Iran's Rezaei dismisses reports of US talks, demands acceptance of seven condition
Iran's security chief Mohsen Rezaei on Monday accused Washington of spreading false reports about negotiations with Tehran and demanded that the United States accept Iran's seven conditions in a post on X.
“The war on Iran has already wrecked the US government. But Washington flails like a desperate gambler,” Rezaei wrote.
“FOLD YOUR HAND. STOP manufacturing FAKE NEWS about imaginary talks,” he added, rejecting reports of negotiations.
Rezaei also called on Washington to recognize what he described as a new regional order in West Asia.
“Time to SURRENDER to the seven conditions Iran has repeatedly set out,” he said.
An Iranian flag flies above Tehran's sprawling skyline, shrouded in haze, November 9, 2026
Four Iranian reformist intellectuals have urged Tehran to seize an opportunity for diplomacy following Donald Trump's midterm election defeat, while warning that the US president could respond to his political setback by escalating rather than ending the war.
Writing in three articles published in the reformist newspaper Etemad on Sunday, November 8, Mohammad-Javad Haghshenas, sociologist Mahmoud Sadri, international relations analyst Alireza Ghandriz and political analyst Alireza Rajaei offered differing assessments of what Democratic control of Congress could mean for negotiations.
Their shared premise is that the elections have raised the domestic cost of the war for Trump without removing his authority to wage it. Trump himself acknowledged that “part of it was Iran,” while defending his decision to attack.
Haghshenas, a former leader of the National Trust Party, offered the most optimistic assessment, arguing that Tehran should move quickly rather than wait for uncertain political developments in Washington.
Citing reports of a purported letter from Vice President JD Vance proposing direct talks, Haghshenas argued that Vance, a potential contender for the 2028 Republican presidential nomination, had a political interest in ending a war that has damaged his party.
Echoing Qatar's prime minister, he urged both sides to accept a workable agreement rather than hold out for an ideal one.
Making a deal politically possible
Sadri and Ghandriz, writing jointly, argued that any agreement must be politically defensible in both Tehran and Washington.
They warned that Democratic opposition to Trump's handling of the war should not be mistaken for opposition to pressure on Iran.
President George W. Bush, they wrote, responded to the Republican defeat in the 2006 midterm elections by ordering a military surge in Iraq rather than withdrawing.
Citing the gradual normalisation of US-Vietnam relations in 1995 as a model, they proposed starting with limited humanitarian and maritime cooperation before expanding civil, academic and business ties.
Above all, they warned that presenting an agreement in Iran as an American surrender would undermine the very figures in Washington whose support would be needed to sustain it.
The danger of a wounded Trump
Rajaei offered the most guarded assessment, comparing Trump to a political gambler who might raise the stakes rather than accept a visible defeat. He stressed that he was describing political behaviour, not making a psychological judgment.
He outlined three possible scenarios: a limited agreement, continued pressure through sanctions and military threats, or renewed escalation triggered by failed negotiations, Israeli pressure or miscalculation.
Rather than trying to predict Trump's next move, Rajaei urged Tehran to strengthen crisis management, civilian resilience and transparent public communication.
His warning comes as Washington continues to combine diplomatic signals with military and economic pressure.
On the eve of the midterms, Trump said a deal with Iran “could happen,” and Tehran has since conveyed proposals through Qatari mediators. Meanwhile, the US naval blockade and sanctions remain in place.
Reports of preparations for a larger US offensive and the expected arrival of an aircraft carrier group in the region have added to uncertainty.
The conflicting signals make it difficult for Tehran to distinguish genuine negotiating opportunities from attempts to extract concessions under pressure.
Trump's record of abrupt changes in negotiating positions, including his public rejection of Iran's account of the Islamabad memorandum in June, adds to the risks of relying on a sweeping agreement rather than limited, reciprocal steps.
Each reversal could also strengthen Iranian hardliners who argue that Washington cannot be trusted, echoing Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei's November 4 warning against expecting changes in US policy simply because political control shifts between parties.
The three articles offer a snapshot of reformist thinking at a moment when Tehran faces competing pressures to negotiate and maintain its confrontational posture.
Haghshenas sees an opportunity that should be seized quickly. Sadri and Ghandriz argue that any agreement must withstand political opposition on both sides. Rajaei warns that Trump's electoral defeat could encourage escalation rather than compromise.
What unites them is a warning that Trump's electoral defeat is neither an Iranian victory nor a guarantee of American restraint.
The facade of a residential building in the Ekbatan complex in western Tehran, November 6, 2026
I was at a gathering of about a dozen friends in Tehran on Thursday night. It was hilariously tragic to watch a bunch of slightly tipsy people at each other's throats over an election in which none of us had a vote but whose outcome could profoundly affect our lives.
We spent much of the evening arguing about Democrats and Republicans, Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu, and whether the election of Muslim politicians in America was something to celebrate or fear.
“Imagine being told ten years ago that a man with a name like Abdul El-Sayed would become a United States senator,” one friend said. “You’d ask them what drug they were on.”
“Oh, come on,” another protested. “You think America is turning into another Iran because they've elected a progressive senator or mayor who happens to be a Muslim?”
The greatest strength of American democracy, he argued, was that voters could throw out leaders who made a mess of things, or at least take away some of their power.
Quite a few shook their heads. “The trouble is,” one said, “once political Islam gets into power, you can't necessarily get rid of it with another election.”
It was an argument familiar to anyone who has spent time around politically engaged Iranians, but there was something almost comical about hearing it unfold in a Tehran living room.
We were worrying about whether American democracy could survive the election of a Muslim politician while living in a country where our own ability to choose those who govern us has been contested for decades.
The conversation grew louder when someone admitted she was disappointed by the Democratic gains. She had been hoping that Trump and Netanyahu might finally bring about the end of the Islamic Republic.
“The Democrats will make a deal with the mullahs, and we'll be stuck with this lot for another 50 years,” she said.
Her brother was having none of it: “You seriously think Trump and Netanyahu went to war because they care about you and me? All they ever wanted was to force the regime to give them what they came for. Then they’ll walk away. And it’ll be us and the mullahs all over again.”
I have heard versions of this disagreement many times. Some people still hope that outside pressure might accomplish what years of protest have failed to achieve. Others find that hope almost unbearable, particularly after seeing what war has done to the country and how little it has changed the lives of those who survived it.
What struck me, though, was how easily everyone moved between these positions, sometimes contradicting themselves, sometimes laughing at arguments they had made quite seriously only minutes earlier. Nobody seemed especially interested in convincing anyone else.
“I don't even know why you're burning calories over this,” said one of the two friends who had barely spoken until then. “We don't even know if we'll have enough money to pay next month's rent. To hell with the American elections.”
That took some of the energy out of the argument. We could disagree all night about American politics, but there was rather less to disagree about when it came to paying the rent.
And what was the point of discussing that anyway, one friend said bitterly, as though talking about our problems might somehow make them go away.
Perhaps that is what a year of protests, crackdowns, war and unrelenting financial anxiety have done to us. We do talk about politics all the time. But most of us have stopped expecting much from it.
There was a time when conversations like this came with confident predictions. The regime would fall, a deal would be reached, sanctions would be lifted, or another protest would finally change everything. But we’ve stopped making promises about the future, even to ourselves.
None of us in that room had an answer to the question of how we would afford another month, let alone what the American elections might mean for us. But at least we could argue about the latter without having to check our bank balances.
“Avoid the pain if you can” seems to be how we hang on these days. “Take it one breath at a time.”
File photo by IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News shows Mesgarian during a speech
Iran has selected Abdolreza Masgarian, another IRGC Quds Force commander, as its next ambassador to Iraq, according to Iraqi and Iranian reporting, extending a pattern of military figures holding a diplomatic post central to Tehran’s regional influence.
The brigadier general’s reported appointment comes weeks after former foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif’s criticism of that approach resurfaced, questioning why Iran sends representatives of the Guards’ overseas operations arm to neighboring countries rather than diplomats and businesspeople.
US government-funded broadcaster Al-Hurra first reported the nomination on Monday, citing an Iraqi Foreign Ministry source who said Baghdad had received Masgarian’s name as the proposed replacement for Mohammad Kazem Al-e Sadegh.
Akram Ehghaghi, chief foreign policy correspondent for Iran’s semi-official ISNA news agency, subsequently described Masgarian as the newly selected ambassador in a profile posted on X, saying he would succeed Al-e Sadegh after his four-year tenure.
Iraqi outlet Shafaq News separately cited an informed source as saying Masgarian would take up the post at the beginning of 2027 under his full name, Abdolreza Nobakht.
Iran has not yet officially confirmed the appointment. Al-Hurra said neither country’s foreign ministry had announced the nomination.
Masgarian’s reported responsibilities already place him at the intersection of Iran’s military, political and diplomatic dealings with Iraq.
A photo of Mesgarian in IRGC uniform
According to Al-Hurra, he oversees joint security coordination between Tehran, Baghdad and Erbil, having previously handled security coordination between Iran and Iraq’s Kurdistan Region.
The US advocacy group United Against Nuclear Iran has identified him as commander of the IRGC’s Ramadan Headquarters, with responsibilities that include coordinating with Iraqi Shiite armed factions.
Ehghaghi’s account emphasized his longstanding involvement in Iraqi affairs and his relationships across the country’s political spectrum.
She described him as a Kurd from the western Iranian city of Kermanshah with close ties to Kurdish officials, saying his detailed knowledge of Iraq was among the reasons for his selection.
Diplomatic outreach already underway
Those contacts were on display on Sunday, when, according to Ehghaghi, Masgarian visited Erbil and met Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani.
Barzani’s office confirmed a meeting with an Iranian delegation on November 8, although its published readout did not name Masgarian. It said discussions covered relations with Iran, security cooperation and security agreements involving Baghdad and the Kurdistan Region. Both sides emphasized diplomacy and peaceful approaches to resolving disputes.
A photo of the Iraqi Kurdistan's president meeting Mesgarian on Nov. 8, released by the KRG office.
The reported selection would continue Tehran’s practice of assigning commanders with experience in Iraq to its embassy in Baghdad, where relations with the central government overlap with ties to Kurdish leaders and Iran-backed armed groups.
One prominent predecessor, Iraj Masjedi, was a senior Quds Force officer and close adviser to its former commander, Qassem Soleimani.
The US Treasury sanctioned Masjedi while he was ambassador in October 2020, accusing him of overseeing support for Iraqi militias and using his diplomatic position to facilitate financial transfers for the Quds Force. Those allegations illustrated Washington’s concern that the embassy served military networks alongside its diplomatic functions.
Zarif’s criticism addressed the thinking behind such appointments.
In footage from a 2025 speech that circulated again last month, he argued that treating neighboring countries primarily as security threats shaped both Iran’s choice of ambassadors and the relationships it pursued.
“Why are our ambassadors in Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq representatives of the Quds Force?” he asked. “Because we see them as threats.”
He argued that an approach centered on opportunities would instead favor businesspeople and diplomats, allowing economic cooperation to play a larger role in Iran’s regional policy.
The remarks drew an angry response from the hardline Kayhan newspaper, which accused him of undermining Iran’s security institutions and helping Washington. Zarif, who served as foreign minister from 2013 to 2021, has defended Iran’s regional military capabilities while advocating greater reliance on diplomacy and economic ties.
The reported change in Baghdad also comes amid friction over US efforts to restrict Iran’s access to trade routes through Iraq.
Al-Hurra linked the nomination to tensions following Iraq’s October 21 closure of the al-Sheeb border crossing in Maysan province. It previously cited Iraqi government sources alleging that Al-e Sadegh was encouraging tribal leaders to pressure Baghdad to reopen it.
Ehghaghi, however, presented the succession as the end of the incumbent’s term. Neither account establishes that the border dispute prompted his replacement.
Tehran prosecutors have opened a criminal case against a gynecologist who spoke publicly about what she described as a growing trend of unmarried Iranian women choosing to raise children without fathers, Iranian media reported Monday.
The physician, Zohreh Amiri, said single motherhood was becoming increasingly common among young Iranian women, particularly those born in the 2000s.
“The newest thing that has become fashionable, and has become very common, is the phenomenon of single mothers,” Amiri said, before questioning whether raising children without fathers should be regarded entirely as a personal choice or warranted broader social discussion.
She described encountering several young women who had decided to continue their pregnancies despite knowing that the children's fathers would not participate in raising them.
Her observations, however, were based on her medical practice, and it remains unclear whether they reflect a broader demographic trend.
Before prosecutors intervened, the Revolutionary Guards-affiliated Sabereen News channel circulated a video of Amiri's remarks, denouncing what it described as the normalisation of a new social abnormality and demanding judicial action.
“This is the normalization of a new social abnormality. The judiciary must address this matter as soon as possible,” the channel wrote.
On Monday, Tehran prosecutors announced that Amiri had been summoned for questioning after allegedly failing to provide evidence supporting her claims. The judiciary said she had been formally accused of spreading falsehoods and that her social media account was no longer accessible.
The case touches on a sensitive issue in Iran, where the Islamic Republic has long promoted marriage and childbearing within traditional family structures while maintaining legal and social restrictions on relationships outside marriage.
Researchers prosecuted over sensitive social issues
The case recalls previous instances in which Iranian authorities pursued medical professionals and researchers whose work brought sensitive social issues into public discussion.
In 2008, physicians Arash and Kamiar Alaei were arrested after pioneering HIV/AIDS prevention programmes addressing drug use, sexual health and the spread of infection.
Authorities accused the brothers of cooperating with an enemy government. They received prison sentences of six and three years, respectively, before being released.
A decade later, population researcher Meimanat Hosseini Chavoshi was arrested in 2018 amid espionage allegations linked to her demographic research. Authorities also summoned fellow demographer Mohammad Jalal Abbasi for questioning about population and fertility studies.
Sociologist Saeed Madani, whose studies examined poverty, prostitution, domestic violence and child abuse, was arrested in 2022 and sentenced to nine years on national security and propaganda charges. His sentence was subsequently reduced, and he was released in April 2026.
Although the circumstances and charges differed, the cases illustrate the risks faced by researchers examining aspects of Iranian society that challenge official narratives about family, morality and social order.
A giant banner depicting US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is set ablaze during a state-organized event in Tehran marking the anniversary of the 1979 seizure of the US embassy, November 4, 2026
Democrats' sweeping midterm gains have weakened Donald Trump at home. But do they amount to the strategic victory that some in Tehran are claiming?
“You lost the war and the election,” Iran's security chief Mohsen Rezaei declared on X, mocking what he portrayed as turmoil within the Trump administration and questioning who in Washington should receive Tehran's warning against another war.
“So who exactly in Washington do we need to get this message across to?” he asked.
Iranian establishment newspapers have also been quick to celebrate. Hamshahri declared “The Shadow of Iran Over America's Elections,” while another outlet depicted Trump as a hostage, invoking the seizure of the US embassy in Tehran in November 1979.
But Trump remains president, with substantial authority over military and foreign policy decisions, even as a Democratic Congress gains greater power to scrutinize and constrain his administration.
Tehran's victory narrative
Behnam Taleblu, senior director of the Iran Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, said the Islamic Republic's political messaging is central to its strategy.
“The strategy is the propaganda,” he told Iran International’s Eye for Iran podcast.
Unable to match the United States or Israel in conventional military strength, Tehran has relied on asymmetric tactics, economic disruption and political narratives, Taleblu argued.
Conservative political commentator Peter Roff warned that the Islamic Republic may have misjudged the consequences of Democratic control of Congress.
“The mullahs in Iran are the second biggest losers because they bet on change of control in Congress, changing the conduct of the war. And that's not going to happen,” he told Eye for Iran.
While Congress retains powers over funding, oversight and legislation, Roff argued that the election would not fundamentally constrain Trump's conduct toward Tehran.
A weakened president, in other words, is not necessarily one unwilling to act.
Did Iran cost Republicans the election?
Republican political strategist Albert Eisenberg acknowledged that the conflict contributed to the losses but rejected attempts to separate it from broader dissatisfaction with the administration.
“Anybody telling you that the Iran conflict didn't factor in is lying. Anybody who's telling you that the Iran conflict was the only factor is definitely lying,” Eisenberg said.
The war, he argued, accelerated an existing backlash, particularly because the White House failed to explain its objectives.
Joel Rubin, a Democratic foreign policy strategist and former deputy assistant secretary of state under President Barack Obama, argued that affordability, tariffs and economic uncertainty were already weighing on American households before the conflict.
He accused Vice President JD Vance of using Israel and the war to deflect responsibility for the administration's broader failures.
“What Vice President Vance did was demonize Israel for his own administration's failures to execute a war effectively, to explain it to the American people, to prepare for it, to get it through Congress,” Rubin said.
Washington's unresolved Iran strategy
Beyond the election results lies a more fundamental problem for Trump: the absence of a clearly communicated strategy for what comes after military pressure on the Islamic Republic.
Despite their disagreements over the midterms, analysts from both parties questioned whether the administration had adequately explained its objectives to Americans.
Eisenberg argued that Washington had failed to highlight the experiences of Americans affected by Iranian-backed attacks or the plight of women and minorities under the Islamic Republic.
Roff echoed that criticism: “The president has not made the geostrategic case to the American people, and he needs to.”.
Rubin warned that mounting political pressure could instead push Trump toward abandoning the confrontation without securing arrangements to address Tehran's nuclear program or regional activities.
Taleblu identified a related concern. Washington, he argued, has achieved significant military gains against Iranian nuclear and missile infrastructure without defining the political outcome those operations are intended to secure.
Regime change, containment, a limited agreement and deconfliction remain possible objectives, but the administration has yet to establish a coherent path toward any of them, he said.
“Just because the shooting isn't active doesn't mean there isn't a war,” Taleblu warned.
The danger of miscalculation
Tehran may see Trump's domestic troubles as an opportunity to prolong the confrontation or wait for a more favorable political environment in Washington. But that calculation carries risks.
Trump could seek a negotiated settlement, maintain existing pressure or pursue additional military action. The election alone does not determine which course he will choose.
Nor does Democratic control of Congress necessarily settle the question. Lawmakers could challenge the administration's handling of the war and seek to limit further military action, but their ability to change its course remains uncertain.
Taleblu warned that the Islamic Republic remains motivated by revenge and survival, making its behavior difficult to predict even during periods of reduced military activity.
For now, Tehran has gained a propaganda opportunity from Trump's electoral defeat. Whether that translates into a lasting strategic advantage remains uncertain.
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