Why Tehran’s business pitch to Trump won’t end nuclear deadlock

International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Rafael Grossi said the agency has been unable to verify the status and location of Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium since military strikes by the United States and Israel hit several nuclear sites in June.

The IAEA said it has not been granted access to Iran’s four declared enrichment facilities and has therefore lost “continuity of knowledge” over previously declared nuclear material at affected sites. As a result, it cannot verify whether Iran has suspended all enrichment-related activities or confirm the current size, composition or whereabouts of its enriched uranium stockpile.

Grossi said his agency “will not be in a position to provide assurance that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively peaceful” until Iran improves its cooperation.

Inspectors have observed regular vehicular activity at bombed sites, including the underground complex at Isfahan and the enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow, through satellite imagery. However, Grossi said that without on-site inspections the agency cannot determine the nature or purpose of those activities.

According to the IAEA, Iran holds 440.9 kg (972 pounds) of uranium enriched up to 60% purity, a short technical step from weapons-grade levels of 90%. Grossi has previously said that while such material does not mean Iran has a nuclear weapon, it could, in theory, be sufficient for multiple bombs if further enriched.

The warning comes as Iran and the United States continue indirect talks over Tehran’s nuclear activities. Iran maintains that its nuclear program is exclusively peaceful.

Delegations from Tehran and Washington met under Omani mediation for the third round of indirect talks, focusing on Iran’s nuclear program and sanctions relief, according to Iran’s foreign ministry.

Omani Foreign Minister Badr al-Busaidi said technical discussions would resume next week in Vienna.

While the Omani top diplomat spoke of “progress” in negotiations, US media said no breakthrough was achieved.

Iran rejected major US proposals, including transferring enriched uranium abroad, halting enrichment, and dismantling certain nuclear sites, The Wall Street Journal reported citing informed sources.

US military and political pressure continues

The talks took place amid a large US military presence in the Middle East. Shortly after the talks, CENTCOM chief Admiral Brad Cooper briefed President Donald Trump on potential options, ranging from limited strikes on nuclear and missile sites to broader operations involving Israel, carrying risks of escalation and regime change.

White House officials stressed that no decisions had yet been made.

In Washington, lawmakers signaled hardline positions. Senate Republicans posted on X that “Iran will never have a nuclear weapon.” Representative Carlos Gimenez warned that past deals “breathed new life into the regime” and argued that extraordinary measures may be needed to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran.

US Vice President JD Vance, cited by The Washington Post, said the United States would avoid another prolonged Middle East war while keeping both diplomatic and military options open.

The talks coincide with domestic pressures in Iran, where universities have shifted to online-only classes amid ongoing protests. Observers say the lack of breakthroughs highlights the fragile state of the diplomatic process.

Negotiators are expected to return next week. Core disagreements over enrichment and sanctions remain, leaving the outcome uncertain as Iran continues uranium enrichment and the US maintains military readiness in the region.

With officials apparently convinced that the Geneva talks would not satisfy Washington’s demands over Tehran’s nuclear and missile programs, the government rallied more than 500 Iranians—described as celebrities, academics and public figures—to sign a letter headlined “No to War.”

Many signatories were reformist figures of varying prominence, along with individuals whom Iranian lawyer Hassan Assadi Zeidabadi described in a post on X as “employees of the President’s Office, advisers to cabinet ministers, and staff of state-owned companies and government funds presented as political activists.” He called the initiative deceptive.

Published by the government-owned Iran newspaper and echoed by other outlets, the letter urged the public to press foreign powers to halt any planned attack before it materializes.

The appeal for restraint did not stem the flow of bravado from Iranian politicians and military commanders.

Former Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki addressed the United States using slang associated with Tehran’s street toughs (jahel)—a coded signal that “this time, we mean it.” His remarks were widely mocked online.

Hardline MP, Abolfazl Zohrehvand, warned Washington against targeting Khamenei or his son in coarse language. Only days earlier, he had declared: “Trump is not brave enough to attack Iran.”

As the Geneva talks began, several outlets openly acknowledged the risk of conflict.

The official IRNA news agency wrote that “if the negotiations fail, the situation will move toward dangerous ambiguity and a possible military conflict,” adding that “successful negotiation in Geneva is the only way to prevent a new war.”

Headlines in IRNA and Fararu were blunt: “If we do not reach an agreement today, we will be moving toward war.”

Later on Thursday, Oman’s foreign minister, Badr Albusaidi, announced that the third round of talks had concluded and would resume next week in Vienna.

Axios reported, citing a source familiar with the discussions, that chief US negotiators Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner were “disappointed” by what they heard from Iran’s foreign minister during the morning session.

'At any price'

Meanwhile, economic outlets in Tehran spoke of “early alarms of high war risk.” Eghtesad News reported that traders were rushing to convert assets into foreign currency or gold “at any price” to hedge against a potential collapse in talks.

The unease spilled into consumer behavior. Iranians bought gas canisters, candles and emergency supplies amid fears of fuel shortages, power cuts or casualties. Fararu described the rush as a reflection of growing public anxiety.

Universities shifted classes online—officially to contain ongoing student protests, but also as a precaution against possible conflict. According to Nour News, even calm and remote provinces such as Yazd were affected.

Even Kayhan, closely aligned with Khamenei and typically focused on projecting stability, acknowledged that reports of US aircraft carrier deployments had unsettled public sentiment.

Still, it insisted that “although some 40,000 US troops have been deployed to the region, Iran is capable of inflicting serious harm on Israel and the United States, even at high cost.”

​​The oscillation between alarm and defiance points to a system projecting strength while betraying unease—an establishment at once threatening war and visibly anxious about it.

For forty-seven years, the Islamic Republic has anchored Iran to an ideology that promised dignity and independence but delivered isolation, economic decay and recurring crisis. What began as a revolutionary project hardened into a theocratic system sustained by confrontation abroad and repression at home.

Today, that closed strategic loop appears to be under strain.

January marked what many observers describe as a point of rupture. Security forces killed, wounded and arrested thousands during a nationwide crackdown whose brutality shocked even a society long accustomed to state violence.

The state crossed a political and social threshold, relying more visibly than ever on coercion to maintain control. Whatever legitimacy the regime ever claimed has gone.

Iran now faces a convergence of pressures: economic exhaustion, widespread public frustration, continued international isolation and a credible threat of force from the United States. The familiar formula—delay and deflect diplomatically, escalate through regional partners and expand military capabilities—no longer guarantees stability.

At the center of this crisis lies ideological overreach that has become financially burdensome and strategically counterproductive.

Tens of billions of dollars (or over $100 billion if we consider the entire economic burden) have been invested in uranium enrichment to preserve what officials describe as a “nuclear option.” Rather than delivering security, this path has triggered successive rounds of sanctions and intensified isolation.

Billions more have gone into hardened missile infrastructure and underground facilities designed to project deterrence beyond Iran’s borders.

Supporters call these systems defensive; critics see them as instruments of coercion that have deepened confrontation without producing durable stability.

The same logic shaped Tehran’s network of allied militias across the Middle East. Built to extend influence and encircle adversaries, this proxy architecture was intended to provide strategic depth at relatively low cost. Instead, it has drawn Iran into repeated confrontations with militaries vastly more powerful than its own and entrenched a cycle of escalation.

At home, the Revolutionary Guard and Basij remain the state’s primary instruments of control. Their central mission has increasingly been the suppression of domestic unrest.

Each protest wave met with force further widens the gap between state and society.Continued reliance on coercion risks destabilizing Iranian society and the wider region.

Meanwhile, the United States has shifted into what appears to be a posture of sustained coercive pressure. Strike aircraft supported by aerial tankers; strategic bombers waiting at home to embark on global strike missions; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft; layered air and missile defenses, and a reinforced naval presence including two carrier strike groups near critical waterways signal both capability and resolve.

Washington now possesses credible means to target Iran’s air defenses, command structures, missile forces, naval assets and military and nuclear industries for major effects without repeating the large-scale ground wars of the past.

The message, however, is not that war is inevitable. Rather, it is that Iran’s long-standing brinkmanship strategy may be reaching its limits. It is time for Tehran to decide. This does not necessarily mean surrender, but strategic realism.

In 1988, after eight devastating years of war with Iraq, the Islamic Republic’s founder and first supreme leader Ruhollah Khomeini accepted a ceasefire he described as “drinking from poisonous chalice.” The decision was politically humiliating for many within the revolutionary establishment, yet it prevented further destruction and preserved the state.

Iran may now confront a comparable moment of transformation. Accepting strategic capitulation would not necessarily mean dismantling the state or abandoning national defense. It would mean relinquishing powers and institutions, such as IRGC and Basij, that have contributed to oppression and prolonged isolation, halting uranium enrichment, placing missile programs under verifiable constraints, severing relations with proxy militias as instruments of foreign policy and ending existential rhetoric toward regional adversaries.

In return, Iran could pursue what many of its citizens have long sought: economic recovery, sanctions relief and diplomatic normalization.

Yet, after the events of January 2026, those gains alone may not satisfy public expectations. A growing segment of Iranian society is demanding fundamental political change and a credible path toward secular democracy and free elections in Iran.

The alternative is military attrition layered atop economic fragility and domestic unrest. Infrastructure would degrade further. Isolation would deepen. Public anger would intensify. Repression might temporarily contain dissent but would likely compound long-term instability.

History is ruthless with rulers who mistake ideological stubbornness for strength.

Those ruling Iran still have a narrowing window to prioritize real national interests over ideological expansion. Durable power rests not only in centrifuge halls and missile tunnels, but in legitimacy, prosperity and social cohesion.

For decades, the Islamic Republic framed confrontation as strength and resistance as destiny. Now the shadow of war hangs over Iran. Whether it chooses a peaceful concession of power or renewed escalation with unforeseen consequences may determine not only its own future, but the trajectory of the country and the nation it currently governs.

The path less treacherous for Iran appears clear: stepping back from confrontation and allowing Iranians to choose their future, even if that means the end of an era for those ruling the country.

Negotiators are set to meet in Geneva on Thursday in discussions that could prove decisive, particularly if reports are accurate that Washington has set informal deadlines for progress.

Public messaging inside Iran reflects both anticipation and unease as officials brace for what could be a pivotal round.

Late Tuesday, just before departing for Geneva, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi struck an optimistic tone.

“We have a historic opportunity to strike an unprecedented agreement that addresses mutual concerns and achieves mutual interests,” he wrote on X. “A deal is within reach, but only if diplomacy is given priority.”

Government-aligned newspapers such as Iran and Etemad described the talks as “an exit route for both sides” and “the last resort to prevent military confrontation.” The phrasing carried urgency — and an implicit acknowledgment of rising stakes.

At the same time, outlets close to security circles worked to downplay the prospect of imminent war.

Tabnak, run by a former IRGC commander, and Nour News, affiliated with senior adviser Ali Shamkhani, dismissed Western reporting on possible US military action as “media terrorism inspired by Trump’s manifesto in The Art of the Deal.” The suggestion was clear: Washington’s threats are part of a pressure campaign, not a prelude to attack.

The heightened tone followed President Donald Trump’s State of the Union address, in which he referenced Iran’s nuclear and missile programs — remarks that reverberated quickly across Iranian media and political circles.

Other commentary reflected a careful hedge. Fararu and Iranian Diplomacy, which is close to the Foreign Ministry, outlined potential military scenarios—from limited symbolic strikes to targeted attacks on infrastructure or senior officials—but argued that the cost of escalation makes a prolonged conflict unlikely.

Official rhetoric has remained firm. ISNA reported that Iran warned the United Nations it would “respond swiftly to any aggression,” including attacks on “all assets and military bases of belligerent parties in the region,” which Tehran would treat as legitimate targets.

Yet markets betrayed public sensitivity to the tension. The dollar climbed to 1,660,000 rials amid the renewed uncertainty.

Among the more measured assessments was an article in Fararu by Mohsen Jalilvand, who argued that “there will be no war,” and that the likelihood of regional countries joining a confrontation is “near zero.”

Still, he acknowledged the impasse. “There is a wide gap between the demands of the two sides,” he wrote, warning that even if sanctions were lifted immediately, “it would take at least 15 years for the country to return to normal conditions.”

His closing note captured the broader sentiment: “We cannot afford excessive optimism.”