New Zealand considering IRGC terrorist designation, deputy PM says

Hassan Mousavi Chalak told Khabar Online that worsening economic conditions were forcing more families to rely on their children's income to meet basic needs.

"We must accept that poverty in Iran has deepened," Mousavi said. "The more difficult economic conditions become, the more the use of children's labor capacity to cover family expenses increases."

Criticizing what he described as political efforts to downplay the issue, Mousavi said child labor extended far beyond children visible on city streets. He pointed to the use of children in slaughterhouses, livestock farms, underground workshops, orchards, farms and industrial settings, adding that many remained hidden from public view while facing dangerous and damaging working conditions.

There were no reliable statistics on the number of child laborers in Iran but that the phenomenon appeared more widespread in major cities and pilgrimage and tourist destinations, Mousavi said.

Physical and psychological toll

Children who work are deprived of the safety of school environments and normal socialization processes, Mousavi said, forcing them to adapt to harsh street conditions and sometimes engage in risky behavior to survive.

He warned that child laborers face serious health risks, including malnutrition, skin and infectious diseases, gastrointestinal problems and drug use, as well as different forms of violence and sexual exploitation.

"Social comparisons are also harmful," Mousavi said. "When a child compares themselves with others and sees peers enjoying ordinary and happy lives with their families, they experience psychological pressure and emotional suffering."

He cautioned that economic hardship increases the likelihood that children will be exploited, "sometimes even by those closest to them."

Economic strain fuels concerns

In recent weeks, multiple reports have highlighted the worsening economic situation in Iran, with citizens describing rising unemployment, sharp increases in the prices of essential goods and persistent economic stagnation.

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  Iranian teens say rising costs turn simple wishes into distant dreams

Messages sent to Iran International have pointed to mounting pressure on household finances as living costs rise and employment opportunities decline, deepening concerns about livelihoods and the future of the labor market.

Research published in 2025 found that a combination of poverty, migration and marginalization, alongside ineffective support policies, was pushing both Iranian and Afghan migrant children into street work and workshops.

The study argued that child labor should be understood within the framework of profiteering from children in a dysfunctional economic structure, where shortcomings in the welfare system and ineffective social interventions have left the street to serve as a substitute for formal support mechanisms.

Mafia networks target some children

Addressing remarks about organized criminal involvement, Mousavi said the existence of mafia-like networks in the child labor sector could not be entirely dismissed, particularly when it came to homeless children.

However, he said field experience did not support the assumption that all working children were controlled by such groups.

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  Rising costs push poor Iranian children out of school, activist warns

Many children, he said, were sent by their families from poorer provinces to wealthier areas to help cover household expenses.

"Some children, especially those without guardians or effective caregivers, may fall under the control of such networks," Mousavi said. "In these circumstances, they may be forced into illegal or criminal activities."

In an interview with Iran International, Charles W. Dunne, a non‑resident fellow at the Arab Center Washington DC and an adjunct lecturer at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs, said many in the West misread what sanctions, military strikes, and diplomatic isolation can achieve against Tehran.

“From a Western or an American point of view, this pressure that’s been exerted on the regime should have resulted in its collapse already,” he said. “But that’s not how this system works.”

The United States and Israel launched large‑scale attacks on Iran earlier this year, prompting Iranian missile and drone strikes against Israel, US positions, and Persian Gulf Arab states.

While President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu raised the possibility of regime change as a result of the airstrikes, the Islamic Republic has remained in place and has grown even more hardline, according to observers.

Dunne said the Trump administration’s shifting narrative points to a lack of strategic clarity at the top of the US government. “We’ve heard at least a dozen different explanations for why this war started in the first place,” he said. “Being completely honest with you, I’m not sure the administration knows to what end it is fighting.”

Dunne said talk of regime collapse and Venezuela‑style oil pressure ignores the Islamic Republic’s record of absorbing far greater punishment. Trump has suggested the US could one day seize Iran’s strategic oil hub of Kharg Island and “run” its energy sector “like we did in Venezuela”, but Dunne said the analogy is fundamentally flawed.

“In Venezuela the United States moved against a much smaller country, removed one leader and worked with a pliant figure inside an old regime that essentially survived,” he said. “That is not at all the scenario we face in Iran.”

Despite Trump’s saying that “regime change” already occurred, Dunne said Iran’s power structure has not collapsed and those now in charge “seem to be even more hardline and determined to prevail” than their predecessors.

Dunne added that the Islamic Republic has already shown far greater resilience, pointing to the 1980–88 Iran‑Iraq war, when the new revolutionary state suffered enormous casualties and damage yet fought Saddam Hussein’s Iraq to a standstill. “That war showed how much pain the regime is willing to accept in order to maintain its grip,” Dunne said. “Sanctions, oil export bans, a collapsing rial – none of that has brought the system to its breaking point yet.”

Dunne said repeated strikes on senior officials have not dismantled the state, but instead produced “more hardline, more aggressive personalities rising to the fore.” Iran’s regular army is backed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Basij paramilitaries, a layered security system designed to withstand both external attack and internal unrest.

“From their point of view, they are still in power, they still control the streets, and that is the main goal,” he said. “They believe they can inflict more political and even military pain than the United States is willing to bear over the next few months.”

The US and Pakistani officials say a Memorandum of Understanding with Iran will be signed on Sunday, describing it as a step toward ending the wider conflict, but Tehran has cast doubt on the timing.

That uncertainty has kept attention on the issues still capable of derailing or reshaping any deal.

One of them is Lebanon.

Iranian officials and media reports have suggested that any broader understanding with the United States would have to include an end to fighting involving Hezbollah. Israel has rejected any arrangement that would limit its freedom of action, with Defense Minister Israel Katz saying Friday that Israel would continue operating in Lebanon regardless of any agreement with Tehran.

The dispute reflects a larger reality taking shape across the Middle East: even if a preliminary Iran-US agreement moves forward, the struggle over Lebanon may decide what kind of post-war order follows it.

For veteran Middle East negotiator Aaron David Miller, Tehran’s focus on Lebanon is no accident.

“I think they are using Lebanon now to try to push Trump to push Netanyahu and to establish a new equation,” Miller, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told Eye for Iran.

For decades, Hezbollah served as Iran’s primary deterrent against direct attacks on Iranian territory. Now, Miller argues, Tehran is attempting to reverse that logic by making Hezbollah itself the red line.

Lebanon, he said, has become even more important to Iran after setbacks elsewhere in its regional network. The result is a new dynamic in which military action in Lebanon risks triggering a wider confrontation involving Iran directly.

“The concern about Lebanon and the Persian Gulf is that they provide ample opportunities for miscalculation or kinetic interaction,” Miller said.

The repercussions are already being felt beyond Lebanon.

Mohamed Fahmy, an Egyptian-Canadian journalist and Middle East political analyst who recently returned from reporting in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, said the war has altered how Iran is viewed across parts of the Arab world.

“There is a scar that has changed the psyche of people there towards how Iran is viewed,” Fahmy said.

Fahmy said governments across the region are now grappling with questions about deterrence, security and their future relationship with Tehran as missile and drone attacks continue despite diplomatic efforts.

The shifting landscape is also reshaping traditional assumptions about power in the Middle East.

“If you ask me who are the three most powerful players in the region, they’re the three non-Arabs: Israel, Turkey and Iran,” Miller said.

“The three states that dominated Middle Eastern politics for decades, Egypt, Iraq and Syria, are all offline.”

That makes Lebanon more than a side issue in the diplomacy around Iran. It is one of the places where the limits of any agreement may be tested first: whether Iran can preserve the deterrent value of Hezbollah, whether Israel can keep striking without triggering a wider war, and whether Washington can turn a preliminary understanding with Tehran into a more durable regional arrangement.

'The only real end is Iran regime change'

For former US special representative for Iran Elliott Abrams, the debate over Lebanon points to a larger question about the future of the Islamic Republic itself.

“The only real end of this is the end of the regime, which is to say, let the Iranian people govern themselves,” Abrams told Eye for Iran.

Looking beyond the immediate fighting, Abrams argued that the significance of the war may not ultimately be measured by what happens in Lebanon, but by what happens inside Iran.

“If the regime falls in a few years, we’ll all look back on early 2026 and say that’s when it started.”

For now, Lebanon remains one of the clearest tests of the emerging Iran-US track. A preliminary agreement may slow the war, but experts say the unresolved fight over Hezbollah and Israel’s freedom of action could still shape what comes after it.

Trump, in a Truth Social post, said the Deal is scheduled to get signed on Sunday, and "immediately after it is signed, the Hormuz Strait is open to all."

He also said no money would change hands under the agreement, a claim that contrasts with Iranian statements that the release of blocked funds would be an integral part of any deal.

Trump said that “at the appropriate time,” once conditions are calm, the United States would retrieve what he called “the Nuclear Dust” buried deep underground and downblend and destroy it, either in Iran or the United States.

He also warned that if the process fails, Washington has “the ultimate alternative.”

Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry said Saturday that an electronic signing ceremony for the Iran-US memorandum of understanding is scheduled for Sunday.

A senior US administration official told Reuters that Washington believes it has reached a “strong” deal with Iran.

Yet Iran’s security and military establishment has not yet signed off on the agreement, in what The Wall Street Journal described as a potentially significant stumbling block.

Mediators told the Journal on Friday that circles centered on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps had yet to approve the preliminary deal to wind down the war.

Iran remains cautious

That uncertainty cuts against the public confidence coming from Washington and Islamabad, and helps explain why Tehran’s public messaging has remained more cautious.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has said a memorandum of understanding with the United States could be signed remotely if final negotiations are completed, while insisting the text has not yet been finalized and could still change.

Al-Arabiya reported that Araghchi will travel to Pakistan on Sunday with a delegation for technical discussions related to the emerging agreement.

However, Iran's foreign ministry spokesman had earlier said no delegation would visit Pakistan and no deal is expected to be signed on Sunday.

Differing versions

The two sides are describing the possible agreement in sharply different ways.

Washington has framed it as a performance-based deal that would require Iran to dismantle its nuclear program, destroy or remove highly enriched uranium and accept inspections before receiving economic relief.

A US official told the Wall Street Journal that under the deal, Iran could receive broad sanctions relief if it decommissions nuclear sites, ends its enrichment program and stops funding proxy militia groups, including Hezbollah in Lebanon.

The signing of an initial agreement would open a 60-day period during which Iran would reopen the Strait of Hormuz and the United States would wind back its blockade of Iranian ports and commerce, the Journal reported.

During that period, negotiations would continue on a final nuclear deal and the sanctions relief Tehran would receive under it.

The US official said Iran would receive no money upfront under the deal, despite Tehran’s demand for $24 billion in assets frozen under US sanctions during the 60-day period, along with some upfront economic relief.

Tehran has presented the memorandum as a political and security framework rather than a final agreement. Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei said the release of Iran’s blocked funds would be an “integral” part of any agreement, while arguing that Tehran should receive payment for services it provides in the Strait of Hormuz. He said foreign military bases and forces in the region must come to an end.

Baghaei also said the nuclear issue and related matters would not be addressed at this stage, with the focus instead on ending the war and issues related to Lebanon.

A deal still contested in Tehran

That gap has given hardliners inside Iran an opening to attack the draft before it is signed.

A video released by IRGC-affiliated media appears to show a gathering outside the Foreign Ministry’s representative office in Mashhad on Saturday evening where protesters chant, “Death to Araghchi, the dishonorable compromiser and infiltrator.”

The hardliners have been criticizing the foreign ministry and the negotiating team in recent days, accusing them of giving too many concessions to the United States in the emerging deal.

Kayhan, a hardline daily close to Iran’s most uncompromising faction, warned that the Strait of Hormuz must not be reopened through diplomacy with Washington. It said Hormuz had been closed “with power” and should not be opened until US forces leave the region and Washington accepts the supreme leader’s red lines.

Khorasan daily went further, arguing that any deal would only delay what it described as a final confrontation between Iran and the United States, giving both sides time to rebuild offensive and defensive strength before a wider war.

The backlash has also moved through parliament. Ebrahim Rezaei, spokesman for parliament’s National Security Committee, said “excessive generosity” at the negotiating table had changed “the enemy’s calculations” and made Washington think Iran was weak.

Mahmoud Nabavian, another hardline member of the committee, criticized the emerging MoU as open-ended, saying it does not set a timeline for a final agreement and allows for its extension. He said sanctions relief, the withdrawal of US forces and the lifting of the blockade had all been deferred to a final agreement.

Nabavian also said enrichment would remain at its current level, which he described as “zero,” while Tehran would be committed to preparing the ground for reopening the Strait of Hormuz and allowing all commercial vessels to pass without restrictions.

But the hardline front is not entirely unified. The conservative daily Javan criticized those rejecting any negotiation with Washington, arguing that diplomacy can be part of confrontation rather than surrender.

Tehran also appears to be keeping its strategic partners informed. Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi said he discussed the latest developments on the draft Islamabad memorandum with the Russian and Chinese ambassadors in Tehran.

Hormuz remains the test

Hormuz remains the clearest test of whether diplomacy is lowering the temperature or merely reorganizing the pressure.

Araghchi has said Iran’s pressure over the strait would remain in place and that Iranian forces would intervene whenever necessary. He said tolls could not be imposed under international law, but described “service fees” as part of the negotiations.

Baghaei echoed that argument, saying Tehran’s measures to manage safe traffic through the Strait of Hormuz were both a step to protect national security and an effort serving the broader interests of the international community.

At the same time, the blockade is already affecting trade. Abbas Soufi, deputy chairman of parliament’s Construction Committee, said imports through Iran’s southern ports have faced challenges because of maritime restrictions.

A senior US administration official said Washington would be involved in de-mining the Strait of Hormuz as it reopens, with G7 countries possibly joining the effort. The official also said Trump will meet leaders from the UAE, Qatar and other Middle Eastern countries at the G7 summit.

Hardliners voice

Hardline figure Jalal Rashidikoochi accused Iranian lawmaker Seyed Mahmoud Nabavian of fuelling division over a potential Iran–US agreement, saying he had undermined national unity and warning that his actions would “come back to haunt him,” adding that even if his intentions were good, he had become “the cause and instigator of a great evil in the country which will also engulf you.”

Iranian lawmaker Seyed Mahmoud Nabavian said he read out and explained the text of a potential Iran–US agreement in an interview with the Student News Agency, insisting it is a “total loss,” while adding that he welcomed official denials of his remarks and was ready for debate on the deal.

A hardline influencer, Sarbaz Roohulla Rezvi, said he takes his political position from the Supreme Leader, adding he would support any decision on ceasefire or military action if approved by him, and act accordingly in practice, saying he would defend a ceasefire if ordered or support military action if instructed.

The discussion, hosted by Iran International’s Negar Mojtahedi, centered on whether the latest ceasefire in Lebanon marks the end of a war or the beginning of a more dangerous phase: a regional conflict in which Iran increasingly treats attacks on its proxies as attacks on itself.

A ceasefire that does not end the war

Alex Vatanka, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute, said Iran’s latest posture toward Lebanon should be viewed against the long arc of the Islamic Republic’s presence there.

He noted that it has been more than four decades since the first official officers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps arrived in Lebanon, making the country a central pillar of Tehran’s regional project.

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For years, Vatanka said, Iran used Lebanon and Hezbollah to project power, particularly against Israel. But recent events suggest Tehran may now be entering “a new chapter,” one in which the distinction between Iran and its proxy network becomes more blurred.

“An attack on Hezbollah, an attack on the Houthis, an attack on the Hashd al-Shaabi is going to, from now onward, be considered an attack on Iran,” Vatanka said, describing what Iranian officials have presented as a new defense doctrine.

He cautioned that if taken literally, such a doctrine could mean an open-ended regional confrontation. Any strike on Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, or Iran-backed militias in Iraq could invite a direct Iranian response, turning local battlefields into triggers for wider escalation.

Vatanka said Tehran appears to be defending its proxy strategy at a moment when many analysts had expected the opposite. After October 7 and the heavy blows inflicted on Iran-backed groups, some believed the Islamic Republic might conclude that its “forward defense” strategy had failed. Instead, he said, influential voices in Tehran appear to be arguing that this is precisely the moment to double down.

Iran’s umbrella over Lebanon

Robert Satloff, executive director of the Washington Institute, said Lebanon is now caught between two competing visions of its future.

“There are two competing realities in Lebanon,” Satloff said. “One reality is Iran asserting its umbrella to control Lebanon... The other reality is Lebanon and Israel negotiating a security agreement, potentially a peace agreement.”

That contrast may define the next phase of the conflict. In one scenario, Iran tries to reassert control through Hezbollah and make clear that Lebanon remains part of its regional security architecture. In the other, Lebanon’s government attempts to reclaim sovereignty and pursue security arrangements with Israel, with US backing.

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Satloff said Iran’s attempt to claim Lebanon under its umbrella has not succeeded, but neither has the effort to fully disarm Hezbollah. He described the challenge as a contest between Iran’s regional power projection and a fragile Lebanese state trying to implement commitments it has made before but repeatedly failed to fulfill.

He also argued that Iran’s latest direct attack on Israel showed weakness rather than strength. Compared with previous barrages involving hundreds of missiles, he said, the latest attack was limited and intercepted, exposing the degradation of Iran’s capabilities rather than demonstrating strategic confidence.

Hezbollah down, but not out

Ambassador David Hale, a distinguished diplomatic fellow at the Middle East Institute and former US ambassador to Lebanon, Jordan and Pakistan, said one of the most striking changes is Hezbollah’s current vulnerability.

“Hezbollah is so degraded, it's down but not out, but it's so degraded that it can't defend itself,” Hale said. “Iran is coming in to defend its proxy. It's always the other way around.”

For Hale, that reversal is significant. Hezbollah was long understood as one of Iran’s most powerful deterrent tools, a force capable of threatening Israel and shaping Lebanese politics on Tehran’s behalf. Now, he said, Iran’s direct intervention suggests Hezbollah can no longer perform its traditional role with the same effectiveness.

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Still, Hale warned against assuming that Lebanon can resolve the Hezbollah question through military action alone. He said sovereignty is not “a light switch,” and disarming Hezbollah will require a political process as well as military pressure.

Lebanon’s state institutions, he said, remain weak by design, reflecting the country’s sectarian balance. Although President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam have shown willingness to engage in a new direction, Hale said the Lebanese Armed Forces are unlikely to simply move into Hezbollah-controlled areas “guns blazing.” A durable solution would require humanitarian support, political alternatives for Lebanon’s Shiite community, and a credible state presence in the south.

The US as the decisive variable

The panelists agreed that whether this becomes the region’s new normal depends heavily on Washington.

Satloff said Iran’s attacks across the region, including against Kuwait, Bahrain and a US base in Jordan, should remind Arab states “who the real aggressor is” and create an opportunity for President Donald Trump to rally regional partners against Tehran. But he warned that the moment could be lost if Washington quickly returns to seeking any deal it can get.

Hale said the United States should rely less on public rhetoric and more on sustained pressure. He argued that Tehran understands violence and intimidation, and that Washington must be prepared to respond with persistent military, economic and political pressure.

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But the panel also raised doubts about the coherence of US strategy. Vatanka said he was struck by how much planning appeared to have gone into the military side of the confrontation, and how little into the political endgame. The stated US goal, he noted, has shifted from encouraging Iranians to challenge the regime to narrower objectives such as the nuclear file, trade and the Strait of Hormuz.

That uncertainty may be what makes the current moment so dangerous. A ceasefire may reduce the intensity of the fighting, but if Iran continues to defend its proxies as extensions of itself, Israel continues to strike perceived threats, Arab states are drawn into the line of fire, and Washington alternates between pressure and dealmaking, the region could remain trapped in a cycle of calibrated escalation.

Audience questions turn to Washington’s endgame

The audience Q&A shifted the discussion from battlefield dynamics to whether Washington has a political strategy to match its military pressure on Tehran.

Asked about regime change, Hale warned against raising expectations among Iranians without being prepared to follow through.

Satloff said Washington should instead invest in tools that prepare the ground for change, including stronger broadcasting to Iranians, internet access, and visa or asylum pathways for dissidents.

Vatanka said the deeper problem remains the lack of a coherent US strategy toward Iran.

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The exchange underscored a central point of the townhall: without a political endgame, military pressure alone may leave the region trapped in a cycle of ceasefires, strikes and retaliation.

For now, the experts suggested, the Middle East is not clearly moving from war to peace. It may instead be settling into a volatile gray zone: a ceasefire era in which the guns never fully fall silent.