Iran launched a missile strike on Prince Sultan Air Base on Friday that damaged several US Air Force refueling tankers, The Wall Street Journal reported citing US and Saudi officials.
The attack also involved unmanned aircraft, marking a further escalation in the war between Iran and US‑led forces, the report said.
Yemen’s Iran-aligned Houthi movement warned on Friday it could intervene militarily if the United States and Israel expand their campaign against Iran and allied groups in the region, according to a statement published on its Telegram channel.
The group, which refers to itself as the Yemeni Armed Forces, called for an immediate halt to what it described as US and Israeli “aggression” against Iran, as well as against Gaza, Lebanon and Iraq, saying the conflict risks destabilizing the region and global economy.
The Houthis said they were prepared for direct military action under several conditions, including if other countries join US- and Israeli-led operations against Iran, or if the Red Sea is used for attacks on Iran or other regional actors.
Iran’s recent attempted strike on a joint UK–US military base in the Indian Ocean, some 4,000 km from its territory, marks more than an escalation — it is a wake-up call for the West, experts told Iran International.
On March 20, Iran fired two long-range ballistic missiles at the Diego Garcia base, a target long considered beyond its declared range of around 2,000 kilometers.
Iran’s attempted long-range strike — which US officials say did not hit its target — marks the first time Tehran has demonstrated the ability to reach as far as Diego Garcia.
For years, Iran claimed its missile range was capped at around 2,000 kilometers. That claim now appears increasingly untenable.
The attempted strike exposes a reality that can no longer be ignored, experts told this week's episode of Eye for Iran: Tehran’s missile capabilities extend far beyond the Middle East, its hardened arsenal has withstood sustained US and Israeli strikes, and the conflict is now colliding with critical global pressure points — from the Strait of Hormuz to the growing likelihood of a broader military phase.
A threat no longer abstract
Iran’s ballistic missile threat is no longer abstract — it is real and expanding.
Both Janatan Sayeh, an Iran expert at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), and Farzin Nadimi, a defense and military expert with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, warned on the Eye for Iran podcast that Tehran’s capabilities now extend far beyond previously stated limits — potentially reaching as far as the United Kingdom.
“This should not come as a surprise,” Sayeh said. He noted that Iranian missiles and drones have already been used on European soil through Russia.
“The difference now is that the regime itself can launch them directly from Iranian territory," said Sayeh.
The shift marks a critical evolution — from indirect projection of force to direct long-range capability — underscoring the growing reach of Iran’s arsenal.
Even if unsuccessful, the Diego Garcia strike signals a move from regional containment to global reach — with direct implications for Europe and beyond.
In his State of the Union address last month, President Donald Trump cautioned that Iran’s missile program could soon put the United States within reach — a claim that, in light of recent developments, is no longer theoretical.
Missile cities: A durable arsenal
That expanded reach is underpinned by an infrastructure designed not just to deter — but to endure.
Nadimi said Iran has long possessed the technical ability to extend the range of its missiles, including through payload modification and dual-use space-launch technology.
More significantly, he described a vast network of hardened underground facilities — some “the size of a small city” — buried deep beneath mountainous terrain and reinforced structures, making them extraordinarily difficult to destroy.
These so-called “missile cities” are often positioned near — and in some cases beneath — civilian infrastructure, including residential neighborhoods and public spaces, complicating targeting while increasing their survivability.
“Many of these missile bases are so deep that even the most powerful bunker-buster bombs cannot reach them… some are as deep as 500 meters and the size of a small city," Nadimi told Eye for Iran.
Strait of Hormuz: Global Stakes
The implications extend far beyond military capability.
The Strait of Hormuz — through which roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil supply passes — has emerged as a central pressure point in the conflict.
Disruptions tied to the war have already rattled global energy markets, with prices reacting to uncertainty around shipping routes and potential escalation.
Joel Rubin, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Obama administration, warned on Eye for Iran that Iran’s actions reflect a broader strategic calculus.
“This is how Iran behaves,” he said. “They are willing to disrupt and destroy the global economy to protect themselves.”
Dr. Walid Phares, foreign policy expert, advisor to past US presidents and author, described the Strait not as a theoretical chokepoint, but as an active military theater — where Iranian missile systems along the coastline could trigger direct US intervention to secure global shipping lanes.
President Donald Trump has repeatedly said the United States would reopen the Strait “with or without” allied support — underscoring the scale of the economic stakes.
“Which tells me that ground forces, limited special forces, Marines, now we understand, may be used," said Phares, author of Iran: An Imperialist Republic and US Policy.
Talks as strategy, not solution
Even as diplomatic efforts continue, both sides appear to be using negotiations as part of a broader strategic game.
Rubin pointed to a narrowing political and economic window in Washington, suggesting the US is unlikely to sustain prolonged negotiations as domestic pressure builds.
Phares also framed talks not as a pathway to de-escalation, but as part of a parallel track where diplomacy unfolds alongside active military preparation.
In this environment, negotiations are not replacing escalation — they are occurring within it.
Toward escalation: troops and targets
On the ground, signs of a deeper military phase are becoming more pronounced.
The Pentagon is weighing sending up to 10,000 additional ground troops to the Middle East, according to reporting by The Wall Street Journal and Axios — a move that would significantly expand US combat presence in the region.
The deployment would include infantry and armored units, adding to thousands of Marines and paratroopers already moving into position.
Officials say forces could be staged within striking distance of Iran, including near Kharg Island, a critical oil export hub that handles the vast majority of the country’s crude exports.
Military planners are also reportedly developing options for a “final blow,” including a large-scale bombing campaign and the potential use of ground forces.
No final decision has been made — but the scale and positioning of forces point toward preparation, not restraint.
A region already shifting
At the same time, regional dynamics are beginning to shift.
The United Arab Emirates has publicly warned — in a Wall Street Journal op-ed by its ambassador to Washington — that a simple ceasefire is not enough, signaling growing alignment among US partners around the need for a more decisive outcome.
In Lebanon — long considered firmly within Iran’s sphere of influence — mounting pressure on Hezbollah, moves to marginalize IRGC influence, and the withdrawal of Iran’s ambassador from Beirut point to potential cracks in Tehran’s regional posture.
For many observers, the attempted strike toward Diego Garcia marks a turning point because of what it revealed: the range and the probable intent, all are now visible.
Russia is sending a shipment of drones to Iran, including upgraded versions of technology that Tehran originally supplied to Moscow after its invasion of Ukraine, US and European officials told The Associated Press on Friday.
"Russian and Iranian officials have had “very active” discussions this month regarding transferring drones from Russia to Iran, the European intelligence official told AP," the report said.
"A US defense official said it is unclear if the shipment is a one-time delivery or part of a series. Neither official could say how significant the delivery is or how many drones were sent," the report added. "Another European official said a small number of drones would not have a major impact on the outcome of the war. All the officials spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive matters."
White House special envoy Steve Witkoff said on Friday that the United States was hopeful that there would be meetings with Iran this week.
"We think there will be meetings this week. We're certainly hopeful for it," Witkoff said at an investment forum in Miami, Florida.
"We have a 15-point deal on the table that the Iranians have had for a bit of time. We expect an answer from them, and it would solve it all," he said.
He said the proposed deal does not allow Iran to enrich uranium inside its territory. "No enrichment. No second north Korea in the middle east."
It may be too early to issue verdicts on the war unfolding around Iran since conflicts of this scale rarely follow the scripts imagined in their first weeks and early judgments often prove premature.
Each time tensions escalate between the United States, Israel and the Islamic Republic of Iran, however, a familiar pattern emerges in Western commentary. Before events have meaningfully unfolded, a chorus of analysts moves quickly to declare failure. T
he comparisons are predictable: Iraq, Afghanistan, quagmires. The conclusion is often presented as inevitable.
This reflex deserves scrutiny. Skepticism is necessary in matters of war. But when skepticism hardens into certainty, it ceases to be analysis. To assert at the outset that success is impossible is not caution; it is intellectual closure. Every conflict contains a range of possible outcomes, and serious analysis requires acknowledging that reality.
Part of the current pessimism is political. Assessments of strategy are often filtered through attitudes toward leadership, particularly in the case of President Donald Trump.
For many critics, this leads to the presumption that any policy associated with him must fail. But political actors are rarely defined by a single dimension. The same American founders who articulated the principle that “all men are created equal” also upheld slavery.
Whatever one’s broader evaluation of Trump, the objective of preventing the Islamic Republic from becoming a nuclear power addresses a widely recognized security concern. Judging that objective should not depend on personal or partisan preferences, but on its strategic implications.
Many Middle Eastern states are concerned about Tehran’s regional power projection. Cross-border attacks, missile strikes and the use of proxy forces such as Hezbollah reinforce fears that Iran’s leaders are willing to escalate conflict to preserve their position.
Yet the most common analytical error may lie elsewhere: in assumptions about Iranian society. Political theorists from Antonio Gramsci onward have emphasized that durable power requires more than coercion. It requires a governing narrative, a form of “common sense” that people internalize and that gives legitimacy to rule.
The Islamic Republic once possessed such a narrative, rooted in revolutionary ideology and religious authority. But that narrative has eroded; large segments of Iranian society no longer identify with the ideological foundations of the state.
This matters because regimes that lose narrative cohesion often become increasingly dependent on force. They can persist for long periods, but in a more brittle and reactive form.
During the 12-day conflict in June, reactions inside Iran appeared complex rather than uniformly relieved. While many welcomed the ceasefire, reporting from within the country pointed to a mix of fear, uncertainty and guarded expectation. As Israel’s battlefield advantage became apparent, some Iranians expressed concern that the regime might turn inward to reassert control.
The deadly crackdown that followed in January 2026 underscored the argument that the state’s first instinct when challenged is repression.
A different concern has also surfaced in some discussions among Iranians: that conflict might end prematurely, leaving the regime intact and emboldened. For a population that has repeatedly risked its life in protest, partial measures carry their own consequences.
In Iraq and Afghanistan, external intervention collided with deeply fragmented societies marked by sectarian divisions, tribal rivalries and competing power centers. Iran has its own social and political cleavages, but not necessarily the same degree of entrenched sectarian fragmentation.
Opposition to the Islamic Republic frequently cuts across class, gender and regional lines, creating a form of shared political discontent that differs from those earlier conflicts.
Those ruling Iran appear aware of this vulnerability. Several senior officials have used state media in recent weeks to warn citizens against protest. A government at war focusing on controlling its own population may reveal a measure of insecurity rather than strength.
A similar pattern is visible in its information strategy. Governments confident in their position rarely need to shut down internet access for tens of millions of people. Nor do they typically rely on implausible claims of battlefield success, including reports circulated on state media suggesting the downing of advanced fighter jets, the destruction of major Israeli cities or even the death of senior Israeli leaders such as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
Meanwhile, the external balance has also shifted in ways that are often underappreciated. Israel and the United States have killed several key figures since they began their attacks on Feb. 28. Tehran’s reaction—striking many neighboring states have—has expanded concern beyond its traditional adversaries.
Governments that previously sought to manage relations with Iran now face a more direct security calculus, some even reportedly pondering a more direct involvement in the war.
None of this guarantees a particular outcome. The Islamic Republic retains significant resources, including coercive capacity, financial networks and ideological constituencies. It also benefits from the willingness of committed supporters to endure high costs, reinforced by narratives that valorize sacrifice and martyrdom.
But acknowledging these realities does not require ignoring countervailing pressures. A regime that faces internal discontent, increasing reliance on repression and expanding external pressure may prove less stable than it appears.
To interpret its most extreme actions solely as signs of strength risks misunderstanding the nature of power. Erratic behavior can reflect desperation as much as confidence.
A more balanced assessment would therefore consider not only the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan, but also the conditions that distinguish Iran: the erosion of ideological legitimacy, the agency of its society and a shifting regional environment.
Iran is not Iraq. It is not Afghanistan. Its trajectory is not predetermined.
The more relevant question is not whether failure is inevitable, but whether current analysis adequately captures the possibility that this moment—shaped by internal and external pressures alike—may unfold differently.