Iran's Escalating Subsidence Threatens Key Infrastructure

The advocacy group United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) has disclosed through satellite imagery that two vessels, HECATE and ELVA, are involved in the unloading of sanctioned Iranian oil at Dongjiakou port in China.

According to Claire Jungman, Chief of Staff at UANI, "HECATE was loaded from the Iranian tanker DOVER on March 25 and was designated as an SDGT (Specially Designated Global Terrorist) entity on April 4. ELVA, known for previous sanctions violations, loaded oil from Kharg Island, Iran, on April 2."

Jungman added, "China's continued disregard for counterterrorism sanctions is enabling Iran's financing of terrorism."

Iran utilizes a complex network of entities and intermediaries to sell its oil to third parties, thereby evading the imposed sanctions. Iran reportedly channels some of its oil revenues to state organizations such as the Revolutionary Guard to support their budgets indirectly, circumventing direct financial allocations.

The transactions are typically managed by state entities and business figures closely linked to the regime, generating significant profits.

Despite international sanctions, Iran's oil exports have seen a considerable increase, from 400,000 barrels per day post-2019 US sanctions to over 1,500,000 barrels per day currently.

Behrouz Mohebbi Najmabadi, a member of parliament’s budget committee, said in December, "By utilizing the capacities of neighboring and special allied countries such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS, and regional agreements, today Iran's crude oil sales have exceeded 1.5 million barrels per day."

During his visit, Barzani engaged with key figures of the government, including the Supreme Leader, heads of executive and legislative bodies, the commander-in-chief of the IRGC, the foreign minister, and the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council.

The timing and nature of Barzani's visit, coming months after the IRGC's missile attack on the Kurdistan Region, raise questions about its motives. The high-profile meetings suggest that the discussions likely focused on mutual security concerns.

This trip took place against a backdrop of three significant issues: Firstly, Iran's missile and drone attacks on targets within the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, purportedly aimed at Israeli agents, elicited protests from both Kurdish authorities and the Iraqi central government. Secondly, the upcoming parliamentary elections in the Kurdistan Region, scheduled for June 10, 2024, face controversy as the Iraqi Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) has announced its intention to boycott the elections. Lastly, the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) has made a request for the disarmament and complete expulsion of Iranian Kurdish armed groups sheltering in the Kurdish regions of Iraq.

The backdrop of recent events provides context for the objectives of the Iraqi Kurdish leaders' trip to Iran, though the outcomes remain uncertain due to the reticence of both parties involved.

This visit aimed to achieve three main objectives: 1) renegotiate mutual security arrangements, 2) mitigate threats posed by Tehran against the Iraqi Kurdish region, and 3) facilitate mediation by the Islamic Republic among conflicting political entities to reduce regional tensions.

In the realm of security, the Kurdistan Regional Government, whose high-ranking members have maintained long-standing relationships with Tehran, seeks to halt the regime's missile attacks. For this purpose, President Barzani aimed to reassure Iranian authorities that the regional government would not permit any group, faction, or country to launch actions against Iran or other neighboring nations. Additionally, following the unsuccessful independence referendum in 2017, the Kurdish authorities are attempting to mitigate Iranian threats through dialogue, promoting a narrative of a united Iraq.

In terms of political mediation, the Kurdish authorities are seeking Iran's intervention to reconcile differences between the two major Kurdish parties—the Iraqi Kurdistan Patriotic Union and the Kurdistan Democratic Party—and the Iraqi central government, particularly concerning disputes over regional elections.

Which objectives can be achieved?

The first goal—re-establishing a stable security relationship—seems attainable given the generally tension-free relations between the regional authorities and the Islamic Republic, unless the latter opts to demonstrate its strength by targeting structures within the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. However, there are significant doubts regarding the Iraqi Kurds' ability to fully avoid provocations from the Iranian regime, which sometimes launches attacks on its neighbors for reasons of prestige and maintaining its image.

Regarding the third objective, Tehran’s influence is constrained; it tends to favor military actions over diplomatic engagements with countries like the United States and Israel, and often does not take steps towards easing regional tensions. This preference for military approaches over diplomacy underscores the challenges in achieving mediation and conflict resolution in the region.

Reactions

Two prominent reactions to Barzani’s visit to Iran have emerged on social media. The first comes from Kurds who oppose Iran’s Islamic government; they expressed their discontent with Barzani for seemingly disregarding Tehran’s attacks on Kurds in the region and accused him of pandering during his meeting with Khamenei. Additionally, some Iranian opposition constitutional monarchists are also displeased with the visit, perceiving it as potentially encouraging separatist sentiments among Iraqi Kurds, which they fear might influence Iranian Kurds as well.

In another development, Iraqi journalist Ahmad Abdulsadeh reported that during the visit, Barzani provided a written commitment to the Iranian authorities, wherein Erbil officials pledged to disarm "terrorist groups" and ensure their removal from the Kurdistan Region. This commitment reportedly also includes a promise to curb attacks on the Iranian regime by media outlets like Rudaw and Kurdistan 24, and to control their coordination with foreign media entities. However, implementing these commitments could prove challenging and may lead to internal tensions within the region.

A fatwa by Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei says it is Makrooh (disliked but not sinful) to urinate while standing or on a hard surface, forcing men to use the pit latrines instead.

The move has sparked widespread discourse and critique on social media. One user expressed frustration, remarking, "This is ridiculous! If they'd spend more time worrying about the economy, the starving people, the water shortage, they wouldn't have to worry about how men urinate."

Another user sarcastically said, "I hope the level of your demands always remains this profoundly high, and that your minds never get bogged down with demands for trivial matters like city beautification, increased security, or economic improvements. Demands should only be for issues like hijab and the Islamic way of dressing, as these are what truly elevate people's quality of life."

The removal of urinals is just one example of how the Iranian regime continues to exert control over the minor details of the population's personal lives, from dress codes and family planning to restroom habits.

"This is unwise, hostile, and contrary to accepted international legal standards," Nasser Kanaani, the ministry's spokesman said, responding to the Canadian parliamentary action.

On Wednesday, the House of Commons passed a non-binding motion to designate the IRGC as a terrorist organization and called for the expulsion of approximately 700 Iranian agents believed to be operating in Canada. The decision follows a report from a House committee but does not obligate the Canadian government to act on the recommendation.

Despite the non-binding nature of the vote, it symbolizes a significant political stance from Canada, which has seen gradual movements towards labeling the IRGC as a terrorist group, a policy Canada has been edging towards since at least 2012.

More than a year after the Woman, Life, Freedom movement in Iran in 2022, and persistent appeals from the diaspora to prevent regime-affiliated officials from entering Canada, the Canadian government has started to implement measures to restrict entry and initiate deportation processes for these individuals.

The diaspora continues to argue that the current actions are inadequate. They believe that including the IRGC on the terrorist list would hold its members, who have acquired Canadian citizenship, accountable for crimes committed abroad, thereby subjecting them to more severe penalties.

The United States, having designated the IRGC as a terrorist organization in 2019, has called for international cooperation to combat the IRGC's alleged global terrorism activities. Last year, the US also found Iran to be the world's number one state sponsor of terrorism.

The IRGC was established after the 1979 Iranian revolution and has grown to be a significant force in Iran, incorporating military, political, and economic power.

Ayatollah Nasser Makarem Shirazi, a hardline cleric holding one of the highest ranks in the Iranian regime’s Shiite clerical system, conveyed to President Ebrahim Raeisi during a meeting on Friday the urgent need for the government to curb the “rampant inflation.”

"People are struggling with soaring housing prices. A solution must be found because housing plays a vital role in the nation's well-being," Makarem Shirazi emphasized.

Additionally, he addressed issues such as escalating food costs, dwindling purchasing power, and exchange rate volatility, stating, “the government must tackle these challenges.”

Hossein Noori Hamedani, a conservative grand ayatollah in Iran, echoed similar sentiments on Friday, informing Raisi, “everywhere you go, people lament the high cost and difficulty of life. It has become challenging for individuals to make ends meet."

Yesterday, the Supreme Leader's chief of staff, Gholamhossein Mohammadi Golpayegani, also acknowledged Iran's economic struggles. While attributing them to sanctions, Golpayegani urged Raisi to find a solution: "We are facing challenges due to sanctions, but the government will find ways to overcome them."

Religious figures, who have traditionally supported the Raisi administration and its hard-line policies, have expressed concern amid a backdrop of inflation exceeding 50%.

As of last month, Iran's Central Bank reported a 52.3% inflation rate for 2023, while gasoline remains in short supply despite the country's abundant oil reserves.

Although the economy was already suffering due to international sanctions related to Iran's nuclear weapons programs and support for regional terror groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, which have little connection to Raisi's government, no one seemed to acknowledge the role of the Supreme Leader and instead placed blame on him.

Despite the clergy's criticism of the government and apparent alignment with the people, many harbor pent-up resentment against the clergy as a whole, especially in light of the violent crackdown on women for enforcing the hijab since 2022, which is associated with religious leaders and the harsh, oppressive doctrine of the Islamic Republic.

The dire state of the economy has worsened due to recent foreign policy decisions by the Islamic Republic.

In the first two weeks of April, Tehran's foreign exchange market experienced an unprecedented surge, with the dollar briefly hitting 700,000 rials amid escalating tensions between Iran and Israel. In 1978, a dollar was equivalent to 70 rials.

Over the years, the devaluation of the Iranian rial has pushed millions of Iranians into poverty.