Hardline cleric Alireza Panahian, who enjoys close ties with supreme leader Ali Khamenei, addresses the first conference of the New Islamic Civilization Party, Tehran, Iran, October 9, 2025
Iran’s ultra-hardliners have launched a new political party this month amid intensified factional rivalry following the June war with Israel and the return of UN sanctions. Here’s what we know so far about the New Islamic Civilization Party.
The grouping promotes a vision of “Islamic civilization” that supporters hail as moral renewal—but critics see as another bid to consolidate control within the ruling system.
Positioning itself as an ambitious civilizational force, the party pledges disciplined ideology, elite-cadre training, and governance rooted in “revolutionary justice.”
It rejects technocratic reformism, presenting itself as guardian of the revolution’s founding ideals and the “discourse of resistance” championed by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
Establishment and structure
The party formally launched its activities at its first congress on October 9, which also elected a central council for a two-year term.
It announced plans to form national expert commissions and provincial offices devoted to “discourse-building,” “cadre development,” and “strategic planning” to steer its political, cultural, and social outreach.
Funding sources remain undisclosed, raising questions about the scale and backing of its operations. It is also unclear whether the party intends to field candidates or focus primarily on ideological and institutional work.
Key Figures
All major figures in the party backed Saeed Jalili in the 2024 presidential race, underscoring its alignment with the hardline “resistance” camp.
Yaser Jebraili, secretary-general, formerly headed the Expediency Council’s Strategic Supervision Center and advocates a “state-guided market,” blaming free-market dominance for Iran’s economic crises.
Hossein Mehdizadeh, a cleric tied to the Islamic Sciences Academy founded by the late Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, serves as secretary of the central council.
Hossein Samsami, institutional economist and former lawmaker once close to Ahmadinejad, favors long-term planning over market mechanisms and was named Jalili’s “shadow” economy minister by media.
Alireza Panahian, an ultra-hardline preacher with close links to Khamenei’s office, is known for backing vigilante groups and mobilizing conservative youth networks.
Ideology and tenets
The party’s social-media platforms invite participation in “ummah-building” and the realization of a new Islamic civilization.
Its rhetoric draws heavily on the writings of Khamenei and his predecessor—Iran’s first supreme leader—Ruhollah Khomeini, emphasizing “revolutionary governance” centered on Islamic justice and resistance.
It opposed a recent proposal by the semi-official House of Parties to grant amnesty to security convicts, arguing that such measures encroach on the Khamenei’s prerogative as supreme leader.
The party’s ideological terrain overlaps with existing ultra-conservative networks such as the Paydari (Steadfastness) Front and Jebhe-ye Sobh-e Iran (MASAF)—signaling its role as part of a broader effort to institutionalize Khamenei-era orthodoxy through new organizational channels.