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Hossein Shamkhani’s father, Ali Shamkhani, served as the secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) for almost a decade until last year, but he remains an advisor to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

The Shamkhanis have been known to Iranians as insiders and Hossein, like the children of many other Iranian officials, has been implicated in several scandals over his diverse portfolio in shipping and international oil trade. However, the Bloomberg report has shed new light on his recent ventures, including his Dubai-based company, Milavous Group Ltd.

Read more: Tehran Media Speculate On Security Chief’s Dismissal

In the heart of Dubai’s corporate skyline, the relatively obscure firm quietly rented an office two years ago. Few had heard of the company, yet it soon emerged as a significant force in global energy markets. At the helm of the operation, according to insiders, is Hossein Shamkhani -- a man known in trading circles as “Hector” or simply H. Despite his low profile and sanctions on Tehran’s oil trade, Shamkhani has become one of the most influential figures in the distribution of Iranian oil worldwide.

Based on interviews with more than a dozen sources familiar with the matter, who requested anonymity to discuss confidential business dealings, Bloomberg has uncovered details about Hossein Shamkhani's activities that suggest a complex, sprawling web of interconnected businesses are pushing vast quantities of Iranian and Russian oil into the market.

“People familiar with Shamkhani’s empire said he effectively oversees an intertwined web of companies, with Milavous operating as one of the parent firms. Business ownership, shareholding and control information are easy to obscure, and other executives have been formally registered as the owners and managers, the people said.”

His influence is so pervasive that the companies he oversees have a substantial global footprint, even though many in the industry remain oblivious to his true identity and the source of the crude they are trading.

Milavous, through its subsidiaries, engages in the blending and rebranding of crude oil and various petroleum products from Iran and Russia in third-party jurisdictions, such as the UAE port city of Fujairah. Additionally, it handles oil from countries that are not subject to sanctions. Such methods can obscure the origins of the oil and fuel, making it difficult for clients trying to determine its provenance, Bloomberg cited Matthew Levitt, a former counterterrorism official at the Treasury Department and FBI.

Milavous and other companies within Shamkhani’s network reportedly supply oil to the industry’s giants, including China’s Sinopec, Chevron in the US, and BP in the UK. While these corporations maintain they comply with all laws and sanctions, their connections to Shamkhani’s network highlight the opaque world of policing global oil trade. 

According to Bloomberg sources, Milavous has generated billions of dollars in sales with its turnover in 2022 amounting to some $15 billion.

Unlike his father, Hossein Shamkhani has not been listed as a sanctions violator. Additionally, the UAE has not banned companies from trading crude oil from Iran or Russia. Entities within his network also engage in significant business dealings with Chinese buyers, often conducting transactions in yuan and beyond the purview of American sanctions, Bloomberg sources said.

However, if the US government decides to sanction any UAE-based company involved in violating US regulations, it can add them to its sanctions list. This can be especially problematic for banks facilitating such trades.

Despite not being personally sanctioned, Shamkhani has faced scrutiny from US authorities. Dozens of ships believed to be under his control have been sanctioned by the US Treasury, but their links to him were not publicized. Apparently, the US Treasury Department can sometimes find it more effective to target tankers rather than individuals because of frequent changes in ownership.

Back in 2022, a cargo ship reportedly belonging to the Admiral Shipping Company that Iranian media said is owned by Hossein Shamkhani and his brother Hassan was impounded in one of India’s ports.

Shamkhani and Milavous have repeatedly denied any involvement in illicit activities. In a written statement, Shamkhani categorically rejected claims of a connection to Milavous, asserting that he has no control over any oil companies or trading networks. Mohamed Al Hashmi, the Managing Director of Milavous, likewise dismissed allegations of ties to Shamkhani or involvement in Iranian or Russian oil trading. However, multiple sources suggest that Shamkhani's influence extends far beyond public knowledge. He is believed to have been instrumental in establishing dozens of companies.

Shamkhani's network extends beyond Iran. He spent time studying in Moscow and Beirut before returning to Tehran to earn a Master of Business Administration. His ties to Russia have proven especially valuable as Tehran and Moscow have forged deeper economic and military partnerships in response to Western sanctions.

Hossein Shamkhani's ascent in the oil industry is inextricably linked to his family's legacy. His father has been a towering figure in Iran's military and security establishment for decades and like many of his peers, he is dogged by scandals. Apart from reports about his sons -- Hassan and Hossein -- owning dozens of businesses, there have also been reports about the extravagant lifestyle of his family members in Iran and abroad. Iran International’s investigative journalist Mojtaba Pourmohsen has published several exposés about the family corruption, including his nephews Mo’ud and Naji Shamkhani. 

Controversies reached their peak following allegations of extravagant properties and bank accounts held by Shamkhani’s family, including those of his toddler grandson.

In 2022, the Shamkhani family was implicated in the collapse of a building in southwestern Khuzestan province that killed scores of people. The owner of the building, Hossein Abdolbaghi, a well-connected businessman, had broken multiple regulations when constructing the building, having enjoyed the backing of officials including members of the Shamkhani family.

While the elder Shamkhani encouraged his son to pursue a career in the private sector, his connections and influence have undoubtedly played a pivotal role in Hossein's success.

Amanollah Kahrazehi, speaking to local media, pointed out that the strong US presence in Pakistan, funding military expenses, is the primary reason for the complexities in Tehran's economic ties with -Islamabad.

Nonetheless, he discussed the imports, which appear to serve as a potential substitute for monetary transactions: “Since the beginning of this year [20 March], the trade volume between the two countries has exceeded $928 million, with rice, cotton, and sesame remaining the primary commodities imported from Pakistan to Iran.”

Earlier in August, Iran’s Customs Administration reported that new restrictions imposed by Pakistan on the entry of Iranian goods have resulted in a downturn in trade between the two nations, without providing specific details.

Meanwhile, last year, Iran, under the weight of sanctions, enthusiastically highlighted its ability to export gas and oil to Pakistan and "reduce reliance on the dollar," as Pakistan unveiled a list of goods open for a barter arrangement between the neighbors.

Amid critically low foreign exchange reserves last year, barely enough to cover one month's imports, Pakistan urgently sought to manage a balance of payments crisis and control inflation, which had surged to nearly 38%. The Pakistani government issued a special order allowing barter trade with Afghanistan, Iran, and Russia for specific goods, including petroleum and natural gas, as announced by the Ministry of Commerce.

Russia, also under heavy sanctions, was also an eager supplier of energy to Pakistan as the West moved away from its resources following Moscow's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Last year, Pakistan, traditionally an ally of the US, received its first shipment of crude oil and liquefied petroleum gas from Russia. The Russian embassy noted that the gas delivery was facilitated via the Sarakhs Special Economic Zone with Iranian assistance.

Nonetheless, it was later revealed that the plan had fallen short of Pakistan's expectations, with the anticipated benefits being undermined by higher shipping costs and the inferior quality of refined products compared to those produced from crude sourced from Pakistan's primary suppliers, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Dalga Khatinoglu, an oil, gas, and economic analyst for Iran, told Iran International that Iran exports a range of petroleum products and electricity to Pakistan, including approximately 500 gigawatt-hours of electricity annually.

He noted that Iranian customs data reveals the sale of around $20 million in propane and $50 million in butane to Pakistan last year—both of which are raw petroleum products in the form of liquefied gas. Additionally, he highlighted that Iran exports fuel oil (mazut) to Pakistan, a trade that does not appear in the official statistics.

While Pakistan produces crude oil and natural gas, its output is insufficient to meet domestic demand, necessitating the import of both crude oil and refined petroleum products to bridge the gap.

In May, it was revealed that Iranian traders are smuggling over $1 billion worth of fuel into Pakistan annually.

The crippling sanctions, levied for Iran's nuclear program, human rights abuses at home and support for Russia's war on Ukraine, have prompted Tehran to seek alternative markets. It has led to a substantial rise in smuggling operations across the 900-kilometer Iran-Pakistan border.

The report disclosed that, in the past year alone, approximately $1.02 billion worth of Iranian petrol and diesel was illegally transported into Pakistan, accounting for about 14% of the country's annual fuel consumption

The significantly lower cost of Iranian fuel compared to domestic supplies caused challenges for Pakistani refineries in maintaining stock uptake, further exacerbating the country's own economic difficulties.

According to draft regulations released by the Saudi Ministry of Hajj and Umrah, pilgrims are forbidden from bringing any prohibited items, such as pictures, books, flags, slogans, political publications, or other banned materials, into Saudi Arabia, according to the Saudi Gazette.

Pilgrims are strictly barred from engaging in activities or gatherings that could disrupt public order, security, tranquility, or health, as part of Saudi Arabia's efforts to ensure a peaceful pilgrimage.

The Islamic Republic of Iran, which places significant emphasis on the intertwining of religion and politics, has long marked the "Disavowal of Polytheists" ceremony as a politically charged ritual. Since the 1979 revolution, Iranian pilgrims in Mecca have observed this ceremony, traditionally accompanied by the chant of "Death to America." However, in 1987, this ritual led to a tragic confrontation between Shia demonstrators and Saudi Arabian security forces, resulting in the deaths of over 400 individuals.

In the aftermath of the 1987 incident, the Islamic Republic refrained from holding the ceremony for several years. It wasn't until 2001 that it was reintroduced, albeit in a symbolic and significantly scaled-down form. Since then, it has been conducted within the confines of a closed tent operated by the office of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic.

However, almost during every annual hajj pilgrimage there have been incidents involving some Iranians and Saudi authorities related to political manifestations. The Iranian regime, sending its supporters to the hajj, seems eager to use the opportunity to steer up sentiments during the most important Islamic gathering.

Iranian authorities and state media also describe another religious act, the Arbaeen Walk to sites in Iraq, which attracted over 3.6 million Iranian participants this year, as an expression of “Shia soft power.” This characterization highlights a divergence in how mass religious gatherings are perceived and managed, with Iran framing such events as a display of cultural and sectarian influence, while the Saudi regulations for Hajj stress the importance of maintaining political neutrality and public order during religious pilgrimages.

The Arbaeen ceremony, marking the conclusion of the 40-day mourning period following Ashura—which commemorates the martyrdom of Hussain ibn Ali, the third Shia Imam and grandson of the Prophet Muhammad in 680 AD—is recognized as the world's largest annual gathering.

Traditionally, Shia Muslims convene in Karbala, Iraq, at the burial site of Imam Hussain to observe Arbaeen. Pilgrims often undertake extensive journeys on foot, spanning hundreds of kilometers, to reach the shrine of Imam Hussain and other significant Shia sites. This mass pilgrimage not only serves as a religious expression but also provides a fertile ground for the dissemination of Iranian propaganda and influence among other pilgrims during the ceremonies.

On August 26, a day after this announcement, Yuriy Bilousov, Head of the War Crimes Department at Ukraine’s Prosecutor General's Office, stated in a television program that the opening of this criminal case signifies that Ukraine now recognizes Iran as a party involved in the war on its territory: "In fact, Ukraine has informed the entire world and presented evidence showing that Iranian military representatives are participating in Russia's attack on Ukraine."

According to the Ukrainian Prosecutor General, the investigation revealed that between July and August 2022, Russian military representatives reached an agreement with the Islamic Republic on the purchase of Shahed-136 and Mohajer-6 attack drones, along with related equipment, from Iran.

Kostin further wrote that after the contract was signed, Iranian experts trained Russian soldiers to use these drones in combat operations against Ukraine.

In fact, in July 2022, the United States warned that Russia and Iran were engaged in a process to deploy Iranian suicide drones in the war.

Kostin added that between September and October 2022, a group of military instructors from the Islamic Republic launched at least 20 attack drones in Ukraine's Dnipro and Mykolaiv regions, leading to the destruction and damage of civilian infrastructure protected under international humanitarian law.

The Security Service of Ukraine had previously identified this IRGC brigadier general, stating that Brigadier General Sharifi Mollasaraei directly assisted in commanding Russian Federation occupation forces in attacks on Ukraine and organized the training of Russian troops.

Russia has used hundreds of Iranian kamikaze drones since October 2022 to attack civilian and infrastructure targets. Russia also uses the drones in large-scale missile attacks to overwhelm Ukraine’s air defenses. The latest massive attack earlier this week saw around 100 Shahed drones used.

According to the Security Service of Ukraine, in 2022, Mollasaraei led a team of Iranian drone instructors who traveled to the Russian-occupied Crimean Peninsula.

The Ukrainian Prosecutor General emphasized that this IRGC brigadier general is charged under Ukraine's criminal laws with "aiding in an aggressive war as part of a premeditated plan against Ukraine, violating the laws and customs of war, and committing war crimes."

The report also indicates that, in addition to Mollasaraei, seven other military personnel from the Islamic Republic who were sent as instructors to train Russian occupation forces in Ukraine and the occupied territories are facing similar charges.

In October 2022, Ukraine's Foreign Ministry accused the Islamic Republic of Iran of providing military assistance to the aggressor country, Russia, in its war against Ukraine.

According to published reports, since the fall of 2022, the Russian Federation has used Iranian-made Shahed-136 and 131 kamikaze drones and Mohajer-6 multi-purpose drones in its war against Ukraine.

The Iranian government initially denied supplying its drones to the Russian military but later admitted to it, though it claimed that the drones were delivered before Russia's war against Ukraine began.

In November 2023, the White House warned that the Iranian government was preparing to provide ballistic missiles to Russia. Reuters later reported that Iran had already sent hundreds of ballistic missiles to Russia.

Schindler says the information was withheld by the Obama administration to protect the 2015 nuclear deal negotiations.

Schindler disclosed that over a decade ago, an official from a pro-US intelligence service, whom he refers to only as “M,” successfully recruited a defector from Iran’s Revolutionary Guard. This defector had access to crucial secrets about Iran's nuclear program.

He detailed how 12 years ago at a security conference in Europe, M handed him “original IRGC documents that were classified Top Secret” containing "technical information" on Iran’s centrifuge program. The documents showed that "Iran is further along with their nuclear weapons program than the US Intelligence Community officially assesses, and the Obama administration publicly claims."

When Schindler informed M that he would pass the dossier to his US intelligence contacts, M explained that his service had already formally notified the Americans about the IRGC dossier, but the CIA seemed uninterested.

According to Schindler, M had arranged a direct meeting with the "CIA’s Chief of Station in his country's capital," a contact he was personally acquainted with.

However, the CIA chief “appeared wholly nonchalant and bluntly explained that he couldn’t take the dossier.”

Schindler explained that given that the CIA chief and M were personally acquainted, “the CIA official explained in hush-hush fashion that he had orders ‘from higher up’ not to take possession of the IRGC’s nuclear secrets.”

Schindler took the initiative and personally passed on the dossier, which eventually made its way into US intelligence channels. He was assured that the US intelligence community had “top people” reviewing its contents.

However, Schindler said he believes “the dossier was placed in a back room of a classified warehouse somewhere in Northern Virginia, if it wasn’t immediately burn-bagged.”

“That detailed IRGC dossier was the Wrong Narrative as far as the Obama administration was concerned, it might jeopardize their precious Iran Deal, thus it had to not exist. Therefore, it never existed. Until I went whistleblower right here,” Schindler said.

The Obama administration with its allies, Britain, France and Germany agreed in 2015 to lift international sanctions on Iran in exchange for a limit to Tehran's uranium enrichment and other restrictions, without a firm limit to its ballistic missile program and its aggressive actions in the Middle East. President Donald Trump arguing that the JCPAO was a "bad deal" withdrew from the agreement in 2018 and re-imposed sanctions.

Iran refused offers to revive the deal after long negotiations with the Biden administration, continuing enrichment. Currently it is believed that Tehran could produce enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear warhead within weeks.