Hidden joy in region after Nasrallah killing – Iran unlikely to act, says analyst

Hassan Nasrallah’s killing and Hezbollah’s weakening raise serious concerns for Iran-backed groups, Lina Khatib, associate fellow at the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House, wrote in The Times.

"If Israel is able to bring Iran’s most powerful asset in the Middle East to its knees, then smaller, newer groups in Iran’s network are potentially easier to undermine," she argued.

Khatib also compared Nasrallah’s death with that of IRGC-QF commander Qasem Soleimani, who was killed in a US drone strike in Iraq in 2020. She noted that, unlike Soleimani's assassination, which was an isolated incident, Nasrallah’s killing is part of a broader Israeli strategy to dismantle Hezbollah, potentially signaling the start of Iran's diminishing influence in the region.

Mehrdad Farahmand, a Middle East analyst and political commentator based in Istanbul, told Iran International that "Hassan Nasrallah has become a casualty of the misguided policies of the Islamic Republic and Hamas."

He further noted, "Hezbollah has lost its leader at a time when its very reputation is also in decline."

Farahmand emphasized, "Had Hezbollah been the sole decision-maker, it would have avoided involvement in the Israel-Hamas conflict. However, it is the pressure from the Islamic Republic that has led Hezbollah to its current predicament."

Israel's increasingly larger attacks on Iran and its proxies have been met with smaller or no responses from Tehran, said Ghassan Ashour, a Middle East analyst, adding that this has, in turn, motivated Israel to escalate its assaults.

“In case the Islamic Republic decides to retaliate against Israel, it would inevitably draw in the United States and other countries into the war, which is undesirable for Iran. Even if Hassan Nasrallah were killed, Tehran would refrain from retaliation,” Ashour told Iran International.

This short stay could explain his limited media exposure and help mask his communication weaknesses. Over the past few months, Pezeshkian has shown he’s not a strong speaker, often repeating himself multiple times in the same interview or speech.

Even when reading from a prepared text, he tends to lose his place. On several occasions, he’s even cut speeches short, claiming the audience appeared bored.
Although Pezeshkian’s first appearance in New York took place behind closed doors in a meeting with a group of journalists, labeled by his team as "media managers," it is likely that he will delegate interviews with US and international media to his vice president for strategic affairs, former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif. Zarif is expected to convey the message that Iran has changed and is ready to engage with the world.

Pezeshkian has described his mission to New York as "telling the world that Iran is more secure and free than you think." However, this message may be difficult to convey, given recent events.

Just recently, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated in Tehran, and as in previous years, Iranian expats continue to face the risk of being taken hostage on fabricated charges.

Beyond security concerns, the state of freedom in Iran is also under scrutiny, particularly with Nobel Peace Prize laureate Narges Mohammadi, who has spent years in prison for defending the rights of other prisoners and is expected to serve even more time behind bars.
Pezeshkian's activity in New York may be limited to a 20-minute speech at the UNGA on Tuesday and a brief five-minute address on advocating global peace. Given Iran's involvement in conflicts across the Middle East and accusations of arming Russia against Ukraine, the Iranian president may have little to contribute to the forum initiated by the UN Secretary-General.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi arrived in New York a couple of days before Pezeshkian with his own entourage, possibly to give the President an opportunity to pretend that unlike previous presidents he has travelled to New York as the head of a delegation of 40 people including his daughter and son-in-law. Many on Iranian social media demanded an explanation for why the couple is accompanying the President.

As of Monday evening, Araghchi had only given interviews in Farsi with Iranian state TV and the official news agency IRNA, where he expressed his willingness to resume negotiations over Iran's controversial nuclear program.

However, he quickly acknowledged that this would be difficult to achieve. It remains unclear whom he would engage with, even if Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has given him the green light.

President Joe Biden is largely inaccessible with less than two months before he leaves the White House, and the next president, whose identity remains unknown until the election concludes, won't take office until January.

Pezeshkian, Araghchi, and their entourage are set to meet with a group of Iranians living in the US, where Pezeshkian plans to invite them to invest in Iran. Ironically, many of those invited are university students and academics—not exactly known for their wealth—even if they could trust the officials after enjoying a meal of rice, broad beans, and lamb shank washed down with yogurt drink. Previous Iranian presidents have made similar appeals in past years, all without success.

Convincing Iranians that their country is safe for investment will be even more challenging than persuading foreigners. They know firsthand why they or their families left, often after having their assets confiscated, with little hope of recovering their rights. These experiences make any assurances about security and stability difficult to believe.

The views expressed are the contributor's own and do not necessarily represent the views of Iran International or its staff.

Speaking to domestic media, Iran’s top diplomat, Abbas Araghchi, stated that Tehran is prepared to initiate discussions this week, provided “the other parties are ready.”

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s first trip to the West comes just six weeks before the November 5 US presidential election—and amid mounting regional instability in the Middle East. Reuters reported last week that the country’s new president is set to meet with European leaders while in New York, although there is little sign of any breakthrough.

Iran expert Ali Fathollah-Nejad says that this aligns with Pezeshkian’s so-called mission to seek talks with the West in order to obtain sanctions relief. “Pezeshkian’s so-called mission is also supported by the power center in Iran, by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the IRGC whose daily Javan had even celebrated Pezeshkian’s presidential victory,” said Fathollah-Nejad, who is the director of the Center for Middle East and Global Order (CMEG).

While some analysis in Western media has lauded the "reformist" new President as a potential bridge between Iran and the West, others remain unconvinced. “Pezeshkian is nothing more than a moderate façade for the regime to ward off Western economic sanctions and pressure. The West seems to have little strategic memory that the regime has used this tactic repeatedly throughout its 45-year history,” Andrea Stricker, the Deputy Director and Research Fellow at FDD’s Nonproliferation & Biodefense Program, told Iran International English.

According to Reuters, which cited three Iranian officials, Pezeshkian is set to deliver a message that "Tehran is open to diplomacy," with one Iranian official reportedly saying that "Iran's rulers believe that the tense standoff with the West over Iran's nuclear program should end... but through negotiations from a position of power, not pressure.”

Stricker argues that the emphasis on "power, not pressure" highlights the regime's understanding that it can leverage nuclear coercion and blackmail to secure Western concessions. These range from the US easing oil sanctions, allowing unprecedented Iranian oil exports, to avoiding strikes on Iranian military assets despite attacks on US interests or global shipping, and the West's failure to hold Tehran accountable at the IAEA for its nuclear violations. “All of this permits the regime to increase its malign regional activity with impunity,” Stricker said.

Pressure on Iran has also been mounting from some corners to respond to the widely believed Israeli operations—including the killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh and the latest series of strikes on Hezbollah members in Lebanon. Iran’s reluctance to respond, Fathollah-Nejad argues, is because there is a strategic preference by the regime for Pezeshkian to secure “sanctions relief that is considered vital by Iran’s power center, for regime stability reasons.”

Fathollah-Nejad also notes the uncertainty surrounding the upcoming weeks in Tehran's diplomatic efforts to re-engage with the West. He suggests that for the regime, it would be favorable if Kamala Harris wins the US presidency, as there is significant anxiety in Tehran about Donald Trump's potential return to the White House. While he says that it is difficult to predict what the next weeks will look like, Iran might agree to freeze its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief from the US.

“This would, of course, be a temporary measure, regardless of the fact that there is a need to broaden Iran policy, not least in the regional geopolitical dimension,” Fathollah-Nejad said.

Regardless of who wins the US presidency, Stricker argues that further rounds of fruitless nuclear talks are merely a tactic to "prevent the West from shifting to a pressure strategy aimed at penalizing, deterring, and rolling back Iran's nuclear advancements." “Just as nearly two years of nuclear talks under Biden were ultimately futile, we should expect the same of any talks that are not backed by severe Western pressure and a credible threat of military force. The current dynamic is the result of a failure of US and European strategy and their fear of escalation,” she said.

The Biden administration has seemingly deprioritized negotiations with Iran, focusing on other issues, and with the 2015 nuclear deal effectively defunct, future diplomatic efforts are likely to be more challenging and less effective. Both European diplomats and US officials have suggested in various reports that while Washington is not ready for serious negotiations, Iran may seek engagement with Europe independently.

Whether there will be a new nuclear deal or not, Stricker and Fathollah-Nejad seemingly agree that it will not address the growing threats Iran poses. “The 2015 nuclear deal is obsolete and set to expire in a few short years. It permitted the expansion of Iran’s nuclear program over time, in any case, and legalized the situation we face now with Tehran’s nuclear program,” Stricker maintained, saying the JCPOA was never a long-term solution.

While some have voiced that the West may not have any more tools left to restrain Tehran, Stricker argues the opposite. “It is well past time for the West to revert back to pressure—and to sustain it, backed by a strategy to weaken and destabilize the regime—if there is to be a negotiated solution, but ideally, a free Iran,” Stricker said.

She suggests the West enforce US oil sanctions on Iran by targeting Chinese importers, interdicting shipments, destroying Iranian military assets to restore deterrence, and reimposing UN sanctions expiring in 2025 to reinstate global missile, military, and nuclear restrictions on Tehran. “America, Europe, and Israel can also decisively support the Iranian people in their struggle to rid the country of the root of most Middle East woes—the Islamic Republic regime.”