Iran International
Islamic radical conservatism in Iran, dominant in government for the past two decades, has revealed its dangers through "purification" efforts, an adventurous foreign policy, erosion of the middle class, and the weakening of the private sector.
After two decades of alienating the majority of Iranians—leading over 61% of eligible voters to abstain from the June 2024 presidential election—some within the system now appear to be considering a revival of pre-2005 traditional conservatism.
A report from the centrist website Entekhab noted on Wednesday that the current structure of Iran’s conservative camp appears disjointed, especially after their defeat in the July presidential election, which saw the election of non-factional candidate Masoud Pezeshkian with the backing of “reformist” groups.
Since the disputed 2009 election, which secured ultraconservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s second term, conservatives have attempted to present a unified front ahead of every parliamentary and presidential election. However, these attempts repeatedly fractured, and if not for interventions from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the Guardian Council, the reformist camp might have reclaimed power.
This infighting has steadily diminished the conservative camp, particularly over the past 11 years since pragmatist Hassan Rouhani’s presidency. What remains is a core group of 100 to 160 ultraconservative politicians, primarily linked to the Paydari Party, who advocate for a non-democratic Islamic government rather than the Islamic Republic's semi-democratic structure.
Their ranks have now dwindled to fewer than 80 parliament members and a handful of others in appointed roles, such as those in the Expediency Council.
According to Entekhab, “moderate” conservatives now hold the upper hand in Iranian politics, with Majles Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf leading efforts to restore the conservative camp to its pre-2005 stance. The report noted that Ghalibaf has actively worked to limit the influence of Paydari members within the Majles.
This narrative, however, is questionable. To secure his role as Speaker, Ghalibaf maneuvered between Paydari members, other conservatives, and a few pro-reform MPs, ultimately winning the position with votes from the latter. By spring 2024, Paydari had dwindled to just over 60 members, marking one of its lowest points in popularity and membership.
President Pezeshkian disclosed on the day of the Majles vote for his cabinet in August that it was, in fact, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei—not Ghalibaf—who ensured that all ministers received the necessary vote of confidence from parliament.
Over the past 20 years, especially during Ahmadinejad's presidency, hardliners succeeded in sidelining many moderate conservatives, including former Majles Speaker Ali Akbar Nateq Nouri. In recent years, they have also marginalized other influential conservatives, such as the Larijani brothers—former Chief Justice Sadeq Amoli Larijani and former Majles Speaker Ali Larijani—as well as former President Hassan Rouhani and nearly all of his "pragmatist" allies.
Now, as the country's economy is in its weakest point, the public, as well as politicians in Iran are beginning to remember what Ahmadinejad and the Raisi administration have done to a better economy that existed in Iran until 2005.
Ahmadinejad’s presidency brought sanctions, international isolation, and squandered a massive windfall from soaring oil prices, leaving the treasury depleted by 2013. According to President Pezeshkian’s reserved remarks, the Raisi administration also left virtually nothing for the new government. On his first day in office, Pezeshkian had to borrow from the Khamenei-controlled foreign currency reserve to settle government debts to farmers.
While the shift toward a more moderate conservatism is being spearheaded by Parliament Speaker Ghalibaf, Pezeshkian has shown signs of aligning with hardliners to secure his position.
Over the past week, banners and messages have appeared on highways and over bridges across Tehran urging people to donate to war-affected Lebanese. Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps established Hezbollah in 1982 and has heavily armed and funded the group in the decades after.
The fundraising campaign comes as Iran’s own economy is under pressure, with inflation and the rising cost of living taking a toll on livelihoods.
While the level of Iranian assistance to Hezbollah has fluctuated over the years, US officials estimated in 2018 that Iran transfers around $700 million annually to Hezbollah.
A banner in Tehran asked citizens to send an SMS to express readiness to donate to Lebanese while similar campaigns on state TV and through text messages from the paramilitary Basij group encourage people to donate cash, gold, or even to financially sponsor a Lebanese family.
The efforts have drawn criticism from ordinary Iranians, who feel that the government is prioritizing foreign interests over domestic needs.
“It was revealed that the Islamic Republic was sending funds of 50 million dollars per month to support this group," Ali Shirazi, an Iranian journalist, told Iran International TV.
"But this is not the only expense. Military, weaponry, drones, and missile assistance are also provided, and the reconstruction of damaged buildings falls on Iran’s budget,” he added.
Iran's financial and military support for Hezbollah has come under more scrutiny following Israeli strikes on Hezbollah-linked financial institutions, including the Al-Qard al-Hasan bank in Beirut which may have disrupted Hezbollah's access to funds.
"Bunch of freeloaders"
Discontent with the donations campaign is evident among Iranians, many of whom expressed their frustration to Iran International via messaging apps which protect their anonymity.
“The rise in currency exchange rates, the dollar, and the increasing prices of gold have had a very negative impact, destroying the weaker and lower-income classes,” a Tehran resident said.
“People are now finding their food in garbage bins. More than two million students couldn’t attend school this year,” he added.
Others called for redirecting funds towards addressing domestic issues rather than supporting foreign militant groups.
“If we want to help, we prefer to support our fellow compatriots, especially those in need in provinces like Sistan and Baluchestan, rather than sending money to Hamas and Hezbollah,” said a businessman from the northern city of Rasht.
The government’s push for donations was described as out of touch with the reality faced by most Iranians. “For 45 years, we haven’t heard any good news from the media. If the money spent on Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine were spent in Iran, everything would flourish,” commented another citizen.
As inflation continues to rise, with the US dollar trading at 690,000 rials and predictions of further price increases by the end of the year, Iranians are strained.
“I don’t know how long we have to pay the price for Hassan Nasrallah, Ismail Haniyeh and a bunch of freeloaders," a retired citizen said referring to slain Hezbollah and Hamas leaders, "but the impact it’s had has paralyzed everyone’s lives".