US has no plans to strike Iran-backed Houthis - ABC

“The regime has to fall,” Leiter said. “I think they are on the road to collapse … It may take a little longer than we thought.”

Leiter’s remarks offer an explicit description of Israel’s desired endgame in Iran, going beyond the destruction of Tehran’s nuclear and missile capabilities or the weakening of its regional allies.

When asked whether victory required the government’s collapse, Leiter was unequivocal.

“Absolutely,” he said. “Because if this regime does not fall, if it does not collapse, it will find a way to rebuild itself.”

‘Who outlasts whom?’

Leiter portrayed the next stage of the confrontation primarily as a contest of economic pressure and endurance, crediting US President Donald Trump’s sanctions strategy with putting growing pressure on Iran’s leadership.

“The big question now is: Who outlasts whom? The West or the ayatollahs?” he said, adding that the key was “patience, will, perseverance, resilience and the ability to keep going.”

“We will defeat them. They will fall.”

Leiter’s assessment that the Islamic Republic is heading toward collapse is a prediction rather than an established outcome.

Despite months of war and economic pressure, the Islamic Republic remains in power and capable of inflicting significant military damage.

Iran has continued launching large missile salvos and attacking shipping around the Strait of Hormuz, while strikes this week damaged several US military aircraft at a base in Jordan. The Iran-backed Houthis have meanwhile made new territorial gains around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.

He acknowledged that the timing of any collapse was inherently uncertain, comparing Iran’s situation to the final years of the Soviet Union, whose demise few specialists accurately predicted.

Helping US with intelligence

Leiter also disclosed that Israel is providing Washington with intelligence and other information to support the US economic campaign against Tehran.

“We’re helping right now,” he said. “We’re helping with intelligence and all kinds of supporting information that the United States needs.”

That includes information for “sanctioning the regime, sanctioning countries associated with the regime and companies that do business with the regime,” he said.

He said Israel had taken the leading military role during the 12-day war but that the balance had since shifted, with Washington assuming leadership and the two allies operating “shoulder to shoulder.”

Trump has consistently framed his central demand as preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, while continuing to leave open the possibility of a negotiated settlement with Tehran.

Leiter described Washington as the dominant power in the partnership and Israel as its “junior partner.”

“The United States is a superpower,” he said. “We’re a small regional power. We’re powerful, very powerful, but we’re a small regional power.”

Ready for a ‘final blow’

Leiter also raised the possibility that Trump could eventually conclude that economic pressure had brought the Islamic Republic close enough to collapse for another military operation to tip the balance.

“There may come a point where the president decides and says, ‘This is the tipping point. We’ve brought them to the verge of collapse. Now we need another operation to completely throw them off balance,’” he said.

Leiter described a hypothetical request from Trump for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to participate in what he called a “final blow” against the Iranian government.

“And we’ll be there,” he said. “We want to see this regime fall. We want to see it collapse. We want to see the Iranian people free.”

Leiter did not say such an operation had been ordered or was imminent, presenting it instead as a possible future scenario.

He acknowledged that Israel and the United States could not determine Iran’s political future alone, saying a “third pillar” would ultimately have to come from the Iranian population itself.

Any such uprising would confront a state that has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to use overwhelming force to survive.

Iranian security forces killed thousands during the January protests and arrested thousands more, while the authorities have continued using executions against people accused of involvement in the unrest.

Asked how largely unarmed civilians could overthrow a government that had survived military pressure from both countries, Leiter said he did not have an “exact formula,” while describing the fragmentation of Iran’s opposition as a major obstacle.

Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Ministry said several drones launched from Iraqi territory targeted the pipeline in the Riyadh and Medina regions, causing injuries and damage.

Riyadh said it had given the Iraqi government an opportunity to take sufficient measures to prevent attacks launched from its territory and had exercised restraint while Baghdad acted. It added that the kingdom reserved the right to take all necessary steps to protect its sovereignty, security and critical infrastructure.

Iraq welcomed Saudi Arabia’s decision to hold off on retaliation and condemned any attack threatening the kingdom’s security. Prime Minister Ali Falih al-Zaidi ordered an investigation into those responsible, according to a statement from the Iraqi armed forces.
Baghdad later dismissed a military commander responsible for operations in southern Maysan province after investigations confirmed that the latest drone attacks on Saudi Arabia originated from Iraq. Iraq also ordered the closure of the Shalamcheh border crossing with Iran as a precautionary measure, while security forces launched a wide-scale operation to pursue those responsible.

Saudi Arabia has not publicly identified the group behind the attack, but the incident adds to concerns over Iran-backed Shiite militias operating in Iraq and their potential role in a broader network of pressure on Iran’s regional adversaries.

Iran-aligned Iraqi factions have developed increasingly sophisticated drone and missile capabilities, while several maintain close ties with Tehran and other members of its regional network.

Houthis tighten grip on Yemen’s Red Sea coast

The pipeline strike comes as the Houthis have made major territorial gains in Yemen, expanding their control along the Red Sea coast and strengthening their position around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, another of the Middle East’s most important shipping chokepoints.

The advance gives the Iran-backed group control over virtually all of Yemen’s Red Sea coastline, increasing its ability to threaten shipping and infrastructure along a route that has become even more important amid disruption in the Strait of Hormuz.

That poses a particular concern for Saudi Arabia.

The kingdom’s East-West pipeline carries crude from oilfields in the east to the Red Sea port of Yanbu, allowing Saudi exports to bypass the Strait of Hormuz. Any sustained threat to the pipeline or the Red Sea route could therefore squeeze Riyadh from both sides.

The Gulf Cooperation Council condemned the pipeline attack as a dangerous escalation and urged Baghdad to take “necessary, decisive measures” to prevent Iraqi territory from being used as a launchpad for further attacks. Qatar separately condemned the strike and expressed full solidarity with Saudi Arabia.

The developments come just days before foreign ministers from Iran, Iraq and Persian Gulf Arab states are expected to gather in Oman for talks focused partly on regional security and navigation through the Strait of Hormuz.

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei said Iran and Oman would brief the participants on their discussions over mechanisms for safe passage through the strait.

He said the goal was to establish regional arrangements that would safeguard the shared security and interests of neighboring states without the involvement of outside powers.

Baghaei also portrayed the willingness of Arab governments to attend the meeting despite months of Iranian strikes and regional escalation as evidence that Tehran’s military power had strengthened its diplomatic position.

He said Iranian diplomacy, backed by military strength, had persuaded neighboring states that the solution to regional security was to sit down with Tehran rather than rely on foreign powers.

The meeting comes as the Trump administration is providing Saudi Arabia with intelligence and targeting assistance but has no current plans to launch direct US strikes against the Houthis, ABC News reported. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman sought direct US military intervention in calls with Trump, according to the report, while Riyadh has signaled it could undertake a major operation on its own.

It remains unclear whether Monday’s Oman talks will stay focused on the Strait of Hormuz or also take in the Houthis, Bab el-Mandeb and attacks from Iraq.

On Thursday, Israel said it destroyed a major underground Hezbollah complex, adding to pressure on one of Iran’s most important regional allies, which has been severely weakened over the past two years.

Ultraconservative MP Mohammad-Taghi Naqd-Ali blamed what he called Iran’s “non-confrontational stance,” arguing that Tehran’s failure to respond more forcefully to Israeli threats had placed southern Lebanon and Hezbollah “in serious danger.”

“We must carry out a preemptive strike,” he said.

His warning reflects a broader argument among Iranian politicians and media over whether restraint reduces the risk of a wider war or instead encourages Iran’s adversaries to escalate.

The debate encompasses Tehran’s support for regional allies, its confrontation with the United States and, increasingly, its nuclear policy.

Hassan Ghashqavi, spokesperson for parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, said on Thursday that “until Iran reaches complete and total deterrence, the probability of an attack exists at every single moment.”

The same argument has surfaced in the nuclear debate, where hardline lawmakers and commentators have called for suspending cooperation with the IAEA or even withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

‘Meydan’ vs diplomacy

The dispute echoes an older fault line in Iranian politics between meydan — literally “the field,” shorthand for military power and Iran’s regional armed network — and diplomacy.

The distinction became particularly contentious during Hassan Rouhani’s presidency, when then-Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif publicly complained about diplomacy being subordinated to military priorities.

President Masoud Pezeshkian’s government has not renounced Iran’s regional alliances, and some of the sharpest disputes over military strategy now take place within the conservative establishment itself.

But the underlying argument has resurfaced: whether Iran is safer when diplomacy is accompanied by restraint, or when its adversaries believe Tehran is prepared to escalate.

The disagreement has become more consequential as Iran faces the combined pressures of war, sanctions and a weakened network of regional allies.

The Houthi example

Unlike Hezbollah, which has suffered heavy losses in its conflict with Israel, the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen have continued to expand their military campaign and made new territorial gains in recent days around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.

The Houthis could nevertheless bolster the hardline argument that an allied force can continue imposing costs on its adversaries rather than pulling back under military pressure.

But the comparison also exposes the risks facing Tehran. Greater Iranian identification with Houthi attacks on shipping could deepen its confrontation with the United States and regional powers at a time when Iran is already under intense military and economic pressure.

That tension goes to the heart of the disagreement over Iran’s regional network.

Hardliners have traditionally regarded Hezbollah and other allied armed groups as an outer defensive perimeter, allowing Tehran to deter or confront adversaries before threats reach Iranian territory. From that perspective, the weakening of those groups does not make disengagement more attractive but makes restoring their deterrent power more urgent.

The counterargument is that Iran’s own economic vulnerability and the danger of further regional escalation require greater restraint.

The argument has acquired greater urgency as Hezbollah comes under renewed Israeli attack while Iran itself faces direct confrontation with the United States.

Borshchevskaya said Moscow has already provided intelligence and other assistance to the Iran-backed group, making the Houthis the clearest example of how Russia could help sustain parts of Tehran’s regional network if Iranian resources come under greater strain.

“With the Houthis in particular, there were reports in previous years that Russia also provided them with intelligence… details aside, it’s clear that Russia has been supporting the Houthis,” she told Iran International.

The Houthis reached the strategic island of Perim on Friday after Yemeni government forces withdrew, while the group also took the nearby mainland town of Dhubab, tightening its grip on a vital shipping route as disruption continues in the Strait of Hormuz.

Since late 2023, the group has repeatedly attacked shipping in the Red Sea, while previous reporting has indicated that Russia provided targeting data and satellite intelligence used in attacks on Western vessels.

Iran has also brokered secret talks between Russia and the Houthis over the possible transfer of advanced anti-ship missiles, while Russian actors have reportedly explored weapons sales to the group.

Asked whether Iran could effectively delegate some of the burden of sustaining its regional network to Russia if its own resources were depleted, Borshchevskaya said: “Yes, and that’s not just in Syria; that’s in other parts of the Middle East.”

She argued that Moscow could provide a lifeline without crossing what remains an important Russian red line: direct military confrontation with the United States.

“Russia would do a lot to support this regime. I don’t think they would go far enough to risk a direct military clash with the United States… But they’re not going to sit idly by either.”

A weakened network

Iran’s regional network faces some of its most severe pressure in years. The fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 deprived Tehran of a key regional ally and ended its overt military presence in Syria.

Hezbollah has also suffered heavy losses in its conflict with Israel, which said on Thursday it had destroyed a major underground Hezbollah complex in southern Lebanon.

Iran itself is meanwhile under mounting military and economic pressure from the United States, raising questions about how much support it can continue to provide allied armed groups across the region.

The Houthis stand out in that landscape. Their latest offensive has brought them to the Bab el-Mandeb, on the opposite side of the Arabian Peninsula from Hormuz, potentially giving Iran and its allies leverage over another of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints.

For Borshchevskaya, Russia’s previous assistance to the group provides a model for how Moscow could help keep an Iranian ally operational even if Tehran’s own resources diminish.

“I think we can count on Russia to continue to provide this type of support to Iran—that is, support that stops short of putting Russia in a direct military confrontation with the United States.”

A broader Russia-Iran partnership

The relationship with the Houthis sits within a broader pattern of military and technical cooperation between Moscow and Tehran.

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Iran has supplied Shahed drones and production know-how to Moscow, while Russia has provided Iran with military technology and equipment.

More recently, Russia has secretly helped Iran develop supersonic cruise missile technology that could give Tehran another means of threatening US naval vessels in the Middle East.

Borshchevskaya said the partnership is driven by a broader convergence of interests, particularly their shared desire to reduce US influence.

For Moscow, she argued, the worst outcome would be an Iran that moved decisively toward the West, depriving Russia of an important partner in its wider confrontation with Washington.

That does not mean Russia would assume responsibility for Iran’s regional strategy wholesale. But it gives Moscow a strong incentive to prevent Tehran and its allies from being weakened beyond recovery.

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Syria shows limits—and opportunities

Syria illustrates both the limits of Iranian influence and Russia’s ability to preserve its own position after a major regional upheaval.

Iran lost its overt military presence after Assad’s fall, while Moscow has maintained relations with the government of President Ahmed al-Sharaa and negotiated to preserve a reduced Russian footprint.

“There are no Iranian bases. There are no open talks with the Iranian government the way there are with Russia,” Borshchevskaya said, while cautioning that Iran’s exclusion should not necessarily be assumed to be permanent.

Whether Moscow might eventually use its remaining position in Syria to assist Iranian-linked groups is, she said, “an open question.”

For now, the Houthis provide a more concrete test. Their advance around the Bab el-Mandeb comes as Iran is struggling to maintain pressure around Hormuz and its other regional allies face growing military pressure.

There is little evidence so far that Moscow is assuming the financial burden of Iran’s regional network wholesale. But Borshchevskaya argues that the support already provided to the Houthis offers a model for how Russia could help keep parts of that network operational if Tehran’s resources diminish.

Any such support could complicate Washington’s efforts to weaken Iran by squeezing its ability to finance and supply its regional allies.

The proposal, reportedly raised at an informal meeting of MPs on Monday, was opposed by Parliament Speaker Mohammad-Baqer Ghalibaf and several lawmakers, one of whom subsequently described it as a “coup plot” against the government.

According to accounts from lawmakers and Iranian media, an unnamed MP raised the question of Pezeshkian’s “political incompetence,” a constitutional mechanism that can ultimately lead to a president’s removal.

The lawmaker reportedly compared Pezeshkian with Abolhassan Bani Sadr, Iran’s first president, who was removed by parliament in 1981, less than a year after the start of the Iran-Iraq war.

Under Article 89 of Iran’s constitution, initiating such a process requires the support of at least one-third of MPs, while removing the president requires the support of two-thirds of parliament.

‘Coup plot’

The confrontation was made public by Mojtaba Zarei, a conservative lawmaker and Ghalibaf supporter, who described the initiative as a “coup plot” and stressed that Pezeshkian’s administration was “backed by the Supreme Leader.”

Zarei threatened to disclose further details about the unnamed lawmaker and the party behind the initiative if what he described as a campaign of agitation and threats continued.

The confrontation reportedly occurred during an informal gathering at the Shah Abdol-Azim shrine in southern Tehran. Parliament has not held in-person sessions since the war began, citing security concerns, and Monday’s discussions were therefore not officially recorded.

Hardliners have accused Ghalibaf of using security concerns as an excuse to prevent parliament from meeting physically, thereby frustrating efforts to pursue the impeachment of Pezeshkian’s ministers.

Zarei did not say whether he was describing a formal attempt to invoke constitutional procedures against Pezeshkian or a broader campaign to force him from office.

His use of the term “coup” is particularly striking because hardliners close to former presidential candidate Saeed Jalili have themselves repeatedly accused Pezeshkian, Ghalibaf and their allies of mounting a “coup” against Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei by defying his instructions on negotiations.

Clash over policy

The exchange reflects an increasingly bitter struggle that does not fall neatly along Iran’s traditional hardline-reformist divide: Ghalibaf is himself a prominent conservative but has increasingly clashed with the harder-line factions associated with Jalili and the Paydari and Shariyan groups.

The political confrontation comes as the war with the United States has intensified, including a widening maritime confrontation around the Strait of Hormuz.

The conflict has sharpened divisions in Tehran over whether Iran should seek a diplomatic accommodation with Washington or respond to US pressure with further military and nuclear escalation.

Etemad newspaper said the hardline faction was pursuing parallel efforts to weaken the executive, combining pressure for greater coercion over the hijab with threats of parliamentary confrontation.

Such tactics, it argued, were intended to force the cabinet to expend its energy on political disputes rather than the country’s economic and livelihood crises.

Ultrahardliners at work

According to Zarei and other lawmakers who spoke to Iranian media, the unnamed MP behind the initiative belongs to Shariyan, or the Strategic Network of Islamic Revolution Supporters.

The group emerged as an electoral alliance ahead of Iran’s February 2024 parliamentary election, with prominent Tehran lawmakers Hamid Rasaei and Amir-Hossein Sabeti among its leading figures.

Shariyan has considerable political overlap with the hardline Paydari Party and Jalili’s faction, which have opposed negotiations and accommodation with the United States.

Their confrontation has increasingly extended beyond Pezeshkian to Ghalibaf himself.

Figures associated with the factions have criticised the parliamentary speaker at pro-establishment gatherings, reflecting a longer-running struggle over leadership of the conservative camp and control of parliament.

Hardline activists have also accused Pezeshkian for months of disobeying the new Supreme Leader and lacking the political competence to remain president, with some openly demanding his resignation.

There is no indication that an effort to remove Pezeshkian currently commands the parliamentary support required to succeed. But amid acute wartime and economic pressure, the episode shows how far the struggle within Iran’s conservative establishment has escalated.