Oman's Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi met US Vice President JD Vance in Washington DC on Friday, where he "shared details of the ongoing negotiation between the United States and Iran and the progress achieved so far," he said in a post on X.
"I am grateful for their engagement and look forward to further and decisive progress in the coming days. Peace is within our reach."
Tehran appeared noticeably downbeat about the outcome of Thursday’s negotiations with Washington in Geneva, with signs of disappointment emerging first on the website of the government’s news agency.
In a commentary published Friday, IRNA said the two sides’ clashing positions were jeopardizing the talks, laying the blame for such an outcome at Washington’s door.
It also made clear that Tehran is placing considerable hopes in Oman’s foreign minister, Badr Albusaidi, whose quiet mediation has been central to the negotiations.
Albusaidi now carries a “grave responsibility,” the piece argued, with his role beginning in Muscat, continuing through two rounds of talks in Geneva and now entering “another important step” when he meets US Vice President JD Vance in Washington.
Tehran’s official outlet even hinted at the mediator’s message to the American side: a warning that a war with Iran would not remain limited, that regime change is unattainable and that even heavy damage to Iranian targets would not achieve the goals emphasized by President Donald Trump, “just as they did not in the June attacks.”
Iranian media outlets have also begun outlining the main sticking points in the negotiations.
The news website Fararu reported Friday that the talks remain deadlocked over fundamental issues including enrichment levels, sanctions relief and the dismantling of parts of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.
Another major obstacle, it said, is Iran’s refusal to export enriched nuclear material, with Tehran insisting on maintaining domestic fuel production.
Axios reported that some of Trump’s advisers, including Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff, were disappointed with Araghchi’s proposals, arguing that they fell short of US expectations.
Trump himself signaled frustration with Tehran on Friday, telling reporters he was “not happy” with Iran but expected further talks to take place.
Asked about the possibility of using military force, the president said he hoped it would not be necessary but did not rule it out.
Speaking before leaving the White House for a trip to Texas, Trump said he still wants to reach an agreement with Iran but reiterated that Tehran “cannot have a nuclear weapon.”
Fararu suggested Washington may be pursuing a dual-track strategy, combining diplomacy with the threat of limited military strikes to maintain pressure.
The negotiations, it concluded, have entered a “complex and decisive” phase: a potential framework is beginning to take shape, but deep structural disagreements and continued US military signaling are sustaining a high level of uncertainty.
In a separate interview with the website, foreign policy analyst and former Iranian diplomat Jalal Sadatian said President Trump’s tone toward Iran had recently become noticeably “sharper, more decisive and more alarming.”
Sadatian also warned that Iran’s “asymmetric capabilities” mean that even limited military action could quickly escalate in unpredictable ways.
The US Department of Justice on Friday filed a civil forfeiture complaint seeking the seizure of the motor tanker Skipper and its 1.8 million barrels of Venezuelan crude oil supplied by Venezuela's state-owned oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA).
The tanker was seized on the high seas last December. Prosecutors said it provided material support to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), including its Qods Force.
The complaint alleges a scheme dating back to at least 2021 to ship and sell petroleum for the benefit of the IRGC. The Skipper delivered millions of barrels of Iranian oil to Syria in 2024 and used location spoofing and false flags to evade sanctions.
The current cargo, loaded in Venezuela in November 2025, was partly destined for sanctioned Cuban entities. US Attorney Jeanine Ferris Pirro said the department will pursue such vessels to deny Iran revenue used to support terrorism.
US President Donald Trump told reporters he is not happy with Iran but more talks were expected to be held on Friday.
Trump, when asked about the possibility of using military force against Iran, said he doesn’t want to use it, but that sometimes it’s necessary.
"We haven't made a final decision [on Iran]. We're not exactly happy with the way they negotiated... We're not thrilled with the way they're negotiating," Trump told reporters before leaving the White House.
Asked if there is a risk that an attack could turn into a long, drawn-out conflict in the Middle East, he said, "I guess you could say there's always a risk. When there's war, there's a risk in anything, both good and bad. We've had tremendous luck with myself. Soleimani, Al Baghdadi, everything's worked out, and then we do the midnight hammer and so many others, everything's worked out. And we want to keep it that way, but we're going to see."
"It'd be wonderful if they negotiate, really, in good conscience, good faith and conscience. But they are not getting there so far," he said.
Reports in major outlets that Tehran has floated a “commercial bonanza” to the Trump administration should be understood less as an investment roadmap than as a survival strategy.
As Donald Trump’s 10-to-15-day deadline for a “meaningful” deal with Iran enters its decisive phase, Iranian officials appear to be reframing diplomacy as a commercial opportunity rather than a strategic concession.
The Financial Times reported on February 26—as talks were underway in Geneva—that Tehran had offered access to major energy and mineral resources in an effort to steer Washington away from military escalation.
This is a shrewd pitch to the current White House. Trump has long favored foreign-policy outcomes he can present as concrete transactions, and Iran appears to be speaking directly to that instinct.
By holding out the prospect of access to one of the world’s largest underdeveloped energy systems, Tehran is trying to make de-escalation look like a win for American business rather than a concession to an adversary. It is hoping that profit would help create a future constituency for restraint in the United States.
In that sense, the proposal is about more than upstream contracts. It is an effort to reshape Washington’s political calculus.
Iran can make such a pitch because the underlying resource base is genuinely exceptional.
According to the US Energy Information Administration, Iran holds the world’s third-largest proven crude oil reserves and the second-largest proven natural gas reserves. The agency’s most recent country brief notes that full sanctions relief could raise output significantly within months.
Most of Iran’s crude and condensate exports already go to China, underscoring both the scale of the prize and the distortions created by sanctions. Tehran is trying to turn geological weight into diplomatic leverage at a moment of vulnerability.
That is also why the offer should be treated with caution. A regime confident that time is on its side does not place strategic sectors in front of an American president who is openly threatening it.
Trump has warned that “bad things” will happen if no meaningful deal is reached within roughly two weeks. The third round of talks ended without agreement, and major gaps remain over the terms of any settlement. The offer is being made because the central dispute remains unresolved, not because it is close to resolution.
On February 25, the US Treasury sanctioned more than 30 individuals, entities, and vessels tied to Iran’s shadow fleet and networks supporting ballistic-missile and advanced weapons procurement.
That is not the legal environment in which American firms begin planning long-term upstream projects. Even if some restrictions were waived, companies would still face compliance risks, financing obstacles, insurance complications, and the danger that any opening could be reversed by the next administration.
For corporate boards, Iran is not simply a market with upside. It is a sanctions minefield. American firms may also remember how quickly Iranian openings can collapse.
During the JCPOA window, Boeing signed a $16.6 billion agreement to sell 80 aircraft to IranAir, widely seen as a symbol of potential commercial normalization. The reimposition of sanctions after Washington left the nuclear deal turned that optimism into a lesson in sovereign and political risk.
Nor is the Venezuela analogy reassuring. Exxon chief Darren Woods was reported to have called the country “uninvestable” without major legal reforms even after Washington encouraged US companies to return.
If Venezuela appears risky even with direct US political backing, Iran looks far more uncertain.
Iranian officials have said they did not offer to suspend enrichment and that the United States did not explicitly demand zero enrichment in earlier exchanges. Yet Washington’s broader position remains that any agreement must prevent Iran from moving toward a nuclear weapon.
Reuters reported on February 26 that the United States is still seeking strict caps on enrichment and stockpiles, while the Associated Press said Iran remains resistant to shipping enriched uranium abroad.
This is not a minor technical disagreement. No serious US company is likely to regard Iran as bankable while that gulf exists. Investors move when the political architecture is credible, not when it is still being contested in Geneva hotel rooms.
That is why Iran’s “commercial bonanza” matters as leverage but not yet as policy. It is a sophisticated attempt to buy time, flatter Trump’s instincts, and raise the perceived cost of escalation by dangling future profits before Washington.
It may help preserve diplomacy for another round and give the White House an off-ramp it can market as commercially rational rather than strategically soft. But it is not a breakthrough. Oil and mining rights alone cannot override sanctions law, congressional hostility, nuclear mistrust, or the coercive logic that still governs US policy toward Iran.
Tehran is offering treasure. The problem is that the minefield around it remains fully intact.
A newly released undercover video shown in a Brooklyn courtroom captures an alleged Iran-linked operative describing a 2024 plot to assassinate Donald Trump.
The operative who prosecutors say tried to hire two men to kill Trump for $5,000 upfront demonstrated the plan by placing a vape pen on a napkin to signify his “target,” the hidden camera video released by the New York Post shows.
“This is the target. How will it die?” Asif Merchant said in the meeting.
Merchant, 47, a Pakistani national who entered the United States in April 2024, is accused of attempting to recruit individuals he believed were hired killers.
Prosecutors said he offered cash payments and discussed staging a protest near a campaign rally to create confusion and allow the attackers to escape.