Proposed minister of intelligence in Iran: Who is Esmail Khatib?
Iran's Intelligence Minister Esmail Khatib
Iran's Minister of Intelligence, Esmail Khatib, has been re-nominated to continue in his role under newly elected President Masoud Pezeshkian, despite being sanctioned twice by the United States.
On September 9, 2022, the US Treasury Department added him, along with the Ministry of Intelligence, to its sanctions list due to his involvement in cyber activities targeting the United States and its allies.
Shortly after this, Khatib was subject to another round of US sanctions on September 22, 2022. Alongside Iran’s Morality Police and its senior leaders, he was addedto the US Treasury’s list of individuals for “being a person acting on behalf of the Government of Iran who is responsible for or complicit in, ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, the commission of serious human rights abuses against persons in Iran or Iranian citizens or residents, or the family members of the foregoing, on or after June 12, 2009.”
He had been a vocal critic of the 2009 Green Movement protests, labeling them as "sedition" and praising the Islamic Republic's crackdown on dissent.
The Iranian Green Movement, led by Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, emerged after Iran's 2009 presidential election and continued until early 2010. Protesters demanded the removal of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad from office, alleging that the election results were fraudulent.
Born in 1961, Khatib was a founding member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) intelligence organization during the early 1980s. In 1991, he was appointed head of the Intelligence Office in Qom, operating under the alias Esmail Vaezi.
Following his tenure in Qom, Khatib was appointed head of security for Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran, in the city. He later moved to the judiciary, where he led the Judiciary’s Protection and Intelligence Center from 2012 to 2019.
Khatib’s tenure as minister of intelligence
Khatib was appointed Minister of Intelligence in August, 2021, under late President Ebrahim Raisi's administration. His leadership has seen a significant increase in the Ministry's budget, which he claims has enhanced Iran’s ability to counter Israel. He also boasted about dismantling what he described as a "Mossad infiltration network" responsible for assassinations and sabotage within Iran.
Khatib attributed the attack to Israel, though Israel has not claimed responsibility, claiming it was carried out with US approval. Tehran continues to promise a harsh retaliation for the brazen attack on Iranian soil as global powers attempt to mediate.
Khatib has also addressed the threat posed by a "wandering ISIS" following the decline of the group in Syria, asserting that Iran's security agencies have successfully contained this danger.
"After the events in Syria subsided, we naturally faced a wandering ISIS that was directed toward us," he said last month, adding that "with the strategic planning of security agencies and the synergy developed within the security community, this threat was contained.
On January 3, during the fourth anniversaryof the death of former IRGC commander Qasem Soleimani, two explosions in the southern city of Kerman resulted in 91 deaths and over 200 injuries. Khatib admitted to the failure of local security measures in what was the worst terror attack in the history of the Islamic Republic.
Following the explosions, Khatib said, "Despite all the efforts and actions of the Kerman provincial authorities and the members of the Provincial Security Council, we witnessed this tragic disaster and enemy plot, which caused us great embarrassment before the leader and the people."
In addition to crackdowns on dissidents, throughout his tenure, Khatib has repeatedly issued threats against Iran International, for reflecting news and views critical of the Islamic government. In November 2022, amid widespread protests in Iran, Khatib labeled the network a "terrorist organization" and warned that its journalists would be pursued by Iranian intelligence.
He reiterated these threats in September 2023, stating that Iran would take action against the network "whenever and wherever it deems necessary," despite international support for the media outlet.
Last year, the London offices of the network were forced to temporarily relocate to Washington as British security agency MI5 said it and the police services could no longer guarantee the safety of the staff.
Pouria Zeraati, the television host of the "Last Word" program on Iran International, was attacked by a group of unidentified individuals as he exited his residence in London in March as the threat continues.
Iran's Permanent Mission to the United Nations, referencing a recent Politico report about the hacking of Donald Trump's election campaign, has denied any intention to interfere in the US presidential election.
The Mission said Sunday that the US election is a domestic issue and dismissed the reports as “lacking credibility.”
Despite the denials, the Trump campaign has said that its internal communications, including sensitive vice-presidential vetting files, were hacked in a breach they believe was orchestrated by Iranian hackers.
The revelation emerged after Politico received emails from an anonymous source containing documents from within Trump’s operation, raising serious concerns about the security of the 2024 presidential election.
The Trump campaign quickly pointed to “foreign sources hostile to the United States,” linking the breach to a report by Microsoft that identified Iranian hackers as responsible for targeting a high-ranking official in a US presidential campaign.
While Microsoft did not name the specific campaign, the timing and nature of the attack suggest that Iran is once again leveraging its cyber capabilities to disrupt American politics.
On Friday, the US announced a $10 million reward for information leading to the identification or whereabouts of six Iranian government hackers accused of carrying out cyberattacks on U.S. water utilities last fall. The State Department emphasized its commitment to tracking down these suspects and holding them accountable.
Tehran’s cyber warfare strategy has evolved into a sophisticated operation aimed at undermining the political process and sowing chaos.
This latest incident is not an isolated case but part of a series of aggressive moves by Iranian cyber actors, including groups linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), to infiltrate and influence US elections.
Microsoft’s report highlighted several Iranian cyber groups, including Storm-2035 and Sefid Flood, which have been preparing for influence operations that could incite violence and erode public trust in the electoral process. The breach involving the Trump campaign is just one example of how Tehran’s cyber forces are targeting American institutions.
This hacking incident echoes the 2020 election cycle when Iranian operatives attempted to intimidate voters and spread disinformation. The Islamic Republic’s ongoing efforts to target US political figures and campaigns are widely viewed as part of a broader strategy to retaliate for the US killing of former IRGC Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani in 2020.
The timing of the Trump campaign breach is particularly alarming as it coincides with escalating threats from Iran against former President Trump. Recent reports suggest that Iran is actively plotting to assassinate Trump in revenge for Soleimani’s death.
The documents obtained by the hackers, including a 271-page vetting file on Vice Presidential candidate J.D. Vance, reveal sensitive internal deliberations that Tehran could exploit to further its agenda. The implications of this breach extend beyond the Trump campaign, posing a direct threat to the integrity of the 2024 presidential election.
Iran’s cyber operations are not confined to the US. The Iranian government has expanded its reach globally, with hacker groups like MuddyWater targeting governments and private entities in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and India. These operations are part of a broader effort by Tehran to extend its influence and disrupt its adversaries on multiple fronts.
The US government has responded with sanctions and indictments against Iranian cyber actors, but these measures have done little to deter Tehran’s ongoing aggression.
The Iranian Parliament has confirmed the receipt of President Masoud Pezeshkian’s list of proposed ministers, which includes former chief nuclear negotiator Abbas Araghchi as the nominee for foreign minister.
The list published by the official news agency IRNA reveals that despite Pezeshkian’s promises to include non-Shia ministers in his cabinet, there are no Sunni ministers among the proposed nominees. However, he has included a woman, Farzaneh Sadegh, as the candidate for the Ministry of Roads and Transportation. The average age of the proposed cabinet members is 60, which contrasts with Pezeshkian’s earlier commitment to forming a “young” cabinet.
Some reformists say the make-up of Pezeshkian’s proposed cabinet has hugely disillusioned them.
“Pezeshkian has failed in his first test, except in a few cases [where his nominees are acceptable],” former reformist lawmaker Parvaneh Salahshouri tweeted. She contended that the nominees were chosen under the pressure of others who "demanded a share" and those who “openly interfered” instead of their qualifications and expertise and the advice of the council that was formed to choose the best. “Global experience has shown that such governments are short-lived," she wrote.
“There is not a gap but a deep abyss between the cabinet presented by Mr. Pezeshkian and what was expected from his cabinet. But I’m still hopeful [because] I didn’t vote for Pezeshkian for an ideal cabinet or progress and evolvement,” the prominent reformist pundit Sadegh Zibakalam posted on X, adding that he had only voted for Pezeshkian to stop hardliners and ultra-hardliners who call themselves ‘revolutionaries’ from driving all others out and “purification” of the political establishment.
The relevant committees of the hardline-dominated Parliament will scrutinize the eligibility and qualifications of each proposed candidate. Following this review, the ministers will be invited to defend their programs on the floor before facing a vote of confidence.
Pezeshkian has nominated Abdolnaser Hemmati, the former governor of Iran's Central Bank and a presidential candidate in 2021 backed by some reformists, as the Minister of Economy. Hemmati has previously criticized the government’s economic performance over the past three years, yet during his tenure, the Central Bank implemented inflationary policies that severely devalued the national currency, the rial.
For the position of oil minister, Pezeshkian has chosen Mohsen Pakzad, who previously served as deputy oil minister under Hassan Rouhani. Pezeshkian has also reinstated Abbas Aliabadi, who served as energy minister in Raisi’s administration, to address the significant challenges related to energy shortages, including electricity.
Veteran economist and former reformist lawmaker Ahmad Meydari has been nominated by Pezeshkian to head the Ministry of Labor. Meydari, who appeared as Pezeshkian’s economic adviser during the election debates, may face substantial opposition from the Parliament.
Esmail Khatib, the US-designated minister of intelligence during Ebrahim Raisi’s administration, has been proposed as Pezeshkian’s intelligence minister. Khatib has strong connections with the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) intelligence organization, having held various high-ranking positions there early in his career.
A political analyst in Tehran told Iran International that Pezeshkian’s proposed list seems to be a “compromise cabinet,” with concessions made in key ministries such as interior, intelligence, education, sports, Islamic guidance, and energy.
These concessions may be intended to secure a vote of confidence for pro-reform ministers proposed for foreign affairs, labor, economy, communications, and health, thereby maintaining support from his reformist base.
For the health ministry, Pezeshkian has selected Dr. Mohammad-Reza Zafarghandi, the outspoken reformist Chairman of Iran's non-governmental Medical Council, known for his advocacy and regulatory work of the Council.
Brigadier General Aziz Nasirzadeh, currently the deputy chief of the Armed Forces’ General Staff, has been nominated for the position of defense minister. Pezeshkian has also put forward Brigadier General Eskandar Momeni, a former deputy chief of the Law Enforcement Forces, as the candidate for interior minister. This choice has sparked concern among some reformists who are wary of appointing a military figure to the interior ministry.
At least one ministerial position has been allocated to a close ally of Parliament Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf. Former lawmaker Ahmad Donyamali, who served as Ghalibaf’s deputy in Tehran Municipality, has been nominated for the role of Minister of Sports.
Sattar Hashemi, one of the younger nominees in the proposed cabinet, is slated to lead the Ministry of Communications. If confirmed by the Parliament, he will face the daunting task of addressing internet filtering, a key issue Pezeshkian pledged to resolve during his campaign.
On Tuesday, August 6th, the Middle East Institute hosted a virtual briefing titled "On the Edge: Israel-Iran Tension Post-Haniyeh Escalation," which explored the increasingly tense situation in the region as Tehran issued threats of retaliation.
General Joseph Votel retired four-star US Army General and commander of US Centcom from March 2016 to 2019 and now Senior Fellow on National Security at MEI, and Firas Maksad Senior Director for Strategic Outreach and Senior Fellow, MEI were the speakers. They laid out the implications of the most recent rise in hostilities between Israel and Iran and its affiliated proxies. Also discussed were scenarios of Israel's strategic assessments, the risk of the US being drawn into a broader regional conflict, and the aftermath of Haniyeh's death on Hamas' future.
In his opening comments Firas Maksad said: “Israel has successfully gained escalation dominance in this conflict; essentially projecting out to the world and warring parties that it is ready to take the next step up the escalatory ladder, should it come to it. Iran and Hezbollah have lost quite a bit of their deterrence, as their response on April 13th was not enough to pause,” he added: “I think in fact the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been quite successful in putting both Iran and Hezbollah in a Catch 22 type situation. A policy dilemma.”
Maksad described the closing ring on fire that Iran and its proxies have established around Israel and that it is very real. This is a strategic argument that can be made for a war by Israel. Politically, Netanyahu is embattled, his political future hangs in the balance and many in Israel will say that [Netanyahu] doesn’t have much of an interest in reaching a ceasefire with Hamas in Gaza and he is at odd with most of his intelligence and security chiefs who believe that a deal can be had.” He added: “The answer to the million-dollar question as to whether Netanyahu is looking for a broader war; there are many reasons and justifications as to why the answer to that might be yes.”
He outlined three potential scenarios:
1. Limited Response: The least likely scenario involves a coordinated but fairly limited response from Iran and Hezbollah. Back-channel diplomacy, such as efforts by the Jordanian prime minister, has emphasized de-escalation and warned Tehran that Jordan would prohibit the passage of Iranian missiles and drones through its airspace. Saudi Arabia has reportedly conveyed a similar message to Iran.
2. Escalated Conflict from Lebanon: The second scenario, which may be the most likely, involves increased missile fire from Lebanon. Given Lebanon's proximity to Israel, this incoming fire would be harder to block. Hezbollah possesses over 1,000 missiles, many equipped with precision-guided kits, and the US and its allies might not have the same advance warning as they did on April 13. In this case, Israel would likely retaliate strongly, potentially launching a major operation into Lebanon.
3. Wider Regional Conflict: The third and most catastrophic scenario involves Iran following through on its repeated promises to defend Hezbollah if Israel launches a major offensive. Hezbollah is Iran’s most significant foreign investment, with over 40 years and billions of dollars spent on arming, training, and equipping what is considered the most formidable non-state military actor in the world. As Hezbollah serves as a first line of defense for Iran's nuclear program, this scenario could lead to a much broader and more devastating conflict.
General Joseph Votel
In his opening comments Votel pointed out that US influence in the region has diminished which is not unexpected. He explained: “Our desire to put more focus on the Pacific and to reduce our presence in the Middle East which was done to large extent through cessation of operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, though there are still 2500 troops on in the region.”
He emphasized that Iran’s response will not be limited to actions in the Levant and that the IRGC’s global network can exact costs in other parts of the world.
Maksad argued that Hezbollah does not want to see an escalation of the conflict. Given the events of the last week, Lebanon is no longer a secondary front and in danger of becoming the primary front. He explained that there are many reasons why Hezbollah does not want to fight a head on war with Israel. The most important reason being that Hezbollah’s primary sponsor does not want to see it spent in such a war and wants to keep that power in case of any potential Israeli attack on Iran proper. Lebanon is still staggering from the financial collapse of 2019 and the Shia community in Lebanon does not want to see a war that could be devastating for Beirut being fought for Palestinians and Hamas.
A viewer asked: What are the chances and the consequences of the war spreading to the entire region and the GCC, impacting energy flow through the strait of Hormuz. Votel replied saying that it will certainly impact shipping, market and insurance prices and will have an overall decrease of the movement of goods out of the region.
Maksad and Votel who have recently returned from touring countries in the region, including the CENTCOM facilities in the area. Maksad argued that it is unescapable for the GCC countries not to be impacted. According to Maksad, Saudi Arabia is laser focused on Yemen, the Houthis and their participation in any forthcoming escalation. The regional countries have done their utmost to sit this war out which is very difficult for them. The Red Sea is vital and so much of what the Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman, envisioned, into turning the country into a logistical trade hub by 2030 whose logistical trade is around the Red Sea through which 15% of the global commerce goes through. The UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia are firm US partners and allies, but they cannot continue to hedge if the issue expands into the Persian Gulf as well.
Maksad argued that if the reports of the their readiness of providing Iran with a significant air defense as possible, such as the S400 to help defend against incoming Israeli attacks, will underscore what many including Maksad and Votel have said all along to the Biden administration which is it is not possible to push back against Russia and the rise of China and not be involved in the Middle East. Russia is stepping back in in a significant way and this will give credence to not only the Israeli argument but other American allies in the region, that America needs to be more involved.
President Massoud Pezeshkian's submits the names of his cabinet ministers to the Iranian parliament (Majles) on Sunday, six weeks after he won the election and began a hard process of choosing ministers.
In the days leading up to the Sunday parliamentary meeting, strong opposition emerged from politicians and the public alike against the individuals rumored to be named as Pezeshkian's ministers, whose names had been leaked to the press.
Iranian investigative reporter Behnam Gholipour posted a screenshot of a tweet by Ali Agha Mohammadi, an official at Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's office, on August 8 in which he named some of the new ministers by their surname. Gholipour wrote that that the official deleted the tweet later on the same day. These must have been names presented by Pezeshkian for Khamenei's review.
The 14 men on the list are: [Esmail Khatib] as Intelligence Minister, Taghavinejad as Labor Minister, Aliabadi as Minister of Energy, Eslami as Road Minister, [Abbas] Araqchi as Foreign Minister, [Abdolnaser] Hemmati as Economy Minister, Abbas Salehi as Culture Minister, Rahimi as Justice Minister, Majid Ansari as Interior Minister, Dr. Sadeghi as the Minister for Sports and Youths, [Majid] Hosseini as oil Minister, Dr. Dadandish as the Minister of Education and Zafarghandi as Health Minister.
Conservative commentator Naser Imani has told Khabar Onlinewebsite that Pezeshkian was under immense pressure during the week about choosing his cabinet ministers. Imani said that he defends the idea of having ministers younger than 55 years old, but there is nothing wrong in having older politicians as vice presidents. However, he noted that some vice presidents are over 70 years of age and that is not quite right.
Pezeshkian had repeatedly promised during the campaign to form a "young government" and not to re-cycle the same politicians who have rotated in different governments.
The politician also said that some of those who call on Pezeshkian to form "a government of national accord" expect the president to have 10 ministers from each political faction. Imani said this is counterproductive. He reiterated that Pezeshkian is under pressure by leading politicians to give top jobs to individuals with certain political affiliation.
Conservative political activist Hassan Sobhani Nia also told Nameh News that the long delay in introducing cabinet ministers to the Majles is caused by the pressures of politicians in various political factions who want top jobs from Pezeshkian for the members of their faction. This comes while Pezeshkian has started his work as Preszident in a tough political situation and the people have high expectations of him, Sobhani Nia said.
In another development, former reformist lawmaker Mahmoud Sadeghi saidthat "among the news about possible ministers, none has been as disgusting as the reports that say Pezeshkian is going to reinstate current Education Minister [Reza Morad Sahrai." He said those who put forward Sahrai's name probably do not live in Iran. Sahrai's performance as President Raisi's Minister of Education has been too problematic and he has been harshly criticized for saying that only those who pay good money deserve better education. Sahrai's name was on some of the list of possible candidates for ministerial posts.
On the other hand, according to Nameh News, while Pezeshkian was working hard during August to get Khamenei's confirmation for his choice of cabinet ministers, hardline lawmakers at the Iranian parliament were trying to impose their own lists of candidates on Pezeshkian. They guarantee that they will easily give vote of confidence to the ministers if they choose them.
Pezeshkian is expected to introduce up to 19 ministers to the parliament. Former lawmaker Mansoor Haqiqatpoor has said that getting Khamenei's endorsement before introducing the ministers to the Majles would limit the parliament's choices as it is difficult in Iran to oppose Khamenei.
The head of Hamburg Islamic Center (IZH) received direct orders from Iran's Supreme Leader, documents obtained by Germany’s Interior Ministry show, shedding more light on the extent of Tehran’s influence over Islamic centers in Europe.
The documents, which were part of a 220-page closure and activity ban order issued by Germany’s Federal Ministry of the Interior, show that Mohammad Hadi Mofatteh, the head of the Islamic Center of Hamburg, was in continuous contact with Mehdi Mostafavi, a senior official in Khamenei’s office, Der Spiegel reported Friday.
Through WhatsApp, these two exchanged over 650 messages between late 2021 and late 2023, discussing everything from ideological messaging to the center’s future activities.
The instructions from Khamenei’s office included detailed directives on how to shape the narrative around significant events, such as Hamas’ attack on Israel in October 2023, which claimed around 1,200 lives.
Just days after the brutal Hamas attack, Mofatteh was told to frame the incident as a necessary act of resistance against Israel’s alleged crimes. The messaging was clear: portray the attack as an act of bravery by Palestinian youth and as a turning point.
“The Islamic Resistance had no other means to stop Israel’s crimes… Thanks to the courage of Palestinian youth, the Zionist regime will never be the same,” read a message seen by Der Spigel.
The revelations are not limited to ideological influence; they also expose financial links between the Islamic Center of Hamburg and Hezbollah, the Lebanese organization that has been classified as terrorist by both Germany and the European Union.
Inspectors discovered documents bearing Khamenei’s personal stamp and signature, indicating financial endorsements for operations in Yemen. These documents suggest that the center was not only spreading Tehran’s ideology but also acting as a financial conduit for Iran’s militant proxies.
Further evidence of the center’s deep ties to Hezbollah includes reports of visits by a senior Hezbollah cleric responsible for foreign relations. This cleric, who visited the center multiple times, expressed gratitude for the "financial, spiritual, and advisory support" provided by the center’s leadership.
Last week, the German government deported Nasir Niknejad, the Iran-linked Imam of the Islamic Center in Berlin, as revealed by Iran International's correspondent in Berlin. Reports indicate that Niknejad and his wife were detained at Berlin airport upon returning from a month-long leave, just three weeks after the closure of Islamic centers affiliated with the Islamic Republic across Germany. They were subsequently deported back to Iran.
In July, Germany shut down the Khamenei-controlled Islamic Center of Hamburg and the Blue Mosque for their role in promoting terrorist ideology, antisemitism, and anti-democratic threats to the Federal Republic's constitutional order, according to the interior ministry.
In November 2023, Germany's federal police raided the Islamic Center of Hamburg on suspicions of supporting the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah, which has been accused of engaging in terrorism. Germany banned Hezbollah's activities in 2020, stating that the Islamic Center's actions sought to spread the revolutionary ideology of Iran’s Supreme Leader and undermine Germany’s "constitutional order."