Disqualified Presidential Candidates in Iran Lodge Protests

Former Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, who has an extensive resume across different organs of the Iranian system, was disqualified for the second time since 2021. This represents another humiliation for Larijani and speaks to his family’s growing ostracization from power. His brother Sadegh Larijani, while chairman of the Expediency Council, was so disgusted by the Guardian Council’s decision to disapprove of Ali’s candidacy in 2021 that he resigned as a member. Among the concerns of the system is likely that Larijani’s daughter Fatemeh Ardeshir Larijani has been living in the United States for years and is now an assistant professor at Emory University School of Medicine.

In the end, the Guardian Council approved the candidacies of six men: Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Saeed Jalili, Amir-Hossein Ghazizadeh Hashemi, Alireza Zakani, Mostafa Pourmohammadi, and Masoud Pezeshkian. All are conservative, aside from Pezeshkian, who is a ‘reformist.’ This is a similar dynamic to the seven 2021 presidential finalists, where the Guardian Council allowed one token reformist Mohsen Mehralizadeh, a former vice president under Mohammad Khatami’s administration, to run as well as pragmatist former Central Bank Governor Abdolnaser Hemmati in a heavily-choreographed win for Raisi, the system’s favored candidate.

Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf

Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf has been preparing for the presidency for years. He has occupied multiple senior command positions in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), including as deputy commander of the Basij, head of its Khatam Al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters, and commander of the IRGC Air Force. During student protests in 1999, Ghalibaf signed onto a letter with other IRGC commanders threatening then-President Mohammad Khatami if more force was not used to suppress the demonstrations.

Later, Ghalibaf became head of Iran’s police, which is a position traditionally occupied by an IRGC commander. An audio recording emerged where Ghalibaf bragged to the Basij that he beat protesters with wooden sticks on the back of a motorbike in 1999 and that he ordered police to fire at protesters during campus demonstrations in 2003.

Afterwards, he became mayor of Tehran and rebranded himself as a technocratic manager. During his tenure, Ghalibaf hobnobbed with world leaders at the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2008. While there he told The New York Times, “We don’t need any atomic weapons or unconventional weapons” and was marketed as an “authoritarian modernizer.” He sought to distance himself from his old rival Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who was then a firebrand president, by expressing a willingness for dialogue with the United States.

Ghalibaf has run unsuccessfully for president for years. When he campaigned for the office in 2005, leaked U.S. cables circulated about how the Supreme Leader’s son Mojtaba Khamenei, who is now considered a contender to succeed his father as supreme leader, “was reportedly the backbone” of Ghalibaf’s bids for political office. One indicated, “Mojtaba is said to help Ghalibaf as an advisor, financier, and provider of senior-level political support.” Although Mojtaba later convinced his father to switch his support to Ahmadinejad at the last minute, viewing him as more reliable—a prediction he would likely later regret given Ahmadinejad’s falling out with Khamenei.

But this shows Ghalibaf still enjoys a strong relationship with Khamenei’s inner circle, especially as he is reportedly a relative of the supreme leader. Both hail from Khorasan in the northeast, with Ghalibaf being born in Torqabeh near Mashhad, where Khamenei hails from.

In 2020, Ghalibaf became speaker of parliament. During his tenure, he presided over parliament’s passage—despite President Hassan Rouhani’s objections—of the Strategic Action Law to Lift Sanctions and Safeguard the National Interests of Iran, which mandated aggressive steps to accelerate Iran’s nuclear program and restrict International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring.

He has been implicated over the years in spectacular corruption scandals. An audio recording emerged in 2022 of Ghalibaf being engaged in a cover-up of embezzlement during his time as mayor of Tehran of around $3 billion. Ghalibaf suggested signing a fake contract to conceal its disappearance. Photos also emerged in 2022 of Ghalibaf’s family returning from a shopping trip in Turkey with a large layette set which generated controversy given his previous criticisms of a candidate for president of buying baby clothes in Italy and at a time when Iranians were struggling under crushing economic mismanagement. Ghalibaf’s son Es’haq was also denied a permanent residency application in Canada. Leaked documents emerged which showcased hundreds of thousands of dollars in his bank accounts abroad. Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf himself has been sanctioned by Canada.

Thus far in this cycle, powerful elements in the IRGC are promoting Ghalibaf’s candidacy, with Tasnim, an IRGC-affiliated outlet, defending him. Journalists who revealed Ghalibaf’s corruption were also conveniently arrested this week as Ghalibaf entered the presidential contest. If successful, Ghalibaf would be the first president under Khamenei to have served as a senior career commander of the IRGC. Having Ghalibaf in the presidency would thus ensure IRGC equities are protected in a succession process should Khamenei, at 85 years old, pass away during his tenure.

Saeed Jalili

Saeed Jalili has been nicknamed “a living martyr” after losing one of his legs during the Iran-Iraq War as a member of the Basij. Like Khamenei, he was born in Mashhad, and holds a Ph.D. from Imam Sadegh University, an ideological training ground for the regime. His dissertation was entitled “The Foundation of Islamic Political Thought in the Quran.”

Jalili has held a series of positions spanning the Office of the Supreme Leader, Iran’s Foreign Ministry, and on the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). They include head of Iran’s Foreign Ministry’s Inspection Office, head of the Foreign Ministry’s US Affairs Office, a senior director in Khamenei’s office, deputy foreign minister for European and American Affairs, secretary of the SNSC, and later the supreme leader’s personal representative on the SNSC.

CIA Director Bill Burns once described Jalili in his memoir as “stupefyingly opaque” and that he did not envy his students. Jalili in 2022 reportedly advocated for Iran increasing uranium enrichment to 90%, which is weapons-grade. He is an ideologue, steeped in the theocracy’s revolutionary ethos. Like Ghalibaf, Jalili is sanctioned by Canada. But Ghalibaf has reportedly been trying to sabotage Jalili’s chances—positioning himself as a more pragmatic hardliner.

Amir-Hossein Ghazizadeh Hashemi

Amir-Hossein Ghazizadeh Hashemi is a physician by training. A former member of parliament, he served as a member of its presidium and first deputy speaker. He ran for the presidency in 2021 but lost. Ebrahim Raisi later named him as a vice president and head of the Martyrs and Veterans Affairs Foundation. This Iranian parastatal foundation is under sanctions for directing financial resources to terrorist organizations, particularly Hezbollah. It has numerous businesses, especially in Lebanon, which are directed by Hezbollah’s Executive Council, whose holdings across various sectors provide the terrorist organization with vital funding. Martyrs and Veterans Affairs Foundation officials also took part in Hezbollah operations against Israel during the 2006 Lebanon War.

Alireza Zakani

Alireza Zakani has held a series of posts in the Islamic Republic, including as head of the IRGC’s Student Basij Organization (SBO), a member of parliament, president of the Parliament’s Research Center, and currently mayor of Tehran. He is under UK sanctions for the commission of serious human rights abuses in Iran and generated controversy when he visited Brussels in 2023 given his record. When he was a legislator, Zakani headed a parliamentary commission on the nuclear deal, where he emerged as a leading critic of the negotiations with the P5+1. As mayor of Tehran, Zakani has spearheaded the Noor Plan to forcibly enforce the hijab on Iranian women. His tenure in Tehran has witnessed multiple scandals, including around $336 million missing. Zakani reportedly has multiple wives, with embarrassing personal revelations recently emerging on the subject. His decision to support construction of mosques in public parks also generated controversy.

Zakani ran unsuccessfully for president in 2021. Ahmadinejad rose from mayor of Tehran to become president in 2005. However, Zakani faces an uphill climb with more established conservatives like Ghalibaf and Jalili on the field. That is not to mention that Zakani, who was Ghalibaf’s campaign manager in his unsuccessful 2005 presidential bid, now running against his old boss will make for an awkward dynamic.

Mostafa Pourmohammadi

Born in Qom, Mostafa Pourmohammadi is the sole cleric to be approved to run for the presidency in 2024. He attended the Haqqani Seminary and served in a series of positions including as revolutionary prosecutor in Masjed Soleyman, Hormozgan, and Khorasan; deputy intelligence minister and the Intelligence Ministry’s representative in Evin Prison; head of the social-political bureau in the Office of the Supreme Leader; and head of the General Inspectorate Organization. He later became interior minister in the conservative Ahmadinejad presidency and justice minister in the pragmatic Rouhani administration. Thus, Pourmohammadi has a considerable bureaucratic pedigree across political factions, Khamenei’s office, the judiciary, and executive branch. He shares career overlaps with Jalili, who also was a member of Khamenei’s staff and Ebrahim Raisi, who likewise served as head of the General Inspectorate Organization.

Pourmohammadi is notorious to Iranians given his service with Raisi on a Death Commission which greenlighted the executions of thousands of political prisoners in 1988. He is cognizant, however, of waning public support for the Islamic Republic, admitting in 2023 that “popular satisfaction has declined” and that “the young generation has distanced itself from us.” Yet he was disqualified from running for the Assembly of Experts, the chamber that will choose Khamenei’s successor, in 2024. This is despite Pourmohammadi having proved loyal to Khamenei in disclosing electoral irregularities to him without Ahmadinejad’s knowledge, prompting his dismissal as interior minister in 2008.

Masoud Pezeshkian

Masoud Pezeshkian is the sole ‘reformist’ permitted to run in this election. A heart surgeon by training, he previously served as health minister in the administration of Mohammad Khatami. In 2003, the parliament tried to impeach him unsuccessfully, citing incompetence in his appointments, inappropriate use of a loan, and other issues. His experience during this time tracked with other Khatami ministers who were targeted by conservatives for the reformist tendencies of his presidency. Later, Pezeshkian was elected to parliament and rose to become a deputy speaker.

He has been outspoken in criticizing the government over the issue of hijab enforcement. After the murder of Mahsa Amini in 2022, he told an interviewer that “we want our children to be modest, but if our behavior makes them hate our religion, we should at the very least refrain from continuing with this method.” He has been critical of parliament members chanting death to certain countries, arguing “we need to tolerate others and work and collaborate with the world.” He has also been a supporter of the Iran nuclear deal.

Yet Pezeshkian, while condemnatory of the Raisi administration as being incapable of solving Iran’s problems, has not crossed the line in publicly complaining about Khamenei. He has also championed core regime principles that the United States is the root cause of tension in the region and hailed cooperation with Russia as both countries are subject to sanctions.

Pezeshkian will make a bid to generate excitement and voter turnout given his ‘reformist’ roots—his campaign motto is already “For Iran,” which likely seeks to exploit the Shervin Hajipour song ‘Baraye’ that became the anthem of the Woman, Life, Freedom movement. He is already copying gimmicks of Abdolnaser Hemmati, who lost the 2021 presidential race. Back then, Hemmati pledged to make Javad Zarif the first vice president or foreign minister again. During this cycle, Pezeshkian has hinted about his intention to include figures like Zarif in his administration if he wins. Zarif has in turn endorsed him. But the failed experience of Khatami’s presidency looms large in the memory of many Iranians, who believe the Islamic Republic must end, and that reformists and conservatives are two sides of the same corrupted, incompetent, and repressive coin.

"Despite positive opinions from responsible bodies and the judiciary's ruling against some past claims of the council, the Guardian Council, through an opaque mechanism, has created an obstacle in the path of such cooperation," Larijani declared in a statement.

He added, "I had hoped that with your support, we could overcome the obstacles and pave the way for Iran's national development."

Critics quickly highlighted the irony in Larijani's statement. "Read Ali Larijani's statement about his disqualification; this guy couldn't even tell the Guardian Council 'boo' in defense of his own rights, yet he was planning to save the Iranian people. The others are just like our own Larijani, don't over inflate them," wrote a user.

The Guardian Council in Iran plays a crucial role in the country's political landscape, particularly through its authoritarian power to vet and disqualify candidates for various elections, including the presidential race. Out of 80 candidates who registered for the upcoming June 28 snap election following the sudden death of President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash, 74 were axed by the council.

Comprising twelve members—six appointed by the Supreme Leader and six jurists nominated by the judiciary and approved by the parliament—the council is ultimately tasked with carrying out the wishes of the Supreme Leader.

Opponents from both constitutional monarchy and republican spectrums condemned the Islamic Republic’s highly engineered vote to pick a successor for the late President Ebrahim Raisi, who was killed in a helicopter crash last month.

The political coalition "Coordination for a Secular Democratic Republic in Iran" released a statement emphasizing that boycotting the “pseudo-elections” signifies a renewed commitment to the "Woman, Life, Freedom" movement. The coalition stated, "The ultimate outcome of the continued existence of this regime is the spread of extremism both within and beyond Iran's borders."

The 12-member unelected Guardian Council, which vets candidates, approved only six out of more than 80 who registered to run. Key figures, including former parliament speaker Ali Larijani and former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, were disqualified.

The Tehran-based website Khabaronline asked readers to identify whose absence they felt most keenly among the list of qualified candidates. The most frequently mentioned names were Ahmadinejad, Larijani, and other ‘reformists’.

Ghalibaf vs. Pezeshkian

Mohammad Ali Abtahi, former ‘reformist’ President Mohammad Khatami's chief of staff, advanced the view that the only ‘reform’ candidate, Massoud Pezeshkian, can become one of the two top choices. "If the society intends to participate in the elections, there is a possibility of serious competition between Pezeshkian and Ghalibaf."

Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf appears to be the top candidate for the core of the ruling regime, including perhaps a large stratum of the Revolutionary Guard. Pezeshkian can become a threat to Ghalibaf only if the “gray strata” of voters, who have stayed away from the ballot boxes in the last three elections, decide to turn out to vote this time.

In an online survey by Tabnak news website in Tehran, out of more than 2,500 participants, 66% voted for Pezeshkian and only 14% for Qalibaf, which is close to Abtahi's opinion. Even when the number of respondents increased to more than 6000, the ratio was almost the same. Although this is not a reliable survey, it presents a sense of how domestic users reacted to the news. The question is if the general public, who has lost trust in the political system, will once again turn out to vote for a ‘reformist.’

Over the past 28 years, 'reformists' or 'moderates' held the presidency for 16 years, yet had no significant impact on the core policies pursued by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Iran's nuclear dispute with the West, its malign activities in the region, and its centralized and inefficient economic system all remained unchanged.

Nevertheless, Gholamhossein Karbaschi, the former mayor of Tehran and one of the reformists, also pitched for Pezeshkian: "There should be a bipolarity between Pezeshkian and Ghalibaf. Mr. Pezeshkian is in a better position than Ghalibaf," whose name has been tarnished by negative news about corruption, he insisted.

The reformists vying for executive positions

The 'reformists' were largely barred from having significant candidates in the parliamentary elections in March and couldn't compete effectively. However, the approval of Pezeshkian as a presidential candidate has given them renewed hope. As a result, they are now rallying behind him both collectively and individually.

Mohammad Reza Aref, who was the leader of the reformist minority faction in the parliament (2016-2020), referring to the special importance of the upcoming elections, considered the presence of Pezeshkian a valuable opportunity for the people and the regime and announced his support for him. Karbaschi's support is also key because he is one of the most important donors of the reformist camp. Marginalized reformists want to return to the executive management field with Pezeshkian in charge of the executive branch.

Election campaigns that failed

Immediately after the qualification results were announced, political campaigns began on government outlets. On Monday, the lottery ceremony for radio and television campaigns for the six candidates was broadcast live on state TV's Channel 1, following the evening news, to generate excitement for the elections.

Among the disqualified candidates, Ali Larijani was active on social media. A few hours before the news of his disqualification, he announced that he had received more than one million messages through domestic and foreign social networks. This message did not have much effect on the statement of the Guardian Council. Most users reacted to Larijani's tweet with skepticism.

Ahmadinejad's frequent presence in gatherings in his Narmak neighborhood and Tehran's old bazaar also did not help him gain the Guardian Council's approval for his candidacy. The Guardian Council seeks a subdued and quiet election, and his actions contributed to his disqualification. The selection of qualified candidates is reminiscent of the non-competitive, low-participation presidential elections of 2021.

The move has raised concerns about the misuse of municipal resources for personal political gain. Zakani had previously informed the city council that he saw no need to appoint a successor for himself in the municipality during the election campaign period, with the decision widely criticized as an attempt to maintain his control over municipal resources while campaigning.

Forouzandeh relayed an "official directive" from Zakani on Monday stating that "under no circumstances should the resources of Tehran Municipality be used in the election campaigns of any candidates, including himself." 

Zakani's political career has been marred by aggressive tactics, particularly against reformists, and his tenure as mayor has been fraught with controversy. Disputes over urban policies, such as mosque constructions in parks and enforcing hijab on public transport, have sparked internal conflicts within the conservative camp and the city council. 

Financial and familial scandals, including nepotism involving his son-in-law and questionable financial dealings by his daughter, have further tainted his administration.

Massoud Pezeshkian, a lawmaker running as the sole ‘reformist’ candidate replied that he would welcome people “who have experience, knowledge and are effective,” without directly affirming or rejecting Zarif’s possible appointment.

Pezeshkian is being promoted by some on social media as an alternative to five other candidates who are clearly on the conservative side of the political spectrum. Whether the highly manipulated election will give Pezeshkian a fair chance, or whether millions of disillusioned voters would rally around him are entirely different questions.

In the last three elections, in 2020, 2021 and March 2024, a substantial segment of voters stayed away from the ballot box. Turnout was substantially below 50%, although amid government control over information it is hard to exactly know how many people voted. In the March parliamentary elections, officials announced that around 40% of eligible voters participated, but many regard this as an exaggerated tally by those who are in control.

Zarif has not commented on his willingness to re-enter the government. However, he was one of over 150 'reformist' figures who signed a letter last week, urging the regime to moderate its behavior and encouraging people to vote. 'Reformists' as their label denotes, are committed to the essence of the Islamic Republic as a political system but cautiously criticize some of its practices.

For example, in the letter, signed by many prominent 'reformists' homage is paid to Iran's missile and drome attack on Israel, harshly condemning the United States for its support for the Jewish state. However, the signatories criticize the regime for its internal policies favoring hardliners and creating a rift with the people.

The make-up of six candidates, out of 80 aspirants, approved by the unelected Guardian Council, which is controlled by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, is not much different from the 2021 election. The list is dominated by conservatives and hardliners loyal to Khamenei, with one ‘reformist’ included who has to face difficult odds if 10 million more voters do not turn up to push him ahead of others.

But voters have tested what many call “the regime’s game.” In order to increase turnout and boost the Islamic Republic’s waning legitimacy, sometimes a reformist is included to attract voters. Even if that candidate wins, an array of conservative state institutions, media and pressure groups launch obstructive campaigns to make the elected official ineffective.

This is what happened to President Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005), who faced crisis after crisis during his tenure, mostly manufactured by hardliners. The same awaited ‘centrist’ Hassan Rouhani (2013-2021), who was harassed and subjected to incessant attacks, while having little control over key economic and diplomatic decisions.

These two presidents were elected by large turnouts encouraged by ‘reformist’ groups and parties. However, voters realized that no meaningful change could take place, even if a ‘reformist’ is president or ‘moderates’ dominate the parliament.

The question now is whether Pezeshkian, a physician seemingly untainted by corruption scandals, can motivate "the gray strata" to come out and vote. If he secures a decisive victory, he might consider appointing Javad Zarif. However, it's important to note that Khamenei has the final say on most ministerial appointments. If he agrees with Zarif’s appointment, it could mean an inclination to use his diplomatic experience to find a way out of back-breaking sanctions that have paralyzed the economy.