The Hamas attack, the 12-day Iran-Israel war in June and Israel’s relentless strikes on Iranian-aligned actors did not end the region’s conflicts, but they changed how states now manage them.
In place of grand diplomacy or formal pacts, a loose alignment has begun to form from overlapping security, political and economic imperatives.
Stretching informally from Baghdad to Damascus, this nascent arc of stability is emerging less as a peace project than as a constraint on Iran’s regional reach—interlocking with the logic of the Abraham Accords and pressing against the network of proxies through which Tehran has long projected power.
This shift has unfolded alongside a parallel Iranian track: diplomatic outreach, particularly towards Saudi Arabia and other Arab neighbors, aimed at preserving room for manoeuvre even as Tehran’s proxy network comes under strain.
That dual approach matters, shaping regional calculations as Iran seeks both to absorb pressure and to prevent the emergence of a more openly consolidated front against it.
Iraq: on the mend but shaky
In Iraq, the aftermath of the recent elections and the government’s brief attempt to designate Lebanese Hezbollah and the Houthis as terrorist organisations—followed by a rapid reversal—highlight a deeper struggle over sovereignty.
An emergent bloc of political, clerical and institutional actors is pushing for greater state consolidation, while Iran-backed networks seek to preserve the hybrid armed–political order entrenched since the fight against Islamic State in 2014.
Senior clerics linked to the orbit of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani have repeatedly warned that the continued power of militias is eroding national unity and hollowing out state authority.
At the same time, developments inside Iraq are complicating Tehran’s position. Efforts to expand domestic gas production, reduce reliance on Iranian imports and attract Western investment after the withdrawal of sanctioned Russian firms are slowly reshaping the economic outlook.
Improved, if fragile, coordination between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government on revenue sharing and border controls has also narrowed institutional fissures Iran has long exploited.
These shifts are incremental and uneven, and their durability remains uncertain. Yet together they form the first pillar of a broader regional realignment rooted less in ideology than in state capacity and economic necessity.
Iraq may also prove the weakest link: its politics remain volatile, and Iran-aligned actors retain deep organizational and financial networks. Still, even limited consolidation across security, energy and governance would tilt the strategic balance of the Levant in ways long thought unattainable.
Syria: stabilizing but weak
The fall of Bashar al-Assad a year ago, and the rise of a Salafi-leaning transitional authority have opened a period of uncertainty, marked by serious risks but also new constraints on external actors.
Syria is unlikely to join the Abraham Accords or pursue formal normalisation with Israel soon. Nevertheless, quiet contacts involving Damascus, Israel and Qatar—aimed at limiting spillover, restraining militias and establishing narrow de facto understandings—point to the emergence of a pragmatic, if tentative, security framework.
Events beyond Syria’s borders have sharpened regional sensitivities.
Israel’s attempted attack against Hamas leaders in Qatar which failed to kill their intended targets unsettled several US Arab partners and may have influenced strategic thinking even where public positions remained measured.
More significant is the regional effect of a Syria no longer fully aligned with Iran’s strategic priorities. A stabilizing Syrian state, broadly aligned with Iraq and Jordan, would sharply restrict the land and air corridors Iran has long used to supply Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Recent interceptions of Iranian weapons shipments across Syrian and Jordanian territory by Israel and Jordan underscore that Iran may still see Syria as a transit point for its weapons.
A pattern emerging
This informal Baghdad–Damascus alignment intersects with the logic of the Abraham Accords, which the Trump administration’s November 2025 National Security Strategy identifies as the US priority to build up security in the region.
The document frames Arab and Muslin normalization with Israel not as a legacy achievement but as a functional framework for missile defence, maritime security as well as intelligence and regional burden-sharing.
While Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman and Kuwait remain outside the Accords formally, growing patterns of de facto cooperation—through air-defence coordination, early-warning integration, maritime security arrangements and intelligence exchanges—suggest the Accords already function as an organising principle for states reluctant to make public commitments.
The spine is formal, but the supporting structures are increasingly informal, sustaining the framework without requiring every participant to commit publicly.
The restrained language of the 2025 strategy reflects a broader shift in Washington’s approach. Rather than relying primarily on American primacy, the United States now appears focused on containing Iran by reinforcing regional structures anchored in the Accords and complemented by emerging alignments in Iraq and Syria.
Across the region, a discernible pattern is taking shape.
Iraq’s uneven institutional recovery, Syria’s cautious stabilisation, Jordan’s intensified border security, the Persian Gulf states’ expanding coordination and Israel’s sustained security posture together form the outlines of the most coherent countervailing structure the region has seen in more than a decade.
The contest, however, remains unresolved. Iran retains significant capacity, adaptive networks and a proven ability to rebuild and readjust.
The Baghdad–Damascus arc nonetheless represents a challenge to Tehran’s regional strategy rooted not in declarations or grand bargains, but in overlapping state interests and practical constraints—an alignment shaped by necessity rather than design.
