Bessent says IRGC cut off from ‘plastic surgeon in London, girlfriend in Paris'


US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said Washington’s expanded pressure campaign was increasingly cutting Iranian officials off from international travel and assets, mocking what he described as the overseas lifestyles of members of the Revolutionary Guards.
“They can’t go see their plastic surgeon in London, their girlfriend in Paris, and their money in Geneva,” Bessent told Newsmax on Thursday, arguing that restrictions on flights and financial access were leaving Iranian officials increasingly isolated.
“We did have a maximum pressure campaign. Now we have an absolute isolation campaign and it’s working,” he said.
Bessent said the campaign extended beyond financial sanctions to the US blockade of Iranian shipping and efforts to restrict air and land routes. He said the UAE and Oman were cooperating with Washington, while the US was working with Pakistan and Turkey “to cut off all the land routes.”
He also said Washington could seize about $1 billion in cryptocurrency linked to Iran this week. “We know where it is and we are isolating them,” he said, without providing further details about the assets.
Bessent predicted the blockade would eventually leave Iran with “no oil on the water for sale.”







Men accused of spying for Iran exchanged information about Iran International’s offices and presenter Kambiz Hosseini, while one defendant discussed money transfers and his legal troubles with contacts in Iran, a London court heard.
Jurors at Woolwich Crown Court were taken through photographs, messages and phone records documenting communications among the three defendants and between Mostafa Sepahvand and two men in Iran.
Sepahvand, 41, Farhad Javadi Manesh, 46, and Shapoor Qalehali Khani Noori, 57, have all pleaded not guilty to charges under Britain’s National Security Act 2023.
Prosecutors say they gathered information for Iranian intelligence to prepare for serious violence against at least one target, with Sepahvand expected to carry out an attack and the others helping to plan it.
Locations and social media
In an exchange on December 19, 2024, Sepahvand received a postcode from a UK mobile number and forwarded it to Javadi Manesh, the court heard.
The prosecutor told jurors the postcode identified the location of Volant Media, Iran International’s parent company. Sepahvand also forwarded the telephone number from which he had received it.
Messages from December 24 showed Sepahvand sending Javadi Manesh a photograph of Hosseini, a link to his Instagram account and information about Iran International’s website.
In one message, Sepahvand wrote: “go to insta and you will see both the dog and the car”.
The prosecution also reminded jurors of a video Noori had sent to Sepahvand showing a park where Hosseini walked his dog, Niko. Other messages referred to the dog’s name and a blue Volkswagen.
Jurors were shown photographs recovered from Noori’s phone depicting Malthouse Court in Brentford from several angles, taken from inside a car.
Prosecutors had previously told the court that Iran International journalist Mojtaba Pourmohsen lived there between 2019 and 2023, but the defendants appeared unaware he had moved.



Money and contacts in Iran
The prosecution examined records of Sepahvand’s communications with Mostafa Ghorbani and another contact saved as “Amin Mostafa’s Friend”, both in Iran.
The exchanges included discussions about transferring money to Sepahvand and references to an account in his name at the Workers Welfare Bank.
Jurors also heard messages concerning Sepahvand’s court case in Iran. In one, Ghorbani wrote: “haji says your case will be fine”.
Sepahvand sent Ghorbani two Iranian court documents concerning vehicles linked to him. The documents included instructions to impound the vehicles and arrest Sepahvand if he was found driving them.
Shortly after sending the documents, Sepahvand called Ghorbani and the two spoke for nearly a minute and a half, according to the records presented to the jury.
In later exchanges, Sepahvand complained that nothing had happened with his case. The logs showed repeated attempts to reach Ghorbani, including unanswered calls in early January.
Prosecutors previously said Sepahvand wanted help resolving an Iranian criminal conviction, which they consider relevant to his motivation. Jurors were told not to treat the conviction itself as evidence against him.
A police witness was questioned about the dates, times and durations of calls and messages recorded in the logs, rather than asked to draw conclusions about their significance.
Defendants dispute prosecution’s account
According to the prosecution’s account of his defense, Sepahvand accepts conducting surveillance for Iran but says he feared the consequences of refusing and deliberately did a poor job. Prosecutors reject that account.
Javadi Manesh and Noori accept visiting locations and taking photographs and videos but say they did not know they were assisting Iranian intelligence, according to the prosecution.
At least five Iranian military and police personnel were killed and several others wounded in four armed attacks across southeastern Iran within 24 hours, local rights group Haalvsh reported, as violence targeting security forces continued across the area.
Haalvsh, which covers developments in Sistan and Baluchestan, said more than 12 personnel were killed or wounded overall between Wednesday evening and Thursday evening in Nikshahr, Nosratabad, Faryab and Jalq, but cautioned that the final toll could be higher because some casualties had not yet been identified.
The People's Fighters Front took responsibility for the attacks in Nikshahr, Nosratabad and Jalq, according to Haalvsh. The alliance, announced in late 2025, includes several Baluch armed groups, among them Jaish al-Adl. The group had not taken responsibility for the killing in Faryab.
Nikshahr and Nosratabad attacks
In the Nikshahr area, Haalvsh said two vehicles carrying military personnel were attacked. Mohammadreza Okati was killed and five others were wounded, according to the outlet, which identified the wounded as Ali Najafi, Mohammadreza Hosseini, Mojtaba Mir and two others identified by the surnames Keikha and Iranmanesh.
Haalvsh said those casualties were taken to Mohammad Rasoulallah Hospital in Nikshahr, while other wounded personnel were evacuated by helicopter to medical facilities in Chabahar, Konarak and Iranshahr. It said it had not established their number or identities.
Iran's army separately confirmed on Thursday that Okati was killed when personnel from its 88th Armored Division came under fire while traveling for a shift change, but said three people were wounded.
In the Nosratabad area near Zahedan, Haalvsh said at least three security personnel were killed and two wounded when gunmen attacked a police commando patrol on the Lakhshak road. It identified two of those reported killed as Vahid Enayat and Abbas Aghaei.



Iranian police had earlier confirmed only Enayat's death, saying officers returned fire and that several attackers were wounded before fleeing.
Police major killed in Faryab
In Faryab, Haalvsh reported that Major Mehdi Jamshidi was shot dead while traveling in a private vehicle in the center of the county.
The outlet said Jamshidi was struck by seven bullets. It also cited reports that he had been among police personnel present during a confrontation involving women and other protesters in the village of Pashmuki in June.
The People's Fighters Front had not issued a statement taking responsibility for Jamshidi's killing, Haalvsh said.
Jalq police headquarters attacked
The fourth attack targeted the police command headquarters in Jalq, the administrative center of Golshan County, on Wednesday evening.
Haalvsh said the People's Fighters Front announced that its fighters had used a mine, rocket-propelled grenades and other weapons in the attack and said six police personnel were hit.
Videos obtained by Haalvsh showed heavy gunfire around the facility and at least one support vehicle being targeted, according to the outlet. Haalvsh said it had not independently established the final number or identities of those killed or wounded. IranWire also reported an explosion and gunfire around the police facility.
Attacks follow weeks of violence
The latest incidents follow a series of attacks on Iranian security forces in the southeast. Earlier this week, gunmen attacked two military vehicles in Bampur, while last week a roadside attack near Zahedan and clashes in Rask and other areas produced further casualties.
Official Iranian accounts and reports from Haalvsh have repeatedly differed over casualty numbers in recent attacks. Haalvsh said the toll from the four latest incidents should therefore be treated as provisional, particularly because some wounded personnel were transferred to hospitals outside the areas where the attacks occurred.
Iraq has created a specialized unit within the Popular Mobilization Forces to take control of drones held by armed factions as part of Prime Minister Ali Faleh al-Zaidi’s plan to bring weapons under state authority, Erem News reported on Friday, citing an Iraqi security source.
The source said three of the five factions covered by the plan had completed agreed handovers, but had not surrendered their entire arsenals. The process instead focused on heavy and specialized weapons and dismantling separate military headquarters.
The Popular Mobilization Forces, which the report said formally operates under Iraq’s commander-in-chief, had received the weapons and military headquarters covered by the agreements. It had also begun integrating faction members and severing their previous political and administrative affiliations, according to the source.
Drones placed under PMF structure
The new drone unit is intended to absorb the factions’ unmanned-aircraft capabilities into official state structures rather than leave them under independently run organizations, the source told Erem News.
But the source stressed that the agreements “do not mean complete disarmament.” Instead, they involve transferring specialized weapons and reorganizing armed formations within the PMF.
Erem News said effective control over those military capabilities would depend on completing the integration process and establishing the chain of command responsible for authorizing their use. The report did not identify the three factions that had completed the handover.



Government seeks changes to PMF leadership
A political source close to Iraq’s Coordination Framework told Erem News that the government was also seeking amendments to the law governing the PMF, including limiting the term of its chairman to two years and bringing professional officers from the regular military into senior posts.
The proposal would directly affect the position of current PMF chairman Falih al-Fayyadh, according to the report. The source said the plan faced opposition within the Coordination Framework, particularly from Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law coalition, which wanted any changes tied to a broader political agreement.
Two factions continue to resist
Erem News said Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat al-Nujaba remained opposed to surrendering their weapons, while other factions had accepted the principle of integration into state security institutions.
Zaidi has set June 30, 2027, as the deadline for completing the weapons-control plan and has said decisions on war and peace belong exclusively to Iraq’s constitutional authorities. According to the political source, he has also told Coordination Framework leaders that he intends to continue implementing the plan even if political agreement on some of its details stalls.
The source said Zaidi warned that failure by groups with armed wings to meet agreed commitments could expose Iraq to security, economic and political consequences, including additional sanctions or pressure, while adding that the prime minister still favored negotiations over a direct military confrontation with factions resisting the plan.
Iran has reached a preliminary understanding to allocate land at Chabahar to Taliban-run Afghanistan to build infrastructure for moving its goods to the sea, an Iranian lawmaker said.
Mohsen Zangeneh told Sahar TV during a visit to Afghanistan that the arrangement envisaged about 10 hectares along the waterfront inside Chabahar port and more than 100 hectares in the special zone in an initial phase. The Afghan government would invest in developing the facilities, he said.
“He proposed that we set aside an area in Chabahar for Afghanistan—in other words, that Afghanistan could have land of its own in the free zone at Chabahar port,” Zangeneh said, referring to Afghanistan’s industry minister.
Zangeneh did not specify whether the land would be leased or transferred into Afghan ownership. He said the Afghan side had requested more space within the port itself, but limited coastal land made that difficult.
“We reached this preliminary understanding during this visit and, God willing, we will follow up on it,” he said.
The discussions also covered wider industrial cooperation, a joint industrial park and a goal of increasing bilateral trade to $10 billion, according to Iranian media reports. Zangeneh described the land proposal as a way for Afghanistan to develop the infrastructure needed to transport its goods through Chabahar.
Baloch activists questioned how local residents would benefit, pointing to longstanding problems with housing, employment, infrastructure and access to basic services. They said arrangements for Afghan economic activity in Chabahar dated back to 2012, but questions about the share of development going to Baloch communities remained unanswered.
The Balochistan Human Rights Documentation Network said more than half of Chabahar’s population had at one point lived in informal settlements, with their expansion becoming a major problem for the area.
Against that backdrop, the group said, allocating land for foreign economic activity without disclosing its precise location, ownership arrangements, contract terms or duration of use had heightened concerns. It also questioned the lack of detail about local participation and employment.
Activists called on authorities to identify who would receive the land, disclose investment commitments and explain what obligations would apply to hiring local workers. They also sought clarity on how local communities would share in the revenue and business opportunities generated by the project.
More than two-thirds of respondents to an Iran International Instagram poll said the Trump administration’s pressure on the Islamic Republic is hurting ordinary Iranians more than the authorities.
More than 56,000 people took part in the October 8 poll, with 68% saying ordinary people bear the greatest burden of US pressure. Another 23% said both the public and the government suffer, while 9% said the authorities are affected most.
Men accounted for approximately 76% of respondents and women for 24%.
The largest age group was 25 to 34, representing about 38% of participants, followed by those aged 35 to 44 at 29%. Respondents aged 18 to 24 and 45 to 54 each accounted for 12%.
Thousands of comments accompanying the poll reflected differing views on the economic consequences of US pressure, the Islamic Republic's responsibility for worsening living conditions and whether external pressure could bring political change.
Rising prices dominate concerns
The most common concern among respondents who believed ordinary Iranians were suffering most was the deterioration in daily living conditions.
Many cited rising prices, declining purchasing power, shrinking incomes and the growing financial burden on low-income households.
Others pointed to difficulties accessing medicine and medical treatment, arguing that people with fewer financial resources were particularly vulnerable to economic restrictions.
"Only ordinary people are being crushed under the pressure," one respondent wrote.
Several participants argued that even when US measures target the Islamic Republic, their economic consequences ultimately reach households through higher prices and reduced access to essential goods.
Officials seen as insulated from hardship
Another recurring theme was the perceived gap between the living standards of ordinary Iranians and those of government officials.
Some respondents argued that access to wealth, foreign currency, privileged positions and state resources allowed officials and their associates to avoid some of the hardships experienced by the wider population.
"The main burden falls on the people. The government would even be happy to see people becoming poorer every day," one respondent wrote.
Other participants said the Islamic Republic also suffers from economic restrictions through reduced revenues and limited access to financial resources, but can pass some of those costs on to the public.
For these respondents, the issue was not simply whether sanctions hurt the government or the public, but how the economic burden was distributed.
Economic hardship versus hopes for political change
The sharpest disagreement concerned whether the immediate economic costs of US pressure could be justified by the prospect of political change.
Some respondents acknowledged that ordinary Iranians were suffering but considered the hardship acceptable if it weakened the Islamic Republic or helped bring about a different political system.
"People will endure it because this suffering is worth it for a free Iran tomorrow," one wrote.
Others questioned whether worsening economic conditions would produce meaningful political change.
They argued that household finances could deteriorate far more quickly than external pressure could affect the country's political leadership.
Several respondents held both US policies and the Islamic Republic's economic management responsible for the hardships facing Iranians.
Some likened sanctions to a painful medical treatment, reflecting a willingness among certain supporters of external pressure to accept short-term suffering in pursuit of longer-term political goals.
Others rejected that calculation, arguing that the prospect of political change remained uncertain while the immediate costs to families were already evident.
A divided view of US pressure
Although 68% of respondents believed ordinary Iranians were bearing the greatest burden, their answers did not necessarily show opposition to all forms of US pressure.
Some viewed the economic consequences as unacceptable, while others regarded them as a painful but potentially necessary means of weakening the Islamic Republic.
Likewise, respondents who believed the government was suffering most did not necessarily dismiss the economic difficulties facing households.