Jeffries calls conditions aboard USS Abraham Lincoln a ‘disgrace’

At least six people were sentenced in five cases reported by the Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) on Wednesday and Thursday, with punishments ranging from eight months to 10 years in prison. One 21-year-old student was also sentenced to flogging and exile.

Rights groups have documented thousands of arrests since January and raised repeated concerns over denial of access to lawyers, torture and coerced confessions.

Iran Human Rights said in July that more than 70 January protesters were facing execution in Isfahan Central Prison alone, while HRANA reported in June that authorities in Zahedan had issued verdicts against 111 people detained during the protests.

Couple sentenced together

Homa Teymouri and her husband, Yaser Azadeh, who were arrested at their home during the January protests, have each been sentenced to five years in prison, HRANA reported, citing United Students.

Branch 15 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court convicted Teymouri of “assembly and collusion against national security” and also imposed a two-year travel ban, a two-year prohibition on social media activity and confiscation of her phone. HRANA said Azadeh also received five years but did not specify the charges or court branch.

Teymouri holds a master’s degree in political thought from Tarbiat Modares University and Azadeh a master’s in Western philosophy from Shahid Beheshti University.

Student given prison, lashes and exile

Tara Farhangian, a 21-year-old physical education student arrested during the January protests, was sentenced in Qorveh to one year in prison, 31 lashes and two years of exile in Zabol, according to HRANA, citing Kolbar News.

A criminal court convicted her of “disrupting public peace and order” and “resisting officers,” while the Revolutionary Court separately fined her 120 million tomans for “propaganda against the regime” and “assembly and collusion to commit a crime against national security.”

Farhangian, who studies at Hamedan University, had previously been released on bail.

Ten years over ‘message to foreign media’

Leila Moallemi, a Mashhad resident held in Vakilabad Prison, has been sentenced to 10 years over information she allegedly provided to a media outlet outside Iran during the war, HRANA reported.

A source close to her family said the case concerned a voice message and information she sent to the outlet. HRANA said the precise charges and judicial branch remained unclear. Moallemi was arrested on May 28.

Her case comes amid heightened pressure on people accused of providing information to foreign media or governments during the conflict. HRANA documented 40 political and security-related executions between March 18 and June 3.

Two years for Tehran IT specialist

Mahmoud Ghanbari-Rad, a 40-year-old network security specialist held in Greater Tehran Prison, was sentenced to two years for “assembly and collusion against national security,” HRANA reported.

Ghanbari-Rad was arrested at his Tehran home in May and initially held in Evin Prison. HRANA said he was denied access to a lawyer during part of his detention.

In a call from prison, he rejected the case against him and said he had been pressured to accept the charges.

Sentenced over prison writings

Civil rights activist Mehdi Mahmoudian was sentenced in absentia to eight months for “propaganda against the regime,” based on writings he produced in prison that were subsequently published.

Mahmoudian, who has previously served time on the same charge, was arrested again on January 31 after signing a statement and released on bail the following month.

He faces a separate hearing before another branch of the Tehran Revolutionary Court on September 27.

The dispute centers on plans for a three-country verification mechanism being discussed as Iranian, Omani and Pakistani technical committees work on the operational details of a temporary navigation arrangement.

Hardline lawmakers argue that the government cannot implement the proposed arrangement without parliamentary debate and a formal vote, raising a broader dispute over constitutional authority and military jurisdiction.

Their opposition is focused particularly on third-party verification. Hardliners argue that sharing vessel-tracking responsibilities with Pakistani or Omani personnel, even within a joint cell, would undermine the IRGC Navy’s authority over screening in the Persian Gulf.

Commentators aligned with this view have also warned that external verification channels could be exploited by Western intelligence, potentially giving NATO or US naval forces access to information about Iranian coastal movements under the guise of commercial monitoring.

Regional shield or security risk?

Reformist outlets Shargh and Etemad have argued that involving Pakistan and Oman would instead provide Tehran with a diplomatic shield by reducing pressure for direct US or NATO naval escorts inside the strait’s traffic lanes.

Writing in Shargh, Ahmad Zeidabadi warned that blocking regional verification “does not defend our sovereignty; it locks our economy into a suffocating siege,” adding that a functioning Muscat-Islamabad verification mechanism offered Iran a way to avert deeper economic damage.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei, meanwhile, reaffirmed that any US or NATO military escorts within the strait’s traffic lanes remained prohibited under the draft terms, even as third-party verification continued to be considered in Muscat, according to IRNA.

Parliament pushes tougher terms

The dispute comes as lawmakers are also considering legislation that could further constrain Tehran’s room for compromise over Hormuz.

Iranian media reported that parliament held a closed-door session over the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission’s draft bill restricting the movement of vessels linked to countries Tehran considers hostile.

Hardline lawmakers have pushed for a mandatory transit charge of 5% to 7% on non-exempt commercial bulk cargo to fund coastal defense and infrastructure repairs, alongside tighter inspection requirements.

Pro-Pezeshkian lawmakers and National Security Committee spokesman Hassan Ghashghavi have argued that the proposed verification cell is a technical mechanism operating under the Supreme National Security Council framework rather than a new international treaty requiring lengthy parliamentary ratification.

Government representatives have also warned that imposing statutory tolls could undermine the Muscat negotiations and discourage foreign shipping lines from using Iranian ports.

The competing approaches reflect a wider struggle in Tehran over what Iran should seek to preserve from its wartime control of Hormuz: maximum control and economic leverage, or a regional mechanism that could restore shipping without opening the waterway to a greater US or NATO role.

The dispute could prove consequential for the Muscat talks, as any agreement requiring Omani or Pakistani participation in monitoring traffic would have to overcome objections from lawmakers, while tougher statutory restrictions on shipping could further narrow the government’s room to negotiate.

The United States is preparing to send the USS George Washington to the Middle East in a previously scheduled rotation, while Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said Thursday that rotating ships would allow the US Navy to maintain its blockade for as long as necessary.

“Indefinitely the United States Navy can maintain a blockade like that because we'll rotate ships in and out, as we have, and we'll continue to,” Hegseth told reporters.

The George Washington is expected to replace the USS Abraham Lincoln, the Wall Street Journal reported, citing US officials. The Lincoln was redirected to the Middle East in January ahead of the US war against Iran and has now spent more than 250 days deployed.

CENTCOM also announced Thursday the creation of its first multinational, multi-domain attack drone task force, building on the use of one-way unmanned systems during Operation Epic Fury and strikes on Iranian port facilities in July.

Task Force Falcon Strike will use one-way attack drones in the air, on the surface and below it, with US Special Operations Command Central personnel leading the unit and regional partners being formally invited to join.

Iran signals offensive posture

In Tehran, Mohammad Mokhber, an adviser to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, said Thursday that Khamenei’s strategy was to shift the war to an offensive posture if Iran’s conditions were not met.

That emphasis was also reflected in Khamenei’s appointment of six senior military commanders earlier this week.

His decree naming Ahmad Vahidi commander-in-chief of the IRGC instructed him to strengthen the force’s capabilities for “maximum deterrence” and maintain readiness for “powerful offensive operations against the enemy.”

IRGC Navy commander Ali Azmaei, also formally appointed this week, said Thursday that the Strait of Hormuz remained closed and that no movement through it escaped the force’s notice.

Rasoul Sanaei-Rad, a senior military official, said Iran was preparing for “worst-case” war scenarios and needed offensive capabilities alongside defensive ones. “Our fighters have their fingers on the trigger,” he said, adding that Iran would seek to impose a much heavier defeat if attacked again.

All about Hormuz

Hormuz remains the immediate test of those competing claims of endurance.

Iran’s Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters said Thursday that no commercial ship or oil tanker could safely pass through the waterway without Tehran’s permission and oversight.

The United States, meanwhile, says its blockade remains in force. CENTCOM said that as of Wednesday, US forces had redirected 59 commercial vessels, disabled three and boarded two others while enforcing what it calls its “steel wall blockade” against Iran.

Off the water, diplomatic contacts have continued despite the military buildup.

Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi warned Washington Thursday against what he called a “bigger miscalculation” over the Strait of Hormuz, while Vice President Majid Ansari said war and negotiations were “complementary” and that Iran would pursue its objectives in the waterway and the wider region.

The parallel military and diplomatic tracks have yet to produce a breakthrough over Hormuz. Instead, Thursday’s statements suggested both sides are preparing for the possibility that the standoff will last.

The defining struggle in Tehran is not between moderates and hardliners. It is a contest within the hardline establishment and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) over power, patronage, and coercion.

The transition has occurred during a very turbulent time for the Islamic Republic, in the midst of a war with both the U.S. and Israel and only months after the largest anti-regime uprising. Mojtaba has also remained largely out of public view for months, fueling uncertainty over his status and capacity to lead. This vacuum gave rival security networks room to advance their own interests, but Washington should not mistake competition within the regime for a pragmatic opening.

The SNSC is the body that coordinates defense, intelligence, and foreign-policy decisions and its resolutions take effect only after approval by the supreme leader. The secretary therefore operates at the intersection of war, diplomacy, and internal security. Rezaei commanded the IRGC from 1981 to 1997, founded its intelligence unit, and served as Mojtaba’s military adviser since March. Mojtaba first named him his representative on the council and Pezeshkian then formally appointed him secretary.

The removal of Rezaei’s predecessor, Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, is equally revealing. He held the secretary position for less than five months, an extraordinarily short tenure for a post usually held for years. Pezeshkian had reportedly asked him to remain and later acknowledged unspecified “differences,” exposing the friction between the presidency and Mojtaba’s emerging power center.

Zolghadr was a close ally of Ahmad Vahidi, the IRGC commander who played a central role in running the country during the war, while Rezaei has shown he is fully aligned with Mojtaba. Replacing one hardline IRGC veteran with another, therefore, reflects a shift in networks rather than ideology, placing the regime’s most important security forum under Mojtaba’s orbit.

The dispute over the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Washington and Tehran deepened that divide. Zolghadr voted in favor of it, while Rezaei had publicly questioned the agreement and later argued that Mojtaba had favored a different path. Zolghadr’s support for the memorandum made him less compatible with a leader determined to impose his own authority on the security establishment.

Taeb’s appointment is equally significant. He and Mojtaba both served in the Habib battalion during the Iran-Iraq War, beginning an alliance that later extended into years of behind-the-scenes schemes to influence Iranian politics. Taeb was sidelined late in Ali Khamenei’s rule after his removal as head of the IRGC Intelligence Organization in 2022, but Mojtaba has now restored him to lead the Basij once again.

The Basij paramilitary embeds itself across various sectors of Iranian society and mobilizes regime loyalists to surveil and repress dissidents. Taeb sharpened that coercive machinery during his tenure, a record that later drew sanctions from the United States, Canada, the European Union, and the United Kingdom. Mojtaba now has a trusted loyalist at the center of the institution most crucial for suppressing another nationwide uprising.

Taeb’s appointment decree instructed him to strengthen the Basij’s ‘intelligence network,’ expand its use of technology and improve coordination with other regime bodies. The priority is unmistakable: consolidation at the top and more effective control of the streets.

Ali Khamenei’s death was bound to trigger a struggle for power. For decades, access to political office, economic privilege, and security authority depended on proximity to him and his office. His death disrupted that system of patronage.

Mojtaba’s task is threefold. He must strengthen his own network, balance the influence of officials tied to rival centers of power, and sideline networks that flourished under his father and were opposed to Mojtaba. Rezaei’s elevation and Taeb’s return serve that purpose.

Washington should treat this reshuffle as a warning that Mojtaba is placing loyalists at the helm of the institutions that shape external and internal national security doctrines. This should put an end to Washington’s hope that pragmatists inside the regime can lead the country toward a different path.

The United States should reject bargains that strengthen the regime without verified changes in Tehran’s conduct. It should work with Israel and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf to deter Iranian aggression and constrain Tehran’s military partnership with Russia and China. It should also deny the regime’s repressive organs the finance and technology they need while expanding support for the Iranian people confronting the regime’s apparatus of oppression.

That distinction has come into sharper focus with Mohsen Rezaei’s appointment as secretary of the council. Rezaei was first appointed by Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei as one of his two representatives on the SNSC, giving him a constitutional seat and a vote. President Masoud Pezeshkian then appointed him secretary, putting him in charge of the council’s secretariat as well.

The order was notable, as in recent decades, the more familiar pattern had been for the president to choose a secretary first and for the Supreme Leader to subsequently appoint the same person as one of his representatives, effectively giving the secretary a vote.

With Rezaei, the process worked the other way around: Khamenei placed him on the council first, and Pezeshkian followed by making him secretary.

The move was welcomed by some hardliners as a sign that Pezeshkian was deferring to the new Supreme Leader and demonstrating his loyalty, amid lingering uncertainty over Mojtaba Khamenei’s authority after months out of public view.

The episode also highlighted something that is often lost in descriptions of the SNSC: being secretary and being a voting member are two separate things.

What is the SNSC?

The Supreme National Security Council was created in its current form when Iran’s Constitution was revised in 1989, shortly after the end of the Iran-Iraq war and the death of Islamic Republic founder Ruhollah Khomeini.

Article 176 of the Constitution gives it three broad responsibilities: determining defense and national security policies within the general policies set by the Supreme Leader; coordinating political, intelligence, economic, social and cultural activities related to national security; and mobilizing the country’s resources against internal and external threats.

Its remit is therefore much broader than military affairs. Questions involving war and peace, nuclear policy, negotiations with foreign governments, sanctions, domestic unrest, internet restrictions, intelligence matters and major regional security issues can all fall within its orbit.

The president chairs the council, but that does not mean the president controls it. The SNSC was designed to bring together several centers of power that do not answer to the president alone, including the judiciary, parliament, the armed forces and the Supreme Leader’s office.

And there is another important limit on its authority: its decisions do not become binding simply because the council approves them. Under the Constitution, SNSC resolutions take effect only after approval by the Supreme Leader.

Once approved by the Leader, no other state body, including parliament or the judiciary, has a formal veto over them.

Who are the permanent members?

Article 176 provides for 10 officials who hold seats on the council by virtue of their positions.

They are the president, who chairs the council; the speaker of parliament; the head of the judiciary; the chief of the Armed Forces General Staff; the official responsible for planning and budget affairs; two representatives appointed by the Supreme Leader; the foreign minister; the interior minister; and the intelligence minister.

Those 10 positions form the fixed constitutional core of the SNSC.

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The two representatives of the Supreme Leader are particularly important. They are not representatives of the government or of another state institution. They sit directly on behalf of the Leader and have the same right to vote as the other constitutional members.

At present, those two seats are held by Saeed Jalili and Mohsen Rezaei.

Who can be added when needed?

The Constitution also names three additional categories of officials who can join the council depending on the issue being discussed.

These are the highest-ranking officer of the regular Army, the highest-ranking officer of the Revolutionary Guards, and the minister responsible for the matter under consideration.

That distinction matters because the Army and IRGC commanders are often casually described as permanent members of the SNSC. In practice, they attend many important meetings and may appear to be part of the council’s standing membership. Constitutionally, however, their participation is tied to the subject before the council.

When they participate in that capacity, they are members of the council for that discussion and have the right to vote.

The same applies to an additional minister. If the council is discussing an issue that directly concerns energy, communications, health, transport or another government portfolio, the relevant minister can be brought in as a member for that issue and can vote.

This means the number of voting members is not necessarily the same at every meeting. The council has 10 fixed members, but the number can rise depending on which military commanders or ministers are required for a particular discussion.

In June, Iranian state media reported that twelve out of the thirteen voting members of the Council voted to approve the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the United States.

Who can attend without a vote?

The SNSC can also invite other officials whose expertise or institutional role is relevant to a discussion.

That could include, for example, the head of state broadcaster IRIB, the central bank governor, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization, senior police officials, economic officials or military commanders who do not hold one of the positions specifically named in Article 176.

Their presence does not make them members of the council.

They may brief the SNSC, take part in discussions or answer questions, but they do not acquire voting rights simply because they have been invited to a meeting.

This creates an important distinction between three categories of people in the room: fixed constitutional members, issue-specific constitutional members who can vote, and invited officials who can participate but cannot vote.

Why the secretary is different

The secretary is one of the most visible figures associated with the SNSC and often acts as the day-to-day face of Iran’s national security establishment.

But there is an unusual feature in the Constitution: the secretary is not listed among the council’s members.

The secretary runs the secretariat, helps prepare meetings, coordinates between institutions, follows up on decisions and can be entrusted with major diplomatic or security files. The president appoints the secretary.

But that appointment alone does not give the secretary a seat or a vote.

For most of the SNSC’s history, this apparent gap has been resolved by giving the secretary another position at the same time: one of the Supreme Leader’s two representative seats.

That second appointment, not the secretaryship itself, is what gives the secretary voting rights.

The result has been a long-running arrangement in which one person usually wears two hats. He is the president’s appointee as head of the secretariat and, separately, the Supreme Leader’s representative as a voting member of the council.

That dual role also gives the secretary political weight that goes well beyond administration. He does not merely organize the meeting; he sits inside the decision-making body and speaks and votes as one of the Leader’s representatives.

Which appointment usually comes first?

There has never been a constitutional requirement that one appointment precede the other.

In recent decades, however, the most common pattern has been for the president to appoint a secretary and for the Supreme Leader to then appoint the same person as his representative.

That happened with Ali Shamkhani in 2013. President Hassan Rouhani chose him as secretary, and Ali Khamenei appointed him as one of his representatives shortly afterward.

The same happened with Ali-Akbar Ahmadian in 2023, when President Ebrahim Raisi appointed him secretary and Khamenei named him as his representative at around the same time.

When Ali Larijani returned to the SNSC in August 2025, Pezeshkian appointed him secretary first, and Khamenei subsequently gave him one of his two representative seats.

But this order has not been universal.

When Larijani first became SNSC secretary under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005, he was already one of Khamenei’s representatives on the council before the president appointed him secretary.

The same legal separation is visible in the case of Saeed Jalili. Ahmadinejad appointed him secretary in 2007, but he was not made one of Khamenei’s representatives until months later. After leaving the secretaryship in 2013, Jalili kept his seat as the Leader’s representative, showing clearly that the two offices are independent of one another.

The broader historical pattern is therefore not that the president always chooses first and the Leader follows. It is that the two positions have usually been combined, regardless of which appointment came first.

Zolghadr was the bigger institutional exception

If Rezaei’s appointment was unusual because of the order in which the two posts were assigned, Mohammad-Baqer Zolghadr’s short tenure earlier in 2026 was unusual for a more fundamental reason.

After Ali Larijani’s death in March, Pezeshkian appointed Zolghadr as secretary of the SNSC. But Zolghadr was not publicly appointed as one of the Supreme Leader’s two representatives.

That meant the two roles were separated in a way rarely seen in the council’s history. Zolghadr ran the secretariat but, on the publicly available record, did not hold a constitutional voting seat merely by virtue of being secretary.

The distinction became especially visible during deliberations over the Iran-US agreement in June, when a public account of the vote listed the participating members but did not include Zolghadr among those casting ballots.

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Who has served as secretary?

Hassan Rouhani became the SNSC’s first secretary after the council was established in its current form in 1989. He served for about 16 years, spanning the presidencies of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami, and became closely associated with Iran’s national security and early nuclear diplomacy.

Ali Larijani replaced him in 2005 under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Larijani was already one of Khamenei’s representatives on the council before becoming secretary. He served until 2007 and resigned amid disagreements with Ahmadinejad over Iran’s nuclear strategy.

Saeed Jalili succeeded him and served from 2007 to 2013. He became one of Khamenei’s representatives months after taking over as secretary and remained in that representative seat even after leaving the secretariat.

Ali Shamkhani was appointed by President Hassan Rouhani in 2013 and served for nearly a decade. Khamenei also appointed him as his representative, preserving the dual-role arrangement. Shamkhani became one of the most prominent figures in Iran’s regional diplomacy and remained secretary until 2023.

Ali-Akbar Ahmadian, a senior former IRGC commander, replaced Shamkhani under President Raisi in 2023. He too served simultaneously as secretary and as one of Khamenei’s representatives.

Ali Larijani returned for a second tenure in August 2025 after Pezeshkian appointed him secretary. Khamenei then appointed him as one of his representatives. Larijani remained in the role until his death in March 2026.

Mohammad-Baqer Zolghadr succeeded him and served for several months. Unlike his immediate predecessors, he was not publicly given one of the Leader’s two seats, leaving him without a vote in his capacity as secretary.

Mohsen Rezaei replaced Zolghadr in August 2026. This time the order was reversed: Mojtaba Khamenei first appointed Rezaei as his representative, and Pezeshkian then made him secretary.

How decisions are made

The SNSC is often described as Iran’s highest national security body, but it is better understood as a place where the Islamic Republic’s major power centers are brought together to negotiate and formalize policy.

The president chairs the meetings. The heads of parliament and the judiciary participate. Key ministers are present. The Armed Forces General Staff has a permanent seat. The Army and IRGC can join as voting members when required. The Supreme Leader has two direct representatives inside the room.

The precise voting procedures are less transparent than the membership rules. Article 176 establishes who belongs to the council but does not publicly lay out a single detailed voting formula for every type of decision.

In practice, deliberations can involve bargaining before a matter ever reaches a formal vote. Sensitive decisions may already have been discussed with the Leader’s office, the armed forces or other senior bodies before they come before the SNSC.

And even after a majority or other required threshold is reached, the process is not finished.

The Constitution says SNSC resolutions become effective only after the Supreme Leader approves them.

That gives the Leader influence at several points in the process. He sets the broad national security policies within which the council operates, appoints two voting members directly and retains the final authority to approve its decisions.

The president, meanwhile, controls another important part of the institution: he chairs the council and chooses the secretary who runs its day-to-day machinery.