International Security and Law Analyst
Ali Larijani’s tour of Iraq and Lebanon a few weeks after his Russia visit underscores his re-emergence as a trusted envoy and crisis manager tasked with shoring up Tehran’s defences in the twilight of supreme leader Ali Khamenei’s rule.
In just three weeks, Larijani has traversed the highest corridors of Moscow, Baghdad, and Beirut.
The veteran conservative met Russia’s President Vladimir Putin in Moscow late July. This week, met Iraqi leaders, laid a wreath at the site of Qassem Soleimani’s killing, and visited Lebanon amid a push to disarm Tehran-allied Hezbollah.
Once sidelined from presidential politics, the former parliament speaker and IRGC founding member is now back at the centre of power—chairing the new Defence Council and is dispatched abroad to steady alliances and project resilience at a moment of regional strain and looming succession.
The itinerary reflects his rebirth: Moscow for geopolitical depth, Baghdad to reinforce Iran-aligned proxies, Beirut to guard influence amid Western-backed disarmament moves.
Syria lies outside the traditional axis: Assad has fallen, Jolani governs Damascus and IRGC forces have withdrawn, yet some Iranian influence endures through discreet networks and shadow intermediaries.
War mode reloaded
Larijani’s revival is no accident but a deliberate restoration of wartime instincts.
During the Iran–Iraq War, real power shifted from Khamenei’s ceremonial presidency to Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani, the acting Deputy Commander-in-Chief.
The slight was deeply felt by Khamenei, who spent much of his second presidential term at the front, forging bonds with commanders like Soleimani—ties that became the backbone of the Beyt-e Rahbari after he became Supreme Leader in 1989.
Khamenei disappeared from public view during Israeli strikes on Iran in June. The so-called 12-day war, in which many of his key protégés were killed, reinforced Khamenei’s long-held belief in relying on loyal men willing to risk all to preserve him.
That’s where Larijani enters the picture.
Unqualified no more
A former chief nuclear negotiator, he was deemed unfit to run for the presidency as late as 2024. Now, he has been placed at the helm of the Defence Council, positioned as both succession strategist and potential wartime coordinator.
Precedent underpins this orchestration.
In 2011, Ahmadinejad’s 11-day disappearance during a succession standoff left a vacuum between the presidency and the Leader’s office.
As speaker and a member of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), Larijani navigated the crisis amid speculation that IRGC-linked governance was filling the gap.
Today, Khamenei is again turning to the tools that preserved the theocracy in its formative years: centralised command, crisis-tested operatives, and the fusion of media, military, and diplomacy.Beirut’s standoff illustrates the stakes.
Lebanon test case
The US plan to disarm Hezbollah—paired with Israeli withdrawal and reconstruction aid—has exposed Lebanon’s political fault lines.
On the eve of Larijani’s arrival, Hezbollah denounced the plan as a “grave sin” and rejected it in cabinet, while the Lebanese army was tasked with drafting legislation to give the state a monopoly on arms.
Former President Michel Aoun and others have called for “arms under state authority” through dialogue, while Hezbollah insists on Israeli withdrawal first, warning it will resist any state compulsion.
Amid these fractures, Larijani’s mission is not the defence of state sovereignty but the calculus of regime survival—Khamenei’s answer from the past to a future laden with uncertainty.
Larijani is not simply a returning statesman but a recycled instrument from the Islamic Republic’s most turbulent chapters, tasked now with holding the line until the next hand—willing or not—seizes the tiller.
