Visiting lecturer, Paris School of International Affairs (PSIA)
Europe is no longer a mediator but a co-architect of US-led pressure on Iran, and the relationship post-snapback is likely to harden into a more openly adversarial phase.
The reactivation of the so-called snapback of UN sanctions in late September dismantled the last remaining elements of the 2015 nuclear deal.
More than a technical step, snapback crystallizes a strategic shift already underway in Europe.
Since 2006, the E3 troika of countries Britain, France and Germany had acted less as mediators and more as facilitators—indeed supporters—of the US-led international sanctions regime.
But since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and Tehran’s deepening military partnership with Moscow, the E3 are no longer content to cushion Washington’s pressure. They are emerging as full partners, even co-architects, in Western strategies to contain Iran.
The future of the relationship will hinge on three intertwined spheres: the security lens through which Europe increasingly sees Iran, the economic constraints shaping both sides’ room for maneuver and the regional military dynamics that could force Europe into starker choices than in the past.
'Hostage diplomacy'
Security concerns now dominate Europe’s approach.
Iran’s continued use of “hostage diplomacy”—the arrest and prolonged detention of foreign nationals for political leverage—has hardened attitudes across European capitals.
The ordeal of French citizens Cécile Kohler and Jacques Paris, detained for more than three years on espionage charges before their release in a prisoner swap on 5 November 2025, remains emblematic.
Today, both are still confined inside the French Embassy in Tehran, awaiting the possibility of returning to France after the January 2026 trial of Mahdieh Esfandiari, who herself remains stuck inside the Iranian Embassy in Paris.
Their case highlighted a pattern Europe now sees as coercive diplomacy rather than isolated incidents.
In the United Kingdom, the continuing detention of British travelers Lindsay and Craig Foreman since January 2025—arrested by the IRGC’s intelligence service and accused of espionage, allegations they strongly deny—and their decision to begin a hunger strike have sparked similar outrage and further eroded what little goodwill remained.
Foiled operations
Compounding these tensions is mounting evidence of Iranian covert activity across Europe.
Security agencies in France, Germany, Britain and other states have disrupted plots involving Iranian operatives or Iran-linked criminal networks tasked with surveilling or targeting dissidents, journalists, and even state officials.
A joint statement by fourteen Western countries in July 2025 revealed that more than twenty such operations had been foiled in the UK alone since 2022.
Tehran dismisses these accusations as fabrications meant to justify European hostility, but the effect has been unmistakable: Europe is prioritizing deterrence, tightening security coordination, and preparing for a long phase of defensive diplomacy that could include further expulsions of Iranian diplomats.
Declining trade
Economic considerations offer no clearer path to de-escalation.
Europe’s decision to reimpose sanctions through the snapback mechanism has sharply curtailed Iran’s access to technology, investment, and high-value markets at a moment of intense domestic economic strain.
Total trade in goods between the EU and Iran reached €4.5 billion in 2024—€0.8 billion in imports and €3.7 billion in exports. For now, European companies already wary of secondary US sanctions are expected to continue withdrawing from the Iranian market.
Yet some ambiguity persists. European policymakers recognize that a future diplomatic breakthrough between Washington and Tehran may require a rapid shift toward selective re-engagement, particularly in the energy sector.
Iran’s vast reserves remain attractive in a context of tight global supply, and several European governments are careful not to close off their options entirely.
Nuclear dossier
These contradictions are now playing out in Vienna.
Ahead of the November 19–21 IAEA Board of Governors meeting, the E3 has drafted a resolution demanding that Iran halt uranium enrichment and reprocessing, based on Director General Rafael Grossi’s latest reports on undeclared nuclear activities.
Iran rejects the initiative as illegitimate, arguing that the expiration of Resolution 2231 in October 2025 renders such demands meaningless.
Europe, meanwhile, finds itself in an awkward dual role—as a sanctions enforcer aligned with Washington and a champion of multilateral oversight.
This duality is likely to persist and underscores the strategic limbo in which Iran-Europe economic relations now operate.
The most explosive dimension lies in the regional military arena, where the prospect of an Iran-Israel confrontation could force Europe into clearer and more divisive positions.
Russia factor
The snapback reimposes restrictions on Iran’s ballistic missile program at a time when Tehran’s capabilities have grown significantly through cooperation with Russia.
Since 2022, Iran has been linked to supplying drones and munitions for the war in Ukraine while simultaneously deepening cooperation with Moscow in technological, defense, and nuclear-related fields—an exchange formalized in a 20-year strategic partnership signed on 17 January 2025 and ratified by Iran on 21 May 2025.
By refusing to implement punitive snapback measures, Moscow has provided diplomatic cover for Tehran at the UN, shielding it from further action and complicating Europe’s efforts to exert pressure through multilateral channels.
For Europe, the tightening Iran-Russia axis represents both a regional threat and an extension of the Ukraine war into the Middle East.
Shadow of war
A major confrontation between Iran and Israel—whether through direct strikes or proxy escalation—would have immediate implications for European security, energy supplies, and domestic politics.
European states might respond by increasing arms deliveries to Israel or imposing further sanctions on Iranian entities, yet internal divisions, particularly over Israel’s conduct in Gaza and wider regional policy, could hinder a unified approach.
Europe’s efforts to assert strategic autonomy run into hard limits whenever crisis gathers in the Middle East, where US intelligence, deterrence frameworks, and diplomatic weight remain indispensable.
The months ahead will determine whether the two sides can still find a path to de-escalation. The IAEA deliberations, Iran’s nuclear posture, and the evolution of Iran–Russia military cooperation will all serve as key indicators.
Absent meaningful diplomatic openings, the likely trajectory is one of deepening antagonism and tighter alignment between Europe and the United States on measures to contain Iran.
Whether diplomacy can rise above coercion in a fragmented geopolitical landscape remains the central uncertainty shaping the future of Iran-Europe relations.
Speaking at the opening of the first international governors’ conference of Caspian coastal provinces in the northern city of Rasht, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said the Caspian region now holds the same weight in Iranian strategic planning as the Persian Gulf.
Araghchi told delegates that Iran’s neighborhood is “the main pillar” of its diplomacy and that cooperation among Caspian states had expanded across political, economic and security fields.
He said the five littoral governments – Iran, Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan – had already built regular platforms for coordination, including leaders’ summits, ministerial meetings and now, for the first time, a gathering of provincial governors.
In outlining Tehran’s priorities, Araghchi said the Caspian basin is central to Iran’s plans for transport corridors and energy cooperation.
“The Caspian Sea basin … in the field of energy and transit corridors has extraordinary importance for all Caspian countries,” he said.
Regional officials at the event echoed his remarks.
Gilan Governor Hadi Haghshenas told the conference that joint action was essential to protect the Caspian’s environment as water levels fall and coastal ecosystems come under strain.
“We can, with shared cooperation, minimize the impact of falling water levels and the environmental damage caused by shipping and offshore oil activity,” he said.
Kazem Gharibabadi, Iran’s deputy foreign minister for legal and international affairs, said the provinces bordering the Caspian handle key responsibilities in fisheries, energy and transit.
On the region’s commercial role, he said: “By developing joint projects among Caspian coastal provinces and creating avenues for reciprocal investment, we can expand this region’s potential in ways that benefit all its people.”
"The Caspian is a natural crossroads for North-South and East-West transit routes, and by strengthening port capacity, improving transport infrastructure and coordinating logistics, we can significantly increase the Caspian’s share of international trade and turn existing corridors into stable, reliable routes,” the diplomat added.
Caspian Sea’s growing role
Iran is placing new emphasis on the Caspian Sea as a strategic anchor for its north-south trade ambitions, viewing the basin as a vital link in the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which connects Indian Ocean ports to Russia and Europe.
The northern provinces of Gilan, Mazandaran and Golestan handle most of Iran’s Caspian traffic and host its main ports at Anzali and Amirabad.
According to an analysis by Mostafa Mohammadi, a political-economy researcher at Mazandaran University, the Caspian has long been an underused asset for Tehran despite its economic and geopolitical potential.
He describes the area as “the strategic depth of the Islamic Republic,” saying Iran’s priorities rest on securing its northern frontier, limiting foreign military presence in the basin and strengthening ties with Russia, Turkey and the Central Asian republics.
Mohammadi said that Iran is the only littoral state that has yet to exploit its offshore Caspian energy reserves, while neighbors have developed theirs for decades.
He argues that Iran’s geography gives it unique logistical leverage between the Caspian and the Persian Gulf, making it a natural bridge for rail, road, air and maritime flows across Eurasia.
“Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan remain significantly dependent on Iran’s geography for global trade access,” he wrote.
Iran aims to use this position to increase INSTC cargo volumes, upgrade its northern ports, and attract investment in shipping, fisheries, tourism and coastal industries.
Officials say the governors’ conference this week in Rasht reflects a shift toward integrating provincial-level diplomacy into national foreign-policy planning.
Littoral states see gains as trade grows
Regional cargo data show strong growth across the Caspian basin.
Freight volumes on the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) – the Middle Corridor linking China and Europe – rose 63% to 4.1 million tons in the first 11 months of 2024, according to Caspian News. Container traffic increased 2.6-fold to 50,500 TEU over the same period.
Kazakhstan reported 2.3 million tons of cargo along the corridor in the first half of 2025, a 7% year-on-year rise, Eurasian Star said. Azerbaijan handled 6.17 million tons of sea freight in January-August 2025, up 9.3%, according to Caliber.az.
Infrastructure upgrades are also accelerating. The Port of Baku plans to expand capacity from 15 million to 25 million tons, while academic research identifies Caspian ports as “critical logistics nodes” linking maritime trade to inland transport networks across Russia, Central Asia and the Caucasus.
For landlocked Central Asian states, the Caspian provides a route to global markets that reduces dependence on Russian transit.
For Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, it has become an increasingly important leg of east-west trade amid geopolitical realignments and Moscow-related sanctions on traditional routes.
Infrastructure and environment challenges
Despite rising volumes, structural weaknesses continue to constrain the region’s full potential.
A 2024 study by the he Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) Program cited limited multimodal integration, fragmented logistics operators and inconsistent customs procedures as major bottlenecks slowing cargo transfers between sea, rail and road.
Environmental risks are also mounting with Iranian officials warning that up to a quarter of the Caspian Sea's water levels may dry up within the next 20 years.
Azerbaijan’s environment ministry reported in August that the Caspian Sea’s water level had fallen 2.5 meters over three decades, with annual declines of up to 30 cm disrupting port operations and increasing shipping costs.
Officials at the Caspian governors’ conference urged coordinated action.
Gilan’s governor said during the event that joint monitoring could “minimize the consequences of falling water levels” and safeguard fisheries, while Gharibabadi said environmental protection was inseparable from energy, transport and port-development planning.