Iran analyst
Lebanon was named in the first clause of the Islamabad memorandum, with Iran presenting itself as a guarantor of its territorial integrity. But repeated Israeli attacks on southern Lebanon, especially Ali al-Taher, have exposed the limits of that guarantee.
Even Tehran’s recent threats to respond to these attacks have not been acted upon and have remained ineffective, prompting criticism from supporters of the government as well.
The Israeli military said on September 3 that it had gained “operational control” of the heights, a phrase indicating that the hill had not yet been fully captured but was on the verge of falling. Hezbollah neither fully confirmed nor denied the claim, while media close to the Iranian government presented contradictory accounts, describing it at the same time as both true and false.
On the other hand, Israel’s attacks and bombardment of the area have not only continued but intensified. The question now is whether pressure from government supporters will force Tehran into a military response, and whether this hill will ignite a new war in the region.
How far do “all fronts” extend?
The text of the memorandum of understanding signed between Tehran and Washington reflected the Islamic Republic’s concern about Lebanon, as the government was willing to tie Iran’s security to the security of that front. The first clause of the memorandum explicitly said that the United States, the Islamic Republic and their allies would declare “the immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon” and commit to “ensuring the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon.”
This wording was a point of dispute between the parties from the outset. Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, host of the negotiations, said “all fronts, including Lebanon” were part of the agreement, but Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu rejected that interpretation hours later.
Iranian parliament speaker and top negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf has described the inclusion of Lebanon as an achievement for the Islamic Republic: “We brought the resistance front and Lebanon into the first clause of the memorandum.” But he has also repeatedly cited Lebanon as one of the provisions of the memorandum that has been violated, without Tehran taking any notable action in response apart from on one occasion.
Mojtaba Amani, the Islamic Republic’s former ambassador to Beirut, describes the deterrence equation this way: “Since we responded militarily, they have been trying to disrupt this equation; an equation that has prevented Israel and Netanyahu from daring to attack Beirut and the Dahiyeh.”
But southern Lebanon has effectively become a place where Israel is building its own security zone while Tehran merely watches. The situation is also difficult for Tehran because in different streets across Iran, it is said that “southern Iran” has also become “southern Lebanon.”
The gap between the Islamic Republic’s claims and its actions is precisely the space in which Israel is advancing.
While the memorandum emphasizes an end to the war on “all fronts,” Tehran’s practical red line has so far extended no further than the Dahiyeh area of Beirut.
On the other side, Israel, citing “existential security,” has made Hezbollah’s complete disarmament a condition for withdrawal and justifies its movements from Beaufort Castle to Ali al-Taher within that framework. Tehran, however, has taken no effective position against this process apart from private and non-public warnings.
What does Israel want?
Ali al-Taher is a strategic elevation about 600 meters above sea level, near the city of Nabatieh and roughly 15 kilometers from the Israeli border.
According to Lebanese security sources and Israeli claims, Hezbollah had built an underground network inside these heights, including a command center and weapons depots, a position linking the border areas of southern Lebanon to the mountainous depths of Iqlim al-Tuffah farther north.
According to the Israeli military’s account, the hill was one of the main hubs of Hezbollah’s Badr unit, which is said to have relied on this infrastructure to play a role in missile attacks on Israel during the conflict Tehran called the “Ramadan War.”
Ihab Hamadeh, a Hezbollah member of Lebanon’s parliament, asks: “How can the Israeli enemy claim that it controls the hill while it continues to bombard it relentlessly?”
He adds that Israel has released no images of its capture and is trying to portray the hill as the “last stronghold” so Netanyahu can turn it into an electoral card. But an Islamic Republic reporter, in a report about the hill, says the area has been lost for some time and that IRGC soldiers there went through an Ashura-like situation.
These conflicting accounts themselves illustrate the ambiguity surrounding the area. Nicholas Blanford, a researcher at the Atlantic Council, says that if Israel wanted to hold Ali al-Taher, it would also have to seize the heights to its north and northeast; in his view, Israel would prefer to blow up the facilities and withdraw to more defensible ground. A report by Israel’s Kan broadcaster reinforces the same assessment and explicitly links it to the conclusion of the Ali al-Taher operation.
If so, Tel Aviv’s primary objective should be understood as destroying the facilities on the hill so it can establish itself more easily within its security zone. But the fate of this objective also depends on the response of Hezbollah and the Islamic Republic, because the fall of the hill would also open the way to the occupation of Nabatieh.
Nevertheless, the battle for now appears to be about more than simply capturing the hill; it is about severing the connection between the front line and its operational rear. Lebanese military sources told Erem News that Hezbollah had already moved some of its weapons and air-defense systems to the mountainous belt of Iqlim al-Tuffah, al-Rayhan, Armati, Mleeta and Jabal Safi, and that the next phase of attacks will likely target these areas.
If Israel’s objectives in Lebanon expand from neutralizing a specific position to consolidating a “security zone,” controlling access routes and permanently preventing Hezbollah from rebuilding its capabilities, the development could have consequences extending beyond the Lebanese front.
Within such a framework, pressure on Hezbollah would be part of Israel’s broader strategy to constrain the Islamic Republic’s regional capabilities, a strategy Benjamin Netanyahu has also referred to by stressing that “Israel’s work with the Islamic Republic is not yet finished.”
Will Tehran accept the risk of battle?
According to Reuters, Tehran had warned the United States through Oman that it would respond forcefully in the event of a large-scale attack on Ali al-Taher. Two regional officials told the news agency that “more than 12 members of the IRGC” were present in the area. A White House official responded that the claim was “not accurate,” while Israel’s Maariv newspaper reported that the Israeli military assessed that no IRGC forces were present at Ali al-Taher. It appears that both sides are deliberately trying to keep the situation ambiguous.
Amid this ambiguity, Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, for the first time implicitly acknowledged on state television Sunday night: “Israel, for reasons that we will explain later, has managed to take some places.”
In the same interview, he announced the imminent establishment of a “prohibited zone” outside the Strait of Hormuz. In other words, while Tehran has partially acknowledged defeat in southern Lebanon, it has shifted the escalation to the Persian Gulf rather than Lebanon.
A dual logic can be seen in Tehran’s behavior: avoiding an escalation of direct confrontation with Israel while simultaneously concentrating its capabilities on maintaining security around its southern borders without opening a new front.
In this context, the Strait of Hormuz provides a direct lever independent of the capabilities of its weakened allies, a tool whose intensity can be controlled and which indirectly directs pressure toward Washington.
But the strait appears vulnerable because of US actions involving a maritime blockade and attacks on oil tankers. Its vulnerability could also increase as a result of Yemen’s Ansarallah losing control of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait.
Tehran, however, is under an accumulation of multilayered pressures: crushing economic pressure, a maritime blockade and growing social discontent. At the same time, declining battlefield capabilities and the loss of positions by Hezbollah and the Houthis have made the Islamic Republic’s strategic isolation more pronounced.
If this trend pushes Tehran’s calculations to a point where the costs become intolerable, the likelihood of a shift from passivity toward breaking out of its hesitation and putting its declared offensive policies into practice will increase, with the government viewing escalation as a way to bring the situation under control.
The Houthi advance, the prospect of a protracted US-Iran conflict and renewed international pressure over Tehran’s nuclear program emerged as the three most consequential developments of the day, pointing to a war expanding geographically, placing sustained pressure on US military resources and further threatening global energy supplies.
Three Yemeni government sources told Reuters that the Houthis had taken control of Mocha, a strategically located city on Yemen’s Red Sea coast near the Bab al-Mandab strait, one of the world’s most important shipping routes.
The capture marked a significant territorial advance by the group, which already controls Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, and some of the country’s populous north. It followed a new series of Houthi missile and drone attacks against Saudi Arabia, bringing another major US ally more directly into the conflict.
The Saudi-led coalition said the Houthis attacked Khamis Mushait, Abha and Jazan on Wednesday using ballistic missiles and drones. Saudi authorities issued an early warning in Khamis Mushait on Thursday morning before later announcing that the danger had passed.
Major General Turki al-Maliki, the coalition’s spokesperson, said the Houthis were continuing their attacks on Saudi “national assets and infrastructure.” He said the coalition would respond “responsibly” in defense of Saudi sovereignty, civilians and national resources.
The attacks have also tested the Mecca agreement signed last month by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey. Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry described the accord on Thursday as a “defensive alliance” but said there were no plans to expand it.
“There is no such thing under discussion right now,” ministry spokesperson Sajjad Haider Khan said when asked how Islamabad would meet its obligations following the Houthi attacks. “When the time comes, we will act under the agreement.”
Tehran rejected US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s assertion that Iran was behind the attacks. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei said the Houthis, formally known as Ansarallah, made their own decisions.
“Ansarallah is an independent Yemeni actor that makes its own decisions; it takes orders from no one and acts as nobody’s proxy,” Baghaei said.
Rubio had said that the Houthis were “in many ways agents and proxies of the Iranians” and that “behind some of this is clearly the Iranian hand.”
The developments in Yemen unfolded as top US officials privately considered the possibility that the war with Iran could last considerably longer than Trump has suggested publicly.
Vice President JD Vance, Rubio and other senior advisers have discussed with Trump the possibility that Tehran could continue resisting the US naval blockade, sanctions and military pressure through the end of his presidential term and potentially beyond January 2029, the Wall Street Journal reported, citing US officials.
Those assessments contrast sharply with Trump’s public insistence that Iran cannot withstand US pressure much longer. Trump said Wednesday that the war would end “immediately” after November’s congressional elections because Iran “can’t hold out any longer.”
At a Republican event in Dallas, Trump said Iran was “falling apart” and was no longer the dominant power it once was in the Middle East.
“They’ve been the bully of the Middle East for 51 years, and they’re not the bully anymore,” Trump said.
The Journal reported that a prolonged war would strain American military resources and extend disruption to global oil markets. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has already extended some US deployments in the Middle East into 2027, while some air-defense units are expected to remain in the region without a firm departure date, according to the report.
The military risks were underlined by reported damage to US aircraft at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan following Iranian strikes overnight.
One A-10 Thunderbolt aircraft was left missing a wing and around eight F-15 fighter jets sustained light damage, CBS reported. The F-15s were subsequently returned to service. US forces defending the base launched more than 30 Patriot interceptor missiles during the Iranian attack, according to the report.
Iran said it attacked the base in Jordan as well as US vessels after the United States targeted Iranian oil tankers. US Central Command denied that any American warship had been struck, saying all attempted IRGC attacks against US naval vessels had failed.
The intensifying attacks on military installations, tankers and shipping routes have heightened fears of a prolonged disruption to energy markets.
Only seven vessels passed through the Strait of Hormuz on Wednesday, down from 12 the previous day and half the recent daily average of 14, Reuters reported, citing preliminary ship-tracking data. Some vessels may have crossed with their transponders turned off and would not have appeared in the figures.
Meanwhile, Goldman Sachs warned that escalating attacks in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea could drive Brent crude above $120 a barrel, CBS reported.
Trump said oil prices would decline once the United States defeated Iran.
“Oil will be going down as soon as we win the war with Iran, which is taking place right now,” he said.
The third major source of pressure on Tehran came from the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Board of Governors, which reported Iran to the UN Security Council over breaches of its nuclear non-proliferation obligations -the first such action against the country since 2006.
Iranian officials signaled that Tehran could respond by reducing its already limited cooperation with the UN nuclear watchdog.
Iran had the right to adopt “special measures” in response to the resolution and reserved the option of taking any action it deemed necessary, lawmaker Somayeh Rafiei said.
“It is natural for Iran to seek a review and reassessment of any further cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency or any other institution in the nuclear field,” said Rafiei, a member of parliament’s presiding board.
The confrontation over inspections comes amid renewed scrutiny of construction at Pickaxe Mountain, a deeply buried complex near Iran’s Natanz uranium-enrichment facility.
A satellite-imagery analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies found a sharp increase in activity at the site during 2026. The work included hardening tunnel entrances, paving internal roads, reinforcing access points and removing soil excavated from inside the mountain.
CSIS said the site appeared to have moved from large-scale excavation toward probable internal construction and further external reinforcement. Its analysts said open-source imagery could neither confirm nor disprove assessments that Iran had transferred centrifuges to the facility.
As diplomatic and military pressure grew, Iran sought to project resilience and signal that it was replenishing its defensive capabilities.
Reuters reported that Tehran routed an estimated $2 billion to $2.5 billion through a China-based trade mechanism during the past year, using proceeds from oil sales to pay for Chinese goods without transferring money through the international banking system.
The barter-like arrangement was used to acquire medicine, vehicles and communications equipment and was also connected to contracts worth millions of dollars for Chinese air-defense equipment, Reuters reported, citing two senior Iranian sources and three other people familiar with the system.
Iran’s Defense Ministry said on Thursday that the country’s military industry remained operational and was “stronger, smarter and more advanced than before.”
“You will soon see a glimpse of the tip of this iceberg,” the ministry said, without identifying the capabilities.
Iranian lawmakers and commanders issued similar warnings. Alireza Salimi, a member of parliament’s presiding board, said Iran possessed “many military surprises” known to the United States.
“If they continue their actions, we will make them regret it,” Salimi said.
The combination of expanding Houthi operations, preparations in Washington for a potentially multiyear conflict and mounting confrontation over Iran’s nuclear program suggested little immediate prospect of de-escalation.
With fighting spreading across the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf, the risks increasingly extend beyond the direct confrontation between Washington and Tehran.
