Iran International political analyst
In the week since Donald Trump won the US election, Iran’s president Masoud Pezeshkian and his foreign policy chiefs have talked about the importance of engaging with Washington. Their wording may vary, but the message is one: that tensions with the US must be managed.
Pezeshkian, his right-hand man Javad Zarif, and Iran’s foreign minister Abbas Araghchi appear to have recognized that the era of American leniency toward Tehran under president Joe Biden is nearing its end.
In most countries, comments from a president and a foreign minister would be the ultimate reflection of that state’s foreign policy. Not in Iran.
On the biggest and most consequential questions in Tehran—whether or not to attack Israel, whether or not to support Hezbollah, whether or not to move toward nuclear weaponization, and of course, whether or not to talk to the Americans—on all these questions, Pezeshkian and his team hold little or now sway.
Their role is to present a civilized, more relatable face to the outside world. But the real face of power in the Islamic Republic is the supreme leader Ali Khamenei and the commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), who can hardly be clearer when voicing their anti-American and anti-Israeli agenda.
A few days ago, FM Araghchi suggested on X that US president-elect Donald Trump should adopt “Maximum Rationality" instead of returning to his “Maximum Pressure”, which in the eyes of Araghchi will lead to “Maximum Defeat” for America.
The irony of Iran calling for rational behavior aside, it seems unlikely that Trump would heed Araghchi’s advice or pay particular attention to similar comments from Zarif and Pezeshkian. The president-elect is much more likely to take note of Tehran’s attempt to hurt American interests and alleged attempts to assassinate him.
President Biden was relatively lenient in dealing with Iran. His team tried not to aggravate the ayatollahs and prevent an all-out war in the Middle East. This approach made Iran more aggressive, in fact. Regional armed groups aligned with the IRGC were emboldened..
Thus, it seems unlikely that the Iranian charm offensive, spearheaded by Araghchi, will alter the incoming Trump administration’s hawkish approach against the Islamic Republic. It’s also unlikely that Trump will engage in direct confrontation with Iran early in his term.
The president-elect said during his campaign that all he wants from Iran is not to make a nuclear weapon. It cannot be ruled out that he offers broader talks that include not just Iran’s nuclear program but missile capabilities. The latter is something Khamenei and IRGC commanders are unlikely to entertain.
The complicating factor in all this is that Tehran is closer to a nuclear weapon than it has ever been. And it has been suggesting for some time that it might reconsider its long-standing position against weaponization.
It’s hard to tell if this is just a bluff or a serious threat. Given Trump’s clear message about a nuclear Iran, and glancing over what Israel has been willing to do across the Middle East in the past year, Khamenei would be risking all if he were to follow with that threat.
