Iran International
This month, three Iraqi Shiite militant groups, backed by the IRGC, announced their readiness to send forces to Lebanon to participate in a potential war between Hezbollah and Israel.
At the same time, the commander of the Ground Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran has stated that groups known as the Resistance Front will not remain silent in the face of a possible war.
With that, all signs point to Tehran sending the necessary resources to Lebanon through these Iraqi militant groups, using Syria as a land bridge.
The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee (IRCC), also known as the Tansiqiya, is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias – part of Tehran’s broader strategy to exert influence in the region, countering US and allied presence.
Among these groups are Harakat al-Nujaba (HaN), Kata'ib Hezbollah (KH), and Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSS).
But how do these Iran-backed groups operate, and how has Iran strategically positioned them to challenge Israel's security?
Harakat Al-Nujaba: A Strategic and Integral Arm of IRGC's extraterritorial unit, the Quds Force
Harakat al-Nujaba (HaN) is currently the most prominent group within the Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee (IRCC).
According to a source close to Hashd al-Shaabi, an umbrella organization composed of various Shia militias in Iraq, the group was formed under the direct supervision of Qasem Soleimani, the former commander of the Quds Force of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
HaN initially began as part of Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) in 2004 but became an independent organization in 2013 due to disagreements between Akram al-Kaabi, the leader of HaN, and Qais al-Khazali, the leader of AAH. Despite their split, both groups maintain good relations and continue to cooperate because of their shared goals.
The group's initial budget of $10 million was provided by Lebanon’s Hezbollah, which also helped organize the group.
Soleimani reportedly preferred HaN to remain focused on military activities, rather than shifting towards political engagement.
Financially supported by the IRGC, HaN pays its fighters significantly more than other groups, with salaries around $1,400 per month – while other Iraqi fighters received a monthly salary of $300 to $400. The extensive financial backing has helped HaN increase its manpower with the group boasting over 10,000 members.
HaN is deeply integrated with the IRGC, essentially operating as an extension of the Quds Force rather than just a proxy group.
Notably, it played a significant role in the Syrian civil war, particularly in the battle of Aleppo.
The group appears to also enjoy a special relationship with Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, facilitated by Mohsen Qomi, the deputy international affairs officer in Khamenei's office, who acts as their primary liaison
The group’s media operations are supported by the Union of Islamic Radio and Television, boasting an extensive organizational presence in Iran. The Persian section of HaN's website and social media accounts is notably more active and better maintained compared to its Arabic section. HaN operates 12 offices across major Iranian cities, including Tehran, Qom, and Mashhad, with a significant facility being an eight-story building located in Jannatabad, Tehran.
HaN forces receive their training at specific military facilities in Iran. These include the Pazooki Barracks in Tehran and the Imam Sadiq Brigade 83 base in Qom. These locations are significant training centers where HaN fighters are prepared under the supervision of the IRGC, enhancing their military capabilities and integration with Iranian strategic operations
HaN’s military activities are carried out under the IRGC's supervision, and IRGC special forces oversee the launching of its rockets at their targets. Hamid Fazeli, former head of Iran's Space Organization and head of Unit 340 of the IRGC's Quds Force, directs the oversight operations.
A source close to Hashd al-Shaabi shared with Iran International that the Quds Force has established a weapons manufacturing factory for HaN in Iraq, and a significant portion of these weapons are sent to Lebanon. These are the shipments that Israel frequently tries to interdict as the enter Syria and transports west towards Lebanon.
Akram al-Kaabi, the Secretary-General of HaN, has reportedly lived in Iran for a long time and travels to Iraq using a Misaq card and an Iranian passport. The Misaq card, issued to prominent figures of the Resistance Front, facilitates smooth passage through airports and highways.
According to the same source, the 47-year-old has three wives and nine children who live in two of his homes in Jannatabad and the Olympic Village area of Tehran.
He is known to frequent Iran's political circles and has met with numerous key figures, ranging from former President Ebrahim Raisi to Ahmad Alamolhoda, the Friday prayer leader of Mashhad, and Mohsen Rezaei, the Secretary of the Supreme Economic Coordination Council.
Today, the group comprises four factions. Qasim al-Jabbarin conducts attacks on Erbil Airport, while Saraya Ababil specializes in drone operations. As'hab al-Kahf, established by Hezbollah's Imad Mughniyeh, focuses on IED attacks against American forces. Saraya Awliya al-Dam targets US bases in the Persian Gulf and supports Houthi forces in Yemen.
Seven years ago, HaN announced the formation of the Golan Liberation Corps, claiming readiness to retake the Golan Heights from Israel at Syria's request.
After Hamas' attack on Israel on October 7 last year and the start of the Gaza war, Harakat al-Nujaba attempted to attack Israeli territory. Last November, the group claimed a missile attack on Eilat Port in Israel.
According to a source close to the IRGC, the organization has also established an economic commission for HaN. This commission operates offices in China and the United Arab Emirates and handles the sale of oil on behalf of the IRGC. This arrangement enables the IRGC to carry out certain financial transactions through HaN, effectively bypassing official records and maintaining a level of financial opacity.
The source also mentioned that HaN returns the proceeds from oil sales to the Quds Force because the IRGC covers all of its expenses, further highlighting the deep integration and dependency of the group on the IRGC.
Kata’ib Hezbollah: From the Badr Corps to Iran’s anti-Israel proxy
The second group declaring readiness for war with Israel is Kata'ib Hezbollah (KH). This powerful Iraqi militant group was founded by Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis in 2003.
Initially, the group focused on combating US forces in Iraq, but it later joined the Syrian civil war, fighting in support of Bashar al-Assad.
The US designated KH as a terrorist group in 2009.
According to the source close to Hashd al-Shaabi, KH traces its roots back to the Badr Corps, a Shiite militia and political party in Iraq whose fighters allied with Iran during the Iran-Iraq War.
Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis established KH by leveraging familial connections within the Badr Corps, eliminating the need for structural support from Hezbollah Lebanon.
This was the first group of militia that Tehran would send to Syria to help Assad suppress street protests.
Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the founder of the group, was killed in Iraq alongside Soleimani in a US airstrike on January 3, 2020. He was succeeded by Ahmed al-Hamidawi.
While the Islamic Republic financially supports KH, the group also engages in extensive economic activities.
According to an Iraqi source, they purchase land in Europe, sell oil, and have acquired shares in several Iranian refineries. Additionally, the group earns approximately $100 million from exporting chemical fertilizers from Iran to Iraq.
Last February, a US drone strike killed one of the group's prominent leaders, Abu Baqir al-Saadi. Following this, the group's leader, Ahmed al-Hamidawi, along with his three brothers, As'ad, Arqad, and Akhlad, fled to Iran, where they now reportedly reside.
It was previously disclosed that Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis lived with his Iranian wife on Golestan 1st Street in Tehran's affluent Pasdaran neighborhood, known for its upscale residences, commercial centers, and proximity to political and military elites.
Since the start of Israel’s war on Hamas on October 7 last year, KH has claimed responsibility for conducting more than 150 attacks against US forces.
Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada: Soleimani’s strategic contractors in Syria
Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSS) is the smallest of the three groups that have declared readiness to send forces to Lebanon.
This group announced its existence in 2013 when three of its members were killed in the suburbs of Damascus.
KSS has primarily been active in Syria, claiming to have sent 500 fighters to Damascus and Eastern Ghouta.
According to the source close to Hashd al-Shaabi, they cooperated with Soleimani in Syria as contractors, reportedly receiving $2 million for maintaining a front and advancing five kilometers.
Recently, KSS has sought to attract more attention by attacking American targets.
The group’s leader, Abu Alaa al-Walai, welcomed Ebrahim Raisi's selection as Iran’s President in 2021, stating that his "victory" would bolster IRGC-supported militant groups.
KSS has about 3,000 fighters and receives funding from the IRGC's Quds Force, though it also receives payments from the Iraqi government as part of the Hashd al-Shaabi.
The group maintains close ties with Lebanon’s Hezbollah, benefiting from financial and intelligence support.
Last year, the US designated KSS as a terrorist organization.
In a statement on its website, the US Treasury said it is sanctioning "nearly 50 entities and individuals that constitute multiple branches of a sprawling 'shadow banking' network used by Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) and IRGC to gain illicit access to the international financial system and process the equivalent of billions of dollars since 2020."
"MODAFL and the IRGC engage in several commercial revenue-generating activities, most notably the sale of Iranian oil and petrochemicals," it added.
According to the statement, "networks of Iranian exchange houses and dozens of foreign cover companies under their control enable MODAFL and the IRGC to disguise the revenue they generate abroad that is then available to use for a range of MODAFL and IRGC activities, including the procurement and development of advanced weapons systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles."
The US Treasury says the revenue made through this network "also supports the provision of weapons and funding to Iran’s regional proxy groups, including Yemen’s Houthis, who continue a campaign of reckless attacks on global shipping, as well as the transfer of UAVs to Russia for use in its war of aggression against Ukraine."
Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Wally Adeyemo said the US is taking action against "a vast shadow banking system used by Iran’s military to launder billions of dollars of oil proceeds and other illicit revenue."
“We have sanctioned hundreds of targets involved in Iran’s illicit oil and petrochemical-related activity since President Biden took office, and we will continue to pursue those who seek to finance Iran’s destabilizing terrorist activities. We continue to work with allies and partners, as well as the global financial industry, to increase vigilance against the movement of funds supporting terrorism," Adeyemo said.
Iran's Defense Ministry "is responsible for development, production, funding, and logistics for all of Iran’s defense industries," according to the US Treasury. "Iran’s budget allots billions of dollars’ worth of Iranian oil to the Iranian armed forces to sell abroad in order to supplement their budgets."
On top of the list of sanctions is Iranian-Turkish money-changer Seyyed Mohammad Mosanna’i Najibi who, through his Iranian branch of business Sadaf Exchange, "has managed several currency exchange businesses in Iran and Türkiye in coordination with the MODAFL Supply Division for the purpose of bypassing US and European sanctions on Iran," the Treasury said.
Omid Sepah Exchange Company and Hekmat Iranian Exchange & Foreign Currency Services Company, and Iranian money-changers Asadollah Seifi, Ramin Jalalian, Reza Mir Mohammad Ali and Siavash Nourian are among other key individuals and entities sanctioned by the US Treasury on Tuesday.
The Treasury's OFAC says it has also designated 27 cover companies based in Hong Kong, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the Marshall Islands that are controlled by Najibi and used to obfuscate the MODAFL Supply Division’s international financial activity.
Iran's IRGC has utilized foreign currency exchange offices in Türkiye and Iraq as well as Hong Kong, among other countries, to circumvent US sanctions and fund its regional proxies.
Last year, the United States set a reward of up to $15 million for receiving information on the illicit financial network of Iran's Revolutionary Guard (IRGC).
"The IRGC uses numerous financial mechanisms to fund its activities, including front companies and other entities that help it bypass US and international sanctions," the US State Department said last year.
The Biden administration has already issued dozens of sanction designations on companies and individuals affiliated with the Revolutionary Guard in several countries.
In the absence of accurate and unbiased polls and surveys, predicting what might happen—even in the short term—is always challenging. This lack of reliable data makes it difficult for anyone to have a clear understanding of imminent events.
A few days before the voting day in Iran's snap presidential election, it remains uncertain who will stay in the race. Four of the six candidates—Majles Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Tehran Mayor Alireza Zakani, former nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili, and Martyrs Foundation Chief Amir Hossein Ghazizadeh Hashemi—are from the same camp. If they all remain in the competition, no one in the conservative camp is likely to win.
None of them is meaningfully more popular than others in the same camp, although Ghalibaf and Jalili are the two forerunners. The other two are so sure about their unpopularity that they do not do any campaigning, other than the free campaigning the state television offers all candidates.
Although none of the polls and surveys can be fully trusted at this time, all available figures—both genuine and fabricated—indicate that turnout will significantly impact the candidates' standings. Most suggest that a lower turnout increases the likelihood of a conservative victory, while a high turnout would favor the pro-reform candidate, Massoud Pezeshkian.
A turnout under 40 percent gives Jalili a strong chance of winning, potentially even in the first round. A 50 percent turnout puts Ghalibaf, a slightly less hardline candidate, in a better position. A 60 percent turnout would likely ensure Pezeshkian's victory in the first round, eliminating the need for a runoff election.
The reason is that over 60% of voters have shunned the ballot box in the last two elections due to deep disillusionment. The more this disillusioned majority votes, the more support relative moderates are likely to receive.
However, despite all the fuss about a consolidated conservative camp, they are badly divided. Their combination in the election, shows that it is every man for himself. Some journalists say there will be a conservative figureheads' gathering on Tuesday or Wednesday and three of the conservative candidates will withdraw in the interest of the more popular individual. No one yet knows for sure whether Jalili or Ghalibaf will remain in the race.
From the perspective of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Ghalibaf is the preferable choice because, unlike Jalili, he lacks an ideological agenda and political party affiliation. Jalili's domestic and alleged foreign connections make him a suspect in Khamenei's eyes, as he leaves no room for doubts regarding his men's loyalty.
During the past days, while mudslinging against Ghalibaf has been diminishing, videos surfaced on social media in which former presidents Ebrahim Raisi and Hassan Rouhani showed Jalili in a bad light. Raisi said in his video that he offered many jobs to Jalili but he did not accept any one of them. These comments are extremely damaging as Raisi' is being treated like a saint following his death.
Rouhani on the other hand said that all members of the Supreme Council of National Security endorsed Former Foreign Minister Javad Zarif's way out of the diplomatic impasse over Iran's nuclear deal with big powers, but Jalili obstructed the plan and the negotiations failed.
The two videos could have not surfaced in a worse time. Many social media figures believe that they ruined Jalili's chances and brought Ghalibaf to a position to be one of the main two contestants in the upcoming election.
Current estimates of a low turnout might prove wrong. As Qom Seminarian Mohammad Taqi Akbarzadeh has noted, if officials misinterpret the people's votes as wholehearted support for government policies and fail to implement necessary changes, the public is likely to express their opposition through street protests and rebellion.