Iran International
Commentator in Tehran are warning that Iran’s economy has become to dependent on news from Washington, with markets reacting sharply even to personnel changes in the US president’s inner circle.
Iran's official strategy to jumpstart a sputtering economy must look beyond talks with Washington and address root problems, several analysts and editorials have said.
“The reality is that our economy reacts intensely to political developments,” former central bank deputy Kamal Seyyed-Ali told reporters in Tehran. “If the possibility of a full-scale war rises again, the dollar rate will once again break records.”
Seyyed-Ali, a senior economist, pointed to a March spike in the dollar-to-rial exchange rate—reaching 1.05 million—after Donald Trump warned of possible military action if Tehran refused to negotiate.
The rate dropped when talks began in Oman, then crept back up when negotiations stalled. This increasing sensitivity, he said, underscores how economic expectations in Iran have become “tethered to political headlines.”
Policymakers and markets alike, he added, are behaving as if diplomacy with Washington will dictate the fate of the economy.
The hardline daily Kayhan recently questioned the government’s economic strategy, asking in a published commentary: “What is the government doing besides negotiating with the United States?”
The paper argued that diplomacy should be a tool to improve economic performance, not a substitute for internal reform.
Inflated hopes for a post-deal recovery have masked structural failings—among them, a banking system in crisis, outdated industry, underinvestment in agriculture, and widespread dysfunction in pensions and public services.
Repeated blackouts caused by power shortages have disrupted everything from water distribution to digital connectivity, triggering price hikes in housing, transport, and healthcare.
Energy Minister Abbas Aliabadi admitted in April that Iran’s power plants can generate only 65,000 megawatts against annual demand of more than 85,000. A vicious cycle compounds the problem: water shortages disable power plants, while power cuts prevent water distribution.
Citizens have voiced growing anger through Persian-language media abroad. Callers to Iran International describe how outages in major cities now affect phone signals, Internet access, and even access to clean water.
The latest round of US sanctions targets the petrochemical sector—already plagued by multi-billion-dollar corruption scandals. While the judiciary has acknowledged these cases, many remain suppressed or unresolved, a fact critics say reflects both impunity and systemic failure.
Despite poor growth and repeated economic shocks—Iran’s industrial output contracted 1.6% in January—officials continue to blame sanctions alone. Few in power acknowledge the depth of mismanagement. Instead, each government accuses its predecessor, avoiding accountability as public frustration mounts.
Even if sanctions are eased, economists say, Iran’s crisis will not be resolved by diplomacy alone. Without tackling the roots—corruption, dysfunction, and decay—any recovery will be fragile, temporary, and externally dependent.
Business documents and emails obtained by Iran International reveal a layered network of shell companies used to mask the military links and channel the sanctioned oil through foreign intermediaries.
The firm, Sepehr Energy Jahannama Pars, was incorporated in November 2022 in Tehran. Within months, two affiliated companies—Sepehr Energy Paya Gostar Jahan and Sepehr Energy Hamta Pars—were registered in the same building.
Corporate records identify Sepehr Energy Jahannama Pars as the controlling shareholder in both. Registered firms in Iran are required to have four names.
Individuals central to the operation include Majid Azami, Elyas Niroumand Toumaj, Farshad Ghazi, Majid Rashidi, and Mojtaba Hosseini. The US Treasury added Azami and Niroumand to its sanctions list in November 2023. The others have not been designated.
In an appeal sent days after the sanctions were imposed, Azami and Niroumand denied any military affiliation, saying there was a misunderstanding based on similar naming.
They told the US Treasury their companies were involved in civil construction and trade and had been “experiencing harassment from both sides” since the designation.
However, Farsi-language draft contracts and internal memoranda contradict their argument. One agreement 2023 identifies Sepehr Energy Hamta Pars as acting on behalf of the Iranian armed forces' general staff in negotiations with Persian Gulf Star Oil Company.
Another set of shipping documents shows the same military body guaranteeing Sepehr Energy Jahannama Pars’ obligations in chartering vessels from the National Iranian Tanker Company.
To obscure these links, the network appears to have operated through a proxy firm in Hong Kong. In April 2023, Xin Rui Ji was registered there, with a nominal Chinese executive listed in filings. Yet, communications from Xin Rui Ji were routinely copied to Niroumand and other Sepehr managers.
One August 2023 letter requested the National Iranian Tanker Company deliver crude to Xin Rui Ji without a bill of lading—critical for cargo tracking—via ship-to-ship transfer in Singapore.
The transfer of cargo from one ship to another is a method used by the Islamic Republic to obscure its role in the sale of oil and petroleum products in order to evade sanctions.
Often in Malaysian and Singaporean waters, it is relabeled as oil originating from Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Oman or particularly Malaysia.
The same contact information and domain used by Sepehr Energy appeared on Xin Rui Ji contracts, pointing to a unified operation.
Xin Rui Ji sought buyers across Europe, China, and the Persian Gulf. One such client was the Netherlands-based Gemini Group, which advertises global reach in oil and energy trading. In September 2023, Gemini delayed payment for a crude shipment citing banking concerns and “rumors online about sanctions.”
In one email dated 30 October 2023, Gemini representative Niek Tersteeg confronted his Iranian counterpart Elyas Niroumand about a delayed payment. While citing confusion over contract terms, Tersteeg made clear that the problem was not procedural.
“The only reply we are getting are your statements that your side is governmental,” he wrote.
Tersteeg added: “This morning I personally will call my contacts inside the Government in Tehran to check if they can assist finding a solution.”
The email indicated that Gemini had longstanding experience dealing with sanctioned Iranian entities.
“Let us not talk about the 'commission payments' behind the curtain. In short: please forgive my honesty and directness, we are the ones working, financing, taking all the risks while lots of people are waiting in their rocking chairs for their pockets to be filled,” added Tersteeg in his email.
Five days later, on 5 November, Tersteeg followed up in another message addressed to Niroumand and Majid Azami, both of whom were sanctioned by the US government. He expressed appreciation for their collaboration and emphasized the depth of their partnership: “We are not the enemy. We are true friends and brothers ready, willing and able to take any risk.”
Tersteeg then recounted his own arrest in the Netherlands for dealings with Iran. “I myself was in put jail in 2013 by the Dutch secret service for my trading activities with your beautiful country on special, urgent request of the USA Government.
"They didn’t break me. I kept my mouth shut. After several days the Dutch secret service and Dutch Government found out that I did nothing wrong and they released me from prison with written apologies. The USA Government did not apologize and placed me on certain lists. I am not allowed to travel and enter the USA and Israel. No problem for me.”
Contacted by Iran International, Tersteeg denied any contractual ties with Sepehr Energy. He said personal and commercial links with Iranian officials were confidential.
The documents depict a sanctions evasion structure that operated with strategic cover and foreign complicity, exposing vulnerabilities in enforcement mechanisms meant to isolate Iran’s military-linked commerce.
Most of Iran's floating oil is stored in Singaporean waters, awaiting brokers and buyers for shipment to China.
The drop in Iran's oil exports comes as the government, led by Masoud Pezeshkian, plans for daily exports of 1.85 million barrels this year.
Before US sanctions in 2018, Iran exported 2.5 million bpd. This figure plummeted to 350,000 bpd by the final months of Donald Trump's presidency in 2020. However, Iran’s oil exports gradually increased under his successor.
