Iran’s nuclear chief says atomic industry is non-negotiable

If Tehran has indeed introduced this idea in the fourth round of talks, it may represent new flexibility on the sticky point of enrichment and explain the positive assessment of both Iranian and American officials on the latest round of talks.

A commentary in the conservative Khorasan daily on Monday said the idea of creating a consortium may have been among what Omani Foreign Minister Badr al-Busaidi referred to as “useful and original ideas reflecting a shared wish to reach an honorable agreement” after the completion of the fourth round of talks on Sunday.

Some signals suggest this idea may have been quietly floated in diplomatic channels: ahead of the Muscat talks on April 11, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi visited Riyadh and Doha, followed by a trip to the UAE after the talks.

The idea was originally proposed by former Iranian nuclear negotiator Seyed Hossein Mousavian and Princeton physicist Frank von Hippel long before the current Tehran-Washington talks in an October 2023 article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

Such a body consisting of Iran, Saudi Arabia,and other interested Middle Eastern countries would oversee enrichment under international safeguards and ensure that the enriched uranium it produced would be used only for peaceful purposes, they argued.

On the eve of the April 11 nuclear talks in Muscat, Mousavian addressed the risk of failure if the US refused to acknowledge Iran’s rights under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

“Steve Witkoff recently made an unreasonable statement, saying that Iran cannot benefit from the right to peaceful uranium enrichment technology. This stance is a clear violation of the NPT treaty. If this is the final US position, tomorrow's negotiations... will end in failure,” he warned.

In the same post, Mousavian again floated the consortium idea: “The solution is ... the establishment of a joint nuclear consortium among the Persian Gulf countries.” He argued this would resolve the US’s contradictory stance of supporting enrichment in Saudi Arabia while denying the same to Iran.

He also hinted at a broader vision: an Iran-US economic agreement worth up to $1 trillion, involving American investment in Iran’s nuclear, fossil, and renewable energy sectors. Such a deal, he suggested, could help “open the deadlock in US–Iran relations.”

Some commentators have described the idea as a possibility for a breakthrough.

“Araqhchi's visit to Saudi Arabia and the UAE is probably not unrelated to the proposal to create a joint regional enrichment consortium,” Rahman Ghahremanpour, a commentator and analyst of Middle East politics in Tehran, posted on X.

“Iran is trying to break the deadlock on zero enrichment, and if the countries in the region agree to this proposal, perhaps the Trump administration will change its position. This is an important confidence-building measure in arms control,” he added.

Abdolreza Davari, a conservative politician who supports Pezeshkian, also supported the idea in a post on X on May 10. This, he said, would be “similar to the model implemented in Europe that supplies fuel even to the United States.”

“This consortium could be the center of regional cooperation in the areas of nuclear technology exchange, safety, environment, production of fresh water and radiopharmaceuticals, and also include a regional non-proliferation regime," Reza Nasri, another commentator in Tehran, wrote on X before Araghchi’s visit to Riyadh.

Hossein Aghaei, a Turkey-based senior security and geopolitics analyst, referred to Saudi Arabia’s wish to create a consortium in collaboration with the US and possibly Russia in a post on X on May 8. He said Iran could be a participant in the consortium to ensure it will not be able to build nukes.

However, he warned that Israel’s vision is completely different. “In the nuclear matter, Israel may not even trust Saudi Arabia, let alone the Islamic Republic.”

During a visit to Moscow Iran’s Oil Minister announced that Russia has agreed to export 55 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas annually to Iran, claiming that this would turn Iran into a regional gas hub.

Mohsen Paknejad said on April 25 that various routes were considered and it was finally agreed that the gas would be delivered via land through the Republic of Azerbaijan, with Russia’s gas handed over to Iran in Astara.

While the Mozdok–Baku pipeline can transfer Russian gas to Azerbaijan, and the Baku–Astara pipeline can transport it to Iran, the combined daily capacity of these pipelines is only about six million cubic meters per day (mcm/d).

By contrast, Iran faces a gas shortfall of approximately 150 mcm/d during warmer months—rising to double that amount in colder seasons.

This means that the proposed Russian gas deliveries to Iran would not even cover a small portion of the country’s gas deficit—let alone turn Iran into a regional gas hub.

Paknejad has described this as the “first phase” of the gas deal, implying that new pipelines will be required to realize the full annual export volume of 55 bcm, which equals around 150 mcm/d.

The key issue here is that Gazprom, Russia’s state-run gas company meant to supply the gashas suffered massive losses of $18 billion over the past two years after losing its European markets following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Gazprom lacks the funds to complete an even more politically desirable “Power of Siberia 2” pipeline to China designed for the same annual capacity of 55 bcm.

Building a new pipeline connected to Russia’s main gas transmission network to deliver gas to Iran would require a stretch of at least 1,000 kilometers, demanding more than $10 billion in investment. If the pipeline were to cross the Caspian Sea, the cost could exceed $20 billion.

Another crucial point is that to become a regional gas hub, Iran must receive large volumes of gas from Russia and sell it to neighboring countries.

But Turkey already receives Russian gas directly via two pipelines, and most of Iran’s other northern and southern neighbors are gas producers or exporters themselves. Iran’s only potential customers would be Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

Iraq plans to eliminate its need for gas imports within the next few years. Pakistan, despite a gas deal with Iran signed in 2009, has not built the pipeline due to sanctions.

Under the current contract, Iran would export only 7.5 bcm annually to Pakistan—raising questions about what Iran plans to do with the rest of the gas received from Russia.

Iran suffers from a gas deficit of 150 mcm/d in summer and 300 mcm/d in winter, and it could use Russian gas to meet its domestic needs.

However, 55 bcm of gas is worth around $15 billion, and Iran simply doesn’t have the money to pay for such a massive volume of gas. Even if it did, the government would need to provide enormous subsidies for its domestic use, given that gas prices in Iran’s domestic market are extremely low.

To illustrate, the Iranian government plans to sell 240 bcm of gas to the domestic market this year, earning only about 3,300 trillion rials in revenue—which, at the current exchange rate, amounts to less than $4 billion.

More Hollow Claims of New Oil Deals

Iran’s oil minister also announced that $4 billion in oil contracts have been signed with Russian companies.

Over the past two decades, Russian firms have signed more than a hundred contracts and memoranda of understanding (MoUs) with Iran, but almost none of the projects have ever gotten off the ground.

Paknejad provided few details, merely stating that “four contracts worth $4 billion have been signed with Russian companies for the development of seven oil fields.”

However, three years ago, Mohsen Khojastehmehr, then-CEO of the National Iranian Oil Company, made a similar announcement, saying that “contracts with Russian companies for the development of seven oil fields, worth $4 billion, have entered the operational phase.”

This strongly suggests that the contract Paknejad is referring to had already been signed years earlier—yet no action has been taken by the Russian side, contrary to Khojastehmehr’s assertions.

Back then, Iran and Gazprom had also signed 40 oil and gas memoranda of understanding, none of which led to any contracts or actual projects.

At the time, Iranian oil officials under President Ebrahim Raisi described the MoUs as being worth “$40 billion”, calling them “the largest deal in the history of the country’s oil and gas sector.”

Unlike formal contracts, MoUs do not carry any binding legal obligations, nor do they typically have a defined financial value—they are merely frameworks for studies and future negotiations aimed at signing actual contracts.

According to regional sources cited by Al Arabiya and Al Hadath, the Lebanese armed group, closely aligned with Tehran, is monitoring ongoing nuclear negotiations between Iran and the United States in Oman.

Hezbollah apparently fears that any Israeli strike targeting IRGC personnel could derail the talks and put Iran in a difficult diplomatic position, according to the report.

“Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is expected to use every possible means to pressure Tehran and obstruct its nuclear progress,” the sources said, suggesting that any high-profile Iranian casualty in Lebanon could serve as a pretext for escalation.

IRGC officers are believed to reside in discreet locations in Beirut’s southern suburbs and in the Bekaa Valley, and typically move under strict security protocols.

Israeli intelligence has previously succeeded in targeting IRGC-linked figures and Hezbollah commanders during recent conflicts in Lebanon.

Neither Hezbollah nor Iranian officials have publicly confirmed the reported withdrawal request.

Last year, seven senior IRGC commanders and officials were killed in an Israeli strike on the Iranian consulate complex in Damascus, triggering Iran's first ever direct airstrike on the Jewish state.

"This year, we will definitely pursue the removal of zeros," Farzin told an annual monetary and foreign exchange policy conference in Tehran. "It has been tried in about 70 countries such as Russia, Turkey, and Germany, and proven effective when implemented at the right time."

The announcement marks the clearest signal yet that Iran is moving forward with the redenomination plan first proposed in 2019 and approved by parliament in 2020.

The new currency system would peg one toman to 10,000 rials, aligning official usage with the informal practice already common among Iranians, who long abandoned the rial in everyday transactions.

Farzin stressed that the plan is being accompanied by broader reforms in the banking system, following the ratification of new legislation earlier this year.

"This is a year of transformation," he said. "We are moving from an old model of banking governance to a new one, underpinned by a series of newly approved laws and regulations."

Still, the move comes amid persistent economic headwinds. Iran’s inflation rate has hovered above 40% in recent years, and the national currency has lost more than 95% of its value over the past four decades.

A 10,000-rial note, once worth around $150 before the 1979 revolution, is now valued at less than 10 US cents.

Critics argue that striking zeros from the currency without addressing Iran’s underlying economic challenges—such as fiscal imbalances, monetary instability, and international sanctions—may prove cosmetic.

“The problem is not the four zeros, but the persistent inflation and monetary mismanagement,” economist Jamshid Assadi said in an earlier analysis. “Without reforms to central bank independence, fiscal discipline, and financial transparency, the redenomination will not have a lasting effect.”

Past experiences in countries like Zimbabwe, Venezuela, and Argentina have shown that currency redenominations alone do little to stabilize economies without deeper structural reforms. Conversely, countries such as Turkey and Germany only succeeded after implementing broad fiscal and institutional changes.

Iran’s caretaker Economy Minister Rahmatollah Akrami echoed some of these concerns at the same conference on Monday, warning that limited independence of the Central Bank, unclear inflation-targeting frameworks, and a lack of transparency have all contributed to Iran’s recurring macroeconomic instability.

“The effectiveness of monetary policy tools is limited in the absence of institutional strength,” Akrami said, urging a “redefinition of the Central Bank’s role” within Iran’s economic governance.

The new currency rollout is expected to span up to a few years, during which both the rial and the toman will circulate simultaneously. The Central Bank will oversee the withdrawal of rial notes and coins and their replacement with the new toman units.

While the psychological effect of dealing with smaller numbers may ease some frustrations for the public, analysts warn that without tackling deeper problems—such as rising liquidity, declining purchasing power, and a weakening private sector—the benefits of redenomination will be limited.

As global sanctions continue, not only for Iran's nuclear program, but for the country's human rights abuses and support of Russia's war on Ukraine, the economy is in its worst condition since the founding of the Islamic Republic.

Over one third of Iranians live below the poverty line with unemployment plaguing the population.

“The real question is whether this is meaningful reform—or just another economic shock dressed up as policy,” wrote Iran’s Jahan-e Sanat daily back in 2019 when the reform was first proposed.

Infectious disease specialist Davoud Yandegarinia told IRNA on Sunday that while there is no consolidated data on the number of new infections, an increase in hospital admissions and clinic visits indicates the virus is spreading again.

“It seems to be the Omicron variant, which remains the last variant of concern according to the World Health Organization,” he said.

Yandegarinia advised people with underlying health conditions, weakened immune systems, and those working or moving through densely populated areas — including healthcare workers — to resume mask use.

He also urged elderly individuals, pregnant women, heart patients, and those taking corticosteroids to continue using the same preventive methods employed during earlier stages of the pandemic.

“There is no need at this time to apply preventive measures to the general public,” he added, “but it is better for people to use masks in offices, closed environments, and hospitals.”

IRNA also earlier reported that Deputy Health Minister Alireza Raisi recently sent a letter to university health departments across the country, calling for increased precautions against respiratory illnesses, particularly COVID-19 and influenza.

Iran became the second country after China to officially declare an outbreak of the pandemic in February 2020, since reporting nearly 145,000 deaths — the highest official toll in the Middle East, with over 7.5 million confirmed cases.

However, experts have suggested that the actual death toll may be as high as seven times the official figures.