Turkey warns expanding Iran talks to missiles risks another war

Netanyahu’s sudden trip to Washington on Tuesday is not routine diplomacy. It reflects his deep concern that renewed US–Iran talks in Oman could drift toward a narrow nuclear agreement that would stabilize Tehran rather than confront it.

Recent statements by President Trump have focused almost exclusively on the nuclear file. After the meeting on Wednesday, he said he told Netanyahu that he prefers a negotiated settlement with Iran and hopes Tehran is more reasonable than it was in 2025.

For Netanyahu, this signals a familtiar danger: pressure within the United States to settle for a deal that curbs uranium enrichment while leaving Iran’s missile arsenal, regional network of proxies, and broader strategic posture intact.

Netanyahu appears to believe this moment is unique—that Iran is weaker than it has been in years: economically strained, internally divided, and strategically exposed after recent regional confrontations. In his assessment, a limited agreement would squander a rare opportunity to alter the regime’s trajectory, particularly at a time of unprecedented US military presence in the region.

As in past confrontations with US administrations, Netanyahu is expected to arrive armed with intelligence briefings and a historical argument tailored to Trump himself. The message is likely to be direct: presidents are remembered for moments when they reshape history, not defer it. This, he will argue, is such a moment.

Netanyahu will also push for broadening negotiations to include Iran’s ballistic missile program—a threat not only to Israel but to US forces and regional allies.

Tehran is unlikely to accept such terms. Iranian officials have asserted this many times. Yet from Netanyahu’s perspective, that refusal would strengthen the case for a tougher American response. If Tehran accepts expanded terms, its capacity to project power would be significantly reduced.

There is also a domestic dimension.

Netanyahu seeks to reinforce his image as the leader most capable of confronting Iran while maintaining close ties with the US. That positioning carries particular weight after earlier claims that Israel had neutralized key Iranian threats—claims now tempered by recognition that deterrence alone may not suffice.

Underlying this approach is a broader strategic conclusion: Israel can manage Iran’s proxies, but it cannot indefinitely manage the regime itself. Only a fundamental shift in Tehran, whether through internal collapse or decisive US-led military pressure, would transform Israel’s long-term security equation.

Netanyahu’s decision to engage Trump directly also reflects skepticism toward the president’s diplomatic circle, particularly advisers who favor a pragmatic nuclear arrangement that stabilizes tensions in the short term while leaving the core challenge unresolved.

From Netanyahu’s standpoint, the risk of a narrow agreement is clear. Economic relief for Tehran could dilute international urgency and complicate future coalition-building against Iran while constraining Israel’s freedom of action.

Yet this strategy carries risks of its own.

Netanyahu may underestimate the resistance his approach could encounter within the United States, especially among segments of the MAGA movement increasingly skeptical of foreign entanglements. While Trump himself has shown openness to assertive uses of power, much of his political base is wary of being drawn into another Middle Eastern confrontation.

Historical memory also shapes the landscape. Netanyahu’s 2002 congressional testimony supporting military action in Iraq—and the subsequent costs of that war—still resonates in Washington. Advocacy framed as preventive or regime-targeting military action inevitably triggers those comparisons.

Israel could face heightened scrutiny and erosion of political goodwill should US–Iran tensions escalate in ways perceived domestically as externally driven or strategically avoidable.

In seeking to shape US policy at a pivotal moment, Netanyahu is pursuing what he sees as strategic necessity. But in doing so, he risks complicating Israel’s long-term standing within an increasingly divided American political landscape.

The signals of flexibility were buried beneath the usual chants of defiance and confrontational theatrics at the annual rally marking the foundation of the Islamic Republic. Coffins bearing photos of US officials were paraded through the streets. An effigy of Jeffrey Epstein was set on fire.

The messaging unfolded as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met President Donald Trump at the White House—a meeting that could reinforce calls in Washington for a harder line on Tehran.

Two dozen Western reporters were in Tehran. Some appeared delighted to meet Iranian schoolchildren speaking fluent English; others were charmed by Persian cuisine and elderly men eager to shake hands. Few seemed inclined to recall that, just four weeks earlier, thousands of protesters had reportedly been killed in those same streets.

Away from the orchestrated celebrations and from the state-approved “fixers” guiding journalists through carefully staged displays of loyalty, senior officials blended familiar defiance with cautious hints of compromise.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei said Iran was ready for talks about the level of enrichment and even the extent of its stockpile of enriched uranium.

“If the negotiations are meant to bear results, there needs to be some kind of compromise,” he added, acknowledging that “this is the difficult part of the job.”

Ali Larijani, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, struck a similarly measured tone, telling Al Jazeera that talks in Oman had been positive while reiterating Tehran’s position that conflicts with Washington’s demand for stricter limits.

“There is no talk of zeroing out enrichment,” he said. “We need it in the fields of energy and pharmaceutical manufacturing.”

The comments followed Larijani’s visits to Oman and Qatar, where he reportedly delivered a red folder that some analysts suggested could contain Khamenei’s response to a message from President Trump.

Photographs show him handing a letter to the Sultan of Oman and later presenting a red envelope in Doha, despite aides’ denials that any formal message was conveyed.

In an interview with Oman’s state television, Larijani offered an unusually restrained assessment of US policy, saying Washington’s framework “has become more realistic.”

Whether these tonal shifts signal a durable change in Iran’s messaging or a tactical adjustment on a symbolic day remains unclear.

Another unusual development added to the speculation. For decades, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has marked the anniversary by meeting a delegation of Iranian Air Force officers, echoing a similar gathering with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1979.

This year, he skipped the meeting and instead sent the officers to pay their respects to Hassan Khomeini, the founder’s grandson and presumed heir—a gesture that reignited the never-ending whispers of succession.

Originally scheduled for February 18, the visit was brought forward by a week following fresh indirect talks in Oman that both sides have indicated could resume in the coming days.

Netanyahu is expected to press President Donald Trump to impose firm constraints on Iran’s ballistic-missile program and its support for armed groups in the region. But the urgency of the meeting appears to reflect more than immediate tactical concerns, pointing to a blunter effort by Israel to shape US policy rather than simply align with it.

Trump has repeatedly signaled his preference for a "deal with Iran." But Netanyahu remains wary that negotiations might focus narrowly on the nuclear file and leave unaddressed what he sees as Tehran broader threat ecosystem.

That gap was evident during the previous round of US–Iran talks in the spring of 2025.

While Trump conveyed optimism about diplomatic openings and outlined prospective nuclear proposals, reporting suggested Netanyahu remained unconvinced, ultimately awaiting the expiration of Washington’s 60-day deadline before launching strikes that became the 12-Day War.

Even after US bombers joined strikes on Iran’s Natanz and Fordow nuclear sites, Washington reportedly urged Israel to scale back operations as Israeli forces moved closer to senior figures following the killing of top Revolutionary Guards commanders.

Israeli and Western officials say Iran has since moved to restore damaged ballistic-missile infrastructure, in some cases prioritising missile sites over nuclear facilities. Iranian officials have also publicly pointed to renewed—even enhanced—missile capabilities, reinforcing Israeli concerns about Tehran’s readiness to deploy them in a future confrontation.

It is against that backdrop that Israel has watched recent diplomatic signals from Tehran and Washington with growing unease.

Iran has reintroduced senior figures into the diplomatic arena, including Ali Larijani, a longtime adviser to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who has held consultations alongside the Muscat talks. His reappearance has been read in Israel as a sign that Tehran is seeking to project flexibility while resisting constraints on missiles and regional networks.

Those moves have coincided with messaging from within Trump’s political orbit emphasizing diplomatic opportunity.

Remarks by J.D. Vance, cautioning against escalation and underscoring the potential for a negotiated outcome, have been noted closely in Jerusalem, where officials have long worried that talks could narrow toward the nuclear file alone.

Taken together, these developments appear to have heightened Israeli concern that its core security priorities could be sidelined as diplomatic momentum builds—helping explain Netanyahu’s decision to advance his Washington visit rather than wait.

Netanyahu’s publicly stated red lines, particularly Iran’s arsenal of more than 1,800 ballistic missiles, align not only with Israeli threat assessments but with those of key Arab states.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have borne the costs of Iran’s regional tactics firsthand. Iran-supplied Houthi drones and missiles struck Saudi Aramco’s Abqaiq processing facility in 2019 and later targeted infrastructure near Jeddah in 2022.

Israel’s September 2025 strike on Hamas leaders in Doha strained but did not sever quiet channels with Qatar.

Despite public friction, Persian Gulf states involved in the Abraham Accords and Qatar continued to participate in US-led security discussions in which Israeli intelligence on Iran was reportedly shared, underscoring the resilience of regional threat coordination.

At the same time, Iran’s Arab neighbors have actively sought to contain escalation and, in some cases, helped create the conditions for diplomacy.

While they share Israel’s assessment of the missile and proxy threat, they have often favored de-escalation and engagement as a means of managing it—highlighting a divergence not over the nature of the threat, but over how best to reduce it.

Netanyahu’s visit to Washington reflects an effort to push back against that regional pull toward accommodation, pressing for a harder line on Tehran that addresses Israel’s security concerns. He appears to view Iran’s nuclear latency, missile expansion and regional outreach as a single, interlocking challenge.

Israel’s objective, therefore, is not episodic deterrence but the steady erosion of the capabilities that allow Tehran to sustain an existential threat posture—a logic shaping Netanyahu’s diplomacy in Washington as much as Israel’s readiness to act alone.

The widening gap between the two suggests not tactical ambiguity but strategic confusion—and it is most visible in the conduct of Iran’s foreign minister and chief negotiator, Abbas Araghchi.

Days after returning from Muscat, where he exchanged messages with US envoys in indirect talks, Araghchi embarked on an extended media tour at home, laying out rigid red lines that either were not conveyed to the Americans or were deliberately softened in private.

At home, Araghchi insists that Iran “will not stop enrichment,” that its stockpile of enriched uranium “will not be transferred to any other country,” and that it “will not negotiate about its missiles, now or in the future.”

Abroad, he has described the Muscat talks as “a good beginning” on a long path toward confidence-building.

The two messages are difficult to reconcile. Together, they suggest an intention to stretch out negotiations—an approach the United States under President Donald Trump has shown little interest in accommodating.

Even if these positions were not stated directly to US interlocutors, they have now been aired publicly. The question is no longer what Iran’s red lines are, but which audience Tehran believes matters more.

Other senior officials have reinforced the same internal message. Iran’s nuclear chief, Mohammad Eslami, said Tehran would be prepared to dilute its 60-percent enriched uranium only if all sanctions were lifted first—a familiar posture of maximum demands paired with minimal, reversible concessions.

This hardening rhetoric contrasts sharply with Iran’s underlying position.

Tehran enters these talks economically strained, diplomatically isolated, and politically shaken by the bloody crackdown on protests in January. Sweeping arrests of prominent moderates over the weekend have further narrowed the state’s already diminished base.

Still, for domestic audiences, defiance remains the preferred language. Hossein Shariatmadari, the hardline editor of Kayhan, warned after the Muscat talks that “the United States is not trustworthy” and urged officials to “keep our fingers on the trigger.”

State-affiliated outlets have amplified that tone, declaring the Oman talks a “political victory for Iran” without explaining what was won. State television has gone further, airing AI-generated footage portraying Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei as having “defeated” the United States.

More extreme claims have circulated as well. Ultraconservative lawmaker Mahmoud Nabavian asserted on state television that Trump had “begged” Iranian commanders to allow a limited strike—echoing earlier efforts to recast confrontations with the US as evidence of dominance.

Taken together, these messages point to a leadership struggling to reconcile its external need for sanctions relief with its internal reliance on confrontation. Diplomacy abroad requires flexibility; legitimacy at home, the system appears to believe, still demands bravado.

It is the Supreme Leader who must ultimately arbitrate between these competing narratives. Ali Khamenei has long proven adept at sustaining both at once—and at bearing responsibility for neither. Whether he can repeat that balancing act one more time remains an open question.

Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi told reporters at a foreign policy conference in Tehran that Friday’s Muscat talks were limited to the nuclear file and that Iran would not negotiate on missiles or regional issues.

“Zero enrichment can never be accepted by us,” Araghchi said, adding that talks should focus on arrangements that allow enrichment in Iran.

“We need to focus on discussions that accept enrichment inside Iran while building trust that enrichment is and will remain for peaceful purposes.”

Araghchi said results of the Muscat round were being reviewed and that both sides were waiting for decisions in their capitals on whether to proceed, with any next round expected to remain indirect and potentially be held outside Oman.

“The results of the talks are under review,” Araghchi said. “The overall approach of both countries is to continue the talks, and we are waiting for decision-making in the capitals.”

He added that Iran would not negotiate its missile program or regional policies, pushing back against US calls to widen the agenda.

“The missile issue and regional issues have not been on the agenda and are not on the agenda,” Araghchi said.

Tehran’s top diplomat described the first Muscat meeting as a test of seriousness, adding that talks would continue only if Iran concluded the United States was acting in good faith.

“The first session was a trial of how much we can trust the other side.”

He also said Iran had increased consultations with regional states compared with past nuclear diplomacy, and that Tehran had kept Russia and China informed of the process.

Speaking at the same event, Kamal Kharazi, head of Iran’s Strategic Council on Foreign Relations and a former foreign minister, said Tehran’s foreign policy should prioritize ties with neighboring countries while maintaining what he called resistance to coercive pressure from adversaries.

Ali Akbar Salehi, a former foreign minister and senior nuclear official, argued that Iran faced a broader governance challenge in translating its revolutionary ideals with practical policy tools, adding that strengthening the domestic economy and modern capabilities would make Iran’s foreign policy more sustainable.

Saeed Khatibzadeh, head of the Foreign Ministry’s political and international studies center, said the conference aimed to bridge academia, industry and the foreign policy establishment.

Araghchi framed enrichment as tied to sovereignty, saying no outside power could dictate what Iran may possess, and argued that diplomacy could work only if Iran’s rights were respected.

The Muscat talks came amid high regional tensions and an expanded US military posture in the region.

Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian said on Sunday that the talks were a “step forward,” adding that Tehran wanted its rights under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to be respected.