Student walkouts reflect continued political presence of Iran's Gen Z

The action, observed in numerous high schools and junior-high schools, followed a call earlier in the week by the country’s teachers’ union—one of the few remaining independent professional bodies whose members and leaders repeatedly face summons, detention and imprisonment.

The union had urged students and educators to honor those killed during the January protests, many of whom were themselves teenagers or in their early twenties.

Human rights organizations and media reports indicate that young people made up a significant share of those killed, wounded or detained during the crackdown, reinforcing the central role of Generation Z in Iran’s protest movement.

Videos circulating online on Wednesday appeared to show students—many of them girls—refusing to attend classes and instead gathering in schoolyards to sing patriotic songs in apparent solidarity with the victims.

Justice Minister Amir Hossein Rahimi acknowledged this week that a number of minors remain in detention in connection with the protests, adding that authorities were working to secure the release of some underage detainees.

At the center of unrest

Iran’s Generation Z has played a visible role in successive waves of unrest, including the nationwide protests of recent years.

Lists compiled by human rights organizations indicate that a large share of those killed or arrested were under 30, including university students and minors.

The involvement of younger Iranians reflects both demographic realities and deeper social changes.

Iran’s Generation Z has grown up during a period defined by economic instability, international isolation and increasing social restrictions. These conditions have shaped their expectations and political outlook in ways that differ from earlier generations.

A distinct identity

In a recent commentary published in the reformist newspaper Etemad, political analyst Abbas Abdi argued that Iran’s younger generation faces “multiple layers of pressure,” reflecting economic hardship, social constraints and limited political representation.

He identified several sources of tension, including declining economic opportunities, widening gaps between official norms and social realities, and what he described as the political marginalization of younger citizens.

These pressures, he wrote, have contributed to a growing sense of disconnection between younger Iranians and the country’s political establishment.

Abdi also emphasized that Generation Z is the first generation in Iran to grow up fully connected to digital networks, with access to global information and alternative sources of identity formation.

This shift has altered traditional patterns of socialization and authority. Younger Iranians are often less receptive to hierarchical forms of political messaging and more inclined toward decentralized and informal forms of expression and mobilization.

The outlook

While the state retains significant coercive capacity, the persistence of youth participation in protests suggests that underlying social and generational tensions remain unresolved.

Abdi warned that failure to address these generational pressures could deepen long-term instability, arguing that sustainable political order ultimately depends on the ability of governing institutions to adapt to social change.

The student walkouts this week, though limited in scope, reflected the enduring political consciousness of a cohort that has come of age during one of the most turbulent periods in Iran’s recent history—and whose role is likely to remain central in shaping the country’s political trajectory.