At the peak of the Reform Movement in the late 1990s, when Iranian president Mohammad Khatami promoted political openness and civil society, hardliners labeled him Iran’s Gorbachev.
Hardliners like Hossein Shariatmadari and Hassan Abbasi used the title to demonize him, while opposition groups clung to the hope that he might accelerate the regime's collapse—a feat they themselves had been unable to achieve.
In reality, neither Khatami nor his inner circle accepted such a role. They repeatedly stressed that their reforms were intended to strengthen the system, not dismantle it. The structure of power at the time also made a true "Gorbachev moment" nearly impossible.
Now-slain Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei controlled the pace of reform, restraining both reformists and hardliners and preventing the political system from tipping into crisis.
Iranian society in the late 1990s was also not prepared for a total rupture with the state. A significant portion of the population still believed reform was possible. The generation shaped by the 1979 revolution remained politically active and hopeful.
Three decades later, the situation appears markedly different. A new generation, deeply disillusioned with the system, appears to settle for nothing less than regime change.
Over the past three years the Islamic Republic has endured repeated foreign military strikes. Ali Khamenei, referred to by many officials as the “system,” has been removed from the scene. Mojtaba, his son, lacks the authority that allowed his father to hold competing factions together during moments of crisis.
It is in this environment that an individual—or individuals—may unintentionally become "Iran’s Gorbachev." One possible candidate is Mohammad Baqer Ghalibaf.
During the 40-day memorial of Ali Khamenei, Ghalibaf traveled to Islamabad to meet with the Vice President of the country that helped kill the Supreme Leader.
Signs suggest that the remnants of the regime, in a desperate attempt to remain in power, may be prepared to make concessions that strike at the ideological foundations of the Islamic Republic.
US President Donald Trump’s demands—surrendering enriched uranium, permanently ending enrichment, and disarming Hezbollah—strike at core elements of the Islamic Republic’s identity. Accepting them could alienate the ideological base that has long defended the system.
Even without an official agreement, hints of retreat have already triggered anger among loyalist forces. Aggressive reactions from accounts linked to ultrahardline figures, accusing officials of "sedition" and a "coup," suggest tremors within the regime’s core supporters.
When a Jalili-aligned account writes, “If these are the Leader's orders, release a video of him saying so,” it signals how deeply trust in the central authority has eroded.
Another example of frustration within the regime’s ideological base appeared in a tweet warning: “Alas for the public’s rage and disillusionment when they learn what has been agreed upon and what is yet to come.”
During the final years of the USSR, the policies of Glasnost (Openness) and Perestroika (Restructuring) distanced the Soviet system from its founding ideals. When transparency exposed the privileges of party elites, the ideological base lost faith. Many refused to defend the system when it needed them most. The "Evil Empire" collapsed with startling speed.
If those in power in Tehran abandon uranium enrichment and withdraw support from Hezbollah, there is no guarantee that their ideological base will mobilize in their defense—or shoot protesters as they did in January.
Without Ali Khamenei to frame such a retreat as "Heroic Flexibility," Ghalibaf and his allies, in their struggle to preserve the system, could inadvertently become the Gorbachevs of Iran.
