Services imports accounted for roughly one-quarter of Iran's total imports during the year, an unusually high share for an economy traditionally dominated by trade in physical goods.
At the same time, Iran's exports of services declined, pushing the country's services trade deficit to a record $17 billion. The deficit was 52% higher than in 2024 and roughly three times larger than in 2020.
Separate central bank data on foreign trade in goods point to an equally dramatic contraction in merchandise trade.
Iran imported approximately $49 billion worth of goods during the fiscal year ending March 21, a decline of 32% compared with the previous year. Non-oil exports also weakened considerably, falling 22% year-on-year to about $45 billion.
The figures suggest Iran's trade structure is undergoing a significant transformation, with services playing an increasingly prominent role while merchandise trade contracts.
The reasons behind the rapid rise in services imports remain unclear.
Iran's services imports primarily include transportation and logistics services, insurance related to foreign trade, financial transaction services, engineering and construction projects, technology purchases and other professional services.
One possible explanation emerged in a Wall Street Journal report published last October, which suggested that part of Iran's oil exports to China were being exchanged for services rather than cash payments or traditional oil-for-goods arrangements.
China is effectively the sole buyer of Iranian crude oil. According to estimates by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Iran's crude oil exports were worth approximately $44 billion last year before accounting for sanctions-related discounts and the costs of circumventing US restrictions.
While the central bank data do not reveal the source of the imported services, the figures are consistent with the possibility that a growing share of Iran's oil revenues is being settled through services rather than conventional financial transfers or merchandise imports.
Another factor attracting attention is the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in both oil exports and major infrastructure projects.
Under Iran's previous budget law, the IRGC was tasked with exporting 700,000 barrels of crude oil per day, roughly half of the country's actual crude exports. The organization is also one of Iran's largest contractors in infrastructure and construction.
However, the central bank data provide no direct evidence regarding the destination of oil revenues or the beneficiaries of imported services.
The outlook for the current fiscal year is even more uncertain amid the conflict involving the United States and Israel.
Trade flows with the United Arab Emirates, Iran's largest supplier of goods, have reportedly been disrupted over the past three months.
Meanwhile, Chinese customs data show Iran and China recorded only about $400 million in bilateral non-oil trade during March and April combined, roughly one-fifth of the level recorded during the same period a year earlier.
Whether the shift toward services reflects changes in sanctions-evasion mechanisms, evolving arrangements with China, or broader economic weakness remains an open question. What is clear from the latest data is that Iran's trade profile is changing in ways not seen in recent years.
