with students. So why are we told that the ‘president matters’ when students are handed harsh sentences during both reformist and hardliner administrations. This powerlessness can be seen in other areas too."

The only candidate who attempted to connect with the Zs early in the campaign was Masoud Pezeshkian, the “moderate” (or reform) candidate who claims to have entered the race to “save” Iran. He’s a surgeon who has previously served as health minister, and member of Iran’s parliament, Majles.

In a half-hour campaign ad titled “Z: A Look at the Demands of the New Generation," young people asked Pezeshkian about entrepreneurship, employment opportunities, and time spent online. The ad included some criticism of Iran's current situation and the widespread desire among the youth to leave the country. However, it left out many critical issues: mandatory hijab, suppressed sexual orientations, compulsory military service—all aspects of a lifestyle that many in Generation Z desire but which are criminalized by their fanatical rulers.

“There is no longer a common language,” one young man said in the campaign ad. And the candidate agreed. I put this to Parsa, an 18-year-old who has decided to train for a trade instead of going to university, and who, unlike many of his peers, has followed the campaign closely.

“The lack of a common language is even more evident in the candidates’ debates,” Parsa said. “In one debate, Pezeshkian said the clashes over hijab in Iran shows parents are not doing a proper job. What he truly demonstrated was his belief that people desiring different lifestyles stem from improper upbringing. He doesn't acknowledge that diversity and differences need to be recognized. While he opposes the methods of the so-called morality police, he supports their intention to impose a singular view over others. And yet, they expect us to vote for this man as the 'progressive' candidate.

The Zs’ parents used to see the ballot box as the only way to reform Iran’s authoritarian system. Elections did matter to them, and it showed in the high turnouts before 2020. For the Zs, however, elections are yet another ‘state-sponsored event’. It has nothing to do with them, as far as they’re concerned. It seems the candidates are aware of this too and have directed all their effort to engage the over-25s. They know full well that the Zs are not coming back.

As a result, a significant majority of the populace will more likely disregard the electoral process entirely.

Despite the five poorly managed debates, rival candidates brought to light ten critical issues that had never been covered by the state's TV and radio stations. These issues pertain directly to people's livelihoods, rights, freedoms, and economic development. Successive governments in Iran have either officially denied, ignored, or relegated these controversial and scandalous matters to the back burner.

The Controversial Crescent Contract

This controversial contract for the daily sale of 500 million cubic feet of gas from the Salman oil field was signed in 2002 between Crescent Petroleum Company (CPC) and the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) during the tenure of Oil Minister Bijan Namdar Zanganeh in President Mohammad Khatami’s administration.

In a landmark ruling, the International Court of Arbitration in Paris ordered NIOC to pay $607.5 million to the UAE's Dana Gas Company, an affiliate of Crescent Petroleum, due to Iran’s failure to deliver according to the contract.

During the debate, hardliner candidate Saeed Jalili claimed that this case had been archived in the office of fellow candidate, cleric Mohammad Pourmohammadi, when he was head of the General Inspection Organization. Pourmohammadi, in turn, blamed Jalili for halting the proceedings.

In fact, hardliners have been blamed for numerous corruption scandals in recent years and they aimed at highlighting mistakes and scandals that took place during so-called reformist administrations. This belied Jalili's quest to bring out the Crescent issue.

COVID Vaccine Ban During Pandemic

In the debates, other hardliner candidates, Tehran Mayor Alireza Zakani and Ghazizadeh Hashemi accused the administration of former President Hassan Rouhani, who was in power during the pandemic, of delaying the purchase of the coronavirus vaccine.

They failed, however, to mention that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei had banned the entry of Western vaccines into the country in January 2021, when no other vaccine existed yet. Due to this delay, it is approximated that between 70,000 and 100,000 people died. Total casualties are estimated to be between 160,000 and 300,000, based on official and unofficial counts, respectively.

Both Zakani and Hashemi have since dropped out of the presidential race.

Internet Shutdowns Amid Popular Protests

While all the candidates in the debates expressed disapproval of the state-sanctioned filtering and blocking of the Internet, some used the opportunity to blame and attack each other's roles in these actions.

The discussion at one point focused on the internet shutdown during the authorities' crackdown on the November 2019 protests, known as 'Bloody November.' These widespread protests initially erupted across Iran in response to fuel price hikes but quickly escalated into anti-regime demonstrations.

Candidates opposing then-President Hassan Rouhani attributed the internet shutdown to his administration. The only pro-reform candidate, Masoud Pezeshkian, countered by conveying that the shutdown was approved by the Supreme National Security Council, implicating senior figures and candidates like Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Saeed Jalili in the decision-making process.

The 2019 Mahshahr Massacre

The Mahshahr protests in November 2019 began peacefully, with residents of this oil city in Khuzestan Province setting up roadblocks to protest. In response, the National Security Council, led by Ali Shamkhani, deployed an IRGC commando brigade armed with tanks, heavy weapons, and a military helicopter.

IRGC forces targeted protesters with heavy machine guns and helicopter fire, indiscriminately shooting at civilians. Many fled to nearby reed fields for shelter, but the IRGC continued their assault, resulting in numerous deaths, including many youths. A journalist described the scene as if the marshes were being cut through with a sickle.

During the debates, Ghazizadeh Hashemi acknowledged and justified the shootings in the reed fields, but failed to mention that over a hundred people were killed for simply protesting by creating traffic jams on a suburban road.

The 1988 Massacre

In an interview amid his campaign, cleric and prosecutor Mostafa Pourmohammadi defended and downplayed his role in the mass execution of thousands of political prisoners in 1988. As a member of the "Death Committee" in Tehran’s Evin prison, Pourmohammadi implicitly confessed: "In a period, I had to be in the most difficult and bitter position against the hypocrites and be strong against the infidels.” The mention of "infidels" is a reference to members of the opposition group Mojahedin (MEK), who were targeted during the purges.

Up to 5,000 political prisoners serving their prison sentences were murdered in 1988. Their bodies were secretly buried in isolated or mass graves.

Pourmohammadi described the massacre as "the project of the Islamic Republic, the difficult moments of the military, a major conflict." Contrary to the popular belief that there was only one death panel, Pourmohammadi revealed that 30 death panels managed the massacres around the country.

The Debsh Tea Embezzlement

The Debsh Tea Embezzlement case is arguably the biggest corruption case in the Islamic Republic’s young history.

Embroiling key Islamic Republic figures, the scandal involved the Debsh Agriculture and Industrial Group misappropriating $3.37 billion in government funds meant for tea and machinery imports by selling $1.4 billion of the currency on the black market, fraudulently labeling low-grade tea, and re-importing cheaper Iranian tea for profit.

The embezzlement took place during both the Hassan Rouhani and Ebrahim Raisi administrations.

Despite initial reports and promises to address the issue, it became one of several cases that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei had previously ordered "not to be followed." Consequently, the case has yet to go to court.

The Murder a Former Mayor’s Wife

During the debate, Ghazizadeh responded to Pezeshkian's protest against the violation of women's rights by bringing up Mohammad Ali Najafi, a former Tehran mayor and Minister of Science in the Rouhani administration.

Najafi was sentenced to death for killing his wife, but was released later after he had his life “spared” by her family.

Ghazizadeh criticized the candidates from the authoritarian faction for their support of Najafi, highlighting their actions: "When the Minister of Science in the Rouhani administration killed his wife in such a horrible way, why did they go and support him? They got consent from her family and overturned the court verdict. Wasn't she a woman?"

JCPOA, FATF, Sanctions

The JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) and the regime's accession to financial and banking treaties have been sources of serious disagreement between political factions in Iran.

The authoritarian faction accuses the reformists of capitulating to Western demands, while the so-called reformists accuse their opponents of exploiting the sanctions for their own benefit.

During the election campaign, former President Rouhani claimed that the opposing faction caused $300 billion in damage to the country by passing the Strategic Act to Cancel the Sanctions.

The Zahedan Massacre’s Bloody Friday

On Friday, September 30, 2022, amid nationwide protests, security forces opened fire on demonstrators during the Friday prayer protests in Zahedan, resulting in the deaths of over 100 people. This occurred in the aftermath of Mahsa Jina Amini's killing, while in the custody of the "morality police."

The government has not officially accepted responsibility for the massacre, instead attempting to placate the victims' families with blood money. Pezeshkian criticized the government's handling of the situation and its treatment of the people of Sistan and Baluchestan Province.

Attack on Embassies

Since 1979, the Islamist regime’s authorities have either directly participated in or supported attacks on foreign embassies. Notable incidents include the attacks on the American, British, Danish, and Saudi embassies, which have caused hundreds of billions in damages to the country by disrupting normal relations and trade. During the debates, candidates blamed each other, ultimately indicating that the regime was behind and supportive of these attacks.

While the candidates did address the aforementioned topics—mainly to blame each other and shift responsibility—many other critical issues were conspicuously absent from the debates.

These unaddressed issues include the murder of Mahsa Jina Amini, the killing and blinding of hundreds of protesters in 2022, the regime’s role in the October 7 Hamas attacks, the chemical assaults on over 230 schools across 25 provinces in 2022-2023, and the expenditure of tens of billions of dollars on the regime's regional expansion plans, terrorism, banditry, and global hostage-taking – just to name a few.

His presidency was seen as a sign of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's decision to rid the system of the unpredictability of competitive elections: all moderates and reformists, who had until then been tolerated as ‘opposition’ were disqualified. Raisi was thought to have been chosen to play a significant role in Khamenei's succession plans. But he died in a helicopter crash on May 19, 2024. Snap elections were called, and a ‘reform’ candidate, Masoud Pezeshkian, was surprisingly allowed to run by the un-elected Guardian Council, effectively controlled by Khamenei and tasked to vet candidates.

How come this happened?

Many believe Pezeshkian was included to create a semblance of competition and boost voter turnout, which has dropped to historic lows. In the 2023 parliamentary elections, the officially reported turnout was 41 percent—the lowest since 1979. In major cities like Tehran, turnout was as low as 15 percent, with some candidates entering parliament (Majles) with support from less than 6 percent of eligible voters.

This Friday’s presidential election in Iran is the first one after the “Woman, Life, Freedom” protests of 2021 –the most radical movement since the inception of the Islamic Republic in 1979. The movement reflected a majority demand to live a normal life under a secular government, with respect for human rights, women’s rights, and sensible trade and foreign policies. The election comes after three elections since 2020 in which many former officials were disqualified, and the turnout continually dropped –highlighting an almost complete rupture between the people and the ruling elite.

100%

So it may be that the Supreme Leader felt compelled to let in a more palatable candidate to woo at least some of those who until a few weeks ago seemed like they’d never vote again.

The stage set for a controlled election

Six candidates were approved to compete for the presidency. But the forces at play can be grouped in three: first, those who support the status quo and seek to follow Raisi’s ‘path’; second, the ‘reform’ camp who back Pezeshkian, arguing that he’d be able to effect some change, however minimal; last, those who say Iran’s recent history shows real change cannot come out of the ballot box –and see Pezeshkian’s candidacy as a tactic to hinder more radical protests.

What does each group stand for?

The Principlist camp are hardline supporters of the Supreme Leader and his policies, which were implemented by Raisi. They defend conservative religious and political norms, including mandatory Hijab, and strict control on the press and the internet. Their chances rise as turnout falls, since the loyal supporters of the regime always vote. This group is currently divided into two sub-groups led by Saeed Jalili and Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Iran’s former nuclear negotiator who represents the Supreme Leader in Iran’s National Security Council, and a former IRGC commander who’s now the speaker of the parliament. The two must tap into one broad base of conservative voters –and thus face a dilemma: both share the ‘loyalist’ vote and risk a run-off against Pezeshkian, or one can step aside for the other and hand him the bulk of the ‘loyal’ vote.

The Reformist camp, consistently pushed aside since the election of Mohammad Khatami in 1997, seeks a gradual ‘opening up’ of the system. They say Pezeshkian can implement better economic policies, restrict the morality police, relax censorship, and begin to normalize Iran's relationship with the West. The more radical reformists, however, criticize Pezeshkian for not emphasizing democratic values and instead expressing total obedience to the Supreme Leader at every turn. They warn that Pezeshkian is there only to save face for the regime and his team of conformists and bureaucrats would not move towards the more liberal demands of the Iranian public.

The Boycott camp is the largest of the three groups – 40 to 50 percent of eligible voters, according to semi-official polls. These argue that the president in the Islamic Republic of Iran is proven to be incapable of effecting meaningful change, therefore voting would only amount to partaking in a show that legitimizes a system of oppression. They favor popular mobilization and more radical tactics.

It is safe to say that the outcome of Iran’s 2024 presidential elections ultimately depends on the second group above to persuade the third to show up to keep out the first. It’s the well-known, some may say tired, narrative of bad versus worse. We’ll soon know if it has just enough appeal to work one more time.

The opinions expressed by the author are not necessarily the views of Iran International.

Zakani is the second hardliner to withdraw after Amir-Hossein Ghazizadeh Hashemi announced his resignation on Wednesday. Both candidates had meager chances, scoring less than 5% in several opinion surveys.

Six candidates were initially approved by the un-elected Guardian Council that vets all candidates and operates under the influence of Supreme leader Ali Khamenei.

In a statement on his official X account, Zakani pleaded with fellow hardliner candidates Jalili and Ghalibaf to unite in order to prevent the ascent of a reform-leaning candidate: "We must consolidate our efforts to address the rightful aspirations of revolutionary factions, thereby preventing the formation of another Rouhani administration."

Hardline contenders are wary of Masoud Pezeshkian potentially forming a government akin to a "third Hassan Rouhani administration," foreseeing a cabinet that might include former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif among its ministers.

Zakani's political trajectory has been marked by controversy, particularly his confrontational approach towards reformists. Despite his assertive rhetoric, he has faced considerable criticism, including from state media, questioning his suitability for higher office.

His tenure as mayor has been fraught with challenges, including contentious urban policies such as mosque constructions in parks and enforcing hijab rules on public transport, which have stirred internal discord within the conservative faction and the city council.

Financial and personal scandals have further marred Zakani's reputation. His administration's decision to allocate financial deposits to municipal managers for housing needs sparked backlash among city council members. Additionally, allegations of nepotism involving his son-in-law and questionable financial dealings by his daughter and her husband with the Islamic Development Organization have surfaced.

A majority of voters, who stayed away from the polls in 2020, 2021 and March 2024 are expected also not to vote on Friday, disillusioned by the leadership of the Islamic government. Successive election in the past 30 years not only have failed to improve the state-controlled economy, but conditions have gradually worsened.

Iran now suffers from an annual inflation rate hovering around 50%, in addition to ever more social and political restrictions on the populace.

Mohammad Khatami and Hassan Rouhani, each leading Iran’s government for two 4-year terms between 1997 and 2021, have come out in support of Masoud Pezeshkian –who has served as Khatami’s Minister for Health.

The two former presidents encouraged Iranians to turn up at the polling stations Friday and use their vote to keep out the hardliners from the executive. Their message stood in stark contrast to that of leading opposition figures who asked people to stay away from the ballot boxes and not recognize the “show” election.

“The most peaceful way to show your opposition to this blatant oppression, and to send the message of “No to the Islamic Republic”, is to boycott the upcoming farce of an election,” said well-known activist and former prisoner Hossein Ronaghi in a video message Wednesday.

Joining Ronaghi’s call from prison was Faezeh Hashemi, former lawmaker and the daughter of another former president, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. Before her, other voices from inside Iranian prisons had called for a boycott of the election, most notably, the Nobel Peace Prize laureate activist, Narges Mohammadi –who called the election “staged”.

The upcoming presidential election in Iran features five hand-picked insider politicians, after one hardliner, Amir Hossein Ghazizadeh Hashemi, quit the race in support of three other hardliners. The hardline camp are worried that their vote would be divided, allowing the only ‘moderate’, Pezeshkain, to move ahead at the vote.

Existing polls show that at least half the eligible voters may shun the election on Friday. This will be Iran’s first presidential election after the widespread uprising in 2022, in which at least 500 were killed and thousands arrested. Many of those who took to the streets across Iran and bore the brunt of the state’s brutality, have once more turned against the system with their call to boycott the election.

In a joint statement Wednesday, several mothers of slain protesters and dissidents called the upcoming election a "circus" that Iranians have to ignore, focusing instead on other ways to pressure the system to change.

"We will not stop seeking justice until we get our right to try and punish the criminals who innocently executed and shot our children,” they said.

Several student organizations and women's right groups also encouraged Iranians not to vote Friday. Over the weekend, over 500 teachers, union activists, and prominent cultural figures in Iran similarly issued a joint statement publicly declaring their decision to abstain from participating in the upcoming presidential elections.