CENTCOM says US carrier Lincoln deployed to 'promote security'

Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem on Monday said the group considers threats by US President Donald Trump against Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to be a threat against Hezbollah itself.

“Hezbollah is concerned with confronting Trump’s threat against Khamenei and considers it a threat against itself, and it has full authority to take whatever it deems appropriate to confront it,” Qassem said.

Qassem described Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei as the group’s supreme Islamic authority.

Referring to nationwide protests in Iran, Qassem accused the Islamic Republic's adversaries of seeking to undermine the country from within through economic pressure and by, he said, inserting “saboteurs” into demonstrations.

The United Arab Emirates said it would not allow its airspace, territory or territorial waters to be used for any hostile military action against Iran.

“The UAE confirms its commitment to not allowing its airspace, land or waters to be used in any hostile military actions against Iran,” Afra Al Hameli, director of strategic communications at the UAE foreign ministry, said in a post on X.

She added that the UAE would not provide any logistical support for such actions and said Abu Dhabi believed dialogue, de-escalation and respect for international law were the best way to address regional crises.

On December 28, a strike by shopkeepers in Tehran’s markets triggered protests that rapidly spread far beyond their original setting.

Nearly a month later, estimates suggest that at least 36,500 people may have been killed in clashes and crackdowns across more than 400 cities and 4,000 separate sites of confrontation.

These figures remain difficult to independently verify amid prolonged internet disruptions. Still, even allowing for uncertainty, their magnitude points to what many describe as a potentially significant turning point in the country’s modern history.

Even before the protests began, Iran was already under severe strain: persistent inflation, an energy system operating close to capacity, mounting environmental pressures, and security structures weakened by a mix of external shocks and internal attrition.

The events that unfolded after December 28 did not create these pressures. They appear instead to have exposed them, intensified them, and increasingly bound them together.

An economy with little cushion left

Official figures put unemployment at just over seven percent, but nearly 40 percent of the unemployed were university graduates, a mismatch that had been widening for years.

The national currency continued to lose value, the Tehran stock exchange spent much of the year in decline, and liquidity pressures rippled through the private sector. Point-to-point inflation rose from about 39 percent in early spring to nearly 53 percent by late autumn.

Even households traditionally considered middle-income were cutting back on basic goods. Installment-based purchases for food items, including fruit and nuts, had become increasingly common.

The government’s proposed budget projected wage increases of 20 percent, well below the officially acknowledged inflation rate. ‌But even that was rejected by lawmakers outright, citing unrealistic revenue assumptions.

The banking sector added another layer of fragility. One major private bank formally acknowledged insolvency weeks before the protests began. Credit expansion continued largely through money creation, reinforcing inflation rather than growth.

When markets shut down after December 28, they did so with limited reserves. A month of disrupted commerce appears to have left many businesses with little remaining buffer, while reports of burned commercial districts and threatened asset seizures have compounded losses.

Even under optimistic assumptions, restoring activity would require substantial public spending. The availability of such resources remains unclear.

Energy and limits of revenue

Energy has long been treated as Iran’s most reliable economic lever. That assumption has increasingly come under strain.

Oil exports never fully recovered from earlier sanctions, and recent enforcement efforts appear to have further narrowed room for maneuver. Other energy sales once described as relatively insulated—particularly gas and electricity exports to neighboring countries—have also faced growing pressure.

At the same time, domestic shortages intensified.

Power plants turned to heavy fuel oil, worsening air pollution, while export volumes were quietly reduced to meet internal demand.

The tension has become increasingly structural: exporting energy risks domestic instability, while retaining it limits revenue.

These constraints matter because energy income underpins much of public spending, including security outlays. Budget plans approved in December to bolster military capabilities in the next Iranian year rely heavily on oil-backed revenues—funding streams that appear increasingly uncertain.

Without a stable energy surplus, both fiscal recovery and political containment could become harder to sustain.

Environmental stress

Environmental pressures have shifted from background concern toward immediate risk.

Official estimates attribute around 58,000 deaths annually to air pollution. Water scarcity has become acute enough that authorities have publicly acknowledged difficulties supplying drinking water to the capital, with rainfall described as the only short-term relief.

Agriculture, which consumes over 90 percent of national water use and employs nearly a fifth of the workforce, cannot be restructured quickly without risking further social disruption.

Modernization would require investment levels current budgets may struggle to support.

Security erosion

Alongside these pressures, signs of strain have appeared within the security apparatus.

Equipment losses during recent regional conflicts, the deaths of senior commanders, and repeated cyber breaches exposing sensitive databases have raised questions about internal resilience.

Externally, Iran has lost key regional partners, while negotiations with Western powers remain stalled and unpredictable.

Diplomatic defections abroad, including asylum requests by senior officials, are cited by analysts as possible indicators of diminishing confidence within parts of the system.

After December 28

What distinguishes the period since December 28 is not only the scale of violence, but its social reach.

If the current death toll estimates are even roughly accurate, a large share of the population would now be directly connected to loss—through families, relatives, or neighbors—potentially creating levels of resentment that may be difficult to contain through force alone.

Inside the country, prolonged internet disruptions have obscured events, but have not halted them. Outside, large diaspora communities have mobilized in parallel, amplifying international attention and pressure.

Taken together, the available figures suggest that the crises present before December 28—while severe—were fragmented. The response to the protests appears to have bound them more tightly together.

The numbers, rather than the slogans, help explain why many Iranians who have spoken publicly since the crackdown say they see little prospect of a simple return to earlier conditions.

Iran’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations Office at Geneva, Ali Bahreini, said Tehran is prepared for “any scenario,” including the possibility of an attack, amid heightened tensions with the United States.

“The United States is unpredictable, so we are prepared for any scenario, including any possible aggression,” Bahreini said, according to state media.

Bahreini said informal messages have been exchanged between Iran’s foreign minister and US envoy Steve Witkoff, but said it would be difficult to describe those contacts as negotiations.

The remarks came after Iran’s foreign ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei rejected reports that Tehran had sent a message to Witkoff seeking to delay possible US military action, saying such reports were false.

Iran would respond forcefully to any attack by the US or Israel, Defense Ministry Spokesman Reza Talaei-Nik said, as tensions remain high in the region.

“If there is any aggression by the US or Israel, it will be met with a more painful and decisive response than in the past,” Talaei-Nik said, adding that Iran’s military readiness had increased compared with the 12-day war in June.

“Certainly, if the enemy takes a hostile action, it will fail more than before and face a heavier defeat,” he said.