US Leaves Door Open For Iran Nuclear Diplomacy - Reuters Analysis

The United States, France, and the United Kingdom are arguing that Russia and Iran are violating UN Security Council Resolution 2231 by Tehran sending military drones to Moscow. While US spokesman Vedant Patel told a press briefing Friday that he was “not going to get ahead of the UN internal deliberations,” there has been chatter for months that the US wants to restore UN sanctions against Iran under a ‘snapback’ procedure in the JCPOA.

What is ‘snapback,’ and why does it matter?

The JCPOA lifted international sanctions against Iran in return for strict limits on the Iranian nuclear program. Under the terms of the JCPOA, the sanctions can ‘snapback’ if Iran violates the agreement.

Is Iran violating the agreement?

Iran began breaching JCPOA limits – for example enriching uranium to 60 percent rather than the permitted 3.67 percent, and by using more advanced centrifuges – in 2019, the year after President Donald Trump withdrew the US from the 2015 agreement and imposed ‘maximum pressure’ sanctions.

So why is ‘snapback’ being raised now?

It has come up because France, Germany, the US and the UK have told the UN that Iran’s supply of military drones to Russia for use in Ukraine breaches a clause in Resolution 2231 required prior UNSC approval (up to October 2023) for the transfer to and from Iran of certain military equipment and weapons. These powers say Iran’s supply of drones violates that clause – and this has raised the possibility of snapback, under which multilateral sanctions would come back onto Tehran.

Does the drone supply for sure violate Resolution 2231?

That is yet to be decided. Monday’s meeting may produce a view from the UN secretariat as to whether Russia and Iran are violating Resolution 2231 – following up a request for an investigation made in a letter sent in October by the US, France, Germany and the UK.

Snapback relates to “significant non-performance of commitments.” Resolution 2231 refers to a 79-page document submitted at the time by the US – S/2015/546– that listed categories of weapons needing prior Security Council approval. S/2015/546 refers to drones “capable of delivering at least a 50kg payload to a range of at least 300km,” and while Iranian-made drones can have a range of over 1,000km they carry a slightly lighter payload. There would be a clearer violation if Iran transferred Fateh-110 and Zulfiqar missiles.

How would ‘snapback’ work?

Any party to the JCPOA can move snapback within the ‘JCPOA Commission.’ If after 30 days, the issue is not resolved, then UN sanctions would come back into effect. For the issue to be resolved, a UNSC member would need to move at the Security Council that sanctions not come back into play, and this could be vetoed by any other member.

This was the basis for the claims from President Barack Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry at the time the JCPOA was signed that Russia, or China, could not stop snapback. It’s as if the veto power is reversed.

But can the US move ‘snapback’? Didn’t it leave the JCPOA?

When the Trump administration tried to move snapback in 2020, other JCPOA members, including the three European signatories (France, Germany, and the UK) said it couldn’t because it had left the agreement.

But this interpretation has been challenged. Gabriel Noronha, an Iran advisor 2019-21 to Trump, argued in tweets November that the US could still move snapback.

What would be the practical effect of snapback?

Some say the ‘bark’ would be worse than the ‘bite.’ For Europe to reimpose sanctions on Iran would make little difference given its trade has massively reduced under US ‘maximum pressure,’ under which the US can penalize any third party for dealings with Iran, and which has left Tehran unable to access billions frozen around the world. Russia and China will argue that the US left the JCPOA and is in no position to cite it to justify any actions.

What are US intentions?

State Department Spokesman Ned Price has been unenthusiastic when asked about snapback, although his references November to a possible Russian veto were speedily rebutted by Noronha. US officials have referred to various other means of restricting Iran-Russia links, including US sanctions on Iranian defense companies and generals.

Washington may be less concerned over Iranian-made drones – which are useful to Russia but less effective in the conflict than the publicity suggests – than over the possible transfer of missiles. US strategy is to run down Russia’s military capacities.

How is the Ukraine war affecting talks to revive the JCPOA?

One reason for the US not to move snapback may be the logic, inherent in the JCPOA, that the nuclear file should be kept largely separate from other issues. Given JCPOA critics argue such separation is difficult, if not impossible, the Biden administration is saying it can take stringent measures against Iran – over missiles, or treatment of protests – while remaining open to reviving the JCPOA. Only time will tell if they are right.

Eslami referred to a parliament bill passed in December 2020 that required the government to increase high-level enrichment of uranium, demanding that the United States lift all sanctions. Praising the legislation, Eslami said that the decision made possible an unprecedented enrichment capacity.

In November 2020, Iran’s parliament with a hardliner majority - many officers of the Revolutionary Guard - initiated the legislation and passed it in early December, right after newly elected US president Joe Biden signaled his readiness to return the United States to the Obama-era nuclear deal with Iran known as the JCPOA.

His predecessor Donald Trump had abandoned the accord in 2018 calling it a “bad deal” and imposing sanctions on Iran.

In early 2021, the Islamic Republic began enriching uranium to 20-percent and shortly after to 60-percent, a short step from acquiring highly enriched fissile material for a nuclear bomb. According to estimates, it now has enough enriched uranium for one atomic bomb.

Eslami claimed that Iran’s nuclear program has led to production of energy and has saved “a lot of money” and reduced fossil fuel consumption.

His claims, however, are refuted by the fact that only a small fraction of Iran’s electricity is produced by its only reactor at Bushehr, while highly enriched uranium is not needed for nuclear power plants, which is not the subject of the dispute with the West.

“We hope the visit of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials to Tehran in the coming days can help resolve issues with the agency,” Mohammad Eslami, head of the Atomic Energy Agency Organization told state television.

Tehran and the IAEA have been increasingly at odds since earlier this year over uranium traces found by the IAEA in 2021 at three sites in Iran not declared as nuclear-related. Iran has argued IAEA questioning over the issue came only after allegations by Israel in 2018 and should be shelved as part of efforts to revive the Iran nuclear agreement, the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action).

“Our interactions with the agency are ongoing and we hope that a step forward will be taken in order to remove the obstacles and ambiguities with the agency,” Eslami said. There was no immediate confirmation from the IAEA over a visit, which would be addition to the agency’s on-going, albeit reduced, activity in Iran.

In November, Iran seemed to have canceled a similar IAEA trip reported to planned by the agency’s director Rafael Mariano Grossi. Eslami said at the time that “no meeting was scheduled.

In remarks to Hamshahri newspaper last week Iran’s nuclear chief said the uranium traces had been discovered at a farm, an abandoned mine and a landfill, and in the last had been found in imported waste. “This does not mean the place of discovery was a nuclear site or that it was an undeclared nuclear activity,” Eslami said.

Iran’s failure to satisfy the IAEA over the traces, which apparently relate to work carried out before 2003, has led the 35-member IAEA board to twice vote through censure motions, in June and November.

In the meantime, popular anti-regime protests in Iran and the government’s deadly use of violence have led to strong Western criticism of Tehran. This came after the JCPOA talks reached an impasse in August, and Western powers have said they are not focused on the nuclear talks at this point.

The protests and increasing international isolation, coupled with a deteriorating economic situation have put renewed pressures on Tehran.

Grossi: ‘An obligation, as simple as that’

In an interview this week with al-Jazeera television, Grossi, the IAEA director-general, insisted that it was “an obligation, as simple as that,” for Iran to satisfy the agency over the uranium traces, regardless of what “political decision-makers” might agree over the JCPOA.

Grossi said that Iran’s nuclear program needed to be assessed overall. “They are moving fast to increase…the enrichment capacity and the accumulation of enriched uranium,” he explained. The IAEA director-general highlighted Iran’s enrichment to 60 percent (as opposed to a 3.67 percent JCPOA cap), its use of more advanced centrifuges barred by the JCPOA, and its stockpiling enriched uranium, including 60-percent-enriched uranium, of which Iran has over 62kg and which is close to 90 percent ‘weapons grade.’

The JCPOA “allowed 5,000 centrifuges, of an older generation, the so-called IR-1s, which were slower,” Grossi said. “Now we are moving into IR-2, IR-4s, IR-6s…thousands of centrifuges…20-22,000 … far above what had been agreed before.”

But Grossi said the technology used was not the “indication of intentions.” Iran had a “right to enrich uranium,” he argued, but also a “responsibility to give assurances, that everything…is clear and there is no diversion [for non-peaceful purposes] …We have to sit down and talk to each other… Nobody is saying that they are making nuclear weapons, but at the same time…the constant accumulation of material at those very high levels requires a very intensive presence of IAEA inspectors. There is a need for transparency.”

Both at the UN Human Rights Council November 24, and in an interview this week with Iran International, United Nations special rapporteur Javaid Rehman had said he sought prosecutions over human rights violations in Iran under principles of universal jurisdiction either in national courts or outside Iran in international courts.

Asked by Iran International reporter Samira Gharaei Tuesday, Price explained steps the US would take over human rights in Iran. Washington, he said, would move a resolution December 14 to expel Iran from the UN Commission on the Status of Women and would continue “imposing costs on those responsible for the brutal crackdown… through multiple rounds of sanctions.” Price linked this to the UN investigation, which showed the “world is watching.”

Price also warned Iran over issuing death sentences for protesters. “Unfortunately, this is just really the latest tactic that we’ve seen from the Iranian regime…[against] individuals who are exercising their universal rights. These sentences, we know, are meant to intimidate people, to suppress dissent. They are – they simply underscore Iran’s leadership’s fears of its own people and the fact that Iran’s government fears the truth,” stated Price.

Asked if the United States would support a demand by protesters for “regime change” Price replied, “We support the ability of the Iranian people to exercise their rights, to demand what it is that they seek. These are questions that are up to the Iranian people.”

Asked about returning Iran’s nuclear program to the restrictions of the 2015 nuclear agreement, the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action), Price repeated that “talks are not on the agenda right now” as the US “focused on…ways to support the protestors across Iran.”

Diplomacy, arming ‘partners’

Nonetheless, diplomacy was the best way to ensure “Iran will be permanently and verifiably barred once again from obtaining a nuclear weapon,” Price said. This had been the case, he noted, before the administration of President Donald Trump in 2018 withdrew the US from the JCPOA and imposed draconian sanctions against Iran, prompting Tehran by 2019 to begin exceeding the JCPOA nuclear limits.

Price said that Tehran would gain no leverage in talks by further expanding the nuclear program or by not satisfying the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) “safeguards investigation,” a reference to the agency’s probe into uranium traces found at ‘non-nuclear’ sites.

Such actions would, the spokesman said, lead rather to “additional costs” on Iran. Price noted that the US had “worked very closely with partners in the region, partners beyond, regarding the challenge that’s presented by Iran’s nuclear program.”

Speaking to Iran International correspondent Arash Aalaei, US Republican Party Senator Josh Hawley, a close ally of Trump, said the Biden administration had made a mistake by negotiating with Iran and treating it as “a legitimate state.” Hawley called for “arming…partners and allies in the region…” This, he said, would “send the message of support to Iranian protesters and the folks who’re trying to stand up for some sense of liberty there.”

The Trump administration agreed over $400 billion in arms sales over ten years to Saudi Arabia, which is expected this week to sign weapons deals worth $30 billion with a Chinese delegation led by President Xi Jinping. Riyadh has already deployed Chinese ballistic missiles.

After a statement by Secretary of State Antony Blinken that the US intends to continue nuclear talks with Iran, the Republican Senator said, “The Biden admin made a mistake by saying we'll get back to negotiation with Iran and will treat you as a legitimate state. They're not, and we should make that clear.”

After popular nationwide protests broke out in Iran in mid-September, the Biden administration has repeatedly said that Washington’s focus is on solidarity with the protesters and not the nuclear talks that came to an impasse in August.

But the administration has not announced a formal end to the talks and Blinken recently reiterated that the US is still counting on diplomacy with Iran to revive the 2015 nuclear accord known as JCPOA.

“The US should be doing nothing to lend aid to the Iranian regime, and we should be doing all we can to express our solidarity with protesters and saying to the world that the US is not going to help this regime get stronger,” Hawley said.

He added that the intentions of the Iranian regime’s “interests and ambitions in that region are malign, and we ought to be saying that. One of the clearest ways to say that would be to say we're not going to negotiate with them.”