Iraq welcomed Saudi Arabia’s decision to hold off on retaliation after Riyadh said drones launched from Iraqi territory struck its East-West pipeline.
In a statement on Friday, Iraq condemned any attack threatening Saudi security and said Prime Minister Ali Faleh al-Zaidi had ordered an investigation into those responsible.
Iranian hardliners are demanding that Tehran abandon restraint and restore deterrence through military confrontation following the latest Israeli attack on Hezbollah sites in southern Lebanon.
On Thursday, Israel said it destroyed a major underground Hezbollah complex, adding to pressure on one of Iran’s most important regional allies, which has been severely weakened over the past two years.
Ultraconservative MP Mohammad-Taghi Naqd-Ali blamed what he called Iran’s “non-confrontational stance,” arguing that Tehran’s failure to respond more forcefully to Israeli threats had placed southern Lebanon and Hezbollah “in serious danger.”
“We must carry out a preemptive strike,” he said.
His warning reflects a broader argument among Iranian politicians and media over whether restraint reduces the risk of a wider war or instead encourages Iran’s adversaries to escalate.
The debate encompasses Tehran’s support for regional allies, its confrontation with the United States and, increasingly, its nuclear policy.
Hassan Ghashqavi, spokesperson for parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, said on Thursday that “until Iran reaches complete and total deterrence, the probability of an attack exists at every single moment.”
The same argument has surfaced in the nuclear debate, where hardline lawmakers and commentators have called for suspending cooperation with the IAEA or even withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
‘Meydan’ vs diplomacy
The dispute echoes an older fault line in Iranian politics between meydan — literally “the field,” shorthand for military power and Iran’s regional armed network — and diplomacy.
The distinction became particularly contentious during Hassan Rouhani’s presidency, when then-Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif publicly complained about diplomacy being subordinated to military priorities.
President Masoud Pezeshkian’s government has not renounced Iran’s regional alliances, and some of the sharpest disputes over military strategy now take place within the conservative establishment itself.
But the underlying argument has resurfaced: whether Iran is safer when diplomacy is accompanied by restraint, or when its adversaries believe Tehran is prepared to escalate.
The disagreement has become more consequential as Iran faces the combined pressures of war, sanctions and a weakened network of regional allies.
The Houthi example
Unlike Hezbollah, which has suffered heavy losses in its conflict with Israel, the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen have continued to expand their military campaign and made new territorial gains in recent days around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
The Houthis could nevertheless bolster the hardline argument that an allied force can continue imposing costs on its adversaries rather than pulling back under military pressure.
But the comparison also exposes the risks facing Tehran. Greater Iranian identification with Houthi attacks on shipping could deepen its confrontation with the United States and regional powers at a time when Iran is already under intense military and economic pressure.
That tension goes to the heart of the disagreement over Iran’s regional network.
Hardliners have traditionally regarded Hezbollah and other allied armed groups as an outer defensive perimeter, allowing Tehran to deter or confront adversaries before threats reach Iranian territory. From that perspective, the weakening of those groups does not make disengagement more attractive but makes restoring their deterrent power more urgent.
The counterargument is that Iran’s own economic vulnerability and the danger of further regional escalation require greater restraint.
The argument has acquired greater urgency as Hezbollah comes under renewed Israeli attack while Iran itself faces direct confrontation with the United States.
Russia could help sustain Yemen’s Houthis if Iran’s ability to support the group is weakened, providing a lifeline as the group expands its reach around a second crucial Middle Eastern shipping route, according to Anna Borshchevskaya, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute.
Borshchevskaya said Moscow has already provided intelligence and other assistance to the Iran-backed group, making the Houthis the clearest example of how Russia could help sustain parts of Tehran’s regional network if Iranian resources come under greater strain.
“With the Houthis in particular, there were reports in previous years that Russia also provided them with intelligence… details aside, it’s clear that Russia has been supporting the Houthis,” she told Iran International.
The Houthis reached the strategic island of Perim on Friday after Yemeni government forces withdrew, while the group also took the nearby mainland town of Dhubab, tightening its grip on a vital shipping route as disruption continues in the Strait of Hormuz.
Since late 2023, the group has repeatedly attacked shipping in the Red Sea, while previous reporting has indicated that Russia provided targeting data and satellite intelligence used in attacks on Western vessels.
Iran has also brokered secret talks between Russia and the Houthis over the possible transfer of advanced anti-ship missiles, while Russian actors have reportedly explored weapons sales to the group.
Asked whether Iran could effectively delegate some of the burden of sustaining its regional network to Russia if its own resources were depleted, Borshchevskaya said: “Yes, and that’s not just in Syria; that’s in other parts of the Middle East.”
She argued that Moscow could provide a lifeline without crossing what remains an important Russian red line: direct military confrontation with the United States.
“Russia would do a lot to support this regime. I don’t think they would go far enough to risk a direct military clash with the United States… But they’re not going to sit idly by either.”
A weakened network
Iran’s regional network faces some of its most severe pressure in years. The fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 deprived Tehran of a key regional ally and ended its overt military presence in Syria.
Hezbollah has also suffered heavy losses in its conflict with Israel, which said on Thursday it had destroyed a major underground Hezbollah complex in southern Lebanon.
Iran itself is meanwhile under mounting military and economic pressure from the United States, raising questions about how much support it can continue to provide allied armed groups across the region.
The Houthis stand out in that landscape. Their latest offensive has brought them to the Bab el-Mandeb, on the opposite side of the Arabian Peninsula from Hormuz, potentially giving Iran and its allies leverage over another of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints.
For Borshchevskaya, Russia’s previous assistance to the group provides a model for how Moscow could help keep an Iranian ally operational even if Tehran’s own resources diminish.
“I think we can count on Russia to continue to provide this type of support to Iran—that is, support that stops short of putting Russia in a direct military confrontation with the United States.”
A broader Russia-Iran partnership
The relationship with the Houthis sits within a broader pattern of military and technical cooperation between Moscow and Tehran.
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Iran has supplied Shahed drones and production know-how to Moscow, while Russia has provided Iran with military technology and equipment.
More recently, Russia has secretly helped Iran develop supersonic cruise missile technology that could give Tehran another means of threatening US naval vessels in the Middle East.
Borshchevskaya said the partnership is driven by a broader convergence of interests, particularly their shared desire to reduce US influence.
For Moscow, she argued, the worst outcome would be an Iran that moved decisively toward the West, depriving Russia of an important partner in its wider confrontation with Washington.
That does not mean Russia would assume responsibility for Iran’s regional strategy wholesale. But it gives Moscow a strong incentive to prevent Tehran and its allies from being weakened beyond recovery.
Syria shows limits—and opportunities
Syria illustrates both the limits of Iranian influence and Russia’s ability to preserve its own position after a major regional upheaval.
Iran lost its overt military presence after Assad’s fall, while Moscow has maintained relations with the government of President Ahmed al-Sharaa and negotiated to preserve a reduced Russian footprint.
“There are no Iranian bases. There are no open talks with the Iranian government the way there are with Russia,” Borshchevskaya said, while cautioning that Iran’s exclusion should not necessarily be assumed to be permanent.
Whether Moscow might eventually use its remaining position in Syria to assist Iranian-linked groups is, she said, “an open question.”
For now, the Houthis provide a more concrete test. Their advance around the Bab el-Mandeb comes as Iran is struggling to maintain pressure around Hormuz and its other regional allies face growing military pressure.
There is little evidence so far that Moscow is assuming the financial burden of Iran’s regional network wholesale. But Borshchevskaya argues that the support already provided to the Houthis offers a model for how Russia could help keep parts of that network operational if Tehran’s resources diminish.
Any such support could complicate Washington’s efforts to weaken Iran by squeezing its ability to finance and supply its regional allies.
A reported attempt by a hardline lawmaker to raise President Masoud Pezeshkian’s removal from office has triggered a fierce confrontation not between Iran’s hardliners and moderates but within the conservative camp, exposing divisions that have deepened during the war.
The proposal, reportedly raised at an informal meeting of MPs on Monday, was opposed by Parliament Speaker Mohammad-Baqer Ghalibaf and several lawmakers, one of whom subsequently described it as a “coup plot” against the government.
According to accounts from lawmakers and Iranian media, an unnamed MP raised the question of Pezeshkian’s “political incompetence,” a constitutional mechanism that can ultimately lead to a president’s removal.
The lawmaker reportedly compared Pezeshkian with Abolhassan Bani Sadr, Iran’s first president, who was removed by parliament in 1981, less than a year after the start of the Iran-Iraq war.
Under Article 89 of Iran’s constitution, initiating such a process requires the support of at least one-third of MPs, while removing the president requires the support of two-thirds of parliament.
‘Coup plot’
The confrontation was made public by Mojtaba Zarei, a conservative lawmaker and Ghalibaf supporter, who described the initiative as a “coup plot” and stressed that Pezeshkian’s administration was “backed by the Supreme Leader.”
Zarei threatened to disclose further details about the unnamed lawmaker and the party behind the initiative if what he described as a campaign of agitation and threats continued.
The confrontation reportedly occurred during an informal gathering at the Shah Abdol-Azim shrine in southern Tehran. Parliament has not held in-person sessions since the war began, citing security concerns, and Monday’s discussions were therefore not officially recorded.
Hardliners have accused Ghalibaf of using security concerns as an excuse to prevent parliament from meeting physically, thereby frustrating efforts to pursue the impeachment of Pezeshkian’s ministers.
Zarei did not say whether he was describing a formal attempt to invoke constitutional procedures against Pezeshkian or a broader campaign to force him from office.
His use of the term “coup” is particularly striking because hardliners close to former presidential candidate Saeed Jalili have themselves repeatedly accused Pezeshkian, Ghalibaf and their allies of mounting a “coup” against Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei by defying his instructions on negotiations.
Clash over policy
The exchange reflects an increasingly bitter struggle that does not fall neatly along Iran’s traditional hardline-reformist divide: Ghalibaf is himself a prominent conservative but has increasingly clashed with the harder-line factions associated with Jalili and the Paydari and Shariyan groups.
The political confrontation comes as the war with the United States has intensified, including a widening maritime confrontation around the Strait of Hormuz.
The conflict has sharpened divisions in Tehran over whether Iran should seek a diplomatic accommodation with Washington or respond to US pressure with further military and nuclear escalation.
Etemad newspaper said the hardline faction was pursuing parallel efforts to weaken the executive, combining pressure for greater coercion over the hijab with threats of parliamentary confrontation.
Such tactics, it argued, were intended to force the cabinet to expend its energy on political disputes rather than the country’s economic and livelihood crises.
Ultrahardliners at work
According to Zarei and other lawmakers who spoke to Iranian media, the unnamed MP behind the initiative belongs to Shariyan, or the Strategic Network of Islamic Revolution Supporters.
The group emerged as an electoral alliance ahead of Iran’s February 2024 parliamentary election, with prominent Tehran lawmakers Hamid Rasaei and Amir-Hossein Sabeti among its leading figures.
Shariyan has considerable political overlap with the hardline Paydari Party and Jalili’s faction, which have opposed negotiations and accommodation with the United States.
Their confrontation has increasingly extended beyond Pezeshkian to Ghalibaf himself.
Figures associated with the factions have criticised the parliamentary speaker at pro-establishment gatherings, reflecting a longer-running struggle over leadership of the conservative camp and control of parliament.
Hardline activists have also accused Pezeshkian for months of disobeying the new Supreme Leader and lacking the political competence to remain president, with some openly demanding his resignation.
There is no indication that an effort to remove Pezeshkian currently commands the parliamentary support required to succeed. But amid acute wartime and economic pressure, the episode shows how far the struggle within Iran’s conservative establishment has escalated.
Iran-backed Houthi forces advanced toward the Bab el-Mandeb Strait on Friday, reaching Dhubab as Yemeni government forces withdrew from nearby Perim Island, raising concerns over another major shipping route amid disruption in the Strait of Hormuz.
Two Yemeni government sources told Reuters that Houthi forces had entered Dhubab, which lies directly across from Perim Island. Government forces later withdrew from the island, the sources said.
The positions are strategically important because they sit at the entrance to the Bab el-Mandeb, a narrow passage linking the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and a major route for global trade and energy shipments.
Fighting spreads along Yemen's coast
Saudi Arabia launched two airstrikes on Mocha airport on Friday, according to the Houthi-run Al-Masirah television channel. The Houthis seized the Red Sea port city a day earlier after a large offensive against Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces.
The fighting has forced more than 46,000 people from their homes since last week, the International Organization for Migration said on Friday, warning that the number was rising rapidly.
“Families are being forced to flee for the second or third time in this conflict, with almost nothing left,” IOM Director General Amy Pope said.
The displacement has spread across Yemen's west coast and Taiz governorate, with people also moving toward Lahj, Aden and Ibb, the agency said.
Saudi Arabia seeks more US support
The Houthi advance has also prompted urgent consultations between Washington and Riyadh. US Central Command chief Admiral Brad Cooper traveled to Saudi Arabia on Thursday for coordination meetings over the fighting, Axios reported, citing two people familiar with the matter.
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman separately called US President Donald Trump twice on Thursday and urged him to order US strikes on the Houthis, Axios reported, citing two US officials.
Trump declined, and US officials said Washington did not plan to intervene directly against the Houthis for now. The United States would instead provide Saudi Arabia with intelligence and targeting information, Axios said.
“The United States is focused on protecting our core national security interests - such as ensuring freedom of navigation in the Red Sea - while empowering our regional partners to take the lead in managing and resolving regional security challenges,” a senior Trump administration official told Axios.
Pressure grows on Saudi oil routes
The Houthi advance comes as Saudi Arabia depends more heavily on routes toward the Red Sea because of disruption around the Strait of Hormuz.
Satellite imagery showed smoke on Thursday near Saudi Arabia's East-West oil pipeline, Reuters reported on Friday. The pipeline carries crude from the country's eastern oil-producing areas toward the Red Sea coast and has become more important as shipping through Hormuz has fallen.
There was no official Saudi confirmation of an incident near the pipeline.
The developments add pressure on two of the region's most important maritime routes at the same time, with Iran restricting traffic through the Strait of Hormuz while its Houthi allies advance near the Bab el-Mandeb.
Israel’s destruction of Hezbollah’s Ali al-Taher complex, despite Iranian warnings, has exposed the limits of Tehran’s deterrence in Lebanon as it increasingly relies on maritime chokepoints for leverage.
Israeli forces on Thursday destroyed more than two kilometers of underground infrastructure beneath the strategic ridge in southern Lebanon after establishing what the military called operational control above and below ground.
The Israeli military said the network contained rockets, missiles, drones, anti-tank weapons, mines and explosives, as well as a command complex used by Hezbollah’s Badr unit.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz said the operation completed the consolidation of an Israeli security zone and that troops would remain in the area to prevent Hezbollah from rebuilding its capabilities.
The demolition followed weeks of conflicting claims over control of Ali al-Taher and came after Tehran had warned Washington that a major Israeli assault on the position would provoke a forceful Iranian response.
Yet the operation went ahead, dealing another blow to an Iranian-backed front that Tehran had explicitly sought to protect under the Islamabad memorandum with the United States.
How far do ‘all fronts’ extend?
Lebanon was written into the first clause of the memorandum between Tehran and Washington, with the parties committing to the “immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon” and to ensuring Lebanon’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.
The wording was disputed from the outset. Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, whose government mediated the agreement, said the cessation of hostilities applied to “all fronts, including Lebanon,” while Netanyahu rejected Tehran’s interpretation.
Iranian parliament speaker and chief negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf repeatedly portrayed Lebanon’s inclusion as a diplomatic achievement.
“We brought the resistance front and Lebanon into the first clause of the memorandum,” he said, later accusing the other side of violating the provision.
But Tehran’s ability to enforce that interpretation has increasingly been called into question.
Mojtaba Amani, Iran’s former ambassador to Beirut, had argued that an earlier Iranian military response established a deterrence equation that prevented Israel from attacking Beirut and the Dahiyeh.
In southern Lebanon, however, that equation has proved far less effective. Israel has continued strikes, expanded its presence and tied withdrawal to Hezbollah’s disarmament while gradually establishing what it describes as a security zone.
Ali al-Taher has now become one of the clearest tests of that gap between Tehran’s declared red lines and its ability or willingness to enforce them.
Israel destroys the Ali al-Taher network
Ali al-Taher is a strategic elevation near Nabatieh, around 15 kilometers from the Israeli border, overlooking routes connecting southern Lebanon with the mountainous Iqlim al-Tuffah area farther north.
Lebanese security sources had said Hezbollah built a large underground network inside the ridge, including weapons stores and command infrastructure. Israel described it as a major hub for Hezbollah’s Badr unit.
For weeks, control of the position remained disputed.
Hezbollah lawmaker Ihab Hamadeh questioned Israeli claims to control the ridge while Israeli forces continued bombarding it. Media aligned with Tehran also gave conflicting accounts, while one Iranian reporter acknowledged that the area had effectively been lost.
That ambiguity has now largely disappeared.
Israel said Thursday that its forces had established operational control both on the surface and underground before destroying the tunnel system. The network extended for more than two kilometers and included command centers, weapons depots and living quarters that allowed fighters to remain underground for extended periods, according to the Israeli military.
The massive demolition was powerful enough for the US Geological Survey to register a magnitude-4.1 seismic event in the area.
Atlantic Council researcher Nicholas Blanford had previously argued that Israel was more likely to destroy the infrastructure at Ali al-Taher than attempt to permanently occupy every surrounding height. The first part of that assessment has now materialized, although Israel says its forces will remain in the area rather than withdraw after the demolition.
Control of the ridge also gives Israel greater military reach toward Nabatieh and the mountainous belt farther north, where Lebanese military sources have said Hezbollah moved some weapons and air-defense systems as pressure increased around Ali al-Taher.
The battle therefore extends beyond one position. Israel is attempting to break the connection between Hezbollah’s southern front and its operational rear, prevent the group from rebuilding and deepen a security belt inside Lebanon.
A red line crossed
The importance of Thursday’s operation lies not only in what Israel destroyed, but in what happened to Iran’s warning.
Reuters reported last week that Tehran had warned Washington through Oman that it would mount a major response if Israel launched a full-scale offensive against Ali al-Taher.
Two regional officials told Reuters at the time that more than 12 members of the Revolutionary Guards were present in the area. The White House said that account was inaccurate, while Israeli assessments reported by local media said no IRGC forces were there.
Israel nevertheless proceeded to take operational control of the ridge and destroy the underground complex.
Before the demolition, Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, had already implicitly acknowledged territorial setbacks in Lebanon, saying on state television that Israel had “managed to take some places.”
In the same interview, however, Rezaei announced plans for a new restricted zone outside the Strait of Hormuz.
That contrast points to a broader shift in where Tehran sees effective leverage.
Rather than escalating directly over every Israeli advance in Lebanon, Iran has increasingly concentrated pressure around the Persian Gulf, where its ability to disrupt energy flows imposes costs not only on Israel and the United States but on the global economy.
Recent exchanges have demonstrated both the power and the vulnerability of that strategy.
Iran has disrupted shipping through Hormuz, while the United States has imposed a maritime blockade and attacked Iranian oil tankers. Tehran has in turn attacked vessels in and around the strait and threatened stronger retaliation against further strikes on its assets.
Oil prices have climbed above $100 a barrel amid uncertainty over shipping through the Persian Gulf and escalating attacks on tankers.
Unlike the Lebanese front, Hormuz gives Tehran a lever that does not depend on Hezbollah retaining territory or military infrastructure.
But it is no longer Iran’s only significant maritime pressure point.
Pressure at both ends of the region
The latest developments in Yemen have strengthened rather than weakened Iran-aligned forces around another of the world’s most important waterways.
The Houthis on Thursday seized the Red Sea port of Mocha in an offensive that has increased their leverage around the Bab al-Mandeb Strait.
Reuters reported, citing Yemeni, Iranian and regional sources, that Iranian weapons and military advice played a critical role in the offensive and that Revolutionary Guard personnel helped guide the operation. Tehran denies directly directing Houthi military operations.
The Houthis have also seized strategic Red Sea islands, including Perim, Zuqar and Hanish, further strengthening their position around Bab al-Mandeb, according to the Financial Times.
Those gains complicate the picture of an Islamic Republic simply losing its regional capabilities.
In Lebanon, Hezbollah has lost important positions and infrastructure and Israel has shown an ability to cross a red line Tehran had explicitly drawn around Ali al-Taher.
In Yemen, by contrast, an Iran-aligned force is expanding its geographic position around a strategic shipping route.
The result is an increasingly maritime geography of pressure.
The Strait of Hormuz remains Tehran’s most direct instrument, allowing Iran itself to threaten one of the main arteries of global energy trade. Around Bab al-Mandeb, the Houthis now possess greater capacity to disrupt another route linking the Indian Ocean, Red Sea and Suez Canal.
Together, instability at the two chokepoints has placed additional strain on global energy supplies and shipping.
Tehran nevertheless remains under heavy pressure. Its economy has been battered by sanctions and the US maritime blockade, its oil exports have been severely constrained, and Hezbollah’s battlefield position in Lebanon has weakened.
But the Houthi advances show that Iran’s regional leverage is becoming more uneven rather than simply disappearing.
Ali al-Taher illustrates where Tehran’s deterrence has receded. Hormuz and, indirectly, Bab al-Mandeb show where it still has tools capable of imposing wider costs.
As Israel pushes further past Iranian red lines in Lebanon, those maritime levers are therefore becoming increasingly important to Tehran’s effort to retain the initiative without opening another direct front with Israel.