Weeks after the January 2026 protests, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has shown no indication that he intends to open dialogue with a restless public or adjust course in response to mounting domestic criticism.
On Tuesday, February 24, prominent moderate figure Saeed Hajjarian—long regarded as a key strategist of Iran’s reform movement—warned that the political system “has lost the ability to predict and prevent the waves of protest that continue to emerge one after another.”
He added that since 2021, Iranian presidents have effectively functioned as “chief executives for Khamenei.”
Former President Ebrahim Raisi described himself as the Supreme Leader’s “soldier,” while President Massoud Pezeshkian has repeatedly said he is in office to implement Khamenei’s policies.
According to Hajjarian, protest waves will persist “as long as the system remains incapable of tolerating reforms, even those emerging from within.” His remarks pointed to a deeper concern: not simply public anger, but institutional rigidity.
That rigidity, critics argue, extends beyond politics. Khamenei’s resistance to reform has long been evident, but more striking to some observers is the continued dismissal of economic warnings amid a worsening financial crisis.
Earlier in the week, the news website Fararu warned leaders about the growing fragmentation and polarization of Iranian society.
Rather than easing tensions, authorities deployed Basij forces to suppress student protests on university campuses, effectively placing groups of young Iranians in confrontation with one another.
Fararu cautioned that “polarization reduces the chances for dialogue and increases violence in society.” Without meaningful dialogue, it argued, opposing groups increasingly view one another as “enemies,” making disputes far more difficult to resolve.
Economic concerns have followed a similar pattern.
One of the latest warnings came from economist Hossein Raghfar. In an interview with Khabar Online, Raghfar argued that although the January protests had political dimensions, they were primarily driven by deepening economic hardship and government inefficiency.
Without naming Khamenei directly, he said: “The government is certainly responsible, but major decisions are made elsewhere,” referring to the Supreme Leader’s office. While acknowledging the government’s role, he added that “it is obvious that the entire responsibility does not rest with the government.”
Like many Iranian economists, Raghfar warned that removing subsidies on essential goods—and the unrest that followed—has left Iran weakened at a moment of heightened external pressure. Economic mismanagement, he argued, has pushed the country “to the brink of war” while fueling public dissent to unprecedented levels.
Despite earlier warnings going unheeded, Raghfar again urged authorities to avoid inflicting another shock on society by cutting subsidies on staples such as gasoline and bread to offset chronic budget deficits.
Taken together, the cautions from reformists and economists suggest a political system increasingly confronted with recurring unrest yet reluctant to recalibrate—even as social polarization deepens and economic strain intensifies.
