Contributor
A resilient anti-sanctions consensus dominated major Western policy circles and media narratives for a decade, but this stance risks undermining international law by normalizing Iran’s sustained nuclear defiance.
Prominent foreign policy journals, think tanks and legacy media outlets have consistently portrayed the UN sanctions "snapback" mechanism under UNSCR 2231 not as a legal obligation but as a geopolitical hazard.
Reimposing sanctions, they argue, would empower Iranian hardliners, obstruct humanitarian aid and alienate allies. Though presented as cautious and pragmatic, such positions align with Tehran’s longstanding arguments.
This consensus persists despite mounting evidence of Iran’s sustained non-compliance.
In March 2025, US President Donald Trump issued a 60-day ultimatum demanding Iran reduce enrichment and allow expanded IAEA access. Tehran swiftly rejected the demand.
On the 61st day, Israel struck Iranian nuclear sites, capped off by deeper US strikes on underground enrichment facilities on June 22. A ceasefire took effect on June 24, but the crisis persisted.
Recent escalation, strategic defiance
The IAEA’s resolution of June 12, 2025, confirmed that undeclared nuclear material remained unaccounted for and that the Agency could no longer verify the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program.
On July 4–5, 2025, Iran expelled all inspectors and terminated monitoring protocols, eliminating the last vestige of international oversight.
These actions—alongside continued enrichment to 60%—represent clear violations of Articles II and III of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which bar non-nuclear-weapon states from acquiring certain nuclear technologies and mandate IAEA safeguards.
Although Article IV affirms a right to peaceful nuclear energy, that right is strictly conditional upon compliance with Articles II and III. In the words of former IAEA deputy chief Pierre Goldschmidt, "enrichment is not an unconditional entitlement."
These violations explicitly trigger the condition of "significant non-performance" under UNSCR 2231, legally mandating sanctions snapback."
Binding legal obligations
The snapback mechanism embedded in UNSCR 2231 reflects the principle that enforcement must not be held hostage to political convenience.
Iran’s material breaches—expelling inspectors, concealing enriched uranium, continuing high-level enrichment, and refusing to account for undeclared material—trigger conditions for significant non-performance.
UNSCR 2231 operates under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Articles 39–42 empower the Security Council to determine threats and impose binding measures.
Article 25 obligates all Member States to “accept and carry out” such decisions, while Article 103 ensures Charter obligations supersede conflicting treaties—including the JCPOA.
No expiry date
The International Court of Justice, in its 1971 Namibia Advisory Opinion, affirmed that resolutions under Chapter VII bind all Member States. Once reinstated, sanctions remain legally binding until explicitly lifted by another resolution of equal authority.
International law broadly supports this, as noted by scholars Sue Eckert and Haroun Rahimi. Sanctions do not expire through diplomacy or political shifts. They remain binding.
The Istanbul summit on July 25, 2025, convened Iran and the E3 (UK, France, Germany) amid intense diplomatic pressure but produced no breakthrough.
Iran had already expelled inspectors and resumed 60% enrichment. Uranium removed before the June strikes remains unaccounted for.
The July 22 Qaem-100 satellite launch, despite civilian framing, clearly signals ongoing dual-use missile capabilities. On July 21, Araghchi publicly asserted Iran would proceed regardless of international pressure. The pattern is unmistakable: deliberate defiance.
Abdication not caution
Upholding UNSCR 2231 through snapback is not an expedient—it is a legal obligation. When enforcement mechanisms are neglected, the architecture of deterrence collapses. Delay becomes paralysis, and paralysis risks open conflict.
As Winston Churchill warned amid interwar failures of collective security: "The malice of the wicked was reinforced by the weakness of the virtuous."
Deferring action under UNSCR 2231 amounts not to caution but to abdication.
The E3 now stands at a historical precipice. It can uphold the very enforcement mechanism it established in 2015 or to let it lapse—and with it, allow binding Security Council resolutions to fade into irrelevance.
Triggering snapback means defending the Charter and forestalling further conflict in an already volatile region.
