Iranians driving their cars into a shallow river to beat the summer heat near the Caspian city of Sari, July 23, 2025
Officials in Tehran blame drought and public overuse for Iran’s worst water shortage in living memory, but the crisis stems from decades of mismanagement, short-sighted policy and institutional denial.
Iran consumes about 100 billion cubic meters of water each year—more than twice Turkey’s usage, despite similar populations. Around 90% goes to agriculture, 6% to households and the rest to industry.
Per capita household water use is similar to Turkey’s, but Iran recycles only about 20% of wastewater, compared to 85% in Turkey, 95% in the United Arab Emirates and 98% in Germany.
Despite a UN “red warning” 25 years ago, Iran expanded hydropower rather than wastewater treatment.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has built over 60 dams in recent decades. More than half are now empty, with hydropower generation operating at just one-third of its nominal capacity.
Hydropower’s share in Iran’s electricity mix has fallen below 5%. Meanwhile, 80% of untreated wastewater is dumped into rivers, deserts and underground wells, contaminating the very sources Iran increasingly depends on.
Agriculture: high consumption, low output
The agricultural sector accounts for nearly all of Iran’s water use but contributes just 11% to GDP. Most farming still relies on flood irrigation.
In contrast, Turkey has reduced agriculture’s share of national water use from 75% to under 64%, while doubling the value of its agricultural output, which now stands at $60 billion, 13 times higher than Iran’s.
Perhaps more staggering, Turkey has achieved that using only a third of what Iran uses annually for farming.
Young men pumping water from a pond near the southern town of Karkheh, Iran, July 23, 2025
Overextraction is reducing Iran’s groundwater reserves by 5 billion cubic meters annually. In Turkey, by contrast, aquifer recharge rates exceed extraction by a factor of three.
Drought is real, so is bad policy
Past policies pushing grain self-sufficiency worsened the problem.
In 2014, a deputy agriculture minister dismissed claims that farming consumed over 90% of the country’s water—insisting on continuing the strategy despite mounting environmental costs.
Iran, like many countries in the region, faces rising water stress.
Last year’s rainfall totaled around 400 billion cubic meters, but 70% of it evaporated, compared to a 50% loss in Turkey, which saw 537 billion cubic meters of precipitation.
Official figures show Iran’s dam reserves are just 46% full nationwide, and only 13% in the capital region. Turkey’s dam levels are at 57%, down from 70% a decade ago.
Both countries experience erratic rainfall but Turkey’s investments in water recycling, storage and irrigation have helped stabilize its system. Iran’s have not.
Iran’s water crisis isn’t simply the result of climate stress. It’s the consequence of institutional neglect, poorly prioritized infrastructure, and refusal to heed decades of expert warnings.
While others adapted, Iran doubled down on wasteful practices and political denial. The result: a deepening crisis, no longer possible to blame on nature alone.