Upon leaving office, politicians often resort to writing books to claim that: "I was an important person. I did my job well. They did not appreciate me. Now, you can take advantage and benefit from my experience."
But with his memoir published in Persian in Tehran, The Depth of Patience (or The Audacity of Resilience), former Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif seeks to do much more than that.
Zarif – whose role as Minister was really an illusion – tries to draw an effective and decisive case for the role of the Foreign Ministry. All the while, he was never part of the real game.
In an interview with the Jamaran website in Tehran, Zarif says that he was never seen as an "insider" and that he was considered "to be on his way out" from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – and that is why, he claims, the employees of the ministry did not click the like button for his tweets.
Zarif was often left out of key foreign policy developments, such as during Bashar al-Assad's controversial trip to Iran in 2019, or he was left in the dark about Iran’s attack on the Ain al-Assad US base. At the same time, the Iraqi prime minister had prior knowledge of the attack, while he remained in the dark.
In his memoir, he fails to say what his master plan was – or even what his tenure achieved in eight years, during which millions of dollars of Iranian resources were squandered on numerous foreign trips.
He could have said that improving relations with the West and easing the burdens of the people are not possible within the confines of the current regime – and that the Iranian people have no choice but to overthrow it. But, steadfast in his loyalty to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, he did not dare to do so.
In his writings, Zarif consistently portrays himself as unaware of the purpose for which he was chosen: He was picked not for his capabilities, skill in deception or even being a good liar – but, because he could spearhead a lobbying effort in America to sell the idea of a peaceful nature of the nuclear program.
Zarif was chosen to champion the JCPOA at a crucial juncture when the regime sought European involvement on the issue, to advance its own regional expansion agenda. All the while, Khamenei and the IRGC harbored distrust toward him. For this reason, ambassadors to regional countries were appointed not by him, but by Qassem Soleimani.
Illusions of success
Zarif's eight-year tenure was nothing short of a glaring failure in foreign policy and diplomacy, with the regime’s nuclear program, terrorism, and expansionism setting the stage for this dismal outcome.
One prominent example showcasing his foreign policy shortcomings, and indicative of his limited authority, occurred in 2016.
Just months after the nuclear deal was agreed on, attacks on the Saudi missions in Iran undermined then-President Hassan Rouhani and shattered any illusion of moderation in Iran's foreign policy. Orchestrated by so-called hardliners, the attacks signaled to the West that Khamenei’s nefarious agenda would continue – deal or no deal.
Despite the Rouhani administration's alleged intention to de-escalate tensions with the West, after the failure of political reforms by the reformists, and to foster better foreign relations – by the end of Zarif’s eight-year term, there were no tangible achievements to show for his efforts.
The most important delicate waste
To sweep his lack of success under the rug, Zarif chooses to sidestep crucial matters in his book and focuses solely on peripheral issues.
One way Zarif infamously justified his abysmal record is by using the phrase "we chose ourselves" – a phrase that shifts the responsibility for the choices made by the Islamic Republic, along with its policies and programs, onto the people indefinitely. This particular statement has long angered Iranian dissidents, who argue that there was a revolution 45 years ago with the intention of creating a more democratic country, but clerics steered the new regime towards a dictatorship. Even if a choice was made in 1979, people have a right to demand change after four decades.
In his book, he changes the content of his baseless phrase; Choosing it as a title (TDP, p. 27) he instead discusses idealism and realism in foreign policy – irrelevant to the context of the original meaning of his statement.
While the title of Zarif’s book aims to highlight his purported patience and perseverance, the only areas where the former Minister demonstrated such traits were in deception, manipulating the public, covering up misdeeds, and self-promotion before Ali Khamenei and IRGC commanders.
Two key challenges
As a diplomat who claims the art of persuasion and justification, Zarif faced two significant challenges during his tenure, wherein his success was notably lacking.
The first involved maintaining regular relations with Ali Khamenei, necessitating the balance of praising the Supreme Leader while disliking his Russophile policy.
In this context, he demonstrates his allegiance to Khamenei by portraying him as a servant of the nation and the country, asserting, "The cornerstone of the Leader's approach to foreign policy has always been grounded in honor." (TDP, p. 101)
Then, he defines honor, stating, "He is exceedingly vigilant and meticulous regarding the constitution, prioritizing national dignity and thwarting any attempts by foreign powers to exert dominance over the Islamic Republic." (ibid.) Zarif refutes assertions portraying the Leader as a revolutionary, which imply a disregard for international regulations.
In the case of the IRGC's downing of Ukrainian Flight PS752 in 2020 and the regime's initial three-day denial of responsibility, Zarif once again attempts to deceive the reader.
Zarif tries to present himself as a brave and expedient person in deception and concealment and complains that he was not allowed to "cure" (justify and trowel) the issue. (TDP, p. 139)
Years after leaving office, Zarif is still trying to wash his own hands and absolve himself of any responsibility.
Reza Alijani, a reform-minded religious-nationalist political observer, penned a Persian article for Iran International suggesting that the new Iranian year, beginning on March 20, is poised to be characterized by "chaos and disillusionment in the upper echelons and challenge and erosion in the lower depths" of Iranian society.
Alijani asserts that with the increasing empowerment of radical forces, the social sphere is unlikely to open up; instead, more restrictions may be imposed to suppress militant women opposing the compulsory hijab rule.
Moreover, the ongoing battle between dissatisfied youths and the rigid minority opposing modern lifestyles is expected to persist. Alijani suggests that beneath the surface, public dissent simmers, poised to erupt fueled by frustration over declining livelihoods and resentment toward the lifestyle promoted by hardliners.
Within the government, as the new parliament convenes in the summer, internal strife is expected to intensify. This year, preparations for the upcoming presidential election in 2025 will also commence, further fueling chaos and infighting among the upper echelons of power.
Simultaneously, a complex chess game will unfold among clerics and politicians, shaping the landscape for succession and the post-Khamenei era of the Islamic Republic.
Additionally, Alijani predicts that foreign-based opposition groups will become more radical, while there may also be opportunities for moderates to emerge. This could pave the way for the establishment of an efficient democracy after a transitional period.
Reformist commentator Abbas Abdi characterized the new year as the last opportunity for the regime to come to its senses and begin a process to bring the country to cohesion and progress. The new year, he wrote in Tehran’s Etemad newspaper, marks the need for the government to wake up and accept to bring about or surrender to changes in domestic and foreign policies, as well as in the economy.
In his commentary headlined as "Year of reforms, Year of Awakening," Abdi wrote that "last year was the end of dreams and wishful thinking and the new year is an opportunity for awakening and change.” He added that although the current wishful thinking in the government based on illusions was once tried under the Ahmadinejad administration in the2010s, toward the end of that period even hardliners looked forward to its end.
The new wave of ultraconservatism which started in 2021 by the coming to power of Ebrahim Raisi as President was marked by a surge in "political purification". It is now evident that this process will never end. The new ultraconservatives refused to take a lesson from the fate of their predecessors, but the latest low-turnout elections in Iran should be proof got them that without changing their ways, everyone can drown in an unpredictable storm.
Abdi expressed the belief that hardliners have now realized that political purification cannot help materialize the unrealistic promises they made at the beginning of their government. Now the people have lost all hope and trust in the government and its promises.
However, knowing the Iranian regime, the idea of an awakening is more out of reach than ever. Describing the grim situation, Massoud Pezeshkian, an MP from Tabriz, told Rouydad24 website: "I have no answers for the people's questions. Every morning they wake up to higher prices. Slightly more than a year is remaining from the lifetime of this government. What has it done for the people so far? Rising prices are breaking the people's back and I have no answer for their questions."
Earlier this month, irrefutable evidence surfaced indicating Sedighi's involvement in the appropriation of a valuable plot of land worth approximately $20 million in northern Tehran. The revelation, brought forth by a whistle-blower, shed light on Sedighi's alleged misdeeds.
Initially, Sedighi denied any knowledge of the transfer of ownership, claiming his signature had been forged by a trustee. However, it was later revealed that Sedighi had personally signed the transfer documents at a notary public. Despite this acknowledgment, the seminary he oversees maintained innocence and stated that the plot's ownership was in the process of being returned.
“Claiming [the plot] is in the process of being repatriated [to the seminary], several months after the crime was committed and following its revelation, has no effect on the [nature of the] crime itself,” Mohsen Borhani, a dissident lawyer with seminary training, said on Instagram, arguing that repatriation of the plot, if completed, can only be a factor contributing to reduction of the prescribed sentence for the crime.
Iran International TV’s “Your Side of the Story” program received dozens of messages last week from citizens who are extremely distrustful of a regime they say is “systematically corrupt” and incorrigible.
Some of the messages shared the same suspicions that repatriation of the appropriated plot to the Seminary by Sedighi, even if true, meant nothing other than “taking from one pocket and shoving it in the other”.
Many others who have taken to social media to express their anger, compare authorities’ leniency in dealing with Sedighi’s “grand theft” with their extreme harshness against others for petty theft.
People commented that the system punishes petty criminals for theft by long prison sentences and even amputation of fingers and hands, targets women for showing a few strands of hair, but has not taken any action against Sedighi as if repatriation of the ownership of the plot to the seminary all wrongdoing is forgiven.
“Firstly, there is no documentation or evidence that this man repatriated the plot. Even if he produces proof, no one will believe it because Iranian people’s trust in the authorities of the Islamic Republic does not even reach one percent,” one of the messages sent to Your Side of the Story read.
A veteran of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), Khalil Aghapour, in a tweet recounted how as a 15-year-old he had forged his father’s signature to be able to join the volunteers to defend the homeland against the Iraqi invasion, and was mortally wounded several times. “I wish I was dead,” he said, referring to the deeds of those in power who he said claim to be pious.
Sedighi is among Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s inner circle. Despite the scandal involving him, he was invited to Khamenei’s Norouz (New Iranian Year) speech on March 20.
Hardline media such as Tehran Municipality’s Hamshahri newspaper and Fars News Agency, have been sympathetic to Sedighi and tried to justify his actions.
Dedicating a large section on its front page to the issue on Saturday, Hamshahri called on hardline students known as Justice Seekers (Edalatkhahan) who are highly critical of Sedighi to treat the case “piously” and to “avoid gross injustice in the name of seeking justice”.