State-controlled media initially struck an upbeat tone, highlighting the positive reaction in Iran’s foreign-exchange and gold markets. It also amplified reports about the repatriation of frozen assets and a $300 billion reconstruction package.
But the market rally was short-lived, and both stories about incoming cash were quickly dismissed as fake news and publicly refuted by Trump at the G7 summit in France.
Across Tehran’s media on Tuesday morning, coverage reflected a mix of cautious optimism and skepticism.
The debate is unfolding even as the memorandum itself remains unpublished and some of its key provisions unclear.
The agreement is expected to be formally signed on Friday, but it faces critics in both Tehran and Washington, where opponents have questioned everything from sanctions relief to the handling of Iran’s nuclear program.
The divide was especially clear in two interviews: one with economist Heydar Mostakhdemin-Hosseini in Jahan-e Sanat newspaper, and another with macroeconomist Hadi Haghshenas on the Khabar Online website.
Mostakhdemin-Hosseini’s core message was a warning: while a political breakthrough may calm market psychology and reduce short-term inflationary expectations, it will not resolve Iran’s entrenched structural problems, including chronic budget deficits, excessive money creation and a dysfunctional banking system.
He stressed that political calm can temporarily stabilize markets by reducing panic buying and war-related anxiety, but it cannot cure long-term inflation.
On the dangers of crisis financing, he said: “The greatest danger in wartime conditions is financing the costs of war through printing money… Almost all countries that experienced hyperinflation during periods of conflict repeated this exact mistake.”
He also warned that “capital flees from instability,” arguing that legal stability, respect for property rights, anti-corruption measures and reduced political risk must be top priorities.
“In times of economic crisis, the public’s psychological trust in the government’s economic stewardship is a far more powerful tool for market stabilization than physical gold or foreign currency reserves,” he added.
Offering a starkly different assessment, Haghshenas presented an optimistic outlook for Iran’s economy following what he described as a two-stage agreement with the United States.
He predicted that the post-war period could mirror the economic rebounds seen after the 1988 ceasefire with Iraq under UN Resolution 598 and the 2015 nuclear deal, potentially delivering single-digit inflation and double-digit growth.
He argued that a final deal could reduce inflation by stabilizing the foreign-exchange market and unlocking frozen assets to absorb excess liquidity.
Psychological relief and a decline in inflation would emerge during the current Iranian year ending in March 2027, he said, while more substantial macroeconomic gains, including double-digit growth, would likely materialize in the following year ending in March 2028.
“When blocked resources enter the economy, they will collect a portion of the existing liquidity,” he added. “Therefore, the potential agreement will lead to a reduction in the inflation rate from two directions.”
Whether that optimism proves justified remains uncertain. Even if a broader agreement is reached, many of the structural problems identified by Mostakhdemin-Hosseini—including fiscal imbalances, monetary expansion and weak investor confidence—would remain unresolved.
