Britain temporarily closes embassy in Tehran - Politico
Britain has temporarily closed its embassy in Tehran and shifted operations to remote working, Politico reported on Wednesday, citing a government spokesperson.
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US President Donald Trump said he's been informed that the killing has stopped in Iran.
"They're not going to have an execution, which a lot of people were talking about for the last couple of days, today was going to be the day of execution," he told reporters.
“We've been told that the killing in Iran is stopping, stopped, and stopping. And there's no plan for executions or an execution or execution. So I've been told that in good authority,” Trump said.
“But that's just gotten to me from information that the killing has stopped, that the executions have stopped,” he added.
Asked whether military action against Iran was now off the table, Trump said: “We’ll watch and see what the process is, but we’ve been given a very good statement by people that are aware of what’s going on.”
G7 nations on Wednesday said they were “gravely concerned” by developments surrounding the ongoing protests in Iran, warning that further sanctions could follow if the authorities continue their violent crackdown.
In a joint statement, the foreign ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States, along with the European Union’s high representative, said they were “deeply alarmed at the high level of reported deaths and injuries” linked to the unrest.
The G7 urged Iranian authorities to “exercise full restraint, refrain from violence, and uphold the human rights and fundamental freedoms of Iran’s citizens.”
“The members of the G7 remain prepared to impose additional restrictive measures if Iran continues to crack down on protests and dissent in violation of international human rights obligations,” the statement said.
A 25 percent tariff on US imports from any country that trades with Iran appears aimed at punishing third countries, but it is likely to hit Tehran far harder.
The proposed secondary tariffs were announced by President Donald Trump earlier this week in response to a violent crackdown on protesters in Iran.
Some commentators have questioned whether such measures could be enforced, pointing to Iran’s trade links with more than 140 countries. Others have focused on China’s open opposition, noting that Beijing is Iran’s largest trading partner.
Yet recent experience suggests that secondary tariffs can be far more damaging to the sanctioned country than to those doing business with it.
What past examples say?
A telling precedent is the United States’ action against India over its imports of Russian oil in late August last year. Although the mechanics differed, the effect became clear within months.
By late 2025, Russian crude was selling at discounts of up to $20 to $30 per barrel compared to discounts of around $3 per barrel in summer and $10 in autumn. Even at a discounted price, Russia’s oil exports to India fell by 29 percent in December compared with the previous month.
The pain, in short, was absorbed primarily by Russia, not India.
US Census Bureau data show that despite the imposition of 25 percent tariffs on Indian goods, India’s exports to the United States did not decline significantly. Cheap Russian oil helped Indian refiners remain competitive.
China’s experience tells a similar story. While Chinese exports to the United States fell by about 20 percent in 2025 under US tariffs, China’s total global exports grew by 5.5 percent. Supported by discounted Russian oil and gas, Beijing posted a record $1.2 trillion trade surplus.
Taken together, these cases suggest that secondary tariffs tend to extract concessions from the sanctioned exporter rather than meaningfully penalizing its trading partners.
How secondary tariffs on Iran would work?
Washington has yet to publish detailed guidance on how the proposed 25 percent tariff would be applied. Still, Trump’s public statements indicate that the measure would not be limited to countries purchasing Iranian crude oil.
As with its oil exports to China, Tehran would likely be forced to lower prices across a wide range of goods so that buyers can offset the cost of tariffs imposed on their exports to the United States.
Even if secondary tariffs were applied only to buyers of Iranian energy and petrochemical products, the impact would be severe.
According to data from the commodity intelligence firm Kpler, seen by Iran International, Iran currently exports around 1.3 million barrels per day of crude oil—almost all to China.
It also exports more than half that volume in refined petroleum products, primarily to the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Iraq, India, and Pakistan.
Annual revenues from liquefied petroleum gas exceed $10 billion, fuel oil generates roughly $7 billion, and gas exports about $5 billion. When petrochemical shipments are included, income from these products roughly matches Iran’s crude oil earnings.
Here, too, vulnerabilities are mounting.
Iran’s 25-year gas supply contract with Turkey is set to expire in five months, with no indication that Ankara intends to renew it. Gas deliveries to Iraq have also been halted because of domestic shortages, prompting Baghdad to seek alternative suppliers.
Tehran shouldering the costs
The United Arab Emirates—the largest buyer of Iranian fuel oil and a major importer of Iranian LPG—maintains extensive economic ties with the United States, making it unlikely to risk exposure to secondary tariffs.
Other Asian buyers, including India, Singapore, Malaysia, and Pakistan, import Iranian products in volumes too small to justify jeopardizing access to the US market.
The most likely outcome is that Iran will once again be pushed to rely overwhelmingly on China, offering steep discounts to preserve market share.
If implemented, secondary tariffs would not isolate Iran’s trading partners so much as narrow Iran’s options, deepen its dependence on a single buyer, and erode its earnings at a moment of acute domestic and fiscal strain.
In that sense, the policy may prove more damaging than conventional sanctions—by forcing Iran itself to absorb the cost of maintaining its already limited presence in the global economy.
The United States and its regional partners have established a new air and missile defense coordination cell at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar to strengthen integrated defenses across the Middle East, US Central Command said on Wednesday.
The Middle Eastern Air Defense – Combined Defense Operations Cell is based within the Combined Air Operations Center at Al Udeid and is staffed by US personnel and regional partners.
“This is a significant step forward in strengthening regional defense cooperation,” CENTCOM commander Navy Admiral Brad Cooper said, adding that the new cell would improve coordination and information-sharing on air and missile defense responsibilities.
Ali Shamkhani, an adviser to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, warned on Wednesday that Iran would respond to any attack, referring to a past Iranian missile attack on the US Al Udeid base in Qatar.
"The President of America, who repeatedly mentions the futile aggression against Iran's nuclear centers, would do better to also refer to the plowing of the American Al Udeid base by Iranian missiles," Shamkhani wrote on X.
Al Udeid is the largest US military base in the Middle East, hosting around 10,000 troops. Iran fired missiles toward the base in June after US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, causing limited damage.
Reuters reported earlier on Wednesday that the United States was withdrawing some personnel from major military bases in the Middle East as a precaution amid heightened regional tensions.
