Hardliner reveals ‘top-secret’ Khamenei objections to US talks on state TV

The relative strengthening of the Iranian rial suggests the agreement has already had a positive psychological impact.

The US dollar, which traded above 1.8 million rials during the recent conflict, has fallen to around 1.57 million. Even so, it remains roughly 18 percent higher than six months ago.

According to estimates by Kpler, Iran was exporting about 1.5 million barrels per day of crude oil and condensates before the recent conflict. Without sanctions, exports could eventually return to around 2.5 million barrels per day.

Iran would also no longer be forced to sell much of its crude to Chinese buyers at steep discounts.

Revenue boost

According to OPEC estimates, Iran earned $46.7 billion from exports of crude oil and petroleum products last year. If sanctions are lifted and oil prices remain relatively elevated, that figure could rise substantially.

A rapid recovery, however, should not be expected.

Iran's petrochemical and steel industries, which together generate roughly $17 billion in annual export revenue, have suffered extensive damage during the conflict.

As a result, Iran could temporarily become a net importer of some products it has traditionally exported.

Persian Gulf Holding, which accounts for 38 percent of Iran's petrochemical production, recently reported that output at six heavily damaged complexes fell to just 13 percent of levels recorded during the same period last year. Overall production across the holding's petrochemical subsidiaries declined by 75 percent.

According to Iran's Central Bank, oil, gas, steel and petrochemicals account for 73 percent of the country's total exports, underscoring the importance of rebuilding damaged industrial capacity.

Release of frozen assets

Iran is estimated to hold approximately $24 billion in frozen assets abroad, about half of which could be released within two months.

The Wall Street Journal reported on June 19 that, contingent upon what it described as appropriate Iranian behavior and the transfer of enriched uranium, Tehran could gain access to $6 billion in frozen funds currently held in Qatari banks for the purchase of humanitarian and agricultural goods from the United States.

The arrangement could benefit both countries. Iran imports approximately $17 billion worth of grain annually, while the United States remains the world's largest grain exporter.

Trade between the two countries has collapsed since the 1979 revolution. According to official US statistics, bilateral trade totaled $6.6 billion in 1978 but amounted to only $60 million last year, almost entirely consisting of US exports to Iran.

The reconstruction fund

One of the most ambitious — and least defined — elements of the agreement is a proposed $300 billion reconstruction fund involving foreign companies, including firms from Arab states, to support Iran's reconstruction.

Unlike historical reconstruction programs financed by governments, the proposed fund is expected to rely largely on private investment. That raises significant questions about how such a large sum could be mobilized and whether foreign companies would be willing to commit substantial capital to Iran after years of sanctions, regional tensions and political uncertainty.

Beyond political considerations, investors would also have to weigh sanctions risks, regulatory uncertainty and the long-term stability of the investment environment before committing significant capital.

Given Tehran's strained relations with many Arab states in recent years, enthusiasm among regional investors may remain limited, although countries such as Qatar and Oman could encourage some level of participation.

For now, the creation of a fund on the scale envisioned by the agreement appears unlikely in the medium term. More modest investment flows may be possible if Tehran complies with future commitments and continues improving ties with its neighbors.

The need for investment is undeniable. Iran's oil and gas sector alone is estimated to require at least $300 billion in capital to modernize infrastructure and expand production after decades of underinvestment.

Ultimately, the economic benefits outlined in the agreement depend not only on sanctions relief but also on Tehran's ability to reassure investors, rebuild damaged industries and maintain stable relations with regional and international partners.

For now, the agreement has boosted expectations. Whether it can deliver a lasting economic recovery remains an open question.

Former ambassador Mohammad Irani argues that effort will depend largely on the success of negotiations between Tehran and Washington.

Speaking to Shargh on Thursday, June 18, Irani said that "the restoration of Iran's damaged relations with its Arab neighbors is directly contingent upon the success and final quality of the broader Tehran-Washington agreement."

He argued that with hostilities paused and a tentative memorandum of understanding now on the table, "Iran must adopt an optimistic and rational diplomatic approach to break out of political and economic isolation."

Iran cannot repair relations with Arab and regional neighbors "in a vacuum," he said, insisting that regional diplomacy is inseparable from the outcome of negotiations with Washington.

His comments reflect a broader theme across Iran's press, where discussions of relations with Persian Gulf states have become increasingly tied to post-war diplomacy and the emerging Tehran-Washington understanding.

A recurring argument is that the conflict exposed the vulnerability of Iran's Arab neighbors and reinforced their interest in a durable understanding between Tehran and Washington. Many voices in Tehran argue that regional states now view a sustainable agreement as the best guarantee of their own economic and technological stability.

Irani also argued that a lasting regional order cannot be imported or built through symbolic agreements alone, as smaller states remain engaged in a constant balancing act between larger regional powers, particularly Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Many commentators have likewise suggested that Persian Gulf states are reassessing their security doctrines in the aftermath of the war, particularly regarding Israel's growing strategic and technological footprint across the region.

Several outlets, including Etemad, ISNA and Eghtesad News, have argued that Iran's long-term place in the regional order will ultimately depend on the fate of the nuclear file and the broader understanding taking shape between Tehran and Washington.

At the same time, analysts warn that if the current 60-day negotiation window fails to produce a more permanent framework, Iran's Arab neighbors are likely to deepen security, cybersecurity and defense partnerships with Western and other global powers, further marginalizing Tehran.

For the talks to succeed, Irani argued, the negotiating team needs strong domestic backing to convert wartime resilience into peacetime development.

"The negotiating team must feel that it enjoys the support of the nation," he said. "We must show that the steadfastness and resistance shown during recent conflicts is now gradually bearing fruit."

Ultimately, he concluded, a durable homegrown security framework will remain elusive as long as Persian Gulf states prioritize regime survival over collective security and fundamental disparities in regional power remain unresolved.

According to the message, Mojtaba Khamenei had "a different view in principle" regarding the memorandum but approved it after receiving assurances from the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) and its chairman, President Masoud Pezeshkian, that Iran’s rights and the interests of the "Axis of Resistance" would be safeguarded.

The statement quickly produced competing narratives. Supporters of the government presented it as a roadmap for the next phase of diplomacy, while critics argued it showed the leader’s preferred approach had been sidelined during negotiations.

Pezeshkian said the message had "clarified the responsibility of all influential components in the upcoming negotiation process."

Parliament Speaker and lead negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf said it strengthened Tehran’s hand in holding Washington to its commitments under the memorandum.

Leader ‘ignored’

Hardline media outlets and political figures offered a starkly different reading, arguing that the message showed the leader’s views had not been fully reflected in the negotiation process.

The conservative website Raja News described Pezeshkian’s response as disrespectful, writing: "Mr. Pezeshkian, your duty is obedience and compliance, not merely consideration."

The outlet also criticized Ghalibaf’s comments, arguing that he appeared to treat the leader’s conditions as negotiating leverage rather than binding red lines.

"It seems he has forgotten that the leader’s red lines are not bargaining tools in negotiations but mandatory boundaries by which his future performance will be judged," the website wrote.

Mohsen Maghsoudi, writing for Fars News Agency, argued that opponents of negotiations had effectively been vindicated because their position had been aligned with that of the leader.

He claimed that "the compromise camp" had made decisions on behalf of both society and officials and that "the principled view of the Guardian Jurist was not followed."

Kian Abdollahi, editor-in-chief of IRGC-linked Tasnim News Agency, wrote that if officials advanced the memorandum despite knowing the leader held a different view, they bore responsibility for the consequences.

Competing narratives

Analysts offered sharply different interpretations of the political significance of the message.

Political analyst Ruhollah Rahimpour argued that Khamenei was seeking to reassure hardliners that he had not abandoned his previous positions and had accepted the agreement only because of state interests and the guarantees he received.

"But this manner of expression unintentionally reveals a reality," he wrote.

"The agreement is so costly and controversial for part of the power structure that the leader of the Islamic Republic felt compelled to clear himself of blame before defending it."

Political analyst Shahir Shahid Saless argued that the statement implicitly acknowledged direct negotiations with Washington, noting that the reference to "future face-to-face talks" amounted to recognition of direct engagement with the United States.

Historian and commentator Abdollah Shahbazi argued that the message would increase pressure on Ghalibaf, Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi from opponents of the memorandum.

He also compared the statement to former leader Ali Khamenei’s habit of maintaining distance from controversial decisions while allowing them to proceed.

The 'poisoned chalice'

The debate quickly spread to social media, where some users compared the statement to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s acceptance of the ceasefire that ended the Iran-Iraq War.

But while Khomeini openly accepted responsibility for the decision, famously describing it as "drinking a chalice of poison," critics argued Mojtaba Khamenei’s message emphasized his reservations before endorsing the agreement.

Moderate commentators rejected suggestions that the leader was attempting to distance himself from the memorandum.

Ahmad Zeidabadi argued that relations between the president and the leader remained "close and based on mutual trust."

He said the emphasis on the role of the president and the SNSC amounted to an expression of confidence in Pezeshkian and a reminder of the presidency’s importance as the second-highest office in the political system.

Seraj Mirdamadi similarly argued that the statement reflected trust in an elected official rather than an attempt to shift responsibility, describing it as "democratic and encouraging."

The dispute is ultimately about more than the wording of a single statement. It reflects an emerging struggle over ownership of the memorandum itself.

With talks set to enter a new phase, that battle over credit and blame may prove almost as consequential as the negotiations themselves.

In a statement, the experts said the MoU focuses mainly on military withdrawal, reopening the Strait of Hormuz, nuclear commitments, sanctions relief and a $300 billion reconstruction fund, while the Iranian people are “barely visible” in the framework.

“A deal that serves geopolitical interests while leaving the Iranian people behind is not a peace agreement worthy of the name,” they said.

The groups of experts which includes the UN Special Rapporteur for Iran's human rights situation Mai Sato, accused Iranian authorities of using the war to intensify repression, saying thousands had been detained since late February, with many reportedly tortured, forcibly disappeared, subjected to mock executions or forced to confess on camera.

They said at least 156 people had been executed since the start of the war, including at least 42 on espionage and national security-related charges, many after proceedings in which confessions were reportedly obtained under torture or defendants were denied access to lawyers.

They also cited the seizure of assets belonging to at least 1,500 citizens, including hundreds of Iranians abroad, calling it a tool of punishment and transnational repression.

In recent days, many Iranians opposed to the Islamic Republic have voiced frustration over the signing of the US-Iran memorandum, fearing that Washington and Tehran are moving toward an agreement that would preserve the ruling system after months of war, repression, blackouts and sanctions.

After the January crackdown, in which security forces killed thousands of protesters and detained many more, both Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu promised to support Iranians seeking to bring down the regime.

But the agreement has deepened concern among many anti-government Iranians that ordinary people paid the heaviest price while Tehran’s more hardline leadership survived and may now gain breathing space through diplomacy.

In their Friday statement, the UN experts urged all states involved in or mediating the next 60 days of negotiations to press for accountability, reparations, a moratorium on executions, the release of arbitrarily detained people, disclosure of the fate of the forcibly disappeared, restoration of open internet access and protection of civic space.

“The end of hostilities must not be mistaken for the restoration of rights,” they warned. “For the Iranian people, that work is yet to begin.”

The intervention comes after weeks of criticism from hardline media outlets, clerics and political factions that viewed the agreement as a dangerous concession to Washington.

While the ultraconservative Paydari Party is often portrayed as the main opponent of rapprochement with the United States, recent debate in Iran has highlighted a broader network of political, media and ideological actors resisting a Tehran-Washington understanding.

In a message issued after the signing of the memorandum, Mojtaba Khamenei warned that actions creating “pessimism among the people” effectively serve the enemy, language widely interpreted as a rebuke to hardline critics of the agreement.

Both Pezeshkian and Ghalibaf quickly issued statements pledging to follow the leader's guidance and defend the negotiating process.

The apparent effort to impose discipline on the debate has coincided with growing scrutiny of those opposing diplomacy.

'Negotiation is haram'

One of the most detailed assessments came from Khabar Online, which argued that resistance to the ongoing negotiations should not be viewed as ordinary criticism but as an organized campaign to undermine diplomacy, attack key officials and deepen national divisions.

The report identified state television, IRIB, as the leading institutional opponent of an agreement. It cited remarks by hardline clerics who used the broadcaster's platforms to denounce negotiations with the United States.

Among them was cleric Gholamreza Ghassemian, who declared on state television that “negotiation is haram,” while arguing that those pursuing talks were acting contrary to divine principles. Another cleric, Sheikh Esmail Ramezani, insisted that relations with Washington were impossible.

Khabar Online accused IRIB of functioning as the mouthpiece of a single political faction rather than a national broadcaster and even alleged that portions of the leader's recent warnings against discord were downplayed to preserve a hardline narrative.

The report also pointed to figures associated with the late president Ebrahim Raisi's administration, arguing that some remained more focused on domestic political rivalries than on supporting diplomacy endorsed by the state's highest institutions.

Messianic detractors

The Paydari Party appeared third on the list. The article described it as a rigidly ideological parliamentary bloc that has used its network of lawmakers and media outlets to challenge the negotiating team and question the merits of engagement with Washington.

Yet even Paydari represents only part of the opposition.

In a separate interview with Rouydad24, former lawmaker and security official Mansoor Haghighatpour argued that resistance to a Tehran-Washington agreement also reflects the influence of the messianic Hojatiyeh association, whose legacy remains the subject of recurring debate in Iran.

The article did not mention several familiar hardline voices who have also opposed diplomacy. Among them are Kayhan editor Hossein Shariatmadari, a longtime critic of engagement with the United States, and MP Esmail Kowsari, who continued issuing threats against Washington and regional states during the war and subsequent ceasefire.

'Harsh response'

The divisions echo debates surrounding the 2015 nuclear agreement, when hardline factions accused negotiators of capitulation while supporters argued diplomacy was necessary to ease pressure on the country.

Ghalibaf was more explicit in defending the current process, warning that those acting against the leader's guidance “under the guise of obeying the Leadership” would face a “harsh response from the nation.”

For now, however, public criticism appears to have subsided. The day after the memorandum was signed, Iranian media largely fell silent on opposition to a possible agreement.

Whether that reflects a direct effort by the leadership to quiet dissent, or merely a temporary pause as political factions adjust to the new reality, may become clearer in the days ahead.

What is already apparent is that resistance to a deal with Washington extends well beyond any single party or faction—and that the leadership has signaled it expects those disputes to remain contained.