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The claim was made in an article published on Rouhani’s personal website Monday which also refuted that he had opposed seeking damages as a result of Donald Trump’s sanctions.

Rouhani’s hardliner opponents charged in March that the former president opposed demanding compensation from the US during talks to revive the 2015 nuclear deal, officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

Rouhani’s website alleged that the administration of President Ebrahim Raisi included the issue of compensation on the agenda of the talks in Vienna “as a new demand" or “possibly to claim [an extra] achievement for itself,” if it was accepted.

“The claim that Dr. Rouhani opposed seeking compensation from the US was made by the negotiating team’s media advisor [Mohammad Marandi] after the failure to include the topic in [the agenda of] talks or in the draft of the agreement,” the article said.

In late March in a video interview with London-based pro-regime activist Ali Alizadeh, Marandi claimed that Rouhani’s foreign minister, Mohammad-Javad Zarif,

had suggested to Rouhani that Iran should seek compensation but Rouhani opposed the suggestion and Zarif was offended.

“I personally, and others, told Dr. Zarif that we must ask the US for compensation. This does not mean the US would [actually] pay compensation. You say you should pay compensation so that you can score points elsewhere. Zarif did that but Mr. Rouhani said in a cabinet meeting that this was not required,” Marandi said, adding that Zarif told him his hands were tied because Rouhani was opposed to it.

A few days later, the reformist Jamaran News claimed that a “former member of the negotiation team” has denied any discussion of the payment of compensation between Zarif and Marandi.

“The former member of the negotiation team said seeking compensation from the US for withdrawing from the JCPOA was a failed plan by the current team which they are trying to blame the previous administration for,” Jamaran wrote.

“We don’t currently intend to speak about the damages we have incurred. Authorities of the country will follow up on that at its appropriate time,” Rouhani’s website quoted him as saying at a cabinet meeting on March 24 2021.

It also pointed out that this was “a repetition” of Khamenei’s own remarks in a speech on January 9, 2021 in which he said the United States’ return to the deal would only be meaningful if sanctions were lifted. “Albeit there is the issue of compensation which is among our demands and will be followed up in later stages,” Khamenei said in the same speech.

Rouhani’s website also quoted Zarif’s speech at the Mediterranean Dialogues Conference in July 2020 in which he mentioned the issue of compensation and again in February 2021 when he said in an interview with CNN’s Farid Zakaria that payment of compensation had never been a precondition for the talks but would be discussed after the restoration of the deal and the return of the US to it.

“The said stances prove that what Rouhani said in March 2021 corresponded to the stance of the Supreme Leader of the Revolution … Compensation meant seeking payment from the US for damages [incurred by Iran] following Donald Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA. [It was] not a precondition for negotiations with the 5+1 (France, Britain, Russia, China, the United States and Germany) or a plan devised by the negotiating team,” Rouhani’s website wrote.

The feared militia has launched violent attacks on women and schoolgirls for not wearing hijab.

But speaking on Thursday, Ahmad Mohammadizadeh, the Governor of Bushehr Province in the south, said that there should not be a single teacher in his province who is not in the Basij because the only successful teacher is the one who works with the mindset of the paramilitary force.

The Basij is mostly made up of young volunteers. Its members usually go through limited training to serve as an auxiliary force in local security and enforcing state control over society through suppressing demonstrations and gathering intelligence.

Last year, Iran's Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) announced plans to set up Basij bases in about 11,000 neighborhoods across the country by 2023.

The head of the Basij Organization, under the command of the IRGC, said that there are 50,000 neighborhoods in the country, therefore when the plan – dubbed Islamic neighborhoods – is implemented, Basij will have active presence in about one-fifth of the neighborhoods all over Iran.

In February, Basij plainclothes agents raided a language school detaining two teenage girls who had removed the hijab.

Violence against women, especially teenage girls, due to what the regime calls "improper hijab" has been going on for over four decades. During the uprising of the Iranian people in recent months the violence has intensified with the increase of women's civil disobedience against the mandatory hijab.

The Islamic Republic confronts such civil disobedience with heavy punishment for what it calls "removing hijab".

The group supported the Iranian activist's call for the IRGC to be declared a terrorist organization in a letter they signed and sent to Prime Minister Rishi Sunak.

A group of the MPs backing Beheshti visited him in London on Wednesday as his hunger strike outside the Foreign Office entered its 56th day.

This comes as a series of protests are planned across London this month in support of Beheshti.

“Vahid has shown remarkable dignity and strength throughout his protest and has widespread support from parliamentarians who share his sense of urgency in the need to proscribe the (IRGC) as a terror organization,” read the letter addressed to Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, Foreign Secretary James Cleverly, and Home Secretary Suella Braverman.

“Proscription of the IRGC has deep support across Parliament. MPs unanimously endorsed a motion earlier this year calling for proscription. Peers from all parties and none have also joined the efforts to end the IRGC’s ability to operate in the UK.”

The government's decision to proscribe Hamas and Hezbollah terror groups was also noted by the group as an important step in combating extremism and terrorism, but the UK cannot afford to stop there.

“The IRGC is, after all, the primary financier, supplier, and trainer of these dangerous groups. It is incumbent upon the Government to go after the parent organization,” added the letter.

In a news briefing with reporters about transnational repression, FBI counterintelligence officials urged victims to come forward, saying the bureau is tracking a growing trend of foreign authoritarian regimes breaching US laws to intimidate certain communities.

The officials said the governments have at times resorted to using private investigators to conduct surveillance on dissidents and that several criminal cases have been brought by federal prosecutors involving their use.

The most brazen case of attempts to silence Iranian dissidents were two plots uncovered by US law enforcement against the prominent Iranian dissident and activist Masih Alinejad living in New York City in 2021 and 2022.

The Justice department announced in July 2021 that the FBI had foiled an attempt by Iranian intelligence to kidnap her, although it did not identify her by name. Later, Alinejad told the media that she was the person targeted.

Earlier this month, a federal court in New York sentenced Niloufar Bahadorifar, an Iranian-American woman, who had pleaded guilty in the plot to kidnap Alinejad.

The plan reportedly involved kidnapping her and taking her to Venezuela by speed boat, apparently to be sent back to Iran and executed like other kidnapped dissidents.

"A lot of these are new tactics and lines that are being crossed that we have not seen China and Iran do on US soil in previous investigations," one FBI counterintelligence official said. He added that the FBI hoped to raise awareness of such trends and alert the private investigator sector and state and local law enforcement.

Iranian intelligence extensively operates also in Europe, where serious threats against journalists detected by British police last November led to the temporary closure of Iran International’s London broadcasting center and moving operations to Washington DC.

Officials said the goals of transnational repression schemes are multifaceted, and at times also aim to influence US policy decisions through "malign influence tactics."

"We've really seen an inflection point in the tactics and tools, and the level of risk and the level of threat that have changed over the past few years," another FBI counterintelligence official said.

The call with reporters on Wednesday came just two days after federal agents arrested two New York residents for allegedly operating a Chinese "secret police station" in Manhattan's Chinatown district, in what prosecutors said is part of a broader US government crackdown on Beijing's alleged targeting of dissidents.

Safeguard Defenders, a Europe-based human rights organization, has published reports in recent months revealing the presence of dozens of Chinese police "service stations" in major cities around the world, including in New York and Los Angeles.

FBI officials declined to comment on the New York case or speak about any other open investigations.

Reporting by Reuters

Middle east expert Ghasem Mohebali told moderate conservative news website Khabar Online on April 18 that the agreement does not mean disputes between Tehran and Riyadh have been settled. The effectiveness of the agreement will be tested only after the two countries' embassies reopen in May after seven years.

In the meantime, Iran's President Ebrahim Raisi has welcomed an invitation to visit Riyadh and has on his part invited King Salman to visit Iran, which is yet another sign to indicate willingness of both sides for détente.

Mohebali says the Tehran-Riyadh agreement only shows that relations are back on track for normalization. The two sides, he said, have many differences. The conflict in Yemen is only one of them. The two countries also have their differences over Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and the Persian Gulf, and, of course, Iran's nuclear program. They also need to discuss their regional rivalries in a way to prevent further tensions in the future.

Both Iran and Saudi Arabia can help establish a stable government in Yemen, the Iranian analyst said. As regards Syria, Saudi Arabia needs to bring back Damascus to the Arab League. The impact of this return on the region is also important. And then we need to see what happens to foreign forces in Syria.

Mohebali said the issue of Bahrain is also one of the main challenges facing Iran and Saudi Arabia, with the latter concerned about Iran's influence over Shias in the small kingdom and its interference in that country. Bahrain is next door to Saudi Arabia and developments there affect its security.

However, the two countries have also some shared interests in the areas of oil, energy and security. These can be the topics of the next round of talks between Tehran and Riyadh.

Mohebali added that the revival of ties will also impact regional countries' attempts to settle the post-Arab Spring problems. For all of those countries security is the most important issue. The region's security is also equally important for the United States, Europe and China.

Meanwhile, according to a report published on the moderate Entekhab news website, many questions have been raised about the impact of the Iran-Saudi deal on Iran's foreign policy. How it will affect Iran's other international dossiers including the revival of the 2015 nuclear deal, the JCPOA. The rapprochement can affect Iran’s key foreign policy issues in two different ways, the report said.

The first possibility is rationality extending to other matters in the regime's decision-making system, and leading to major steps toward settling the nuclear issue, negotiations with the United States, and even reaching détente. This is a desirable scenario that could put Tehran back on the right track and even lead to an improvement in governance and restoring the broken ties between the regime and the people.

This is possible only if the regime follows a realistic approach based on national interests. It will mark a serious change in Iran's approach to domestic and international issues.

The other scenario, which is probably more likely within the Iranian government is to interpret the ties with Saudi Arabia within an unrealistic framework. The advocates of this scenario will interpret the restoration of ties based on their own ideological points of reference, and as they have done so far, reiterate that Iran has imposed its will on Saudi Arabia and see the whole dynamics as Riyadh's alliance with Tehran against the United States. They might even think that Iran no longer needs to return to the JCPOA. According to Entekhab, this would be yet another miscalculation by the Iranian regime.

In other words, while Saudi Arabia uses the rapprochement with Iran as part of its strategy of moving toward sustainable development in the digital age by reducing unnecessary regional tensions, Tehran might mistake the restoration of ties with Riyadh for an ideological alliance.