Iran International
A young woman in a loosely draped hijab, strands of hair framing her face, flashes a peace sign while holding a photo of a slain Revolutionary Guard commander.
The improbable image fills the front page of hardline daily Vatan-e Emrooz, presented as part of the Islamic Republic’s “new generation of resistance.”
But analysts told Iran International it is less a reflection of reality than a carefully crafted narrative aimed at shoring up support for Tehran after its 12-day war with Israel — the worst direct military confrontation in their fraught history.
The war left hundreds of civilians dead, damaged infrastructure and deepened economic strain. In its aftermath, the Iranian establishment has worked to project resilience and unity, even among citizens who defy its strict social codes.
The Vatan-e Emrooz cover accompanied a story built around a Foreign Policy article by an Iranian-American academic which argued that some young Iranians are rallying behind Tehran’s anti-West, anti-Israel stance in the war’s aftermath.
Following the bruising conflict, Tehran embraced nationalist symbols it long suppressed, with mythological tales and ancient monarchs adorning public billboards.
For author Arash Azizi, whose book What Iranians Want: Woman, Life, Freedom examines political and social change, this type of imagery is part of a familiar playbook.
Referring to a domestic militia and Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, he described Vatan-e Emrooz as “a hardliner outlet, traditionally close to the Basij, which is a section of the IRGC … known for a very sensational sort of tabloid-style headlines.”
The paper, he added, has long featured stylish young who appear supportive of the establishment to imply that “even sections of the population that flout the hijab rules … nevertheless supports its foreign and military policies.”
Holly Dagres, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, studies Iran’s younger generations and regularly tracks Gen Z and Gen Alpha trends.
She said that while this visual contrast between appearance and ideology is not new—women without hijab have backed hardliners, and chador-wearing women have voted reformist—the cover is nonetheless a strategic push.
“It’s for the regime to make a point, especially at a time when it has historically high anti‑regime sentiment, that ... we have the support of these individuals too that don’t usually fit the stereotypical box of what a good Islamic citizen in our view is," Dagres told Iran International.
No gesture by chance
Visual communication expert Siavash Rokni, who holds a PhD in communication and researcher in popular music at McGill University, sees deliberate messaging in the picture’s design: the woman’s ear “out of her scarf,” the bright blue clothes “evoking kind of happiness and rejuvenation and the future,” and her phone with a peace sign “as kind of the representation of Gen Z.”
Rokni also points to the way she holds her phone — not in a natural texting or scrolling posture, but almost like a prop, gripped sideways with fingers loosely wrapped around it. The position, he suggests, looks staged.
It’s an example of what Rokni calls the Islamic Republic’s turn to “soft war”—countering Western “soft power” via curated cultural imagery. The same effect is visible, he added, in rap lyrics and music videos where some artists are either funded or influenced by the IRGC to echo establishment talking points, while others openly align themselves with them.
Gen Z beyond reach?
Activist Tara Dachek, part of Iran’s Gen Z and now living abroad, sees the image as a sign of weakness, not strength. “The Islamic Republic is drowning — these are its last desperate gasps,” she told Iran International. Such visuals, she says, reflect “fear, repetition and desperation” rather than genuine engagement.
Having left Iran six years ago, Dachek believes the cover only affirms that her “generation is on the right path — the regime has already lost us.”
"Even back then, I didn’t trust state media. I never followed their news because I knew it wasn’t truth — it was survival wrapped in a lie," said Dachek.
Among younger Iranians, the dissatisfaction runs deep.
Surveys show that nearly 75% of Iranians—including many Gen Z individuals—opposed mandatory hijab, with 84% favoring a secular state over the Islamic Republic, according to GAMAAN — a Netherlands-based research organization that conducts large-scale online surveys of Iranians.
Gen Z, who wasn't yet born at the time of the 1979 revolution, frequently expresses opposition to both political Islam and compulsory dress codes while embracing global cultural values.
Despite Tehran’s efforts to project unity, young Iranians may not be as passive or easily swayed as officialdom believes. Shaped by years of protest and repression, they remain among the most vocal critics of the Islamic Republic.
Behind the tailored suits and diplomatic polish lies the same system preparing for confrontation, not compromise.
The SNSC, one of the Islamic Republic’s most powerful institutions, is ultimately controlled by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. All senior appointments fall under his direct authority.
Larijani, who previously served as SNSC secretary from 2005 to 2007 and was parliament speaker for over a decade, is one of the regime’s most enduring insiders. A longtime adviser to Khamenei, he has often served as a bridge between rival factions.
With his neatly trimmed beard, sharp gaze, and preference for suits over uniforms, Larijani offers a stark contrast to his predecessor, Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian of the IRGC Navy, who often appeared in fatigues and had a distinctly harder edge.
But the change is stylistic, not strategic. Tehran’s broader posture remains intact.
Image over substance
The reshuffle comes as Iran faces mounting pressure over its nuclear program and prepares for the possibility of renewed military conflict with Israel or the United States.
Even journalists aligned with the reformist camp have voiced skepticism over Larijani’s return, calling it “too little, too late.” That skepticism is echoed by Nour News, affiliated with former SNSC chief Ali Shamkhani, who issued a thinly veiled warning on Wednesday:
“National security bodies complement the decision-making process, not replace it. If management and structural changes at a national security body are paired with unrealistic expectations, it will lead to the institution losing its operational credibility.”
Contained rivalries
Larijani and Shamkhani represent rival power centers within the Islamic Republic, each vying for influence over national security and foreign policy.
They may trade blows in public—or, in Iranian political parlance, compete for a bigger “share of the revolution’s spoils.” But when faced with internal unrest or foreign threats, such rivalries are quickly subordinated to regime survival.
Their behavior is captured by a Persian proverb: “We might tear each other limb from limb, but we are brothers. Therefore, we will always bury the bones.”
The Islamic Republic’s first supreme leader Ruhollah Khomeini put it more bluntly: “Preserving the regime is everyone’s highest religious duty—even more important than the life of the (Promised Savior).”
A new war council
Two days before Larijani’s appointment, the SNSC invoked Article 176 of Iran’s constitution to establish a National Defense Council.
Echoing the Supreme Defense Council of the 1980s, the new body is tasked with streamlining security decision-making in wartime.
It will be chaired by the president—or an SNSC member appointed by him—and will include the heads of Iran’s three branches of power, the intelligence minister, the chief of the General Staff, commanders of the IRGC and Artesh, two Supreme Leader representatives, and the head of the Khatam al-Anbia Central Headquarters.
The formation of the new body is a sign that Tehran sees confrontation as imminent.
Larijani’s return should be viewed in that context: not the return of a moderate to power, but the placement of a loyal, presentable veteran into a structure recalibrating for crisis.
As another Persian proverb puts it: “When the adversary rains arrows down on you, take shelter. Rush from one column to another, and buy yourself time—until chance provides you with an opening to fight or flee.”
His comeback underscores not only his enduring relevance in Iran’s power circles but also a career defined by strategic shifts, navigating factions and consistent loyalty to the country’s ultimate authority Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
For much of his career, Larijani was known as a staunch conservative.
He vocally opposed reformist President Mohammad Khatami and the broader reform movement, using his position as head of the state broadcaster IRIB to discredit Iranian intellectuals.
The program Hoviat ("Identity") targeted cultural figures like poet Ali Akbar Saeedi Sirjani, some of whom were later victims of the Intelligence Ministry’s multiple targeted murders.
‘Problem solver’
Yet by 2015, Larijani emerged as a key supporter of the Iran nuclear deal, helping secure its approval in parliament in under 20 minutes despite conservative opposition. The move aligned him with then-president Hassan Rouhani and marked a dramatic pivot from his earlier hardline stance.
Khamenei publicly praised Larijani at the time as a "problem-solver," though his growing closeness to Rouhani reportedly raised eyebrows in the Supreme Leader’s inner circle.
Throughout these shifts, Larijani remained attuned to the political winds.
His alliances with Presidents Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Khatami cooled as soon as Khamenei distanced himself from them—underscoring a deeper, more consistent alignment with the Supreme Leader over any political faction.
Return to the fold
Despite being sidelined in recent presidential elections—disqualified by the Guardian Council in both 2021 and 2024 allegedly over his daughter studying abroad—Larijani has evidently regained the trust of Iran's theocrat.
Following President Ebrahim Raisi’s death last yer, he was handed two sensitive tasks: overseeing the Iran-China strategic accord and acting as an intermediary with Russia after Israeli strikes on Iranian soil.
While many establishment figures kept a low profile during the crisis, Larijani reemerged as a visible supporter of the Islamic Republic and its top leadership.
An operator without a party
Though courted by moderate conservatives to form a party during Rouhani’s presidency, Larijani resisted. One reason may be his limited popular base.
In parliament, he represented Qom, where a few thousand votes suffice to win a seat—far fewer than the million-plus votes typically needed in Tehran.
Larijani’s political instincts appear rooted more in elite maneuvering than popular mobilization, consistent with his background in a deeply clerical family tied to the seminaries of Qom and Najaf.
The Larijani legacy
Ali Larijani is part of one of Iran’s most influential political dynasties. His father, Hashem, was a respected cleric who steered clear of politics, but his sons embraced the Islamic Republic’s institutions.
Ali's four brothers have held senior roles across Iran’s judicial, legislative and security branches. Ali, the only full-time politician in the family, carved out a career that included 12 years as Speaker of Parliament, top roles in the media and culture ministries and ongoing membership in the Expediency Council.
Educated at the Qom Seminary and Tehran University—where he earned a PhD in Western philosophy—Larijani blends ideological training with technocratic credentials.
He is married to the daughter of Ayatollah Morteza Motahari, a key architect of the Islamic Republic, further cementing his position within Iran’s ruling elite.
A Loyal chameleon
While Larijani now often echoes hardline rhetoric against the United States, he has occasionally voiced cautious support for dialogue.
Deeply skeptical of Europe but pragmatic when necessary, he remains one of the few establishment figures with the credentials and adaptability to help steer Iran toward diplomatic de-escalation, should that path ever open.
Few Iranian politicians have changed stripes as fluidly as Larijani. Yet through all the turns—from hardliner to moderate broker, from sidelined veteran to high-level envoy—his loyalty to Khamenei has never wavered.
In a system where ideological purity is often less important than proximity to the Supreme Leader, Larijani has mastered the art of staying close to the only power that truly matters.
