Qatar, US discuss Pakistan mediation efforts on Iran conflict

In a system where political and ideological objectives consistently outweigh environmental sustainability and public welfare, even severe and widely recognized crises fail to trigger meaningful correction.

In this sense, Iran’s water crisis is not a failure of resources, it is a consequence of deliberate choices. The impact of decades of misguided water engineering and policy decisions is already visible across Iran’s water systems.

Major lakes and wetlands such as Urmia Lake have shrunk. Groundwater has been depleted across more than half of the country’s plains, land subsidence is accelerating, and per capita water availability has fallen to near or below 1,000 cubic meters.

At the same time, access to reliable drinking water has become increasingly uncertain. Water quality is declining because of inadequate wastewater treatment and aging infrastructure, while policy still emphasizes large-scale agricultural self-sufficiency despite mounting environmental constraints.

It would be easy to assume that these failures could stem partially from financial limitations. But this is not a story of absolute constraint. Even under sanctions, Iran has continued to generate substantial revenues, particularly from oil exports, over the past decade.

The water crisis is not necessarily due to a lack of resources, but how those resources are allocated. Based on Iran’s FY1404 (2025-2026) public budget, significant funding is still directed toward religious and ideological institutions, amounting to roughly $750 to $860 million annually, depending on exchange rates.

At the same time, Iran’s regional activities, including support for groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Houthis, and allied militias, are widely estimated, based on publicly reported figures, to cost an additional $1.1 to $1.5 billion each year.

These estimates reflect direct financial transfers and likely understate total support, which also includes substantial non-cash assistance such as weapons, equipment, and logistical backing.

In total, nearly $1.8 to $2.4 billion per year is allocated to priorities that do little to address Iran’s most urgent domestic challenges. Even redirecting a portion of these resources toward water management and infrastructure could support large-scale, practical solutions. Over a five-year period, such a shift would mobilize roughly $10 billion, enough to move beyond short-term fixes and begin addressing some of the structural drivers of Iran’s water crisis.

Based on order-of-magnitude cost benchmarks for standard water infrastructure projects, a reallocation of roughly $10 billion over five years could finance a coherent national water program. This would include a full-scale effort to reduce water losses in Tehran’s aging distribution network, where non-revenue water (NRW), water lost before it reaches consumers due to leaks, aging infrastructure, and inefficiencies is estimated at roughly 25 to 30 percent.

It could also support the deployment of potable reuse facilities across major urban centers such as Tehran, Mashhad, Isfahan, Shiraz, Yazd, and Ahvaz, helping relieve pressure on overstretched freshwater supplies.

In parallel, a targeted desalination and conveyance package could be implemented for Sistan and Baluchestan province, designed specifically to secure drinking water in a region facing chronic shortages, rather than to support inland agriculture.

Such an investment could also enable the construction of dozens of wastewater treatment plants nationwide, depending on facility size and treatment level, addressing both water quality degradation and reuse potential in regions struggling with untreated discharge.

Beyond urban infrastructure, even limited investments in agriculture could deliver measurable benefits. For example, modernizing irrigation in a single province such as Isfahan, where more efficient systems can reduce water use by roughly 30 to 60 percent, could significantly lower demand in one of Iran’s most water-stressed regions.

Even at the current economic development and growth, over a five-year period, roughly $10 billion directed toward ideological priorities could instead finance a nationwide water recovery program: upgrading Tehran’s water distribution system to reduce losses, building 10 potable reuse facilities for major cities, developing seven coastal desalination plants for southern Iran, and constructing a strategic water transfer system to Zahedan in Sistan and Baluchestan.

It could also fund eight large wastewater treatment plants, dozens of mid-size facilities across the country, and modernize irrigation in Isfahan. Instead, those resources are being directed elsewhere. Now imagine how the country’s water infrastructure can be overhauled if the regime is gone and Iran is back on the path to growth and prosperity, with access to the latest technologies the world has to offer, to tackle this issue.

These figures are illustrative, not precise. They highlight both Iran’s potential capacity to invest in water infrastructure and the scale of resources currently misallocated, without even accounting for additional spending on missile programs, and nuclear development, which further underscores the magnitude of available resources.

Ultimately, the constraint is neither technical nor financial: it is political. As long as the current regime remains in power, resources that could stabilize and modernize Iran’s water systems will continue to be diverted toward non-productive ideological ends.

In an audio message published on May 6, Ghalibaf laid out five requests directed at Iranians at home and abroad, framing austerity, solidarity and public mobilization as essential to surviving what he described as one of the most critical periods in Iran’s contemporary history.

The intervention marked Ghalibaf’s clearest political re-emergence after a period in which hardline factions appeared to sideline him despite his elevated wartime profile.

Ghalibaf rose to prominence during the 12-day war with Israel and the United States in 2025, when he was widely seen as one of slain supreme leader Ali Khamenei’s most trusted political figures.

After Khamenei’s death, he headed Iran’s delegation in the Islamabad talks with the United States — perhaps the clearest sign yet of his standing within the new order.

Repeated remarks by President Donald Trump hinting at regime change in Iran and suggesting that a figure from inside the system could ultimately emerge reinforced speculation abroad that Ghalibaf might become the face of a post-Khamenei transition.

But his position soon appeared less secure. Hardline critics accused him of weakness in negotiations and insufficient resistance to Western pressure, and for a period he largely retreated from public view before gradually re-emerging.

In the May 6 message, Ghalibaf urged Iranians to recognize that the country was engaged in “one of the biggest wars in Iran’s contemporary history,” arguing that enduring hardship was necessary to secure a strategic victory.

His central appeal focused on austerity, with Ghalibaf calling saving and reduced consumption “the missile the people can fire at the heart of the enemy.”

He also called for reviving mutual-aid networks similar to those formed during the COVID-19 pandemic and urged the Basij militia to return to what he described as its historic role as a neighborhood-based problem-solving force helping citizens navigate daily hardships.

The appeal contrasted sharply with the Basij’s prominent role in suppressing protests during the 2022 Women, Life, Freedom movement and the unrest of January 2026.

Ghalibaf’s final request targeted Iranians professionals and experts abroad, whom he urged to contribute ideas and resources to help manage wartime economic pressures. He encouraged expatriates not to wait for official outreach but to “force officials” to use their capabilities.

The appeal quickly drew criticism from some Iranians overseas, with users on social media arguing authorities could not simultaneously seek help from expatriates while hardliners continued threatening confiscation of assets and punitive measures against critics abroad.

Ghalibaf’s remarks came amid broader calls from establishment figures for the government to repair its relationship with the public after months of unrest, war and economic pressure.

Former government spokesman Ali Rabiei and centrist politician Mohammad Atrianfar, both former intelligence officials, have argued in recent days that the state must first reconcile with its own citizens before it can stabilize the country externally.

In an interview with Khabar Online, Atrianfar warned that failing to respond seriously to public demands risked further erosion of public trust and legitimacy, pointing specifically to internet restrictions and communication controls as symbols of the widening gap between the state and society.

The comments reflect growing concern within parts of Iran’s political establishment that war, economic hardship and repeated crackdowns have deepened public alienation, forcing even longtime insiders to speak increasingly openly about the system’s legitimacy crisis.

Erfan Shakourzadeh, born in 1997, was arrested by the Revolutionary Guard’s intelligence organization in February 2025 on charges of “espionage and cooperation with hostile countries.”

His death sentence was recently upheld by Iran’s Supreme Court after he reportedly spent nine months in solitary confinement before being transferred to Evin prison.

Shakourzadeh was a graduate student at Iran University of Science and Technology specializing in satellite technology.

He had previously studied electrical engineering at the University of Tabriz and was described by supporters as a researcher focused on satellite testing software and satellite control and positioning systems.

His case has drawn comparisons to the prosecution of other elite Iranian students on national security charges, including Sharif University student and international astronomy medalist Ali Younesi, whose 2020 arrest became emblematic of a widening crackdown on academically gifted young Iranians accused of links to hostile states or opposition groups.

Younesi is currently serving a 16-year sentence alongside fellow Sharif University student Amir Hossein Moradi after both were convicted on national security charges.

Aerospace, satellite and advanced engineering fields have become especially sensitive areas for Iranian security agencies amid years of cyber conflict, sanctions pressure and fears of foreign infiltration of strategic sectors.

Rights advocates have also raised alarm in recent months over the transfer of political and security prisoners to Ghezel Hesar prison, which has increasingly been used to hold inmates facing execution.

Iran has seen a sharp rise in executions this year as authorities tightened security controls after the January uprising and the subsequent conflict with the United States and Israel.

US Central Command said on Friday its forces disabled two Iranian-flagged empty oil tankers before they could enter an Iranian port on the Gulf of Oman in violation of the US blockade.

"US forces disabled M/T Sea Star III and M/T Sevda, May 8, prior to both vessels entering an Iranian port on the Gulf of Oman in violation of the ongoing US blockade," CENTCOM said in a statement.

"A U.S. Navy F/A-18 Super Hornet from USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77) disabled both tankers after firing precision munitions into their smokestacks, preventing the non-compliant ships from entering Iran," it added.

The statement said American forces also disabled Iranian-flagged M/T Hasna on May 6 "as it attempted to sail to an Iranian port in the Gulf of Oman."

"All three vessels are no longer transiting to Iran."

Iran’s foreign ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei said on Friday that Tehran was still reviewing the US proposal aimed at ending the conflict and would announce its position once a final decision was made.

“Regarding the negotiations, the proposal is under review and once we reach a final conclusion, we will certainly announce it,” Baghaei told Tasnim news agency.

Referring to overnight exchanges of fire, Baghaei said Iran remained “nominally in a ceasefire situation,” adding that the country’s armed forces were closely monitoring developments and would respond “with full force to any aggression or adventurism.”