Iran Speeds Up Uranium Enrichment To Near Weapons-Grade, Says UN
The United Nations nuclear watchdog says Iran has reversed a months-long slowdown in the rate at which it is enriching uranium to near weapons-grade.
The United Nations nuclear watchdog says Iran has reversed a months-long slowdown in the rate at which it is enriching uranium to near weapons-grade.
Iran has "increased its production of highly enriched uranium, reversing a previous output reduction from mid-2023", the International Atomic Energy Agency said in a statement summarizing a confidential report to member states seen by Reuters Tuesday.
According to the IAEA report, Iran is enriching to up to 60% at its Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) in its sprawling Natanz complex and at its Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP), which is dug into a mountain.
"The Agency confirms that, since the end of November 2023, the rate at which Iran has been producing uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 at these two facilities combined has increased to approximately 9 kg per month," the report to member states said.
By the IAEA's theoretical definition, around 42 kg of uranium enriched to 60% is the amount at which making a nuclear bomb with it cannot be excluded. Iran already has enough uranium enriched to up to 60%, if enriched further, to make three nuclear bombs.
Earlier in the year, there were several reports that Iran's stockpile of uranium enriched to up to 60-percent purity, close to the roughly 90% of weapons grade, continued to increase albeit at a slower pace. The slowdown, which had reportedly begun by June, was seen as the result of secret talks between the United States and Iran that led to the release of US citizens held in Iran earlier this year.
Now that the Islamic Republic is internationally rebuked for the increased attacks on US and Israeli targets by its proxies across the Middle East, the IAEA has also become a little more vocal about Iran’s nuclear program. Several Iran-backed militia groups have increased attacks on US and Israeli targets across the region as well as international shipping as part of their attempts to pressure Israel, which has been at war with Hamas, another Iran-backed militia in Gaza.
IAEA inspectors first observed a change in production at Fordow on November 25, after which Iran said the change was made on November 22, and that the rate of production was returning to the pre-slowdown level there, the report said. Inspectors observed an increase in the production rate at Natanz on November 27, it added. The IAEA then verified the amount being produced at Natanz on December 19 and Fordow on December 24, it said. The IAEA did not formally notify its member states of the reversal of the slowdown until Tuesday's report.
Despite Iran’s constant violation of its nuclear commitments and efforts to stonewall the UN watchdog, the IAEA board of governors and its chief, Rafael Grossi, have failed to take any tangible actions. Grossi keeps reiterating that "significant safeguards issues remain outstanding" in Iran’s nuclear program and "no progress" has been made In Iran’s nuclear promises. In September, Iran also withdrew the designation of several inspectors assigned to conduct verification activities in Iran under the Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement. In late November, IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi stated that Iran was not fulfilling many aspects of its commitments under the 2015 nuclear accord (JCPOA) and the March 2023 agreement.
Negotiations since April 2021 to revive the Obama-era JCPOA nuclear deal have failed to make progress, and Iran continues to expand its nuclear program. The previous US administration withdrew from the agreement in 2018 and imposed harsh economic sanctions. Iran retaliated by starting to violate the JCPOA limits and substantially increased both the quantity and the quality of its uranium enrichment.
Iran did not agree to a compromise plan proposed by the European Union in 2022 to revive the agreement, despite the Biden administration’s stated goal of finding a diplomatic solution. Earlier in the month, the Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), Mohammad Eslami, said sanctions against the country must be lifted before Tehran fulfills its nuclear commitments.
With the absence of reformist and moderate groups from the electoral competition due to disqualifications by the Interior Ministry and anticipated vetting by the Guardian Council, the conservative factions are seemingly unconcerned about the potential implications, notably the prospect of low voter turnout on the election day, March 1. In fact, there are reports that ultraconservatives would even welcome a mere 5-percent turnout.
Competition in the elections is taking place in the apparent absence of reformist and moderate groups that have been effectively barred from running for the Majles as most of their well-known candidates have been disqualified by the Interior ministry and other are expected to be barred by the hardliner-dominated Guardian Council.
The conservatives, however, do not appear to be bothered by the implications of rejecting other groups, most notably, a low turnout on the election day, March 1. Former reformist lawmaker Mostafa Kavakebian has quoted an incumbent conservative MP as having said that the ultraconservatives will be even happy with a 5-percent turnout.
However, the conservative factions are seemingly unconcerned about the potential implications of barring others, notably the prospect of low voter turnout on the election five-percent turnout.
While the ultraconservative Paydari Party, which currently holds sway in the government and parliament, maintains its dominant position, several smaller conservative groups are emerging, hoping to secure a few seats in the Majles to establish their political presence for the next four years.
Recent reports on the conservative landscape before the elections have identified at least seven conservative groups challenging the dominance of the Paydari Party. These groups all bear names suggesting support for the Islamic Revolution, making it difficult for non-Iranian readers to discern their positions. The key figures leading these groups, however, provide better insights into their current political stances.
These figures include vigilante leader Hossein Allahkaram, Housing Minister Mehrdad Bazrpash, Majles Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, controversial hardline cleric Hamid Rasaei, and other lesser-known conservative political figures. While they currently identify as conservatives, their ultimate goal is to secure a share of the limited 290 Majles seats.
Conservative activist Hedayatollah Khademi says the seven conservative groups might be shortlisted to around four groups. He says voters will look at the candidates’ background and will reject many of them even before they go to the polls.
Each one of these groups aims to nominate at least 30 candidates for the 30 seats allocated to Tehran, where most Iranian politicians are based. In contrast, the reform and moderate camp has struggled to present even 30 candidates, as vetting and disqualifications by the Interior Ministry and the Guardian Council have limited their options. Former President Hassan Rouhani is said to be planning to give a list of only 16 candidates form his Moderation and Development Party, and apparently, he is not finding that as easy as he might have thought.
Another conservative analyst, Ahmad Bakhshayesh Ardestani, highlights a curious aspect of this competition. While a political heavyweight like Ghalibaf may secure a seat in the Majles for himself, it is unlikely that he will be able to bring anyone closely associated with him into the next parliament.
Moreover, this competitive landscape among conservatives is likely to result in a significant division within Iran's conservative bloc. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who seeks to diminish the influence of moderates and reformists while maintaining conservative power, appears to welcome this division, as it could hinder the Paydari Party from winning an absolute majority, potentially creating complications for the political system. Khamenei's aim seems to be consolidating power by weakening and dividing conservative factions to ensure his own supremacy.