Trump says Iran likely behind Saudi pipeline attack

The heights, overlooking the city of Nabatieh in southern Lebanon and long regarded as a strategic Hezbollah position, came under heavy Israeli attack this week. On Thursday night, explosions destroyed underground facilities that the Israeli military said included command centers and weapons tunnels running more than two kilometers.

Within hours the loss had become an Iranian domestic argument. Hardliners contend that Israel could not have taken the heights had Tehran not tied its own hands by signing the agreement with the United States on June 28.

The clause that was a victory

That agreement, reached in Islamabad, opened with a commitment by both sides to halt military operations immediately and permanently on all fronts, Lebanon included, and referred explicitly to Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Iran said afterwards that any continued Israeli operations in Lebanon would violate the understanding and would be answered.

Israel resumed bombing Lebanon less than a day after the signing. Iran briefly suspended the follow-on talks in Switzerland and briefly closed the Strait of Hormuz. It did not respond militarily in Lebanon.

Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf, the parliament speaker and Iran's chief negotiator in Islamabad, has since repeatedly described the inclusion of Lebanon in the agreement as a victory for Tehran. It is that claim, set against the smoke over Ali al-Taher, that his critics are now holding up.

'Political score-settling'

The reformist daily Shargh, in a report on Wednesday headlined "Polarization under the code name Ali al-Taher," warned that the Israeli attacks were being used for "political score-settling at home."

"The latest Israeli attacks on southern Lebanon and the dispute over the Ali al-Taher heights, instead of being judged solely by the realities on the ground, have once again created the conditions for polarization and attacks on the negotiators and the June 28 Iran-US understanding," the paper wrote.

Shargh said some critics were charging that the negotiators had, through the agreement's first clause, effectively "sold" Hezbollah, or at least abandoned effective support for it. The charge bites because Iranian officials had presented that very clause as the mechanism for protecting the Lebanese front.

Ghalibaf the target

On social media the confrontation has been rawer, and Ghalibaf is its main object.

"What greater betrayal could Ghalibaf have committed to deserve prosecution?" one account wrote, adding that Yemen's Houthis were fortunate not to have placed themselves under his control, "otherwise Yemen's fate would have been no better than southern Lebanon."

Another laid out the hardline case in full: "The day after the ceasefire, 300 points in Lebanon were bombed in 10 minutes. You prevented a response under the pretext of negotiations. You repeatedly prevented a deterrent attack and failed to maintain the continuity and coordination of the various resistance fronts. The responsibility is yours."

Another user accused Iranian officials of allowing the agreement to prevent a military response: “Is there any reason for Iran’s failure to launch a major response against Israel at the last moment other than the insistence of officials on adhering to that worthless, ridiculous piece of paper and keeping it from falling apart? If there is another reason, tell us so we can know too.”

The defense, and what it concedes

Ghalibaf's camp has answered that a dead agreement cannot be blamed for a live war.

"For nearly 60 days, the agreement that imposed restrictions has not been implemented," Mohammad-Saeed Ahadian, a journalist and political aide to the Ghalibaf, wrote on X.

"During this period, some people have offered nothing but vague and imaginary solutions, yet they say the agreement, which they claim is dead, is responsible for the fall of Ali al-Taher. Enough of this destructive game of domestic politics."

Another defender, Vahid Hajipour, argued the fall was a consequence of the agreement's collapse, not its terms: "Now go ahead and insult Ghalibaf again. With this, you are making Netanyahu even happier."

The defense carries its own admission. The clause Ghalibaf called a victory has, by his own aide's account, not been in force for two months. The argument in Tehran is therefore not whether the Lebanon provision protected Hezbollah, since neither side now claims it did, but who should answer for the fact that it did not.

"To the great, proud people of Iran, the hour of your freedom is at hand," Trump says in a video posted on X, drawing on remarks he first delivered on February 28, the day the US campaign began. "When we are finished, take over your government. It will be yours to take."

Six months ago, that was an extraordinary signal from an American president at the opening of a war with the Islamic Republic. This time there was no accompanying policy, no explanation of what "when we are finished" means, and no sign that Washington is preparing to help Iranians seize anything.

"I don't think the Iranian regime is going to care," Eric Mandel, founder of the Middle East Political Information Network, told Iran International's Eye for Iran podcast, whose conversation with him forms the basis of this analysis. "I think they've heard these messages before."

A war shaped by a calendar

Trump said this week that Iran was "limping along" and predicted the conflict would end "immediately after" November's midterm elections. He also acknowledged, in the same week, that electoral considerations may be influencing decisions about whether to escalate military action against Iran.

That is an American president saying, in public, that the pace of a war is being set partly by a domestic election.

His own senior advisers appear to be planning for something very different. Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and others have privately discussed the possibility that Tehran could withstand US pressure and that the conflict could run through the end of Trump's presidency in January 2029, according to the Wall Street Journal.

So the same week produced three incompatible timelines: freedom "at hand," an end "immediately after" the midterms, and a war that may outlast the administration. If Trump is again telling Iranians their government will soon be theirs to take, what has changed since he first said it? Mandel's answer was blunt: "I haven't heard a new policy."

The gap between the promise and the means

For Mandel, the problem is not the stated objective but the distance between the promise and any way of achieving it.

"They can't ask the Iranian people to go out again into the streets and be slaughtered," he said. The last time people came out in their millions, in January, security forces killed tens of thousands in two days.

If Washington genuinely wants the Islamic Republic to fall, Mandel argued, it would have to go far beyond encouragement: bring together Iran's fragmented opposition, finance strike funds so workers can stay home rather than face security forces in the street, tighten secondary sanctions on the countries helping Tehran evade pressure, and give material support to parts of the opposition.

"The Iranian people can't take over if they're unarmed and they are not having coordination," he said. "If we're saying to the Iranian people to take over at that point, that just doesn't make any sense to me."

The operation that lost its name

Trump's original February message came as the White House described Operation Epic Fury as an effort to destroy Iran's nuclear and missile capabilities, degrade its proxy network and cripple its navy, and tied the campaign to decades of confrontation between the two countries.

Even the name has since receded. The Pentagon said Epic Fury officially ended on May 5, and military personnel were later told to stop using it for the continuing operations against Iran. The war did not end with the name.

Nearly seven months on, oil is back above $100 a barrel, the political cost of the conflict is increasingly visible ahead of the midterms, and Trump's advisers are contemplating a far longer confrontation than the president publicly predicts. That is what makes the decision to resurrect the February message striking, and it raises the question Mandel kept returning to: who was it for?

Not Tehran, he thought, which he described as in "survival mode" and betting it can outlast the administration. Not a weary American public either. "If it is for the American people, to my mind, it's the wrong way to present this," he said.

Trump would need to explain why bringing down the Islamic Republic serves US security and why Americans should prepare for a long campaign, and he has not.

Without that, ever more dramatic language loses its force. "To the regime, it's like the boy who cried wolf," Mandel said. "He keeps saying this every month."

The video appeared deliberately produced, he noted, which makes it hard to dismiss as an impulsive post. But he could not say what new message it carried. "I don't get the message yet of what it is."

That may be why an extraordinary sentence received such an ordinary response. A US president once again told more than 90 million Iranians that their government may soon be theirs to take. What remains unclear is whether Washington was announcing an objective, offering encouragement, applying pressure, or repeating a promise the world has heard before.

The clashes began around a residential property in the Bakhshan area before dawn and were still continuing nearly eight hours later, extending to the vicinity of the Madani Grand Mosque and parts of Jahadabad, according to the group’s updates.

Local sources cited by Haalvsh said gunmen attacked at least three vehicles carrying military and security personnel, as well as two locations where forces had gathered. The reported casualty figures have not been independently confirmed.

Sources described sustained gunfire, repeated explosions and the use of heavy weapons, with fighting resuming after brief pauses. Haalvsh said it had not independently established the precise locations of all the exchanges.

• 

  Iran's forces beat Baluch women protesting over mines and local resources

• 

  Armed group claims deadly attack on Guards members in southeast Iran

Several ambulances were reportedly stationed nearby. Local sources said wounded personnel and bodies had been removed by other security forces, with some transported by ambulance to medical facilities. The identities and exact number of those killed or wounded remained unknown.

Roads blocked around residential area

Security forces blocked streets and access routes around the Madani Grand Mosque, roughly 200 meters from the house targeted in the initial operation, local sources said. A substantial deployment remained in the area, restricting movement around the fighting.

Gunmen inside the house exchanged fire with security personnel, some of whom were wearing traditional Baluch clothing, according to the sources. The property was described as belonging to a local resident, but the reports did not establish his connection, if any, to the gunmen.

Haalvsh reported civilians close to some of the clashes. Their situation remained unclear as fighting continued and roads were blocked, with no confirmed information on civilian casualties.

The gunmen’s identities and affiliations, the reason for the initial operation and any casualties among the armed group were also unknown. Military and security authorities had not issued an official account by the time of its latest update.

Saravan is in Sistan and Baluchestan, a southeastern province bordering Pakistan and Afghanistan and home to Iran’s mainly Sunni Muslim Baluch minority. The province has a long history of armed insurgency, although the reports provided no established link between Saturday’s gunmen and any known group.

Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Ministry said several drones launched from Iraqi territory targeted the pipeline in the Riyadh and Medina regions, causing injuries and damage.

Riyadh said it had given the Iraqi government an opportunity to take sufficient measures to prevent attacks launched from its territory and had exercised restraint while Baghdad acted. It added that the kingdom reserved the right to take all necessary steps to protect its sovereignty, security and critical infrastructure.

Iraq welcomed Saudi Arabia’s decision to hold off on retaliation and condemned any attack threatening the kingdom’s security. Prime Minister Ali Falih al-Zaidi ordered an investigation into those responsible, according to a statement from the Iraqi armed forces.
Baghdad later dismissed a military commander responsible for operations in southern Maysan province after investigations confirmed that the latest drone attacks on Saudi Arabia originated from Iraq. Iraq also ordered the closure of the Shalamcheh border crossing with Iran as a precautionary measure, while security forces launched a wide-scale operation to pursue those responsible.

Saudi Arabia has not publicly identified the group behind the attack, but the incident adds to concerns over Iran-backed Shiite militias operating in Iraq and their potential role in a broader network of pressure on Iran’s regional adversaries.

Iran-aligned Iraqi factions have developed increasingly sophisticated drone and missile capabilities, while several maintain close ties with Tehran and other members of its regional network.

Houthis tighten grip on Yemen’s Red Sea coast

The pipeline strike comes as the Houthis have made major territorial gains in Yemen, expanding their control along the Red Sea coast and strengthening their position around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, another of the Middle East’s most important shipping chokepoints.

The advance gives the Iran-backed group control over virtually all of Yemen’s Red Sea coastline, increasing its ability to threaten shipping and infrastructure along a route that has become even more important amid disruption in the Strait of Hormuz.

That poses a particular concern for Saudi Arabia.

The kingdom’s East-West pipeline carries crude from oilfields in the east to the Red Sea port of Yanbu, allowing Saudi exports to bypass the Strait of Hormuz. Any sustained threat to the pipeline or the Red Sea route could therefore squeeze Riyadh from both sides.

The Gulf Cooperation Council condemned the pipeline attack as a dangerous escalation and urged Baghdad to take “necessary, decisive measures” to prevent Iraqi territory from being used as a launchpad for further attacks. Qatar separately condemned the strike and expressed full solidarity with Saudi Arabia.

The developments come just days before foreign ministers from Iran, Iraq and Persian Gulf Arab states are expected to gather in Oman for talks focused partly on regional security and navigation through the Strait of Hormuz.

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei said Iran and Oman would brief the participants on their discussions over mechanisms for safe passage through the strait.

He said the goal was to establish regional arrangements that would safeguard the shared security and interests of neighboring states without the involvement of outside powers.

Baghaei also portrayed the willingness of Arab governments to attend the meeting despite months of Iranian strikes and regional escalation as evidence that Tehran’s military power had strengthened its diplomatic position.

He said Iranian diplomacy, backed by military strength, had persuaded neighboring states that the solution to regional security was to sit down with Tehran rather than rely on foreign powers.

The meeting comes as the Trump administration is providing Saudi Arabia with intelligence and targeting assistance but has no current plans to launch direct US strikes against the Houthis, ABC News reported. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman sought direct US military intervention in calls with Trump, according to the report, while Riyadh has signaled it could undertake a major operation on its own.

It remains unclear whether Monday’s Oman talks will stay focused on the Strait of Hormuz or also take in the Houthis, Bab el-Mandeb and attacks from Iraq.

On Thursday, Israel said it destroyed a major underground Hezbollah complex, adding to pressure on one of Iran’s most important regional allies, which has been severely weakened over the past two years.

Ultraconservative MP Mohammad-Taghi Naqd-Ali blamed what he called Iran’s “non-confrontational stance,” arguing that Tehran’s failure to respond more forcefully to Israeli threats had placed southern Lebanon and Hezbollah “in serious danger.”

“We must carry out a preemptive strike,” he said.

His warning reflects a broader argument among Iranian politicians and media over whether restraint reduces the risk of a wider war or instead encourages Iran’s adversaries to escalate.

The debate encompasses Tehran’s support for regional allies, its confrontation with the United States and, increasingly, its nuclear policy.

Hassan Ghashqavi, spokesperson for parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, said on Thursday that “until Iran reaches complete and total deterrence, the probability of an attack exists at every single moment.”

The same argument has surfaced in the nuclear debate, where hardline lawmakers and commentators have called for suspending cooperation with the IAEA or even withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

‘Meydan’ vs diplomacy

The dispute echoes an older fault line in Iranian politics between meydan — literally “the field,” shorthand for military power and Iran’s regional armed network — and diplomacy.

The distinction became particularly contentious during Hassan Rouhani’s presidency, when then-Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif publicly complained about diplomacy being subordinated to military priorities.

President Masoud Pezeshkian’s government has not renounced Iran’s regional alliances, and some of the sharpest disputes over military strategy now take place within the conservative establishment itself.

But the underlying argument has resurfaced: whether Iran is safer when diplomacy is accompanied by restraint, or when its adversaries believe Tehran is prepared to escalate.

The disagreement has become more consequential as Iran faces the combined pressures of war, sanctions and a weakened network of regional allies.

The Houthi example

Unlike Hezbollah, which has suffered heavy losses in its conflict with Israel, the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen have continued to expand their military campaign and made new territorial gains in recent days around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.

The Houthis could nevertheless bolster the hardline argument that an allied force can continue imposing costs on its adversaries rather than pulling back under military pressure.

But the comparison also exposes the risks facing Tehran. Greater Iranian identification with Houthi attacks on shipping could deepen its confrontation with the United States and regional powers at a time when Iran is already under intense military and economic pressure.

That tension goes to the heart of the disagreement over Iran’s regional network.

Hardliners have traditionally regarded Hezbollah and other allied armed groups as an outer defensive perimeter, allowing Tehran to deter or confront adversaries before threats reach Iranian territory. From that perspective, the weakening of those groups does not make disengagement more attractive but makes restoring their deterrent power more urgent.

The counterargument is that Iran’s own economic vulnerability and the danger of further regional escalation require greater restraint.

The argument has acquired greater urgency as Hezbollah comes under renewed Israeli attack while Iran itself faces direct confrontation with the United States.