Iran International
Iran’s state-run television is facing sharp criticism from senior clerics and political figures over inflammatory religious commentary and what they call biased coverage of negotiations with the United States.
“A fundamentalist group runs state TV behind the scenes,” moderate cleric and former MP Rasoul Montajabnia asserted last week, pointing to a recent broadcast that insulted Sunni Muslims. “(They) deliberately seek to sow discord among Muslims.”
On a daytime live show last week, a guest recited a derogatory poem about Abu Bakr, the first caliph of Islam. The network later issued an apology, removed the episode from all its platforms and opened an investigation.
The measures were deemed too little too late by several prominent clerics who accused the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) of insulting religious sanctities.
Leading theologian Hossein Nouri Hamadani questioned the decisions made at IRIB. “There are many learned clerics at the seminary … It is unclear why the network invites those who make unfounded statements about Islam,” he said late last week.
At least two more prominent clerics, Hossein Ansarian and Hashem Hosseini Bushehri, weighed in on the subject, urging the broadcaster to change course.
This level of public criticism from within is rare—and significant—because the head of Iran’s state television is directly appointed by the Supreme Leader, and its political output is closely monitored by his office.
Even the IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News denounced certain broadcasts as “examples of bad taste,” leaving little choice for IRIB officials to issue rare public apologies—to viewers, authorities, and even neighboring countries.
“I do not deny there are oversights and mistakes,” IRIB chief Payman Jebelli told moderate conservative outlet Khabar Online, affirming his reverence for the clergy and their concerns.
Curiously, Khabar Online had carried an editorial alleging that “radical groups have infiltrated the national network,” and are driving the public away with their biased coverage of politics, especially the nuclear talks with the administration of US president Donald Trump.
Shortly after the second round of talks last month, state TV aired a live show in which an ultraconservative commentator warned of dire consequences including civil war if Tehran's engagement with the Trump administration continued.
“We have tried to deliver accurate news and stay aligned with the negotiators,” Jebelli told Khabar Online when asked about the show, adding IRIB backed the government in general even though some programs may contradict official policy.
Much of the criticism against the broadcaster has centered on Vahid Jalili—a senior IRIB official whose brother Saeed Jalili is the face and voice of Iran’s ultraconservatism and once led Tehran’s nuclear negotiations.
The brothers are seen by moderates as key to IRIB’s vision and direction.
The backlash against the state broadcaster, amplified by religious authorities and hardline outlets, suggests a growing divide not just between factions within the political elite, but potentially within the very institutions that project and preserve the state’s ideological authority.
“This should never have happened on a platform that’s under the leader’s supervision,” Montajabnia told Khabar Online, accusing the hardline faction of defying Ali Khamenei.
Asked if IRIB chief Jebelli could intervene to stop the broadcaster’s drive against the administration of president Masoud Pezeshkian, he said: “Only the supreme leader can resolve this.”
Like the explosion at the nuclear power plant in 1986, the deadly blast at Iran’s Bandar Abbas port—reportedly caused by missile fuel stored at a civilian facility—has become a symbol of decay, incompetence, and state secrecy.
Chernobyl ushered in political change and the collapse of Communism. Could this be the beginning of the end of the Islamic Republic?
Historical analogies are never perfect, but they are often revealing.
In the late 18th century, both Russia and Iran were backward agrarian societies ruled by monarchs, burdened by inequality, and haunted by their failures to modernize. Russia's army was a formidable force, but the empire still lagged behind Western Europeans in industry and capital accumulation.
By the mid 19th century, leftist and liberal movements had begun to emerge in Russia, aiming to abolish serfdom and challenge autocracy as part of a broader push for modernization. In Iran too, the educated few, often inspired by the west, were beginning to call for fundamental change.
In Russia, this quest culminated in the dual revolutions of 1917. In Iran, it led to the Constitutional Revolution of 1905 which brought Iranians partial representation but little material progress.
That began only with the rise of Reza Shah in 1925.
Reza Shah confronted the clergy and their medieval traditions' hold on Iranian society. He oversaw an extensive program of modernisation that continued under his son and transformed the country in many ways.
But without democratic development and under pressure from leftist and clerical opposition, Iran’s own “October Revolution” came in 1979.
As in Russia, Iran's post-revolutionary regime was anti-West. It was largely backed by pro-Soviet activists—most of whom were soon crushed by the religious camp while some quietly adapted and remained in the system.
The Islamic Republic, like the Soviet Union, sidelined foreign capital, prioritized homegrown militarization, and sustained itself on repression and slogans. After almost half a century, the revolutionary fervor is gone, corruption is rampant, and the economy is wrecked with years of sanctions and mismanagement.
Could it be argued then that the Islamic Republic today stands at a similar crossroads to that of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s? I think not.
Yes, the theocracy is under enormous pressure from the United States and Israel. A clear majority reject the ruling ideology and want out, as evidenced by widespread protests and growing defiance of Islamic restrictions.
But the Soviet Union had reform-minded leadership.
By the 1980s, some Soviet leaders recognized the system’s failure."The only one truly believing in Communism at the time was chief ideologist Mikhail Suslov," the last leader of Armenia’s Communist Party, Karen Demirchian, told this author in 1999.
And at the very top stood Mikhail Gorbachev, who became General Secretary in 1985 and launched the reformist movement of Perestroika and Glasnost.
By contrast, Iran is ruled by an 85-year-old cleric, Ali Khamenei, who is no Gorbachev— and may even have a few lessons to teach Suslov in rigidity. Khamenei's security forces have shown no hesitation in shooting unarmed protesters.
Gorbachev could act because the Soviet Union was run by a monolithic party that controlled the state, the military, and the security services. No party apparatus rules in Iran. Power rests with one man who presides over a web of largely dysfunctional institutions, tied and surviving mainly by their will to repress.
The Soviet Union collapsed not by popular uprising, but with Gorbachev's top-down liberalization. No such campaign would be entertained let alone initiated by the leader of the Islamic Republic.
The explosion in Bandar Abbas may have shocked and angered Iranians, but it was no Chernobyl in scale—and it's unlikely to be a Chernobyl in impact. Khamenei has never been fond of reform. Until he’s gone, any 'Soviet moment' is more of a warning than a turning point.
