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Tanker reports two explosions in Strait of Hormuz - UKMTO

Aug 6, 2026, 08:57 GMT+1

A tanker reported hearing two explosions while transiting the Strait of Hormuz, the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations said on Thursday.

The incident occurred 9 nautical miles southeast of Kumzar, Oman, UKMTO said in a delayed report.

The vessel and its crew were safe and no environmental damage was reported, it said.

UKMTO said it had initially classified the incident as an attack but later downgraded it to an advisory after a review found that the intended target could not be conclusively identified.

Authorities advised vessels in the area to transit with caution and report suspicious activity.

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Iran presses wider Hormuz demands as US says deal may be close
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Iran presses wider Hormuz demands as US says deal may be close

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Anti-Islam posts follow Iran's dawn executions, sparking hardline backlash

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ANALYSIS

War or government failure? Record inflation fuels political battle in Iran

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Tehran says any Hormuz accord won't restore pre-war order

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INSIGHT

Iran's parliament fades further from power after the war

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  • Iran's energy crisis is political, not seasonal
    ANALYSIS

    Iran's energy crisis is political, not seasonal

  • Iran's parliament fades further from power after the war
    INSIGHT

    Iran's parliament fades further from power after the war

  • Iran used water hacks to intimidate not cripple, experts say

    Iran used water hacks to intimidate not cripple, experts say

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Iran's energy crisis is political, not seasonal

Aug 6, 2026, 08:27 GMT+1
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Sogand Sara Fakheri
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A woman eats by flashlight during a power outage at a restaurant in Ahvaz, southwestern Iran

In Iran, the authorities call it a scheduled outage. The electricity will be disconnected for two hours. The water may return later in the evening. Families are instructed to adjust their lives to temporary emergencies. But there is no pause button for daily life.

A baby does not stop needing clean water because the pumps have shut down. A patient cannot postpone the use of refrigerated medicine or medical equipment. An elderly person living on the 14th floor cannot simply take the stairs when the elevator stops working. Parents cannot suspend cooking, washing or caring for their children until the state restores the water.

During the brutal Iranian summer, when temperatures in parts of the country exceed 40 degrees Celsius and climb above 50 in the south, air conditioning is not merely a comfort. For children, older people and those with medical conditions, it can become a matter of survival.

The authorities can announce a two-hour power cut. A child's fever, a patient's oxygen machine and a family's need for clean water do not follow that schedule.

Iran's water and electricity emergencies are not separate crises. Water distribution depends on electricity to operate pumping stations and move water through municipal networks, especially into apartment buildings and elevated neighbourhoods. When electricity fails, pumps stop working and water pressure falls. One failing system pulls another down with it.

‘No one to turn to’

Reports from across Iran describe daily electricity cuts lasting for hours alongside recurring water shortages. In Boumehen, east of Tehran, residents reportedly received running water on only two days during one week, and even then for only a few hours.

"We have a sick person at home. We no longer know who to turn to," one resident said.

In Pardis, another city east of Tehran, a resident of a 14-storey building said a four-hour power cut left the elevators out of service. "How are we supposed to climb all these stairs?" he asked.

In Ilam, power cuts reportedly lasted as long as four hours while temperatures reached around 46 degrees Celsius. In Khuzestan, one of Iran's principal oil- and electricity-producing provinces, residents complained that outages had resumed as temperatures crossed 50 degrees.

This is one of modern Iran's deepest contradictions. A country with some of the world's largest oil and natural gas reserves cannot guarantee electricity to its own population. Provinces that generate much of Iran's energy cannot rely on power in their own homes.

Factories lose production hours, small businesses lose income, food and medicine spoil, and families organise their days around outage schedules that are not always accurate.

During the summer they lose electricity; during the winter they face gas shortages. The crisis changes with the season, but it never disappears.

‘Energy imbalance’

Officials describe this as an "energy imbalance," a phrase that makes the problem sound technical rather than political. But Iran's energy crisis was not created overnight.

For years, electricity generation failed to keep pace with demand. Transmission networks deteriorated, renewable energy remained marginal and water systems continued to lose enormous quantities through leakage and decay.

In June 2026, Iran's Parliamentary Research Center reportedly projected a peak summer electricity deficit of roughly 13,600 megawatts.

The government's answer was to ask every Iranian to reduce electricity consumption by ten percent. Once again, citizens were instructed to compensate for failures they did not create.

A family can switch off a lamp. It cannot modernize a power station. A parent can shorten a child's shower. She cannot repair a leaking municipal water network. A shopkeeper can turn off an air conditioner, but he cannot recover decades of lost investment or build the electricity capacity the country requires.

Iran does face genuine environmental pressures. Drought, extreme heat and irregular rainfall have reduced water availability across the country. Climate change is making an already dry region hotter and more vulnerable.

But climate alone cannot explain why so much available water is wasted, why groundwater has been extracted beyond natural recovery or why inefficient agricultural practices remained dominant for decades.

Low efficiency

Even experts quoted by Iran's official news agency acknowledge as much.

Hashem Oraee, head of the Iran Energy Associations Union, estimated that nearly 90 percent of Iran's annual water consumption goes to agriculture, where efficiency remains extremely low.

He also said roughly one-third of the water entering urban distribution networks is lost before reaching consumers.

Iran is not simply running out of water. It is losing the water it still has. The current war did not create this crisis. It struck a system that was already fragile, underfunded and unable to meet national demand.

Iranian electricity officials have said more than 2,000 points across the national grid were damaged during the conflict, reducing available generating capacity by around 4,200 megawatts.

Those figures have not been independently verified, but they indicate the scale of the damage the authorities themselves claim to be facing.

Extended hours

In Bandar Abbas, residents described explosions followed by prolonged electricity cuts. One woman who depends on the internet for her income said she had already been struggling with government-imposed internet shutdowns before longer power cuts placed her work at further risk.

"We always had power cuts, but the hours have now extended," she said.

That distinction matters. The war made the outages longer and more dangerous, but it did not introduce Iranians to blackouts. Years of neglect had already done that.

Inside the home, the consequences are immediate. Refrigerators stop cooling food and medicine. Medical devices fail unless families can afford backup power. Elevators become unusable. Water no longer reaches upper floors when electric pumps stop working. Parents struggle to prepare food, wash clothes, sterilize baby bottles or care for elderly relatives and young children.

The word "outage" suggests a temporary interruption after which normal life resumes. But when electricity disappears every day, when water and power fail together, and when no one knows whether the published schedule can be trusted, the interruption becomes normal life.

Water and electricity are not luxuries. They are the foundations on which healthcare, sanitation, education, industry and family life depend.

Iran did not run out of intelligence, resources or human ability. Its people were deprived of functioning systems because those in power failed to build and maintain them.

Now the lights are going out, the taps are running dry, and ordinary Iranians are once again being asked to bear the cost.

New documentary probes Jamshid Sharmahd's abduction and death

Aug 5, 2026, 21:45 GMT+1
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The coffin of Iranian-German dissident Jamshid Sharmahd is covered with white flowers during his funeral service.

Six years after Iranian-German dissident Jamshid Sharmahd vanished during a trip to the United Arab Emirates, many questions surrounding his abduction, imprisonment and death in the custody of the Islamic Republic remain unresolved.

Marking the anniversary of his disappearance, Iran International has released the investigative documentary I'm Fine, I'll Call You!, directed by Ardavan Roozbeh.

Drawing on official documents, digital evidence and interviews with Sharmahd's family, legal team, international officials and political figures, the film reconstructs one of the Islamic Republic's most controversial intelligence operations—from his disappearance in the UAE to his death in Iranian custody.

In August 2020, Sharmahd, an Iranian-German citizen and US resident, disappeared while traveling through the United Arab Emirates.

Days later, Iran's Ministry of Intelligence announced it had captured him in what it described as a "complex operation" and transferred him to Iran—an act his family, legal team and human rights organizations have described as an extraterritorial abduction and a violation of international law.

As spokesperson for the Kingdom Assembly of Iran (Anjoman-e Padeshahi Iran), Sharmahd was accused by the Islamic Republic of involvement in the 2008 bombing of the Seyyed al-Shohada Hosseiniyeh in Shiraz.

He and his family consistently denied the allegations.

During his detention, Iranian state television aired what it said were confessions by Sharmahd, while rights groups repeatedly warned they may have been obtained under torture or coercion.

His case quickly became one of the clearest examples of what human rights organizations describe as the Islamic Republic's campaign of transnational repression.

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Iran International journalist Ardavan Roozbeh, director of the documentary I'm Fine, I'll Call You!, stands beside the coffin of Iranian-German dissident Jamshid Sharmahd during his funeral service.

Germany and the United States repeatedly called for his release, while the European Parliament condemned Iran's treatment of Sharmahd in several resolutions.

Diplomatic pressure, however, failed to prevent either his death sentence or his death in custody.

In October 2024, Iranian authorities announced Sharmahd's death. Conflicting official accounts, the lack of independent access to his case and unanswered questions surrounding his final months in prison have fueled continuing demands from his family and legal representatives for an independent investigation and accountability.

More broadly, the Sharmahd case has become emblematic of the Islamic Republic's use of cross-border intelligence operations, the targeting of political opponents abroad and the use of national security prosecutions as instruments of state policy.

By reconstructing the events leading from Sharmahd's disappearance to his death, I'm Fine, I'll Call You! examines how one of Iran's most consequential transnational operations unfolded, and why key questions surrounding the case remain unresolved.

Tehran says any Hormuz accord won't restore pre-war order

Aug 5, 2026, 18:45 GMT+1
•
Maryam Sinaiee
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Vessels in the Strait of Hormuz

Iran and Oman appear close to agreeing new navigation arrangements in the Strait of Hormuz, but Tehran insists any reopening must take place under a new post-war security framework rather than a return to the pre-war status quo.

Iranian officials have sought to temper expectations that technical talks with Oman will lead to the immediate reopening of the strategic waterway, stressing that any agreement would be bilateral, exclude the United States and preserve what they describe as Iran's new security role in the Strait.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei said on Wednesday that Iran and Oman had agreed on the geographical coordinates of proposed transit routes and were finalizing a joint statement.

But he stressed that the understanding "cannot, by itself, mean that the Strait will become safe for passing vessels," arguing that the US naval blockade and other "aggressive and threatening actions" against Iran remained the principal obstacles.

Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi later said a proposed transit arrangement under discussion with Oman could remain in place for between two and four months. He added that although a US return to its commitments under the Islamabad memorandum was a prerequisite for reopening the Strait, it would not by itself be sufficient.

The same message was echoed by Iran's security establishment.

Fars News, which is affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards, quoted a source close to Iran's negotiating team as saying the Strait would reopen only after Washington took concrete steps to implement its commitments.

The source accused the United States of derailing the normalization of shipping through military strikes, the naval blockade and the suspension of waivers for Iranian oil and petrochemical exports.

‘No return to pre-war order’

Iranian officials have repeatedly argued that the negotiations are intended to establish a new framework for managing traffic through the Strait rather than simply restore previous arrangements.

Saeed Ajorlou, a member of the Iranian negotiating team's media committee, said Article 5 of the Islamabad memorandum envisages "Iranian arrangements" governing the Strait, under which security, mine clearance, maritime services and other operational matters would be administered by Tehran.

Those arrangements, he said, could remain in force for "one, two or three months," depending on the progress of wider negotiations.

"The transit regime in the Strait of Hormuz should not return to its pre-war status," Ajorlou said. "This principle must be consolidated both on the ground and in official documents and agreements."

Nour News, a media outlet closely associated with Iran's Supreme National Security Council, echoed that position, describing the talks with Oman as technical negotiations over vessel traffic management that "do not necessarily amount to an agreement to reopen Hormuz."

The outlet said broader political issues remained unresolved, including implementation of commitments under the Islamabad memorandum, the release of Iranian financial assets and arrangements concerning the future security and management of the Strait.

‘The sole rule-maker’

Members of parliament reinforced the government's position.

Hassan Ghashghavi, spokesman for parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, said Tehran would reject any southern shipping corridor that the United States sought to impose "through pressure and threats."

"Conditions in the Strait of Hormuz will absolutely not return to what they were before the war," he said.

Other lawmakers likewise argued that preserving Iran's authority over the Strait was a matter of national sovereignty and security, warning that no agreement undermining those principles would be accepted.

Hardline commentators broadly welcomed the tougher position.

Former IRIB presenter Masoud Barati wrote on X that Iranian management of the Strait meant Tehran should remain "the sole rule-maker," maintain full intelligence oversight over shipping and retain the authority to act against violators.

Others questioned whether turning Hormuz into another long-term confrontation would ultimately serve Iran's interests.

One user argued that "the Strait of Hormuz, like the nuclear programme and other policies, will become another lever working against the interests of the Iranian people."

Another wrote: "You kept the country waiting for 30 years over nuclear energy. In the end the facilities were bombed and not even enough electricity was generated for a single village. Is it the Strait of Hormuz's turn as a pretext to confront the world now?"

US and Iran seek a new equilibrium neither trusts

Aug 5, 2026, 17:47 GMT+1
•
Behrouz Turani
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A banner with a threat against President Trump's life is displayed beneath missiles during a state-organized event in Tehran's Azadi Square, Iran, July 30, 2026

A return to the pre-war status quo between Iran and the United States now appears out of reach for both sides, despite their competing claims of victory.

The negotiations under way are no longer about restoring the relationship that existed before the war, but about finding a new equilibrium that neither side fully trusts.

After two months of naval confrontation, Washington wants Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, while Tehran wants the United States to lift restrictions on its commercial shipping. Neither side publicly acknowledges why they fought so long against what increasingly appear to have been their own strategic and economic interests.

That mutual recognition has created an opportunity for diplomacy, but not necessarily confidence in it.

Iran and Oman announced Wednesday that they had agreed on the geographical coordinates of a proposed commercial shipping corridor through the Strait of Hormuz and were finalizing a joint statement.

The Associated Press, citing two regional officials, reported that Iranian and Omani negotiators had completed a draft agreement and were awaiting final approval from Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei.

CNN, citing a senior Persian Gulf official familiar with the talks, said the chances of reaching a broader US-Iran agreement by Friday remained only "50:50," despite President Donald Trump's repeated predictions that a breakthrough was imminent.

Diplomacy without trust

The fragility of the process is increasingly reflected inside Iran itself.

A member of Iran's negotiating team told reporters in Oman on Wednesday that one of the remaining obstacles was Trump's repeated threats to attack Iran if diplomacy failed.

Accepting a compromise under those circumstances, Iranian officials argue, would expose negotiators to accusations from domestic rivals that they had capitulated under military pressure.

Former chairman of parliament's Foreign Relations and National Security Committee, Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh, warned the same day that the current pause in hostilities had created only a narrow diplomatic window.

If negotiations collapse or stall, he argued, the confrontation is likely to spread beyond the military sphere into the region's civilian economy, trade and security infrastructure.

Former foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif echoed those concerns, warning that continued closure of the Strait of Hormuz risked creating a broader regional and international consensus against Tehran, turning one of Iran's principal sources of leverage into a growing strategic liability.

Temporary pause

The debate inside Iran suggests that neither supporters nor opponents of diplomacy expect the current process to produce a durable settlement.

Across state media and security-aligned outlets, the negotiations are presented less as the beginning of a new relationship with Washington than as a tactical pause made possible by regional mediation, particularly Oman, and the temporary framework established under the Islamabad memorandum.

Official messaging continues to reject any suggestion of direct bargaining or political concession to Washington. I

nside Iran's political establishment, resistance to negotiations extends across ultra-hardline factions, conservative clerical institutions and parts of the Revolutionary Guards, all deeply skeptical of engagement with the United States.

For those groups, flexibility over Hormuz or Iran's nuclear program risks weakening deterrence rather than strengthening security.

That institutional skepticism helps explain why every sign of diplomatic progress is accompanied by warnings that the process could quickly unravel.

For both Washington and Tehran, the talks increasingly appear driven less by renewed trust than by recognition that neither side can afford another prolonged confrontation. Whether that recognition proves strong enough to overcome deep political distrust remains the central question.

Iran's parliament fades further from power after the war

Aug 5, 2026, 16:51 GMT+1
•
Behrouz Turani
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Lawmakers raise their hands to express opinion in a parliamentary debate, in Tehran, Iran, undated file photo

Iran's parliament has become all but irrelevant since the war, as power has shifted further toward the Revolutionary Guards and decision-making has moved ever deeper behind closed doors amid the unresolved leadership transition.

The shift has left lawmakers arguing over soaring inflation, corruption and economic policy while increasingly questioning what authority the Majles still retains.

Two interviews published Tuesday by moderate Khabar Online and pro-reform Rouydad24 offered sharply different diagnoses of Iran's economic crisis, but together painted a picture of a legislature struggling to remain relevant.

The interviews came after months of complaints from MPs that parliament has been sidelined, with Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf limiting its work to sporadic online sessions while assuming an increasingly prominent role in high-level diplomacy.

"If you ask lawmakers at the parliament door how much a kilo of chicken, meat or bread costs, I swear to God most of them cannot tell you," outspoken former MP Gholamali Jafarzadeh Imenabadi told Khabar Online.

"This is because a massive gap has formed between our officials and the people."

Citing Parliamentary Research Center data, Imanabadi said less than seven percent of the Majles' resolutions over the past two years had addressed economic issues despite soaring inflation and the rising cost of basic goods.

‘Don’t weep, resign!’

Responding to a current MP who publicly wept over women's non-compliance with compulsory hijab laws, Jafarzadeh said officials should instead feel shame—or resign—over inflation, unemployment and empty stomachs.

"For the empty stomachs of the people, officials should ask for death, not just weep. For the state of inflation, they should resign," he said.

He also criticized what he described as parliament's misplaced priorities, questioning why Ghalibaf had become one of Iran's chief negotiators while lawmakers neglected their core duty of overseeing the government and tackling corruption and inflation.

Former conservative MP Hamidreza Taraghi offered a sharply different assessment in an interview with Rouydad24, blaming President Masoud Pezeshkian's administration rather than parliament for the country's economic turmoil.

"Regarding inflation and rising prices, the government follows methods that lack the necessary efficiency to control inflation," he said, arguing that weak oversight by the administration and the Central Bank lay behind many of the country's economic problems.

Taraghi also rejected suggestions that hardline MPs represented parliament as a whole: "The positions of 10 to 15 MPs should not be generalized to the entire parliament.”

He further defended the Majles against accusations of economic inaction, arguing that under Iran's constitution parliament could not introduce spending measures without identifying funding sources, leaving many economic decisions in the government's hands.

Elected bodies sidelined

The competing accounts reflect a broader debate over who bears responsibility for Iran's economic crisis. Moderates portray parliament as increasingly detached from both public concerns and the country's most pressing challenges, while hardliners argue its powers are constrained and responsibility rests primarily with the executive.

Yet the interviews also point to a deeper shift in Iran's political system.

Under former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, institutions including parliament, the Expediency Discernment Council, the Assembly of Experts and even the presidency steadily lost influence as authority became concentrated in the leader's office.

Since the five-month war with Israel and the United States, critics say that trend has accelerated, with the Revolutionary Guards and the power center surrounding Mojtaba Khamenei increasingly eclipsing the Islamic Republic's formal institutions.

Whether lawmakers blame the government, Ghalibaf or one another, the interviews suggest they are debating problems in a parliament many believe no longer has a role in decision-making..