Iran insists on limiting Hormuz traffic and charging tolls - WSJ
Iran told mediators that it will continue limiting vessel traffic through the Strait of Hormuz even after a US-brokered ceasefire, according to reporting by The Wall Street Journal.
Under the reported plan, only a limited number of commercial ships would be allowed to pass each day, with coordination required through Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Ships would also be subject to transit fees or tolls.
The report says Iran is presenting the system as part of a post-deal maritime arrangement, while retaining the ability to block vessels it considers hostile.
For decades the IRGC relied on its ability to threaten closure of the Strait of Hormuz as its premier economic shield and golden get out of jail card.
Roughly 21 million barrels per day of oil and petroleum products normally transit the strait. That volume accounts for one fifth of global petroleum liquids consumption and one quarter of all seaborne traded oil.
Yet the destinations of those flows expose the asymmetry that ultimately doomed the strategy.
In the first half of 2025 ~89% percent of crude oil and condensate flowed eastward to Asian markets.
China absorbed 37.7 percent of the total followed by India at 14.7 percent South Korea at 12 percent Japan at 10.9 percent and other Asian buyers at 13.9 percent.
Europe received just 3.8 percent and the United States only 2.5 percent. The IRGC was never holding the West hostage. It holds the East.
By throttling traffic during the conflict the regime exercised its only economic "card". Ship transits collapsed to under ten percent of normal levels even after the ceasefire. Insurance rates soared and oil prices spiked.
The move they thought would delivered short term tactical breathing room and helped force negotiations. Yet the decision transformed a potent deterrent into a wasting asset. The primary victims were Asian importers especially China and India. Those nations faced immediate cost spikes and supply uncertainty.
Beijing responded by drawing down its strategic petroleum reserve which covers more than four months of imports while accelerating purchases of Russian African and Latin American crude.
India pursued parallel diversification.
More critically Persian Gulf producers gained the political urgency and capital they needed to lock in permanent bypass infrastructure.
Saudi Arabia ramped its East West Petroline to near its seven million barrels per day capacity routing crude to Red Sea terminals at Yanbu.
The United Arab Emirates expanded the Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline to Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman. Additional overland proposals and expanded export terminals emerged almost immediately.
Once those routes reach commercial scale the strait loses its status as a global chokepoint. It becomes a regional inconvenience whose disruption matters far less to the broader market.
Simultaneously United States crude exports have surged to a record 4.9 million barrels per day in April 2026 with forecasts pointing toward five million or higher in coming months. That volume covers roughly 23 percent of normal full Hormuz traffic and about one third of the crude and condensate segment.
Asian refiners have redirected demand toward US Gulf Coast barrels to fill the shortfall from Middle East shut ins estimated at 7.5 to 9.1 million barrels per day. The surge not only caps price spikes but also cements American producers as the flexible swing supplier to Asia. This development accelerates the very diversification that erodes Iranian leverage.
The one year five year and ten year horizons reveal starkly divergent outcomes.
For IRGC the picture darkens at every stage. In the first year oil revenues collapse despite temporary price spikes because export volumes remain minimal. The economy already contracting from war damage and sanctions faces hyperinflation in food prices and widespread shortages. Over five years bypass pipelines and alternative supply chains become permanent fixtures. Petrodollar inflows never recover and sanctions compound the isolation.
By year ten Iran confronts structural marginalization as a secondary supplier at best. Internal pressures from economic rot and factional rivalry mount inexorably.
The regime is forced to move first. It cannot sustain years of revenue denial while rivals reroute around it. Diplomatic capitulation or escalated domestic repression becomes inevitable well before the five year mark.
China absorbs the heaviest short term pain yet emerges stronger. Higher import costs slow some refinery runs in the first year but strategic reserves Russian pipelines and surging United States imports prevent outright shortages.
Over five years Beijing locks in new sourcing habits and accelerates renewables and domestic production. By year ten China enjoys markedly improved energy security with far less exposure to any single chokepoint. The crisis ultimately serves as an expensive but effective catalyst for diversification but shines a light on Chinese dependency on US rendering any multipolar aspirations null, China isn't a pole probably never was if it can't survive without IRGC cheap oil paid with the blood of Iranians.
The United States stands as the unambiguous winner across all horizons. Export revenues boom in the first year as shale producers respond to sustained high prices.
Over five and ten years America solidifies its role as the reliable Atlantic basin supplier to Asian demand. Strategic leverage deepens without proportional domestic pain.
Arab states astride the Persian Gulf also gain by converting crisis into durable infrastructure and expanded market access.
In strategic terms the IRGC executed a classic use it or lose it blunder. By weaponizing the eastern hostage it compelled the very adaptations that render the hostage irrelevant. Global energy flows have begun a permanent eastward rerouting that favors flexible producers over vulnerable chokepoint holders.
The 2026 crisis therefore accelerates the long term isolation of Iran. It diminishes the regime's economic shield permanently and hastens the internal collapse dynamics already evident before the conflict.
What began as a tactical gambit to survive immediate pressure has instead locked in decades of strategic decline. The geography of oil trade the scale of United States export capacity and the self interest of Asian importers have combined to ensure that the IRGC traded its last "card" for time it didn't get and burned what it could not afford to waste relevance and economic potential to climb out of the grave it dug itself.
The Hormuz closure wasn't a surprise to any serious person, one might argue Trump turned what the enemy believed to be a leverage to a ticking time bomb trap the IRGC just walked into.
Iranian lawmaker Ebrahim Azizi said on Friday ships passing through the Strait of Hormuz must comply with a new maritime system set by the Islamic Republic.
“It is time to comply with the new maritime system of the Strait of Hormuz; this system is determined by the Islamic Republic of Iran, not social media posts,” he said in a post on X.
US crude oil prices dropped sharply on Friday, closing at their lowest level since March 10 after Iran said it would reopen the Strait of Hormuz to commercial shipping, according to CBS News.
US crude settled down 11.45% at $83.85 per barrel, marking the second-largest one-day decline since the war began.
Despite the drop, US oil remains up about 25% since Feb. 28 and roughly 45% since the start of the year.
As Washington signals that a deal with Tehran may be close, a central question remains unresolved: who, if anyone, is actually winning?
US President Donald Trump said on Friday he expects an agreement with Iran “in the next day or two,” even claiming Iran has “agreed to everything,” including halting uranium enrichment and transferring its highly-enriched uranium stockpiles to the US.
The remarks came hours after Iran announced the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz following weeks of disruption, an announcement that sparked rare public criticism from within the Islamic Republic targeting the negotiating team.
Despite Tehran's declared reopening of the strait, Trump said the US will continue blockading Iranian ports until a final deal is achieved.
Speaking at Iran International's English podcast Eye for Iran, maritime sanctions expert Charlie Brown framed the strategy behind the current US blockade as one that could either be about pressure to deal or pressure to collapse.
“I think it’s clear that the goal would be, you know, the first case is pressure to come to negotiate, but the other case would be pressure to collapse the regime system and make space for a new system,” said Brown, a senior advisor at United Against Nuclear Iran who tracks Iran’s shadow fleet and illicit tanker networks.
That dual objective, forcing negotiations while simultaneously weakening the system sits at the heart of the current moment. But whether it is working remains far less clear.
Pressure campaign vs. economic reality
At the center of that uncertainty is the Strait of Hormuz, where a US-led pressure campaign has targeted Iran’s oil exports — the Islamic Republic's economic lifeline.
Both Brown and energy expert Dr. Iman Nasseri, Managing Director for the Middle East at FGE, agreed the impact is real, but warned it is too early to measure its effectiveness.
“The effects of a blockade will definitely take time,” Brown said, cautioning against drawing quick conclusions.
Nasseri, one of the leading experts on Iran’s oil flows and regional energy markets, echoed that view, emphasizing that even under ideal conditions, economic pressure unfolds slowly.
“In normal conditions three to four weeks but in Iranian situation and sanctions evasion it could take up to three months for a cargo to land in the destination market,” he said.
That delay means Iran can continue generating revenue in the short term, even as restrictions tighten.
“Iran is still selling oil which is out there at sea today without loading anything,” Nasseri explained, underscoring how existing cargoes can sustain income flows even as new exports are disrupted.
Shipping data reinforces that point. According to TankerTrackers.com, 633 Iran-linked tankers have been tracked globally, with 397 sanctioned by US authorities. Yet dozens continue operating, including at least 72 vessels currently moving freely in the Middle East.
The system — built on ship-to-ship transfers, AIS spoofing and shadow banking remains active, even under pressure.
That raises a broader question: whether global markets can absorb the disruption long enough for pressure on Iran to fully materialize.
While the economic battle unfolds at sea, the nuclear file remains central to any potential deal and to competing claims of success.
Trump’s assertion that Iran has agreed to halt enrichment would represent a major concession. But nuclear experts caution that the reality is more complex.
“I’d say the probability the regime would want to build the bomb has gone up, but the probability that they can succeed has gone down,” said David Albright, founder of the Institute for Science and International Security.
Albright also warned that focusing only on Iran’s most enriched uranium stockpiles risks missing the bigger picture. Iran possesses thousands of kilograms of lower-enriched uranium that could be further processed if enrichment continues — meaning any deal that does not fully end enrichment could leave a pathway intact.
Taken together, his assessment points to a paradox: Iran may be more motivated than ever to pursue nuclear capability, even as its ability to do so has been degraded by military strikes.
That tension complicates any claim that diplomacy alone has resolved the nuclear threat.
Regional shifts and Iran’s influence
Beyond the nuclear and economic fronts, regional dynamics suggest Iran’s position may be shifting — though not collapsing.
One of the most significant developments has been direct diplomatic engagement between Lebanon and Israel, a move that signals potential decoupling from Tehran’s influence.
“This was the first time that the United States recognizes that the government of Lebanon is sovereign enough and adult enough to sit in face-to-face talks bilaterally without Saudis or Iranians or Syrians or anybody else in the room,” said Hussain Abdul Hussain, a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and author of the Arab Case for Israel.
A newly agreed ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon is set to last 10 days, with the possibility of being “extended by mutual agreement” if negotiations show progress
That shift challenges one of Iran’s long-standing pillars of regional power: its network of proxy forces.
For years, Lebanon has effectively been treated as an extension of Iran’s regional strategy through Hezbollah. But the current talks — taking place independently of Tehran — suggest a possible shift toward decoupling.
Abdul Hussain underscored that divide more directly, describing how Lebanon’s leadership is increasingly asserting its independence from Iran’s negotiations.
“You do you, we do Lebanon,” he said, characterizing the government’s stance as separate from Tehran’s diplomatic track.
A moment of uncertainty
Taken together, the developments across Hormuz, the nuclear file and the regional landscape point to a single conclusion: it is too early to declare a winner.
The United States has demonstrated its ability to impose pressure — militarily and economically — while Iran has shown it can still adapt, sustain revenue and shape the narrative.
For now, the outcome is not defined by victory, but by how long each side can sustain the pressure before it breaks.
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