US superiority over Iran is obvious, the endgame is not

For forty-seven years, the Islamic Republic has anchored Iran to an ideology that promised dignity and independence but delivered isolation, economic decay and recurring crisis. What began as a revolutionary project hardened into a theocratic system sustained by confrontation abroad and repression at home.

Today, that closed strategic loop appears to be under strain.

January marked what many observers describe as a point of rupture. Security forces killed, wounded and arrested thousands during a nationwide crackdown whose brutality shocked even a society long accustomed to state violence.

The state crossed a political and social threshold, relying more visibly than ever on coercion to maintain control. Whatever legitimacy the regime ever claimed has gone.

Iran now faces a convergence of pressures: economic exhaustion, widespread public frustration, continued international isolation and a credible threat of force from the United States. The familiar formula—delay and deflect diplomatically, escalate through regional partners and expand military capabilities—no longer guarantees stability.

At the center of this crisis lies ideological overreach that has become financially burdensome and strategically counterproductive.

Tens of billions of dollars (or over $100 billion if we consider the entire economic burden) have been invested in uranium enrichment to preserve what officials describe as a “nuclear option.” Rather than delivering security, this path has triggered successive rounds of sanctions and intensified isolation.

Billions more have gone into hardened missile infrastructure and underground facilities designed to project deterrence beyond Iran’s borders.

Supporters call these systems defensive; critics see them as instruments of coercion that have deepened confrontation without producing durable stability.

The same logic shaped Tehran’s network of allied militias across the Middle East. Built to extend influence and encircle adversaries, this proxy architecture was intended to provide strategic depth at relatively low cost. Instead, it has drawn Iran into repeated confrontations with militaries vastly more powerful than its own and entrenched a cycle of escalation.

At home, the Revolutionary Guard and Basij remain the state’s primary instruments of control. Their central mission has increasingly been the suppression of domestic unrest.

Each protest wave met with force further widens the gap between state and society.Continued reliance on coercion risks destabilizing Iranian society and the wider region.

Meanwhile, the United States has shifted into what appears to be a posture of sustained coercive pressure. Strike aircraft supported by aerial tankers; strategic bombers waiting at home to embark on global strike missions; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft; layered air and missile defenses, and a reinforced naval presence including two carrier strike groups near critical waterways signal both capability and resolve.

Washington now possesses credible means to target Iran’s air defenses, command structures, missile forces, naval assets and military and nuclear industries for major effects without repeating the large-scale ground wars of the past.

The message, however, is not that war is inevitable. Rather, it is that Iran’s long-standing brinkmanship strategy may be reaching its limits. It is time for Tehran to decide. This does not necessarily mean surrender, but strategic realism.

In 1988, after eight devastating years of war with Iraq, the Islamic Republic’s founder and first supreme leader Ruhollah Khomeini accepted a ceasefire he described as “drinking from poisonous chalice.” The decision was politically humiliating for many within the revolutionary establishment, yet it prevented further destruction and preserved the state.

Iran may now confront a comparable moment of transformation. Accepting strategic capitulation would not necessarily mean dismantling the state or abandoning national defense. It would mean relinquishing powers and institutions, such as IRGC and Basij, that have contributed to oppression and prolonged isolation, halting uranium enrichment, placing missile programs under verifiable constraints, severing relations with proxy militias as instruments of foreign policy and ending existential rhetoric toward regional adversaries.

In return, Iran could pursue what many of its citizens have long sought: economic recovery, sanctions relief and diplomatic normalization.

Yet, after the events of January 2026, those gains alone may not satisfy public expectations. A growing segment of Iranian society is demanding fundamental political change and a credible path toward secular democracy and free elections in Iran.

The alternative is military attrition layered atop economic fragility and domestic unrest. Infrastructure would degrade further. Isolation would deepen. Public anger would intensify. Repression might temporarily contain dissent but would likely compound long-term instability.

History is ruthless with rulers who mistake ideological stubbornness for strength.

Those ruling Iran still have a narrowing window to prioritize real national interests over ideological expansion. Durable power rests not only in centrifuge halls and missile tunnels, but in legitimacy, prosperity and social cohesion.

For decades, the Islamic Republic framed confrontation as strength and resistance as destiny. Now the shadow of war hangs over Iran. Whether it chooses a peaceful concession of power or renewed escalation with unforeseen consequences may determine not only its own future, but the trajectory of the country and the nation it currently governs.

The path less treacherous for Iran appears clear: stepping back from confrontation and allowing Iranians to choose their future, even if that means the end of an era for those ruling the country.

The prime-time speech offers Trump his most prominent platform yet to signal whether he is still betting on diplomacy in the days ahead, or preparing the public for strikes if talks fail.

While advisers have urged him to focus on affordability, immigration and the economy ahead of November’s midterm elections, the buildup toward a potential confrontation with Iran has overshadowed the run-up to the address.

Mainstream outlets have widely previewed Trump’s State of the Union address, highlighting how he might frame Iran alongside domestic political pressures.

Reuters wrote that the speech could be Trump’s best opportunity to rally skeptical voters behind his approach to Iran, including the possibility of military strikes if negotiations fail.

Trump on Monday brushed aside reports of internal dissent about military action, writing on social media: “I am the one that makes the decision… if we don’t make a deal, it will be a very bad day for that country.”

Democrats have sharply criticized his approach. Senator Tim Kaine said Trump was “bumbling his way toward war,” arguing he had scrapped a 2015 nuclear agreement that had constrained Iran’s program.

Bloomberg similarly described Iran as a major flashpoint Trump may address as he seeks to reset the political narrative after domestic setbacks.

The Associated Press said the address offers Trump a chance to make his case for possible action against Iran, citing polling that shows broad public unease with his handling of foreign affairs.

Iran in past State of the Unions

References to Iran in State of the Union speeches have typically surfaced at inflection points–the hostage crisis, regional conflict and terrorism, nuclear negotiations, or moments when presidents sought public backing for a tougher coercive strategy.

In the Cold War alliance era, Iran appeared mainly as a country whose stability and relationships mattered to Western cohesion.

President Dwight Eisenhower’s 1955 State of the Union message cited “Britain and Iran” among nations that had “resolved dangerous differences,” framing Tehran in terms of security and diplomacy rather than direct confrontation with Washington.

After the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the hostage crisis, Iran became the crisis itself.

Jimmy Carter’s 1980 address opened by saying that 50 Americans were still being held in Iran, calling the episode “terrorism and anarchy” and warning that if the hostages were harmed, “a severe price will be paid.”

After 9/11, Iran references shifted into the terror-and-WMD architecture of US strategy, placing Tehran within a broader post-attack security doctrine.

In 2002 and 2003, George W. Bush repeatedly cast Iran as a serious security threat, famously labeling it part of the “axis of evil” and describing its government as pursuing weapons of mass destruction, supporting terrorism and repressing its people, while distinguishing between the regime and Iranians who “speak out for liberty.”

President Barack Obama repeatedly used the address to press for diplomatic compromise while stressing that the United States would prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.

In 2014, Obama said diplomacy had halted the advance of Iran’s nuclear program, warned he would veto sanctions that could derail negotiations, and argued war should be a “last resort.”

In 2015 and 2016, he defended the nuclear agreement reached with Tehran, asserting that it had helped the world avoid another war.

During his first term, Trump invoked Iran to justify withdrawing from the 2015 deal and imposing sweeping sanctions under his “maximum pressure” campaign, portraying Tehran as a central destabilizing force in the Middle East.

In 2018, he said the United States stood with “the people of Iran” against a “corrupt dictatorship” and urged Congress to address what he called “the terrible Iran nuclear deal.”

In 2019, he called Iran the “world’s leading state sponsor of terror.” In 2020, he tied Iran to counterterrorism and deterrence, citing the killing of former IRGC-Quds commander Qasem Soleimani.

The pattern is consistent: presidents have used the nationally televised address to reset Iran policy at decisive moments–to sell diplomacy, justify confrontation, or redefine strategy.

Tuesday’s speech fits that same historical frame.

Habib Arian, a financial markets researcher, told ISNA that the turning point came on January 10, when the market recorded a one-day outflow of 9.4 trillion rials ($5.8 million), at the time the largest daily withdrawal of individual investor funds.

“That figure showed that trust, which is the main asset of the capital market, had been severely damaged,” Arian said. “From that date onward, the Tehran bourse was unable to return to an upward trajectory, and any positive fluctuation was treated as an opportunity to exit.”

Outflows accelerated as regional tensions intensified and speculation grew about possible confrontation between Iran and the United States. Investors shifted from equities toward hard assets, pushing the dollar above 1,650,000 rials and lifting domestic gold prices sharply.

Between January 8 and February 21, the benchmark index fell 15% while 18-karat gold posted a 33% gain over the same period. Gold-backed funds rose 20%, emerging as a primary destination for funds exiting equities.

“The 48-percentage-point gap between gold and stocks explains why liquidity has fled the equity market at this speed,” Arian said.

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  Money is leaving Iran faster as oil income falls and uncertainty mounts

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  Why Iran cannot stop its currency collapse

On Sunday alone, the main index shed another 103,000 points as retail investors pulled out a record 41 trillion rials ($25.3 million) in a single session, according to market data cited by Arian.

He said the stock market was now driven less by economic fundamentals than by political risk. “The market today is more hostage to political tensions and the shadow of war than to economic variables,” he said. “As long as geopolitical risks do not subside, the capital market will continue to act as a liquidity provider for parallel markets.”

The exodus from stocks comes against a backdrop of broader capital flight and currency weakness.

The rial has traded around 1,630,000 per dollar in recent weeks, reflecting deep structural imbalances, falling oil income and persistent uncertainty surrounding nuclear negotiations and sanctions.

Analysts say the combination of record outflows from equities, a weakening currency and rising demand for gold shows the erosion of investor confidence, with households and businesses seeking safety in assets perceived as more resilient to inflation and political shocks.

“In this environment, investors prefer the security of gold and dollar-linked assets to the ambiguity of shares,” Arian said.

The agreement, signed in Moscow in December, commits Russia to deliver 500 man-portable Verba launch units and 2,500 9M336 missiles over three years, the FT reported, citing leaked Russian documents and several people familiar with the deal.

The Verba is described as one of Russia’s most modern shoulder-fired, infrared-guided air defense systems, capable of targeting cruise missiles, low-flying aircraft, and drones. Operated by small mobile teams, it allows forces to create dispersed defenses without relying on fixed radar installations, which are more vulnerable to strikes, the report said.

Under the €495 million contract, deliveries are scheduled in three tranches from 2027 through 2029, the FT said, adding that one person familiar with the transaction suggested a smaller number of systems could have been delivered earlier.

Tehran formally requested the systems last July, days after the end of a 12-day conflict in which the US briefly joined Israel in strikes on Iran’s three key nuclear facilities, according to a contract seen by the newspaper.

A former senior US official told the FT that Moscow likely viewed the agreement as a way to repair ties with Tehran after failing to come to its ally’s aid during the June conflict.

The deal was negotiated between Rosoboronexport, Russia’s state arms export agency, and the Moscow representative of Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), FT’s report said.

The contract was arranged by Ruhollah Katebi, a Moscow-based MODAFL official who previously helped broker Iran’s sale of hundreds of Fath-360 close-range ballistic missiles for use in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

One Russian Ilyushin Il-76TD cargo plane has made at least three runs from Mineralnye Vody in Russia’s northern Caucasus to the Iranian city of Karaj in the past eight days, FT’s report said. At least one more Il-76 flew the same route in late December.

Iran reportedly received up to six Russian Mi-28 attack helicopters in January and operated one of them in Tehran this month.

According to documents seen by the newspaper, Rosoboronexport is selling the 9M336 missiles at €170,000 per unit and the launch systems at €40,000 each.

The deal also includes 500 “Mowgli-2” night-vision sights designed to track aircraft and other targets in darkness, the report added.

Unlike larger Russian strategic air defense systems such as the S-300 and S-400, the Verba systems do not require extensive training or integration and can be deployed more quickly, FT’s report said.

The report added that Verbas have not played a significant role in Russia’s defenses against Ukrainian drone attacks, which could make Moscow more willing to part with them than other air defense systems.

On February 17, while Iran’s negotiating team was in Geneva for talks with US officials, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei delivered a stark warning in Tehran that reflected this outlook. “More dangerous than the aircraft carrier,” he said, “is the weapon that can send it to the bottom of the sea.”

Soon afterward, state-aligned poets circulated verses declaring, “We are leaves; we will fall at the foot of this tree.”

Even as negotiations continue abroad, the establishment in Tehran—and its media ecosystem—appear intent on preparing the public not for agreement, but for the possibility of a decisive confrontation.

A shift in expectations

One striking difference between the current talks and previous rounds is the fading expectation of peace.

Earlier negotiations were framed by officials as diplomacy conducted from a position of strength—what Iranian leaders described as being “peace-seeking but capable of war.” Today, many voices close to the establishment express doubt that talks will produce an agreement.

Officials present negotiations primarily as a means of managing escalation and avoiding uncontrolled regional conflict. But in state-aligned media, a parallel narrative has taken hold—one that increasingly treats war as both plausible and potentially advantageous.

Some commentary focuses on technical readiness, discussing force posture and missile deployment. Other voices frame the situation in theological terms, arguing that divine providence will guide Iran to victory. Compromise, in this telling, is not pragmatic diplomacy but strategic defeat.

The comparison frequently invoked is Libya. In this account, Muammar Gaddafi’s decision to abandon his weapons programs paved the way for foreign influence, internal weakening, and eventual collapse. Agreement, within this framework, is seen as the beginning of the end. War, by contrast, could reset the strategic balance—producing ceasefire, deterrence, and renewed legitimacy.

War as mission and test

This outlook draws on a broader ideological shift that has intensified in recent years. The Islamic Republic’s political language has long contained religious and messianic elements, but such themes have grown more prominent following recent conflicts.

Within this framework, confrontation is as civilizational as it is geopolitical. Resistance, even at high cost, is framed as a test of faith in a larger struggle between opposing moral forces.

State-aligned commentators and officials increasingly describe the confrontation in existential terms. Military figures have shifted their rhetoric from deterrence to preparedness, suggesting Iran is ready not only to withstand conflict but to prevail. Structural weaknesses or social tensions are interpreted not as vulnerabilities, but as trials to be endured.

This perspective reflects a theological logic deeply embedded in the system’s ideological foundations. Victory, in this view, depends not solely on material advantage but on steadfast adherence to divine principles. Even loss or sacrifice can be reframed as spiritual triumph.

Such thinking also intersects with apocalyptic and messianic narratives present in segments of the regime’s ideological landscape, where the state is cast as an actor in a larger historical and religious mission.

The survival trap

Underlying these narratives is a stark strategic calculation. From the leadership’s perspective, compromise carries existential risks.

An agreement with the United States could require limits on Iran’s missile program, nuclear activities, or regional posture. Such constraints, Iran’s rulers appear to believe, would weaken the system’s core pillars and ultimately threaten its survival.

War, paradoxically, may appear less dangerous.

Proponents of this thinking frequently cite what they see as lessons from past confrontations, arguing that external conflict did not produce collapse or widespread internal revolt. Some even maintain that wartime conditions can strengthen internal cohesion and reinforce legitimacy.

This does not mean that Tehran seeks war for its own sake. Rather, it reflects what might be called a survival trap: a situation in which both diplomacy and confrontation carry risks, but only confrontation preserves the possibility of strategic recovery.

Iran’s military doctrine emphasizes asymmetric warfare and regional escalation, expanding conflict beyond its borders to impose costs on adversaries and create leverage. Such a strategy could transform a limited strike into a broader crisis, forcing negotiations under more favorable terms.

The paradox is stark. Negotiation is intended to prevent war. Yet the very act of negotiating—and the concessions it might entail—can appear more dangerous to the system than war itself.